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Abstract 
Musical improvisation, spontaneous and creative play with musical materials, offers 
opportunities to understand aspects of creative cognition and of the human condition in 
navigating an unpredictable world. This research investigated the role of auditory imagery, 
the imagination of the sound of the music, in improvisation. Two complementary approaches 
were adopted. The first addressed improvisers’ experience with a focus on the role of auditory 
imagery and its relationship to their views on improvisation, mind and body, using qualitative 
interview and survey methods. Two studies were carried out with findings that suggest that 
anticipatory auditory imagery is regarded as an essential element which validates 
improvisation as a creative practice. The second approach investigated the embodied aspect 
of anticipatory imagery in an experimental setting. A new guitar-based altered auditory 
feedback paradigm was developed to find out about the effects of the familiarity of hand 
shape on judgements of sonic congruence. These new findings suggest that judgements of 
how a guitar chord will sound partly depend on the familiarity of the hand shape used to play 
them. The implications of these findings for the role of auditory imagery in improvisation were 
considered in the context of tensions between the ethnographic and scientific perspectives. 
This thesis concludes by advocating a rejection of Cartesian dualist conceptions of creativity 
in favour of an embodied ecological account which can reconcile the findings of cognitive 
science with improvisers’ experience and valuing of what they do. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Among improvising musicians there is endless speculation about its nature but only an 
academic would have the temerity to mount a theory of improvisation. (Bailey, 1993, p. 
3) 
 
1.1 Context 
Improvisation is an essential element in all our lives and so pervasive that perhaps we do not 
give it the attention it deserves. Our lives would be very different if we were restricted to sets 
of scripted behaviours triggered by the situations we encounter. It only takes a moment’s 
thought on the current state of artificial intelligence to realise that the normal everyday 
adaptions that we make in context do not reflect a trivial ability, even if we take them for 
granted. Driving home, cooking a meal, having a conversation; it might be possible to do these 
things automatically sometimes, but what if there is a diversion, a missing ingredient, or a 
remark that forces us to radically rethink? This kind of focus on freedom within constraint 
prompted the philosopher Gilbert Ryle to characterise improvisation thus: “If he is not at once 
improvising and improvising warily, he is not engaging his somewhat trained wits in some 
momentarily live issue, but perhaps acting from sheer unthinking habit” (Ryle, 1976, p. 77). 
Ubiquitous though improvisation might be, its essentially variable nature makes it an elusive 
target for empirical study.  
 
Music is a favourable domain for the study of improvisation from a cognitive-scientific 
perspective because it involves so many cognitive processes of interest simultaneously 
(Brown, Zatorre, & Penhune, 2015) and produces a rich data source for analysis: music. The 
attitude towards improvisation from within the music community, and from critics and 
philosophers has been mixed. This word improvisation itself might be partly to blame, with 
its connotations of acting without preparation. The etymology, from the Latin improvisus 
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indicates that a better foundation for the concept of improvisation is the notion of the   
unforeseen.  It is possible to prepare for the unforeseen, as evidenced by the thousands of 
hours spent by jazz musicians in the practice room (Berliner, 1994). The intimation of paradox 
in the balance between freedom and constraint, or habit and novelty has prompted 
detractors from different perspectives. John Cage resisted improvisation in his music because 
he thought that performers, given the opportunity to improvise, resorted to memory or habit 
(Lewis, 1996). Boulez, on the other hand considered that the problem with improvisation is 
insufficient memory in performers’ habits to permit them to produce the requisite complexity 
for creative spontaneity (Peters, 2009). The German philosopher and composer Adorno’s 
writings on jazz have been criticised as prejudiced and dogmatic but some authors (Paddison, 
1982; Peters, 2009; Witkin, 2000) have argued that his critiques should not be simply 
dismissed.  One of Adorno’s criticisms of jazz is that the limited possibilities inherent in 
circumscribing harmonic structures results in “pseudo-individualisation” (Adorno, Leppert, & 
Gillespie, 2002, p. 445). It is this context which motivates George Lewis to quote from the 
same article by Ryle and point out that it is those who do not improvise who act from 
unthinking habit (Lewis, 2009). 
 
1.2 Two Cultures 
With a nod to C. P. Snow, the cognitive-scientific perspective describes improvisation in terms 
of working memory, motor control, auditory perception, and hierarchical processes. This 
involves a high degree of automaticity at lower levels, such as individual note selection 
(Ashley, 2016; Beaty, 2015; Bengtsson, Csíkszentmihályi, & Ullén, 2007; Berkowitz & Ansari, 
2008; Brown et al., 2015; Pressing, 1988). Creativity is computable (Johnson-Laird, 2002) and 
its neural underpinnings involve a balance between cognitive control and mind wandering 
mechanisms in the brain (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016). An implied philosophical 
stance is materialist and reductionist. Improvisation is amenable to a mechanistic explanation 
whereby the task of improvising is specified, and the necessary cognitive processes are 
decomposed into simpler elements. In principle, the neural correlates of these can be 
described as processes in a physical system: the brain. This is by no means the only possible 
interpretation but is set forward as the thesis to the antithesis of the following section.  
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The view from musical culture is rather different. Unlike some of the critics mentioned above, 
there are those who value improvisation as a creative activity a great deal, occasionally even 
imputing mystical properties: 
 
If one of my friends is ill, I’d like to play a certain song and he will be cured; when he’d 
be broke, I’d bring out a different song and immediately he’d receive all the money he 
needed…The true powers of music are still unknown. To be able to control them must 
be, I believe, the goal of every musician. (Porter 1998 p 211) 
 
The path to the Romantic conception of the improvising musician as free autonomous 
creative agent is traceable through the history of philosophy and aesthetics. Plato famously 
distrusted music “…for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole state” (Plato, 428-
328 BCE/2018, Republic, Book IV). Through his characters, Plato clearly recognises the value 
and potential power of music, for this reason it is dangerous if not properly regulated. 
Although it could be argued that Plato’s conception of the appropriate role of music is as 
accompaniment to dance and song (Laws, Book II), Plato’s metaphysics introduces dualism at 
the heart of philosophy. The concept of the timeless immaterial realm of Platonic forms, 
through the influence of Kant’s notion of genius, all paved the way for German Romantic 
thought (Warren, 2009) and the idea of absolute music (Dahlhaus, 1991). The term absolute 
music is attributed to Richard Wagner, but its original meaning was more in line with Plato’s 
notion that mere instrumental music is lacking, as music needs words to be intelligible. It is 
only gradually that German Romantic philosophy transformed the concept into a reversal of 
this original meaning, so that absolute music came to refer to instrumental music as the 
purest form (Dahlhaus, 1991). The idea of absolute music allows the development of the 
Werktreue concept in classical music, whereby performers must try to be true to the musical 
work, which is seen as the singular creation of a composer (Benson, 2003). I am here adopting 
the convention of classical with a small ‘c’ to refer to serious art music in general, as Benson 
does. These ideas are the recent antecedents of the apotheosis of improvisation in jazz, in 
that they promoted an idealised conception of composition as accessing ideal objects via the 
imagination. Improvisers co-opted this view of composition and reframed it as a real-time 
activity of composing during performance just as, ironically, the concept of Werktreue also 
contributed to the decline of improvisational practice in classical music itself (Berkowitz, 
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2010). This modern ideal of improvisation promoted in the ethnographic and pedagogical 
literature therefore emphasises pre-hearing in the mind’s ear what the improviser will play 
to the extent of validating improvisation as a creative practice (Berliner, 1994; Coker, Casale, 
Campbell, & Greene, 1970).  
 
1.3 A Third Culture: The Willing of a Future Past 
 
Non-idiomatic improvisation, sometimes perhaps inappropriately labelled ‘free 
improvisation’, is informed by critical theory and Continental philosophy in dealing with the 
aporias of improvisation and how these relate to some of its discourses and practices. The 
phrase “willed future past” as used by Peters (2009, p. 5) captures two important features of 
improvisation: its temporal nature, and the role of agency. If what separates improvisation 
from other music-making is its degree of underdetermination by any pre-existing artefact or 
memory trace, this leaves the improviser free to mark the unmarked space in such a way that 
it becomes a past that is worthy of eternal recurrence. This is a Nietzschean concept which 
expresses a choice to embrace the possibility that our lives could recur in exactly the same 
way innumerable times (Kain, 2007), and thereby free ourselves from subjugation to 
meaningless suffering. In the context of non-idiomatic improvisation, there is a sense in which 
the freedom from a score and from conventional form brings a risk of arbitrariness. How to 
begin? Why this musical gesture now? Because I will it to be this way, and in so willing I 
embrace the possibility that in the future, this will be a past that is worthy of recurring 
infinitely many times in exactly the same way. 
 
It could be argued that non-idiomatic improvisation is no freer from form or convention than 
other forms of improvisation (Peters, 2009), it merely has a different set of conventions. 
Further, underdetermination is not as rigorous a criterion to distinguish between improvised 
and non-improvised forms as it might seem. The reason is that the criterion fails to distinguish 
between expressive/interpretive variation of pre-existing composition and improvisation 
unless one arbitrarily selects the criteria that specify which attributes of the music to be 
considered. For example, if our focus is on melodic variation, we can ask what is the 
probability that the note in position n in a series will be x (after post hoc trimming of trills), 
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with the idea that in a recital this will be determined by the score, whereas in improvisation 
it is not. This merely begs the question however, since if the focus were inter-onset intervals 
then a recitation with spontaneous rubato would be underdetermined in comparison to a 
relatively isochronous melodic improvisation. A counter to these arguments is that as with 
any fixed points on continua, there may be no principled line to draw that distinguishes one 
category from another, but on the continuum from black to white, we can distinguish most 
of the lights from darks to fit the purposes at hand. In other words, it will all come out in the 
wash, in that behaviours that people pick out as improvisatory can be studied in terms of 
differences in what people do compared to other musical activities, and the same is true for 
the distinction between idiomatic and non-idiomatic improvising. Non-idiomatic 
improvisation aspires to radical freedom from conventions, form and pre-composed musical 
materials and attempts to situate its practice at the unconstrained end of the continuum to 
which improvisation belongs. This position characterises its relation to the paradoxes of 
improvisation: how do we exercise freedom within constraint, and how do we construe 
improvisation as creative behaviour by a conscious agent when so much expert behaviour in 
this domain seems to be characterised by unconscious automatic processes which deploy and 
adapt pre-existing musical materials and formulae?  
 
Returning to Adorno’s particularly scathing criticism of idiomatic improvisation such as is 
found in mainstream jazz, his point is that rather than enacting a dialectic between structure 
and freedom, jazz improvisation merely plays with surface detail. Purporting to be an 
exemplar of freedom, the concatenation of formulae circumscribed by a rigid harmonic 
structure fails in its own terms: 
 
Hence, very few possibilities for actual improvisation remain, due to the necessity of 
merely melodically circumscribing the same underlying harmonic functions. Since 
these possibilities were very quickly exhausted, stereotyping of improvisatory details 
speedily occurred. Thus, standardization of the norm enhances in a purely technical 
way standardization of its own deviation—pseudo-individualization. (Adorno et al., 
2002, p. 445) 
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Adorno has sometimes been dismissed as not understanding jazz or being out of date 
(Paddison, 1982), and certainly a rebuttal is available in terms of the vast possibilities inherent 
within processes based on finite combinatorics. To see that this is so, one need only consider 
the possible number of chess games (Shannon, 1950). It might be thought that in any case, 
non-idiomatic, or so-called ‘free’ improvisation escapes these criticisms by eschewing tonality 
and harmonic or metrical structures. However, this leaves the deeper philosophical problems 
relating to freedom and agency. Derrida understands this: “And so I believe in improvisation, 
and I fight for improvisation, but with the belief that it is impossible.” (Dick & Ziering, 2002). 
What is relevant here in Derrida’s thought is that our experience in time is always conditioned 
by the tension between the irreplaceable singularity and the machine-like iterability of an 
event (Derrida, 1988). Peters characterises the dilemma for improvisers in terms of the 
difference between Levinas’s il y a ‘there is’ and the Heideggerian es gibt ‘it gives’. Peters’ 
concept of the willing of a future past invokes the Nietzschean notions of eternal recurrence 
and the will-to-power in order to argue that true improvisation involves the giving of the 
‘there’, again and again as if anew. The improviser nimbly and with a sense of irony navigates 
the formula-space to deploy what is required in the moment (however replete with 
protensive and retensive folds one construes the ‘moment’ to be). With irony because 
knowing the arbitrary component in the marking of an unmarked space ‘why that mark now?’, 
the improviser does it anyway. This is reminiscent of an argument advanced by the 
philosopher Thomas Nagel regarding the absurdity of existence. He characterises Camus’ 
response to absurdity in The Myth of Sisyphus as finding a nobility in the defiance and scorn 
of absurdity. Nagel’s point is that to shake one’s fist in the face of absurdity in this way is to 
take the matter too seriously. If the human condition is absurd in part because we realise that 
nothing matters, then this ought not to matter either and irony is a more fitting response than 
defiance (Nagel, 1971).  Irony might also be a better response to the potential absurdity of 
arbitrariness in improvisation than an appeal to eternal recurrence. Whether one construes 
eternal recurrence in an ‘as if’ way, or whether considerations of cosmology and transfinite 
arithmetic lead us to take the doctrine literally, it is difficult to see how this can impinge on 
our assessment of an improvisation’s value now. As Nagel points out: 
 
It is often remarked that nothing we do now will matter in a million years. But if that 
is true, then by the same token, nothing that will be the case in a million years matters 
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now. In particular, it does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now 
will matter. (Nagel, 1971, p. 716)  
 
This recoil argument counts against an appeal to eternal recurrence by undermining the 
intuitive appeal of grounding value relative to the evaluative context of a future time, even if 
this is a future recurrence repeated ad infinitum. The other important part of Peters’ phrase 
invokes the will, and that improvisation is free will embodied in a creative act is part of the 
legitimizing discourse that surrounds improvisation as a social practice (Peters, 2009; Warren, 
2009). Creativity itself is thought of as linked with the imagination, which operates in a non-
deterministic, non-materialist realm (Kant, 1790/1914). This way of thinking, compatible with 
Cartesian dualism gives rise to an idealised model of improvisation which will be introduced 
in Chapter 2. The sense of agency which gives an attribution of authorship to the creative act, 
predicated as it is on free will and access to knowledge of our own cognitive processes, 
particularly their temporal order and causal status, is problematic. There are also 
philosophical difficulties with the Cartesian model of improvisation, including the interaction 
problem that besets substance dualism (Lycan, 2013). This arises because it is not at all clear 
how a non-material substance could causally affect matter, or vice versa, since causality itself 
is a property of the material realm. Without a bidirectional causal relation, interaction as 
normally understood is not possible, hence any access to non-material ideal musical objects 
would be unable to have a causal role in their being played via a material body. On the other 
hand, if the Cartesian model is abandoned in favour of a materialist account, there is still of 
course the small matter of whether free will is compatible with determinism. These issues will 
be discussed further in Chapter 6. This thesis argues that an inter-disciplinary debate between 
philosophy and cognitive science would be useful for practitioners and educators of 
improvisation, so that we can better understand what improvisers are doing and how that 
might relate to philosophical questions about the nature and value of creativity. The 
perspective of cognitive science, in thinking of improvisation as a set of behaviours which 
access and deploy musical knowledge in different ways to non-improvisatory behaviours 
(Goldman, 2013), is amenable to experimental investigation of these phenomena that can 
inform the debate going forward. These considerations are what prompted this research 
programme. 
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1.4 Background 
I have been a jazz guitarist, improviser and music educator for almost three decades and I 
have encountered the ideal of pre-hearing within the improvising community many times. My 
interest in philosophy and psychology led me to want to investigate the role of auditory 
imagery in improvisation and to start with the question, is imagery as reliable as it seems? 
This was prompted in part by an example from the visual imagery domain, following from 
experiments on mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). The simple block objects used in 
these experiments seemed to me to be easy to imagine and rotate in my ‘mind’s eye’ but 
Dennett’s (1991) example of an object neatly illustrates that a seemingly vivid and 
controllable image can break down when interrogated in a certain way (Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1. Above, a simple block object like the ones used in mental rotation experiments. 
Imagine it is made of 1cm cubes and you can look through the hole in the front surface. How 
much if any of the red cross is visible? How did you solve the task (Dennett, 1991)? 
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When asked if the cross is visible, people use techniques comparable to imagining ray 
diagrams rather than simply rotating the mental image and looking through the hole with 
their mind’s eye (Dennett, 1993). This implies that our intuitions about our own imagery 
abilities could be mistaken (for further examples, see Pylyshyn, 2003). There are analogous 
findings that cast doubt on other cornerstones of Romantic conceptions of improvisation, 
such as our notions of autonomy and agency. Accordingly, for an improviser to feel 
responsible for creating the music, she must feel that she caused the music to happen as a 
deliberate act. This sense of agency has been investigated experimentally and shown to 
depend on judgements of time and causality. Crucially, manipulations of perceived timing 
affect judgements of causation, and vice versa (see Vuorre, 2017 for a review). In a study using 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to evoke involuntary hand movements, Haggard, 
Clark, and Kalogeras (2002) found evidence of ‘intentional binding’. Participants in this study 
either made voluntary key presses or experienced a TMS-induced movement. When these 
were followed by a tone 250ms later participants’ judgement of the time interval was 
shortened from baseline in the voluntary condition and lengthened in the involuntary one. In 
the former, they judged the timing of the action as later and the timing of the tone as earlier, 
whereas the effect was reversed in the latter condition. These authors concluded that 
voluntary actions and their perceptual consequences appear closer together in time. On short 
time scales, if events are seen as causally connected, the temporal order of events can even 
be perceived to be reordered to fit this interpretation (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016). Could 
the sense of agency itself be subject to manipulation? Wegner and Wheatley (1999) induced 
a spurious feeling of wilful action in participants by priming them to think about the stopping 
point of a mouse pointer on a screen immediately before a confederate moved it there. 
Whether they perceived these events because of their own intention was sensitive to the 
timing of the priming stimulus, the effect being greatest when the prime was between 1-5 
seconds beforehand. The authors infer these findings to be the result of a phenomenon they 
call apparent mental causation (see Figure 1.2). In another study, Bear and Bloom (2016) 
asked participants to rapidly choose from a set of options before one random option was 
made salient. The results showed that they were unaware that a later event had influenced 
their judgement of whether they had made a choice. 
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Figure 1.2. A schematic representation of apparent mental causation from Wegner and 
Wheatley (1999, p. 483). 
In summary, the ideal of pre-hearing music in the imagination and construing this as a freely 
willed act which causes the music to be enacted is called into question by some findings that 
judgements of the veridicality of imagery, causality and the temporal structure of events can 
be unreliable. 
1.5 Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of auditory imagery in improvisation with 
a view to suggesting ways in which the cognitive-scientific perspective might inform 
improvisation practice and pedagogy. I suggest that a critical examination of philosophical 
and theoretical frameworks can offer an account of improvisation which is compatible with 
cognitive neuroscience, without jeopardising its value as a creative activity. In doing so, I 
examine the following research questions: 
1. What is improvisers’ experience of their use of auditory imagery in improvisation? 
How is important is it to them? How does it fit with other aspects of the process? 
2. Does the familiarity of bodily aspects of music-producing gestures affect musicians’ 
anticipation of the resulting sound? 
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3. Is improvisers’ privileging of auditory imagery related to the extent to which they have 
a dualist worldview? 
Chapter 2 gives a review of the literature and sets the stage for Chapter 3 in which I report a 
qualitative study which addresses question 1. Chapters 4 and 5 report Studies 2, 3 and 4 
addressing question 2. Chapter 6 goes into more depth on the philosophical issues raised in 
attempting to reconcile the different perspectives on improvising and reports the findings of 
Study 5, which investigates question 3. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The context of this review is to assess existing research concerning the role of auditory 
imagery in improvisation. Edwin Gordon used a closely related term ‘Audiation’, which he 
defined as follows: “Audiation takes place when one hears music through recall or creativity, 
the sound not being physically present except when one is engaging in performance” 
(Gordon, 1979, p. 43). For clarity, the term ‘auditory imagery’ will be used for processes which 
could be characterised as ‘hearing in the mind’s ear’. The different types of imagery will be 
discussed in detail in section 2.2. 
 
Musical improvisation is a broad term but as a first approximation, it can be defined as the 
production of unscripted musical material in real time. It can take many forms, including solo 
and collaborative improvisation, on a spectrum from ‘free’ improvising to contexts in which 
tonal, rhythmic, formal and idiomatic constraints are applied. Improvisation requires the 
simultaneous involvement and coordination of numerous skills, placing demands on working 
memory, memory retrieval, auditory and sensory-motor systems (Beaty, 2015; Brown et al., 
2015; Pressing, 1998a).  In group settings, improvisers must also interact musically with other 
musicians, attend to cues, monitor turn-taking and adapt their musical output according to 
social feedback. Improvisation will be covered in more depth in section 2.3. 
 
My primary focus in this review is on melodic improvisation with harmonic accompaniment 
in the jazz idiom, as this involves the fundamental aspects of improvising whilst also being 
amenable to experimental interrogation (Fidlon, 2011; Goldman, 2013; Norgaard, 2011; 
Norgaard, Emerson, Dawn, & Fidlon, 2016). What is clear from the literature is that pre-
hearing in the mind’s ear (prospective auditory imagery) is considered by practitioners and 
educators to be an integral part of the process of improvisation (Azzara, 1993; Berliner, 1994; 
Gordon, 1989; Kratus, 1991). What seems less clear is the precise role that such imagery plays 
in generating musical ideas and how this might be reconciled with a cognitive-scientific 
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account of improvisation. The theoretical frameworks of common coding, sensory-motor 
coupling and embodied cognition have been fruitful in the investigation of musical 
performance (D'ausilio, Altenmüller, Olivetti Belardinelli, & Lotze, 2006; Hommel, 2009; Lima, 
Krishnan, & Scott, 2016; Maes, 2016; Novembre & Keller, 2014). These approaches converge 
to the notion that musical imagery is inextricably multi-modal (Keller, 2012; Lotze, 2013; 
Schiavio & Timmers, 2016), and this is supported by evidence from brain scanning studies, 
which will be discussed in detail in section 2.7 (for a review, see Beaty, 2015). Further, 
cognitive models of improvisation and the hierarchical nature of action control suggest a high 
degree of automaticity in complex goal-directed behaviours of this kind (Pacherie, 2008; 
Pressing, 1988). Evidence in support of this has been found in behavioural studies (Fidlon, 
2011; Norgaard, Emerson, Dawn, & Fidlon, 2016). 
 
The structure of the review is as follows: The nature of auditory imagery and the question of 
what is meant by ‘improvisation’ are considered in more detail, leading to a discussion of two 
key cognitive models (Johnson-Laird, 2002; Pressing, 1988).  The evidential support offered 
for Pressing’s model by some recent studies is assessed and then more generally the 
experimental evidence from behavioural studies and studies employing brain scanning 
techniques such as fMRI and EEG are discussed in relation to the cognitive processes involved 
in improvisation. The theoretical frameworks mentioned above are then considered in terms 
of their implications for the role of audiation in improvisation. The nature of imagery, the role 
of working memory and the relative domain specificity and generality of the relevant 
cognitive processes are then considered in order to inform the choice of suitable 
experimental methods. In the conclusion, I argue that audiation is valued in improvisation to 
the extent that it has a normative role in relation to practice. This merits an investigation of 
the nature of auditory imagery within a cognitive-scientific paradigm to elucidate this role 
and inform pedagogy and practice. The aim of this thesis to address important questions 
about the role of auditory imagery in improvisation that are not answered in the literature. 
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2.2 Auditory Imagery 
2.2.1 Overview of Mental Imagery 
Mental imagery could be characterised as a quasi-perceptual phenomenon, which resembles 
the experience of perceiving but in the absence of a corresponding external stimulus (Tian & 
Poeppel, 2010), or in the case of motor imagery, overt action. There has been some debate 
as to the extent that mental imagery resembles perception and on the level of abstraction 
and semantic content of visual imagery (Eysenck & Keane, 2015; Hinton, 1979; Kosslyn, 
Thompson, Kim, & Alpert, 1995; Lima, Krishnan, & Scott, 2016; Pylyshyn, 2003), and this also 
applies to auditory imagery (Linke & Cusack, 2015). Sometimes ‘imagery’ can be associated 
with the visual modality by default, but the derivation of ‘image’, via imago (Latin), which had 
various connotations such as picture, death mask, effigy, shadow, scheme, echo, metaphor, 
illusion, idea, conception, covers a large semantic field (Godøy & Jørgensen, 2001). The 
debate over imagery has a long history in philosophy and psychology and has not been settled 
yet. Aristotle used the term phantasmata and seems to view mental images as linked to 
perception, as does the majority view of modern psychology (Thomas, 2018). Descartes 
makes the distinction between knowledge via perception as very clear and distinct, whereas 
we can form what seems to us to be a veridical mental picture of a triangle but not, for 
example, of a thousand-sided figure. Hume offers a critique of the view that it is just the ‘force 
and vivacity’ with which impressions strike us that allows us to distinguish between 
perception and imagination, pointing to some internally generated sensations like pain and 
some ideas such as the continued existence of unperceived objects, as counter-examples. 
However, he does also seem to hold that the distinction between imagery and perception is 
one of vividness rather than of kind: 
A painter, who intended to represent a passion or emotion of any kind, would 
endeavour to get a sight of a person actuated by a like emotion, in order to enliven his 
ideas, and give them a force and vivacity superior to what is found in those, which are 
mere fictions of the imagination. (Hume, 1739/2017, p. 63) 
Hume also links this contrast in vividness to memory, holding that this can distinguish 
between remembered and imagined mental content, which could be relevant for 
improvisation. If improvisers are recalling musical phrase fragments from long term memory, 
then perhaps this facilitates their veridical mental representation. 
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Kant developed the philosophy of perception and imagination considerably following Hume. 
His transcendental deduction concluded that space and time are a priori necessary categories 
by which our perceptual and cognitive apparatus can make sense of the world (Kant, 
1781/2011).  Kant’s notion of apperception, which is the self-consciousness humans have, 
requires the synthesis of percepts via concepts. Perception is conception plus sensations, and 
the imagination (Einbildungskraft) is not only responsible for imagery but also for our ability 
to synthesise sensations in order to form perceptions. This bears directly on the debate about 
the semantic content of imagery as some philosophers hold that this means that mental 
content is necessarily conceptual (Conceptualism). However, there are non-conceptualists 
who draw an opposite conclusion from Kant’s philosophy (Hanna, 2011), and these views 
resonate with embodied perspectives of contemporary psychology. Musical imagery is thus 
also used by listeners and is responsible for aesthetic judgements, in that hearing music as 
music is dependent on this faculty of imagination. Images can come to mind in an explicit and 
distinct or an implicit and indistinct mode. For example, if in hearing a Tristan chord, someone 
can distinguish the notes and can hear it as Tristan-type then this is the distinct mode (Godøy 
& Jørgensen, 2001). For Husserl (1901/2001), listening to music involves the constitution of 
ideal objects (musical structures and features such as symmetry, repetition, contrast and 
variation) by abstracting salient features and formal properties from sensations and drawing 
on knowledge. As this is a temporal process, it has protensive and retensive aspects in addition 
to binding events in the subjective present. In other words, the structure of consciousness is 
such that ‘now’ always contains elements of anticipation and memory. The temporal aspects 
of imagery in the context of improvisation will be discussed further in section 2.9.5.   
 
At the end of the 19th century the discipline of psychology began to emerge as separate and 
distinct from philosophy, although each continues to be influenced by the other up to the 
present day. William James was a pioneer in ideomotor theory in America but along with 
Wilhelm Wundt in Germany, he also gave imagery a central role in cognition. Two distinct 
lines of thought on imagery emerged at this stage. A student of Wundt, Titchener and one of 
his students Perky further developed the notion that images and percepts are experientially 
alike. Another student of Wundt’s, Oswald Külpe, sought to establish that some mental 
contents were unlike images or perception. The resulting dispute between these opposing 
positions became known as the imageless thought controversy which played a role in the rise 
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of behaviourism and resonates with current debates between picture theory and description 
theory accounts of mental imagery (Kosslyn et al., 1995; Pylyshyn, 2003; Thomas, 2018). 
Meanwhile in philosophy, criticism of the picture theory of visual mental imagery was made 
by Wittgenstein (1967) and developed by Ryle (1949/2015). He makes the point that in the 
visual modality, we already have experiences of portraits and pictures which exist and 
represent objects. Hence, we are tempted to assume that mental images are in some way like 
this, that they must exist somewhere within the private domain of our heads. However, Ryle 
thinks this to misconstrue what we are doing when we visually imagine a scene. Rather than 
looking at a scene projected on some mental canvas, we are using our knowledge of what we 
would see if it were in front of us in order to take ourselves to be seeing it. So, if someone 
imagines their nursery, they are not looking at a picture or likeness in some private mental 
gallery, rather, they are seeming to see the actual nursery when in fact they are not. “He is 
not being a spectator of a resemblance of his nursery, but he is resembling a spectator of his 
nursery” (Ryle, 1949/2015, Chapter VIII, Section 2).  These arguments were further developed 
by Dennett (1993), in his criticism of what he calls the ‘Cartesian Theatre’ model of conscious 
experience. To think that images must be in some way re-presented inwardly is implicitly to 
suppose that there is some kind of inner audience, an homunculus who watches the show. 
This leads to an infinite regress, as for the homunculus to experience the show given this 
model of conscious experience, it must itself have its own homunculus within, and so on. The 
reason Dennett calls this Cartesian, is that representationalist theories that commit the 
‘homunculus fallacy’ in this way have inherited Descartes’ notion that the nervous system 
presents information to some inner judge.  
 
Another strand of the imagery debate also concerns differences between imagery and 
perception. Imagery is under voluntary control whereas perception is not. We can choose to 
imagine, for example, a tiger and perhaps change it to a leopard. When confronted with a 
tiger, our experience is constrained by the stimulus. We can also keep sampling the stimulus 
and learn new information, perhaps even count the tiger’s stripes. In contrast, Wittgenstein 
argued that we cannot derive new information from imagery (Wittgenstein, 1967). Although 
this might be overstating the case, it can be difficult to derive information from manipulating 
an image that is readily available from manipulating an object, as Dennett’s mental rotation 
object demonstrates (see Figure 1.1, Dennett, 1993). The relevance of this is that if visual 
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mental images can be reinterpreted to yield a feature that was not initially apparent, this is 
taken as support for Kossleyn’s quasi-pictorial theory, since this predicts that the mental 
image is functioning like a pictorial representation. Description theorists on the other hand 
have argued that images of ambiguous figures like the infamous duck-rabbit and other 
bistable phenomena like the Necker cube do not behave like percepts. That is, participants in 
experiments are unable to detect the duck if they memorised the picture as a rabbit, even 
though they are able to redraw the figure from memory and then see the duck interpretation, 
and their imagined cubes do not spontaneously flip (Pylyshyn, 2003). However, there is 
evidence that reinterpretation is possible, if difficult. Kamermans, Pouw, Mast, and Paas 
(2017) found that about 30% of participants were able to access the alternative interpretation 
of memorised figures. As the alternative interpretations are most visible when the figure is 
rotated 180 degrees, a prediction that follows from this is that those who are independently 
assessed to have greater mental rotation abilities would be better detectors, and this is what 
Mast and Kosslyn (2002) found. Pouw, Aslanidou, Kamermans, and Paas (2017) found 
evidence that this phenomenon is not restricted to the visual domain but can also occur in 
the haptic modality. This is relevant because although the focus of this review is on the role 
of auditory imagery in improvisation, musical imagery also involves visual, tactile, 
proprioceptive and perhaps most importantly, motor components (Bangert et al., 2006; 
D’Ausilio et al., 2010; Keller et al., 2010; Lima et al., 2016).  
 
Brain scanning evidence that visual imagery activates areas of the visual cortex involved in 
early visual perception processing has also been interpreted as supporting the picture theory 
side of the imagery debate (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). The evidence in the auditory domain 
is mixed however, with some studies showing activation in the primary auditory cortex but 
the majority showing activation in secondary rather than primary areas (see Hubbard, 2010, 
for a review). Even if this evidence were unequivocal, description theorists point to the fact 
that activation in visual areas does not tell us what the representational format of the image 
is, without begging the question of whether perception is itself representational (Degenaar & 
Myin, 2014; Pylyshyn, 2003). There is also a deeper problem with both the description and 
picture theories of imagery. Each side of the debate has tacitly adopted the computational 
metaphor of processing, whereby visual information is represented somehow in the system, 
whilst each side has attacked caricatures of the other. Kosslyn’s theory does not posit actual 
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pictures illuminated inside the brain and Pylyshin’s does not assume that an image of a cat is 
like an internal monologue of a natural language description (Thomas, 2018). Conversely, the 
more nuanced the arguments on each side become about representational format, the less 
clear it becomes that the brain instantiates images in any way that is really like the metaphors 
they deploy. What neither side has solved reduces to the so called ‘hard problem of 
consciousness’ (Chalmers, 1995), which in this context means that no account is given of how 
brain processes result in conscious experience. This in turn means that the representationalist 
computational metaphor is a contentious unargued-for premise. Recent perspectives such as 
enactivist, embodied and grounded perspectives have begun to challenge this view however, 
and these will be discussed more fully in later sections. For now, one example will be sufficient 
to make the point. Ryle was perhaps prescient when he characterised imagining as a species 
of doing rather than like perceiving, and as a kind of expectation of what would be present to 
perception (Ryle, 1949/2015), as this sounds like a description of current enactive theories 
(Thomas, 1999). Indeed, modern theories of perception and predictive coding see perception 
itself as anything but passive (Schröger, Marzecová, & SanMiguel, 2015; Talsma, 2015). An 
example that supports an enactive interpretation of imagery as an alternative to the picture 
and description accounts based on the information processing metaphor, is the presence of 
saccades during visual imagery (Thomas, 2018). These small eye movements are essential to 
the functioning of the visual system and their similarity during imagery of a scene to how they 
would be when actually viewing that scene implies that the visual system is enacting the 
processes involved in vision (Fourtassi et al., 2013; Johansson & Johansson, 2014). Moreover, 
disrupting these movements by moving the eyes in a way incongruous with the pattern 
relevant to the image disrupts imagery in a way analogous to that in which auditory imagery 
can be disrupted by articulatory suppression (Brodsky, Henik, Rubinstein, & Zorman, 2003; 
Brodsky, Kessler, Rubinstein, Ginsborg, & Henik, 2008; Thomas, 2018). An important 
implication for this thesis which will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections is that 
mental imagery engages sensorimotor systems and is multimodal. In particular, the motor 
system is involved in auditory imagery and perception so that our anticipation of the sound 
of what is played is necessarily modulated by movement (Study 2). In the context of musical 
performance, sound-producing actions can be divided into ballistic and sustained types, 
which (along with some intermediates) can be concatenated and subsumed into higher level 
gestures in a hierarchical structure (Godøy & Jørgensen, 2001). Where several different action 
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trajectories are fused into a single action unit this is termed co-articulation. An issue central 
to this thesis and investigated in Study 2 is the extent to which coarticulations are subject to 
motor equivalence (Bhangal, Cho, Geisler, & Morsella, 2016; Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger, 
& Gazzaley, 2016) such that a given melody or rhythm pattern might have several ways of 
being executed and imagined, with invariant features preserved even on different 
instruments. This concept is also related to effector independence (Shea & Wulf, 2005) which 
means that for example a pianist has different options for the fingering to use for a given 
musical fragment. The generative capacity due to motor equivalence is something that 
listeners to music will share depending on their level of musical training and experience in 
playing the instruments they are hearing. This suggests a continuum between vague, low 
resolution images and high-resolution images for musical sound. Low resolution images can 
be envisaged via general categories (hitting something) but these can have variants (hitting a 
cowbell with a stick, a wooden block with a mallet). The more detailed the subdivisions 
available, the higher the resolution of available images (Godøy & Jørgensen, 2001; Godøy & 
Rolf Inge, 2010). Given that in idiomatic contexts, improvisers could be expected to have high-
resolution imagery for music produced by their own instrument, a central question addressed 
by this thesis is the nature of imagery for what is about to be improvised. 
 
2.2.2 Types of Auditory Imagery 
Auditory imagery refers to inner speech, images of natural sounds such as dogs barking and 
breaking glass, and musical imagery. This last category can be broadly divided into involuntary 
musical imagery (INMI, or ‘earworms’) or voluntary musical imagery, for example deliberately 
imagining a favourite piece of music, or experiencing imagery during a purposive activity such 
as reading a score (notational audiation). Within voluntary imagery, a further distinction can 
be made, between autonomous imagery, which occurs in the absence of corresponding 
perceptual stimuli, and coperceptual imagery, in which imaginary projections occur as a 
response to perceptual input (Reybrouck, 2001). Finally, imagery can be prospective 
(anticipatory) and could be regarded as a kind of expectation (Keller et al., 2010). The kind of 
imagery which is at issue in this review is both coperceptual and prospective, in the sense that 
it is an anticipation of the sound of that is about to be played, and rather than occurring in 
20 
 
the absence of perceptual stimuli, it is produced in the context of the perception of what the 
improviser is playing, and often also while perceiving a musical accompaniment.  
 
2.2.3 A Functional Role for Auditory Imagery in Improvisation: Schema Theory 
If such coperceptual prospective imagery is not merely epiphenomenal, then it would be 
useful to consider its functional role in improvisation within a theoretical perspective that can 
account for the effects of musical training. Schema theory (Schmidt, 1975) proposes that 
abstract knowledge structures (schemas) based on proportional principles are involved in 
motor control. Invariant properties of schemas, such as relative timing and force, are scalable 
according to parameters that depend on context. Schema theory is an open-loop theory such 
that feedback is used for online error correction and hence is compatible with Pressing’s 
(1988) cognitive theory of improvisation, which will be discussed in section 2.4. Schemas are 
developed during training according to Hebbian learning principles involving long-term 
potentiation (LTP) and depression (LTD). LTP and LTD depend on synaptic plasticity, such that 
the strength and/or speed of transmission of signals between neurons can be tuned by 
experience and remain relatively stable over long periods of time. The various mechanisms 
involved in synaptic plasticity are beyond the scope of this thesis (see Citri & Malenka, 2008, 
for a review). The important point is that initial blocked training during which an agent has 
knowledge of the results (KR) of their actions forms an association between the firing of 
neurons involved in enacting a motor program and those involved in the perception of its 
consequences. Variable training with partial KR subsequently consolidates the schema by 
enhancing the ability to scale responses to fit the context according to variable parameters 
(Shea & Wulf, 2005). Evidence for long-term neuroplastic reorganization in musicians will be 
discussed in more detail in sections 2.7 and 2.8, however it is worth noting that the enhanced 
neural efficiency and automaticity seen in expertise is compatible both with Pressing’s (1988) 
cognitive model, and with and with fMRI results showing deactivations in relevant brain areas 
(for example Pinho, 1014). The latter is because efficient neural processes require less 
oxygenated blood to carry out cognitive tasks. A possible functional role for imagery in 
improvisation compatible with schema theory rests on the distinction between the recall 
schema and the recognition schema. The recall schema extrapolates from the relationship 
between past outcomes and response specifications to produce current responses to achieve 
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a desired effect. The recognition schema generates the expected sensory consequences of 
the movement, including the anticipated vision and audition (Schmidt, 1975). This is 
compatible with auditory-motor coupling and ideo-motor theories discussed in subsequent 
sections (2.6.2, 2.6.3). Crucially for jazz improvisation, the precise movements required for a 
novel musical idea need not have been rehearsed previously because in schema theory, it is 
the mapping of movements to consequences that is stored. At issue in this thesis is the level 
of abstraction at which this mapping between movement and perceptual consequences 
operates (See Study 2 and sections 2.8.4 and 7.4), and whether conscious prospective 
auditory imagery informs the recognition schema in its control and evaluation of movement. 
 
2.2.4 Auditory Imagery in Improvisation: The Views of Practitioners and 
Pedagogues 
Before considering improvisation in more detail in the next section, as a first approximation 
improvisation can be regarded as the composition of music during its performance (Solomon, 
1986). Berliner (1994, p. 248) reports New Orleans jazz musicians’ advice: “if you can’t sing it, 
you can’t play it”, interpreting this as “exhorting soloists to perform melodies that they can 
conceptualize clearly in their singing minds.” This quotation is one of many from musicians 
expressing the view that auditory imagery is an essential part of improvisation. This view is 
also expressed by educators (Azzara, 1993; Gordon, 1989; Kratus, 1991, 1995; Wiskirchen, 
1975), the following quotation being a good example: “The jazz improviser pre-hears in his 
mind the next musical event” (Coker, Casale, Campbell, & Greene, 1970, from the first 
paragraph of the introduction). The necessity for such conscious prospective auditory imagery 
for improvising represents what I shall refer to as the ‘Ideal Model’ in this thesis, a simplified 
schematic of which is given in Figure 2.1 below: 
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Figure 2.1. A musical phrase is formed in the imagination which triggers the specific bodily 
movements necessary to play the phrase on an instrument, for example finger, hand and arm 
movements for the guitar. The auditory feedback in the form of the perceived sound of the 
phrase being played is used for online error correction and also as an input for the 
imagination, so that the solo can develop in an associative chain. I shall return to the question 
of whether the Ideal Model can be reconciled with a cognitive-scientific view of improvising 
as a process in Chapter 6. The next section considers improvisation in more detail. 
 
2.3 Improvisation 
2.3.1 Overview of Improvisation 
Bach and Beethoven were improvisers (Alperson, 1984) and there are treatises on 
improvisation offering advice like the following from a treatise by Corri from 1810: 
By this means and by transposing certain preludes in different keys, the Scholar may 
form endless variety, and with perseverance become so habituated to passages, 
Arpeggios and Modulation, that the Ear will imperceptibly guide the fingers, and direct 
the fancy to model preludes in various shapes. (cited in Berkowitz, 2010, p. 57) 
Improvisation was an integral part of the Baroque keyboard performance tradition  (Moersch, 
2009). The distinctions between composer and performer and between composition and 
improvisation were not always as they are today in classical music, where only a minority of 
performers improvise even the cadenzas (Berkowitz, 2010). The kind of improvisation which 
involves spontaneous manipulation of melodic, harmonic and rhythmic parameters is now 
associated with the jazz idiom (Berliner, 1994), whereas a classical performer’s manipulation 
of tone, articulation and timing for expressive purposes is not counted as improvisation. 
Musical phrase  
Corresponding 
movements 
triggered 
Played sound is 
heard 
Auditory feedback used for associative chaining and error correction 
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Seeing this as an artificial distinction, Benson (2003) sees all musical performance as 
improvisatory and gives a taxonomy of kinds of improvising ranging from “improvisation1”, 
which refers to the latter kind of expressive classical performance, to “improvisation11”, which 
involves practices where the rules of the improvisatory tradition themselves can be modified. 
Examples of this kind of improvisation can be found in the free jazz genre, by artists such as 
Ornette Coleman, McCoy Tyner and the later John Coltrane. In contrast, non-idiomatic 
improvisation was heavily influenced by the experimental classical music tradition, 
extrapolated to a stance that rejects rules altogether. The focus on classical and jazz music 
represents a fraction of musical practice globally and the terminology of improvisation does 
not necessarily map in a straightforward way onto participatory musics (Turino, 2009) or to 
traditions like Persian music (Nettl, 2009). Participatory music has an ethos of inclusion such 
that musical specialists and non-specialists take part and this results in performances 
characterised by formulaic variation within a loose model (Turino, 2009). In participatory 
music, the flexible concatenation of motifs which can be embellished in different ways to fit 
the context has much in common with models of mainstream jazz improvisation but there is 
less emphasis on individual invention and priority is given to group play and participation 
(Kvifte, 2001). The radif in Persian music is a collection of approximately 270 short pieces 
which are memorised. These are divided into 12 dastaghs which are roughly equivalent to 
Western modes or Indian ragas. Each dastagh has a prescribed point of entry and ways of 
elaborating precomposed elements and what counts as successful improvisation reflects the 
cultural norms within the practice (Nettl, 2009). What these examples have in common is the 
blurring of the distinctions between pre-composition and improvisation. They also illustrate 
the importance of cultural factors in what counts as improvisation. 
 
2.3.2 Issues of Creativity, Novelty and Value: Initial Questions 
The concept of musical improvisation might at first seem straightforward, a question of simply 
making up music on the spot, or spontaneous creativity involving composition during 
performance. Closer inspection reveals certain fundamental philosophical issues, however. 
These relate to the nature of creativity, what it means to be spontaneous, and why we value 
improvising. When a musician improvises a melodic line on stage, in what way does this count 
as creative? Does the musical output have to be novel, in the sense of never having been 
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played before? If so, and we subsequently discover that a musical phrase or line has been 
played before, we would need to re-evaluate musical output that had seemed creative, even 
in the absence of any connection between the two occurrences of the phrase, which seems 
counter-intuitive. Perhaps the criterion should be that the phrase has never been played 
before by that particular musician (Johnson-Laird, 2002)? However, if that were the case then 
the majority of the output of Charlie Parker, one of the most important innovators in jazz 
improvisation, would not meet this criterion, as many of his solos contain phrases or ‘licks’ 
that occur at least twice in his recorded corpus (Norgaard, 2014; Weisberg et al., 2004). This 
also relates to the concept of spontaneity since if a pattern has been used before, how can its 
re-use count as spontaneous? Perhaps spontaneity is best thought of as operating within 
parameters and within a given context. In jazz, performers tend to take turns for solos, follow 
social conventions relevant to the performance situation, interact with other performers, and 
play with reference to certain tonal rules (Monson, 2009) (there might be some free 
improvising contexts in which an improviser is as likely to juggle or eat a ham sandwich as 
play a solo, but these remain in the minority). Given such constraints and the need to play 
something that works when it is the soloist’s turn, some models of improvisation suggest that 
players often draw on an ‘idea bank’ (Berliner, 1994; Norgaard, 2011). This comprises a store 
of phrases and schemas that help in the fluent production of melodic material in the context 
of rapidly shifting harmonic soundscapes. This has some overlap with Pressing’s (1988) 
concept of the ‘referent’ and shares its commitment to the computational metaphor as a way 
of characterising mental processes. This aspect of cognitivism will be critiqued in later 
sections of this chapter, which will address alternative models including enactivist, embodied 
and dynamical systems approaches 
 
If spontaneity is regarded as operating on one or more parameters at the level of the 
deployment of musical material, including pre-composed phrases in different combinations 
and allowing for transformations to fit to the context, could this be sufficient to ground 
creativity? It is possible that a continuum exists, ranging from completely pre-composed 
phrases in a performer’s idea bank that are deployed with little or no alteration, to phrases 
that are conceived anew in a particular performance situation. However, even at the de novo 
end of such a continuum, at least within the mainstream jazz tradition, creativity involves the 
combination of pre-existing musical materials. That is to say, the continuum of frequency and 
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timbre making up a possible soundscape already has elements preselected for use. Notes are 
members of discrete pitch classes which are selected in the context of their membership of 
pitch class sets (musical keys or tonalities) and combined according to the musical grammar 
of the jazz idiom to produce intelligible phrases. Choices of timbre are constrained both by 
idiomatic concerns and the physical properties of instruments. The creativity in mainstream 
jazz soloing then, is perhaps best considered to involve the fluent production of aesthetically 
pleasing melodic and rhythmic phrases via the constrained combination of pre-existing 
musical elements.  
 
2.3.3 An Analogy with Language 
If this seems to circumscribe the creativity of jazz soloing too much, then perhaps it is worth 
considering the analogy between music and language.  Both involve the combination of a 
limited number of fixed elements (phonemes, pitches) which are combined into hierarchical 
structures according to syntactical rules. To take this analogy further, rehearsed musical 
performance would be akin to delivering a memorised speech, whereas improvisation would 
be analogous to conversational speech (Johnson-Laird, 2002; Lehmann & Goldhahn, 2016). 
Azzara (1993, p. 330) states “improvisation is to music what speaking is to language”. Both 
improvisation and speech use formulas or patterns (Fidlon, 2011; Lehmann & Goldhahn, 
2016; Merker, 2006; Norgaard, 2014; Weisberg et al., 2004; Wray & Perkins, 2000), but it 
doesn’t follow that these are the only strategies used or that their use circumscribes creativity 
to the extent that the output is trivial. To argue that jazz improvisation is not very creative or 
spontaneous based on its use of formulas to combine existing elements would therefore also 
deny the possibility of saying novel, interesting and witty things in conversation, which seems 
untenable.  
 
2.3.4 Improvisation as a Process 
A useful distinction can be made between ‘improvisation’, when used as a noun, and the term 
when used as a verb (Alperson, 1984; Berliner, 1994). As Goldman (2013, 2016) points out, a 
focus on the musical product lends itself to the consideration of music-theoretic constraints, 
but these do not necessarily align with the cognitive constraints on improvisation as a process. 
It is not clear from a cognitive perspective that there is a continuum as such, between 
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deploying pre-composed ideas and inventing new ones; there could be a few discrete 
processes producing the range of musical output.  In cognitive terms, composition, recall and 
improvisation all occur in ‘real-time’ in the sense that the necessary mental operations 
involved unfold in time and are thus constrained by, for example, how much information can 
be attended to at once, working memory span, and so on. Improvisation is constrained by the 
limits of how improvisers can think and move when interfacing with their instrument in 
performance (Bailey, 1993; Baily & Driver, 1992). The relevant questions here involve which 
elements of the improvising process make some ideas improvise-able, and others not 
(Goldman, 2013). Nonetheless, musicians do make a distinction between deploying pre-
composed ideas and inventing new ones (Berliner, 1994, p. 222). The latter is valued more 
highly and is seen as rarer (Macdonald & Wilson, 2005), but there are philosophical difficulties 
in deciding what counts as ‘new’ in jazz improvisation if this is seen as a process of constrained 
recombination of pre-existing musical materials. How much of the material in a musical 
phrase can have been played before, in the same order and the phrase still count as new? Are 
the elements of recombination restricted to the note level or do combinations of phrase-
fragments in a novel order qualify as new? How many alterations to a phrase fragment to fit 
the context can be carried out before the result is new? These are paradoxes of the 
continuum. Even if these problems are solvable, there remains the question of how the 
newness of any idea could be known.  A new-sounding phrase might have had hours of 
preparation and rehearsal in the practice room and there is evidence that even expert 
listeners can find it difficult to tell whether performances are improvised or not (Lehmann & 
Kopiez, 2010). The improviser themselves might not remember the origin of a musical motif 
played in performance. These issues will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6. 
 
2.3.5 Distinctions: Creativity, Originality and Value Revisited 
Having made a distinction between improvisation as process and product, other useful 
distinctions can be made which will clarify some of the questions put in the first section. The 
so called ‘standard definition’ of creativity links originality to effectiveness, which in turn can 
take the form of value (Runco & Jaeger, 2012). Williamon, Thompson, Lisboa, and Wiffen 
(2006) offer an insightful elaboration of the relationship between creativity, originality and 
value, albeit in the context of Classical music performance, but which nonetheless helpfully 
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disambiguates these concepts. Creativity is seen as an attribute of cognitive processes, 
characterised along a continuum of probability of arrival at a particular outcome or solution, 
from predictable (for example, identical to a previous instance) to highly unexpected. 
Originality can be formal or conceptual and is also a matter of degree. It is not equated with 
how objectively different a work is from all other instances of the same type, but rather with 
how readily it is distinguished from those instances by relevantly qualified observers within 
the culture. This shift of focus from an ontological to an epistemological perspective has some 
advantages, in that it reflects how the term ‘original’ is actually used and helps to deal with 
the problem mentioned above, regarding novel phrases. To elaborate this problem further, 
suppose someone plays a solo that seems novel and is acclaimed as creative, but many years 
later, a highly similar but obscure solo is discovered which predates theirs, and was unknown 
to them. A retrospective re-evaluation of creativity is not necessary, since creativity is an 
agent-specific property of the generative process, rather than of the product. This realisation 
redirects our attention to the aspect of novelty. Whilst it is impossible to ever rule out the 
subsequent discovery of an independently derived prior product, the problem of how the 
novelty of a solo can ever be known is circumvented in Williamon et al. (2006)’s model. Given 
the model’s focus on originality as judged by the community at the time, the originality of a 
solo is not retrospectively invalidated by such a discovery, precisely because they evaluate 
the process (Johnson-Laird (2002) deals with this problem differently, by defining creativity in 
terms of being novel for the agent, and only optionally novel for society). The third concept, 
‘value’ is characterised thus: “the overall ‘value’ of a product or idea is the mean value 
ascribed to it by individuals within a given culture” (Williamon et al., 2006, pp. 170-171). This 
might at first seem to be a circular definition, but its function is to locate value in a communal 
and to some extent inter-subjectively justifiable judgement, rather than intrinsic to the 
product. Insofar as this represents a philosophical stance on value, it is the one which I will 
adopt in this review. 
 
If improvisation is valued in virtue of its perceived creativity and originality, these issues raise 
questions relating to why we value it based on these criteria. One can be creative but not 
particularly original and vice versa. Indeed, works that are ‘too original’ might not be valued 
when they are produced, even if subsequent generations judge them more favourably 
(Williamon et al., 2006). Even if improvisation is not usually a totally spontaneous act of sui 
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generis composition, perhaps a close consideration of the process will reveal sufficient 
insights to ground its value. Finally, the value of creativity itself might rest on a set of implicit 
premises including those which relate to the philosophical concept of free will, which might 
be challenged by mechanistic interpretations of the findings of cognitive neuroscience. A full 
discussion of the philosophy is beyond the scope of this review, but some of the issues are 
relevant in respect of musicians’ conception of what they are doing in the context of the 
norms of improvisation practice and pedagogy. One way to make progress in addressing these 
issues and gain a clearer perspective on improvisation and the role of auditory imagery, is to 
consider the activity of improvising from a cognitive perspective. 
 
2.4 Cognitive Models of Improvisation  
2.4.1 Pressing’s Model 
Pressing (1988) proposed a cognitive model in which a musical improvisation is seen as a 
series of ‘event clusters’. Each event cluster comprises a group of musical notes performed 
via the triggering of a stored motor program. Here Pressing is adapting the idea of a 
Generalised Motor Program (GMP) from schema theory (Schmidt, 1975), where an abstract 
representation of a set of movements to achieve a goal is established through practice. In a 
given situation, a rule (or schema) allows parameters to scale absolute features of the 
movement (for example force and timing) whilst preserving their relative values. In Pressing’s 
model, anticipation and feedback mechanisms have a role to play in guiding musical action. 
The selection of a given event cluster might be constrained by preceding clusters or take the 
form of an interrupt to the sequence, thus beginning a new sequence of clusters. Feedback is 
used to minimise the discrepancy between the desired outcome and performance. This allows 
the fluent and expressive concatenation of motor programs based on such control 
parameters as note placement, motoric feel, timbre, dynamics, pitch relationships, emotion 
and expressive design. Some aspects of schema theory have been superseded by more recent 
research (Schmidt, 2003; Shea & Wulf, 2005), but the hierarchical organisation of complex 
sensorimotor behaviour remains as an important theoretical perspective (Pacherie, 2008). 
 
An important feature of feedback and error correction in this model is an emphasis on 
redundancy, such that auditory, tactile, visual, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic modalities of 
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feedback are available, but only a small proportion of this feedback might be used at any given 
time. The flexible dynamic interplay between these different mental representations afforded 
by cognitive control of attentional resources is a crucial aspect underpinning improvisational 
fluency (Fidlon, 2011; Pressing, 1988). In contrast, the modalities of idea generation and 
feedforward mechanisms are not specified in detail in Pressing’s model, with the former 
ascribed to vague central cognitive processes and the latter characterised as higher levels of 
cognitive control biasing lower levels toward anticipated actions. Although Pressing makes an 
inference that anticipated output could be in the form of an auditory image (Pressing, 1988), 
it seems difficult to rule out the possibility that a similar redundancy operates in the 
feedforward direction as in the feedback direction. That is to say, the anticipation could be in 
the form of, for example, motor imagery or perhaps any of the other modalities available, 
hence the role of auditory imagery in improvisation as envisaged by Pressing, is unclear. I shall 
return to the question of forward and inverse internal models in later sections and consider 
some evidence from brain scanning techniques which bears on the question of the modality 
of anticipation. 
 
2.4.2 Johnson-Laird’s Model 
Johnson-Laird’s cognitive model of improvisation characterises the process in terms of 
algorithmic demand (Johnson-Laird, 2002). A premise of the model is that creative processes 
in general are computable, and hence jazz improvisation as an example of such a process, is 
also computable. What this means is that improvised musical output could be effectively 
produced by the execution of a finite set of instructions (an algorithm). What kind of algorithm 
could suffice to produce melodic jazz improvisations? Johnson-Laird postulates three possible 
types of algorithm for creativity: neo-Darwinian, neo-Lamarckian, and the third is a hybrid of 
the first two. 
 
 A neo-Darwinian algorithm involving multiple generation and selection of phrases for output 
would require the intermediate results (the candidate musical phrases to be evaluated) to be 
stored in working memory. In humans, this would produce a slowing of performance as the 
working memory load increased because, Johnson-Laird argues, working memory capacity 
represents a ‘cognitive bottleneck’. As musicians seem able to improvise complex ideas as 
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fast as they can play their instrument, Johnson-Laird rules out algorithms that need to store 
intermediate results during processing. Thus, phrases must be produced by a kind of neo-
Lamarckian algorithm whereby all the parameters constraining possible output are used in 
the idea generation process.  
 
Johnson-Laird’s model does not mention mental imagery as a possible source for musical idea 
generation. Like Pressing’s model, the concern is not with precisely how the processes 
involved in improvisation are subjectively experienced. However, in contrast to Pressing’s 
emphasis on stored motor programs, Johnson-Laird proposes that musical output is 
generated algorithmically in real time, rather than by the retrieval of phrases or phrase 
fragments from memory. In this sense, these two dominant cognitive models in the literature 
could be said to be competing representations of improvisation. There are three main reasons 
that Johnson-Laird advances to reject ‘motif theories’ according to which solos involve the 
linking of stored phrases. Firstly, somebody must invent motifs in the first place, in which case 
they are not retrieving them from memory. Second, analyses of corpora reveal that some 
phrases only appear once in solos. This leads to the third reason, which is that the 
memorisation of a sufficient number of such phrases or phrase fragments to produce 
complete improvised solos is impractical (Johnson-Laird, 2002; Lewis, 1996). A counter-
argument to the first reason is that the invention of motifs could occur off-line (in the practice 
room) and they could then be retrieved from memory onstage. The second reason might be 
considered by returning to the analogy with language. Analysis of conversational speech 
reveals that a similar percentage of it consists of patterns or formulas to that found for pattern 
use in jazz solos (Norgaard, 2014; Weisberg et al., 2004; Wray & Perkins, 2000). Since neither 
figure is 100% then it can be argued that other generative strategies must play a role in 
speaking and improvising, however it seems the evidence does not support algorithmic 
generation as the dominant strategy (Norgaard, 2014; Norgaard, Spencer, & Montiel, 2013). 
This in turn casts doubt on the third reason, as it seems unlikely that the issue is one of 
practicality since such a high percentage of pattern use is already evident. More likely is that, 
as in conversation, formulaic recombination serves as a default strategy and grammatical 
(algorithmic) generation steps in when the context requires a more inventive response (Wray 
& Perkins, 2000). Despite there being many possible ways that an algorithmic process 
(generative grammar) could produce semantically equivalent utterances, only a tiny 
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proportion of such are used (Pawley & Syder, 1983). Yet this reliance of formulas in 
conversation does not generally produce stilted or disjointed speech as if from a phrasebook. 
Hence Johnson-Laird’s objections do not stand up to close scrutiny. However one possibility 
is that Pressing’s and Johnson-Laird’s models might be reconciled by considering a suitable 
musical unit above the note level for algorithms to act upon (Fidlon, 2011). I shall return to 
this question in section 2.9.5 The Temporal Dimension of Improvisation. In the next section I 
will consider some recent studies which have offered support for Pressing’s model and discuss 
their implications for the role of auditory imagery.  
 
2.5 Recent Evidence in Support of Pressing’s Model 
2.5.1 Corpus Analysis and Computer Modelling 
Martin Norgaard used a computer programme to look for intervallic and rhythmic patterns in 
a corpus of 48 improvised Charlie Parker solos (Norgaard, 2014). A musical phrase only 
qualified as a pattern if it occurred more than once in the corpus. He found that patterns were 
ubiquitous, with many patterns occurring in different solos as well as within solos. 82.6% of 
the notes in the corpus began a 4-interval pattern with the mean number of instances in the 
corpus being 26.3. The longest pattern identified was 49 intervals and the mean length of 
pattern was 7.3 intervals. When patterns were matched for rhythm and intervals, 57.6% of 
notes were found to begin 4-interval/rhythm patterns.  
 
Although these results are suggestive of Parker having inserted many pre-learned patterns 
into his solos, there are alternative explanations for the data. Firstly, any sufficiently long and 
complex string might yield patterns purely by chance or as an artefact of the search algorithm 
(McKay, Bar-Natan, Bar-Hillel, & Kalai, 1999). Secondly, an algorithm such as that proposed 
by Johnson-Laird might converge to a similar distribution of patterns, given the constraints of 
tonal harmony and considerations of contour and rhythm that could also influence a human 
improviser. In order to rule out the first alternative, Norgaard randomly shuffled the intervals 
in the corpus whilst preserving the interval distribution. When the analysis was carried out 
again on the shuffled corpus, the distribution of patterns was markedly different, with far 
fewer patterns overall, and a sharp decline in pattern frequency as pattern length increased. 
To counter the second objection, that patterned output could be derived algorithmically, 
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Norgaard created a new corpus of solos using a program (Impro-Visor) which uses rules 
derived from actual Parker solos but does not use stored phrases. With this artificial corpus 
the results again differed markedly from those with Parker’s actual corpus. The longest 
pattern found in the algorithmically generated solos was only 10 intervals long (compared to 
49 for Parker) and the percentages for pattern use were much lower. This result seems to 
counter the possibility that the distribution of pattern use in Parker’s solos could be a 
necessary artefact of improvising with tonal material in an algorithmic way. 
 
Norgaard further tested the hypothesis that stored patterns are used by human improvisers 
by developing his own algorithm to generate improvised melodies (Norgaard, Spencer, et al., 
2013). This algorithm was based on a Markov Chain principle, such that an initial four note 
interval pattern is randomly selected, then each subsequent note is generated only on the 
basis of the previous four notes. This process is iterated until the required number of notes is 
reached. The algorithm chooses the next note based on the probability that the resulting 
pattern occurred in the input corpus (the same Charlie Parker corpus as in the study above) 
and incorporates both rhythmic and melodic features. The results, based on a comparison of 
pattern use and interval distribution, again showed a higher correlation with the actual Parker 
solos than attempts by an algorithm (Impro-Visor) based on tonal rules derived from Parker’s 
corpus. It is important to note that the stored patterns in Norgaard’s algorithm were not used 
in such a way as to be simply inserted and concatenated. If that were the case, then it would 
be trivially true that the output would resemble the corpus. Rather, the input corpus is used 
to create a stochastic matrix that governs the probabilistic generation of subsequent notes. 
So this approach is as algorithmic as approaches that use tonal rules in a way consistent with 
Johnson-Laird’s model. The essential difference is in the use of stored patterns rather than 
rules. Furthermore, in contrast to other Markov chain algorithms (Pachet, 2012), Norgaard 
did not use style specific or tonal rules to guide higher-level processes that govern the overall 
architecture of the solo. 
 
Despite Norgaard’s persuasive argument that his results support Pressing’s (1988) model, he 
does concede that it is still possible that future refinements to tonal rule-based algorithms 
could produce outputs that more closely resemble human solos, for example by using more 
sophisticated rules. One limitation of Norgaard’s algorithm is that it does not deal with 
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‘vertical’ or harmonic concerns in the way that human improvisers seem to do. For example, 
one of the improvising strategies identified by participants in Norgaard’s interview study 
(2011), involved the selection of notes with specific attention to the underlying harmonic 
structure of the music, to which the algorithm is blind.  Another limitation is that higher levels 
of control that deal with the architecture of a solo, such as thematic development or the 
balance and timing of tension and release, are incapable of being captured by Markovian 
processes (Pachet, 2012). Norgaard states that “the design could be augmented to 
incorporate constraints related to a given chord progression, larger architectural structures, 
and interaction with external factors” (Norgaard, Spencer, et al., 2013, p. 253), and as such 
this can be regarded as a work in progress. In order to rule out the possibility that Parker is a 
special case, Norgaard used one corpus of fiddle improvisations by Aubrey Hanie, and another 
of Bach’s Partitas and Sonatas for Solo Violin, BWV 1001–1006 as inputs to the same 
algorithm, again with favourable results (Norgaard, Spencer, et al., 2013).  
 
Although computer modelling approaches offer insights into what is required to produce 
improvised output, they do not tell us directly what humans actually do. This is because 
computers instantiate improvisation in a completely different way to humans. Computers use 
serial Von Neumann architecture (instructions are executed one at a time in very fast 
succession), whereas the brain’s distributed systems seem to work in parallel (Pinho, de 
Manzano, Fransson, Eriksson, & Ullén, 2014). Norgaard’s assertion, based on his review of the 
literature, is that stored motor patterns have an auditory component, but it is possible that 
auditory imagery is not necessary when motor programs enact patterns retrieved from long 
term memory (Hargreaves, 2012). Indeed there is evidence that improvised content involves 
subconscious automatic processes at the level of note choice (Limb & Braun, 2008; Norgaard, 
2011), however it is also possible to use implicit processes to enact conscious intentions 
(Berkowitz, 2010). In summary, the evidence from both the analysis of Charlie Parker’s corpus 
of solos and the comparison of computer generated solos to actual human output gives 
support to Pressing’s cognitive model of improvisation, particularly with regard to the use of 
stored patterns, but the question of role of auditory imagery remains open. 
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2.5.2 A Behavioural Approach 
I now turn to an approach which seeks to test improvisation experimentally in order to shed 
light on the underlying cognitive processes underpinning jazz improvising in humans. In a 
study with jazz pianists (Goldman, 2013), participants improvised right handed or left handed, 
in a familiar or unfamiliar key (Bb Major, B Major) and alternating between improvising 
melody or bass line between hands. The notion that there might be such a thing as an 
unfamiliar key for a highly trained pianist used to performing repertoire in all keys needs 
clarification, however. In this experiment, participants were jazz pianists improvising on the 
chord changes to Gershwin’s I got Rhythm, which is most often played in flat keys which are 
suited to horn players. B Major is therefore a less familiar key for improvisation on these 
changes. The improvisations in unfamiliar conditions contained a higher proportion of 
diatonic pitch classes, and lower pitch class variation as measured by the entropy value of the 
analysed MIDI file, interpreted as an indication that these improvisations were simpler and 
more predictable. A main effect of key was found, and in follow up interviews with 
participants, they reported that improvising in B was a more conscious effortful process than 
in Bb. Goldman argues that without access to familiar motor patterns, improvisers fall back 
on explicit knowledge of music theory, the implication being that stored motor patterns have 
a significant role in improvisation as normally practiced in familiar conditions.  
 
An important aspect of Goldman’s methodology is his focus on a cognitive-scientific approach 
to improvisation in contradistinction to a music-theoretic framework. This allows the 
cognitive processes involved in the interface between body and instrument to be investigated 
experimentally, with music-theoretic considerations used as tools to interpret data rather 
than being the defining concepts. From a music-theoretic point of view, the tasks of 
improvising in the keys of Bb and B could be regarded as equivalent, but because of the nature 
of the body-instrument interface for pianists and differences in familiarity between these 
keys, they are revealed to be quite different from a cognitive perspective. This manifested in 
musicians reporting that they used different strategies, for example relying on explicit 
knowledge of tonality in the key of B in contrast to implicit, or procedural knowledge in Bb 
(Goldman, 2013). In common with Norgaard, Goldman posits that when musicians use stored 
motor programs, these are accompanied by an auditory image, even when exhibiting the 
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fluency and automaticity of ‘muscle memory’ in familiar improvising conditions (Goldman, 
2012, 2013). In this, both authors explicitly draw on theories of action control that involve 
sensorimotor integration. In the next section I will consider the cognitive basis of 
improvisation, survey the evidence on auditory-motor coupling and then move on to review 
the general findings of studies using brain scanning techniques. 
 
2.6 Cognitive Processes Subserving Improvisation 
2.6.1 Introduction 
Musical improvisation can be regarded as a hierarchically organised goal-directed behaviour 
(Berkowitz & Ansari, 2008; Limb & Braun, 2008; Pressing, 1988), which balances the need to 
generate self-directed creative thoughts with the need to deploy these in the context of task 
specific constraints (Beaty et al., 2016). This is indicative of the cooperation of large-scale 
brain networks involved in spontaneous thought and cognitive control, the involvement of 
working memory, motor control and sensorimotor integration (Beaty, 2015). At the 
superordinate level, relatively abstract notions of how to construct the solo, such as the 
tonalities and dynamic changes used to build and release tension, can occupy attentional 
resources in the form of conscious sketch planning (Norgaard, 2011). This is possible due to 
the subordinate levels being delegated to more automatic processes thus freeing attentional 
and cognitive resources for superordinate level tasks. In particular, the sequential 
concatenation of complex motor sequences depends on automatic processes. These were 
initially theorised in terms of schema theory as generalised motor programs (Pressing, 1988; 
Schmidt, 1975). Schema theory and the concept of the generalised motor program (GMP) 
have been criticised for over-reliance on the symbolic computing metaphor. The GMP was 
originally developed as an open loop concept, meaning that feedback was not necessary for 
error correction with GMPs typically operating on timescales of around 250ms or less (Shea 
& Wulf, 2005). This presents a problem for how GMPs can explain complex action sequences 
such as a golf swing or music-producing gestures that unfold over longer timescales. These 
concerns prompted the different theoretical approach relying on dynamical systems theory, 
which rejects the top down symbolic representation of schema theory (Newell, 2003), 
although see Schmidt (2003) for a rebuttal. A refinement of the GMP concept, the scalable 
response structure is better able to deal with longer sequential motor processes such as those 
36 
 
involved in improvisation, however (Shea & Wulf, 2005). If these motor processes are 
accompanied by auditory images, as postulated by Norgaard and Goldman, this would seem 
to entail sensorimotor integration in the form of auditory-motor coupling. 
 
2.6.2 Auditory-Motor Coupling 
What evidence is there for auditory-motor coupling and how are complicated sequences of 
movements linked to aural images in musicians? Bangert and Altenmüller (2003) conducted 
a study in which two groups of non-musicians underwent training sessions for five weeks to 
learn sequences of key presses on a piano keyboard. These were in the form of acoustically 
presented target melodies which increased in difficulty in response to the level of success for 
each item. The range was restricted to five notes (C-G) played by the right hand only, which 
was shielded from view. In one of the groups (the map group), the standard key-to-pitch 
mapping was used, whilst in the other (no map), pitches were assigned randomly on each 
training trial. EEG measurements were taken using probe tasks in auditory only (passive 
listening) and motor only (arbitrary silent key presses) conditions. Results showed increased 
activity in right anterior hemispheric brain regions only in the map group, supporting the 
hypothesis that brain plasticity in this region allows training-induced auditory-motor 
associations to be formed.  
 
Further evidence was found for these associations using transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(D'ausilio, Altenmüller, Olivetti Belardinelli, & Lotze, 2006); a greater motor excitability was 
found when pianists listened to a piece they had rehearsed compared to one they had not. 
This effect increased with longer training time and was observed after only 30 minutes’ 
rehearsal, although there is also evidence that the representation of a practiced piece 
changes in terms of its level of abstraction, at least in expert musicians (Palmer & Meyer, 
2000; Schmidt, 2003; Shea & Wulf, 2005). Drost et al (2005b) also found that induced motor 
effects can be produced by auditory stimuli representing potential perceptual effects. In this 
study, pianists were required to play pairs of tones in response to notation in the presence of 
auditory task-irrelevant distractor intervals, which could be congruent or incongruent. In 
subsequent experiments, coloured squares were used as imperative stimuli to control for 
expertise in music reading, and non-musicians were also tested. Pianists but not non-
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musicians had slower reaction times in incongruent conditions and experienced induced false 
responses (Drost et al., 2005b). This behavioural evidence lends further support for training 
induced auditory-motor coupling in musicians in the auditory to motor direction. That is, 
stimulus in the auditory modality was seen to influence motor behaviour. If motor behaviour 
also induces an auditory image in musicians then auditory-motor coupling could be said to be 
bidirectional, but obtaining behavioural evidence for this is more difficult, because imagery is 
an introspective state, immediately accessible only for the participants themselves. 
 
In order to infer such evidence, Keller and Koch (2008) had participants complete sequences 
of key presses on three vertically aligned keys in response to arbitrary colour patch stimuli. In 
some conditions, key presses were congruently mapped to the pitch height of the produced 
tones, whilst in others the mapping was scrambled, or no tones were produced. They found 
that participants’ mean reaction times were lower in the congruent condition and that this 
effect was greater in participants with more musical experience. The authors hypothesise that 
greater musical experience enhances action planning via the anticipation of the auditory 
effects of key presses, and that this is enhanced in musicians due to learned associations 
between physical height and melodic contour.  According to the spacial musical association 
of response codes or SMARC effect (Lidji, Kolinsky, Lochy, & Morais, 2007; Stewart, 
Verdonschot, Nasralla, & Lanipekun, 2013), in pianists this effect has a left-right dimension 
but in score-dependent musicians the vertical dimension is also enhanced. This experiment 
did not use a traditional instrument, such as a piano, so the effect was instrument-
independent, however no independent behavioural data was gathered to establish whether 
auditory imagery was actually used by participants (Hubbard, 2010). How might action 
planning involve imagery and what are the implications for the neural bases of musical 
behaviour in terms of auditory imagery?  
 
2.6.3 Ideo-Motor Theories 
Some closely related theories of action control that could provide an answer are based on the 
Ideo-motor principle (for a review, see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). What these theories 
share is the concept that there is a tight linkage between actions and their perceptual 
consequences. One branch amongst Ideo-motor theories is the common coding paradigm, 
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which is directly relevant to the relation of auditory imagery to music. The core concept of 
this paradigm is that the cognitive representation of actions is coded in the same 
representational format as their perceptual consequences (for a review of M/EEG, TMS and 
fMRI evidence supporting common neural coding in musicians, see Novembre & Keller, 2014). 
Since the perceptual consequences of enacting a motor program (or scalable response 
structure) to produce a musical phrase include how that phrase sounds, the common coding 
approach proposes that the bidirectional coupling of the motor program and the perception 
of the sound produced is achieved via this common representational format, such that 
hearing the sound can prime the motor program, and enacting the program invokes an 
auditory image as an anticipation of how the musical output will sound. An example of a 
common coding theory is the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) (Camus, Hommel, Brunel, & 
Brouillet, 2017; Hommel, 2004, 2009). In TEC, the action-event coupling is achieved via event 
files: hierarchically organised networks of neural codes that relate to different aspects of 
events, such as activation contexts, actions, perceptual effects and thoughts that regularly 
accompany a given event. When one node in such a network is activated, the activation 
spreads to other members of the network, following pattern completion logic. Context-
specific priming can modulate the relative strengths of activations in a task-sensitive way 
(Hommel, 2009).   
 
 
2.6.4 The Mirror Neuron System, Simulation and Emulation 
As well as TEC, and other common coding theories that belong to the broader theoretical 
framework of Ideo-motor theory, there are some other perspectives that share many of the 
key-concepts and can further elucidate these issues. The next to be discussed is the proposed 
mirror neuron system (MNS). Originally identified in the F5 region of the macaque monkey 
premotor cortex, mirror neurons are a distinct sub-population of neurons which are activated 
both by performing an action and by observing the same action being performed by another 
individual (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). Although the evidence for a 
homologous system in humans is less direct due to the fact that invasive techniques such as 
implanting electrodes directly into the brain are not used, non-invasive methods such as 
transcranial magnetic stimulation and brain scanning methods have been used to support this 
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idea (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). It might seem that a system which is hypothesised to 
involve motor resonance in response to visual observations is of limited relevance to the 
current discussion of auditory-motor coupling but there are several interesting findings which 
are of relevance. The first is that subsequent experiments with monkeys it was found that 
motor resonance occurred in response to the sound of actions, leading to the hypothesis that 
there are sub-populations of echo neurons (Kohler et al., 2002). Moreover, the human 
homologue of the mirror neuron system involves frontoparietal circuits including Broca’s 
area, which has been suggested to be involved in domain-general system for the production 
of action sequences, including the novel sequences involved in improvisation (Berkowitz & 
Ansari, 2008). Two studies have shown that the inferior parietal and ventral premotor areas 
(the MNS) are engaged in the learning of guitar chords by imitation and the results further 
show that the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is active during motor preparation 
for unfamiliar chords (Buccino et al., 2004; Vogt et al., 2007). Given the hypothesised role of 
the DLPFC in the selection and combination of existing elements in the motor repertoire to 
produce unpractised actions, this sheds light on its involvement in improvisation discussed in 
section 2.8 below. In contrast to common coding paradigms which posit a shared 
representational format for perceptual and motor processes, the mirror neuron system is an 
explanation at the neural level such that a sub-population of the motor system itself 
represents perceived actions, allowing understanding and prediction which facilitates 
imitative learning, but also offers an explanation of other aspects of musical engagement. 
Overy and Molnar-Szakacs (2009) outline the Shared Affective Motion Experience model of 
musical engagement whereby the human mirror neuron system forms a domain-general 
system for processing the combinatorial rules involved in music, language and sequential 
action. They also propose the anterior insula as a conduit to the limbic system to account for 
our emotional engagement. The mirror neuron system account can be considered to be one 
of a family of simulation theories in that part of the motor system is involved in action 
cognition whilst not actually executing a movement (O’Shea & Moran, 2017).  
 
Another simulation theory that is more directly related to imagery rather than the 
representation of observed actions is motor simulation theory (Jeannerod, 2001). This is 
based on the idea of functional equivalence: motor imagery is taken to be covert action which 
uses the same neural mechanisms as for motor preparation and action but with the difference 
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that the action is inhibited. Motor imagery could be a feature of the motor control component 
of auditory-motor coupling in musical performance. There are also parallels with sports 
psychology, reflecting similarities between elite performance in music and sport. For 
example, Holmes and Collins (2001) propose a systematic model for the use of imagery by 
athletes, based on functional equivalence between motor imagery and motor 
preparation/execution. That imagery and execution rely on overlapping neural correlates in 
this model resembles features of common coding paradigms mentioned above, but here 
rather than a common representational format accessible by both systems, the emphasis is 
on the use of the motor system to predict the outcomes of actions. In an experiment targeting 
the dorsal premotor cortex (involved in motor resonance in response to observed hand 
actions, see MNS discussed above), Hadley, Novembre, Keller, and Pickering (2015) used 
transcranial magnetic stimulation to show a causal role in the operation of this area in the 
accuracy of musical turn-taking. They conclude that motor simulation is an important 
mechanism in musical synchronisation.  
 
Another related class of theories which could account for auditory-motor coupling is 
emulation theories. The distinction between simulation and emulation is pertinent to music 
performance. Whereas the former has a focus on motor imagery, the latter widens this to 
include multimodal predictions of the perceptual consequences of actions (Grush, 2004). 
Although emulation in the motor control context involves the prediction of sensory 
consequences involved in movement, such as proprioceptive factors, this could be extended 
to other modalities, most importantly the prediction of the resulting sound. 
 
There is a great deal of support amongst motor control approaches for Pressing’s ideas of 
feedback and feedforward mechanisms in error detection and control, for example action-
perception coupling theories posit forward and inverse modelling (Keller, 2012; Lotze, 2013; 
Maes, Leman, Palmer, & Wanderley, 2014). Forward modelling means that the perceptual 
consequences of planned actions are predicted, via the production of an ‘efference copy’ of 
the motor command, allowing for the prediction of errors before the sensory consequences 
of an action are perceived (Maidhof, Vavatzanidis, Prinz, Rieger, & Koelsch, 2010; Ruiz, 
Jabusch, & Altenmüller, 2009). Inverse modelling involves the linking of perceived or intended 
sensory states with the motor commands needed to enact behaviour which has those states 
41 
 
as perceptual consequences. As discussed above, these sensory states could include how the 
music will sound; in other words, the intention or anticipation could be in the form of auditory 
imagery. There remains a fundamental question about the mirror neuron, simulation and 
emulation theories discussed so far, however: to what extent are they compatible? If they are 
in fact competing explanations for the same phenomena, they ought to generate different 
predictions that can be tested. O’Shea and Moran (2017) offer a useful appraisal of the 
relative merits of motor simulation, motor emulation and embodied cognition frameworks 
for motor control, whilst pointing out some mutual incompatibilities. Gentsch, Weber, 
Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Schütz-Bosbach (2016) also give a very helpful taxonomy of common 
coding, simulation, and internal model theories. The first category includes ideomotor 
theories and TEC, the second includes simulation theory itself, mirror neurons, motor imagery 
and perceptual symbols accounts. The last category includes motor control, emulation and 
predictive coding accounts. In the final section, embodied and grounded cognition will be 
discussed. 
 
2.6.5 Embodied and Grounded Perspectives 
If ambiguities of terminology beset the theories discussed above, this is no less true of 
embodied cognition. The essential differences between these theories and the motor control, 
simulation, emulation and common coding theories discussed above could be expressed in 
terms of a continuum between the computational metaphors involved in forward and inverse 
models and the degree to which these are representational at the motor control end, and the 
non-Cartesian, non-representational non-computational stance at the embodied end. This is 
related to other debates in cognitive science, for example to what degree are cognitive 
processes carrying out amodal symbol manipulation as opposed to reactivating perceptual or 
motor states? In mental imagery, to what degree is abstract amodal content involved (Kosslyn 
et al., 1995; Pylyshyn, 2003)? Embodied cognition does not just say that the bodily states 
affect thinking, that would be trivial. To varying degrees, embodied theories hypothesise that 
even the most abstract seeming thought, such as mathematical reasoning, involves sensory-
motor processes (Fischer, 2012). Some embodied perspectives emphasise the role of the 
environment (situatedness) and social aspects (Iyer, 2002; Smith & Semin, 2004). The term 
‘grounded’ cognition is used by some authors to refer to the grounding of cognition in 
42 
 
sensory-motor processes , by others to refer to the symbol grounding problem (Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Harnad, 1990). This problem refers to the issue of how arbitrary amodal 
symbols can be tied to meaning. If such symbols just refer to other symbols, how does the 
system know what it is thinking about? Harnad (1990) gives an example of trying to learn 
Chinese using a dictionary which is written in Chinese. This echoes the Chinese Room thought 
experiment deployed to criticise the idea that artificial intelligence could instantiate 
consciousness (Searle, 1980). In this thought experiment an operator, who does not know 
Chinese, receives Chinese symbols as input, follows symbol manipulation rules, and delivers 
output in the form of (other) Chinese symbols. In this way the system mimics the behaviour 
of a Chinese brain, but neither the operator nor the system understands any Chinese. This 
question of how to tie amodal symbols to referents is a serious one, which in part motivates 
grounded cognition’s rejection of the idea that meaning inheres in the arbitrary relation of 
abstract amodal symbols to their referents, or to each other. Grounded cognition solves this 
problem with perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999), which being based on sensorimotor 
simulation, are not arbitrarily related to referents. Instead, meaning is grounded in the 
possibilities for action. Glenberg and Robertson (2000, p. 383) characterise the 
comprehending of the meaning of a sentence like “Jareb stood on the chair to change the 
light bulb” as involving indexing the phrases to perceptual symbols (or objects), derive 
affordances for these, and mesh these affordances guided by syntax. In the context, a chair 
affords being stood on to change the bulb. This concept of an affordance developed by Gibson 
(Eysenck & Keane, 2015), is important in the application of grounded cognition to music and 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section. What distinguishes grounded from 
embodied cognition is partly a matter of terminology (Gentsch et al., 2016), but essentially 
grounded paradigms do not just include embodied (sensorimotor) aspects. They hold that 
“cognition is typically grounded in multiple ways, including simulations, situated action, and, 
on occasion, bodily states” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 619).  Another important difference is that 
grounded paradigms based on perceptual symbols involve multimodal simulation which is 
representational in character, whereas some embodied paradigms which emphasise 
cognition as interaction with the environment, have more in common with dynamical systems 
approaches in that they are not representational (O'Shea, 2017). These perspectives and the 
related enactivist “4E cognition” view (Torrance & Schumann, 2018) will be further discussed 
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in Chapter 7 in terms of musical embodiment which is situated in an environment in which 
musicians interface with their instruments (De Souza, 2017).   
2.6.6 Affordances in Musical Contexts 
When an agent encounters an object or system, properties of the agent and of the system 
combined offer opportunities for interaction; these are affordances (Greeno, 1994). A large 
stone might be throwable for an adult human but not for a child (Windsor & De Bézenac, 
2012), meaning that the same object offers different affordances to different agents 
depending on their attributes. As originally conceived by Gibson, affordances are directly 
perceived (Eysenck & Keane, 2015) rather than recognised and there is some evidence that 
this can be the case. For example, Pappas and Mack (2008) found evidence that affordances 
produced motor priming even though presented objects were undetectable due to masking 
or attentional blink. However, the concept has been developed to include recognised 
affordances (Greeno, 1994). Affordances are directly applicable to musical performance, as 
what a musician can play in a context depends on their abilities after training on an 
instrument, and on the attributes of the instrument itself. The guitar affords subtle blues-
inflected pitch bends to a guitarist, whilst this is not the case for a non-guitarist and is not 
possible on a standard piano. What is improvisable also depends on the affordances offered 
by an instrument to a player (Love, 2017). This is not a static set of possibilities, since the 
effectivities of a musician change with training and in the other direction, instruments are 
designed with human physical capabilities in mind and as people train, explore and expand 
their capabilities, new instruments are designed in response (Windsor & De Bézenac, 2012). 
 
2.6.7 Conclusion 
A considerable amount of experimental evidence supports the bidirectional linking of motor 
behaviour and auditory representations during musical activity, supporting the theoretical 
framework adopted by Norgaard (2014) and Goldman (2013), consistent with Pressing’s 
(1988) prescient cognitive model. However, although these theories of action control are 
consistent with a role for prospective auditory imagery in improvisation, they leave open 
some questions regarding how the various models are instantiated in the brain (Matyja, 
2015). Another criticism is that although these are models of sensorimotor integration, the 
language of feedback and feedforward draws on an information processing metaphor which 
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actually assumes a degree sensorimotor segregation. Brincker (2015) offers an alternative 
model which employs the concept of social affordance space tracking, and although a detailed 
discussion is beyond the scope of this review, it is worth noting that there are different 
theoretical perspectives on improvisation and questions about which are the most valid for a 
given improvisatory behaviour are far from settled. For example, motor simulation theories 
are incompatible with embodied approaches as the former considers imagery as 
representational whereas embodied theories emphasise the interaction of the body and the 
environment in a non-representational way (O'Shea, 2017). What is needed is more research 
which explicitly seeks findings in favour of specific models rather than delivering evidence 
which can be interpreted differently according to incompatible theoretical positions.  Two 
brief examples might be illustrative here: a similar incompatibility exists between the 
cognitivist stance which posits motor programmes and dynamical systems approaches, in 
which complex movements depend on emergent properties of moving limbs at a lower 
hierarchical level, rather than top-down control. What kind of evidence would favour one 
approach over another? Consider the sequence of electromyogram (EMG) signals from 
agonist and antagonist muscles during rapid elbow extension movements. These could be 
interpreted within both stances unless the movement is unexpectedly suppressed. A motor 
programme interpretation would predict that the EMG signals would still be present, whereas 
the dynamical systems approach entails that such a sequence is a property of actual 
movement, and would therefore not be present (Schmidt, 2003). Another example is a study 
by Amsel, Urbach, and Kutas (2014) which was designed to test different predictions made by 
amodal and grounded cognition paradigms. They presented monochromatic object words in 
low and high contrast conditions and participants made judgements of the validity of 
object/colour or object/location combinations (for example, green lime or blue lime, kitchen 
banana, bedroom banana). The authors collected reaction times and event related potential 
(ERP) data which showed that low contrast differentially affected colour decisions, suggesting 
the involvement of visuo-perceptual states in accessing knowledge about an object’s colour. 
Further, the time course of the ERP data is incompatible with amodal processing followed by 
visuo-perceptual involvement. Unless experimenters can produce designs which can similarly 
distinguish between, for example, motor simulation theories and embodied paradigms, 
questions of which theoretical framework should be favoured will remain unanswered. Whilst 
a detailed mechanistic explanation with the necessary evidence to settle these broad 
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theoretical controversies might not be available for some time, there is evidence from brain 
scanning techniques that facilitates a degree of triangulation between approaches, which is 
considered in the next section. 
 
2.7 Functional Brain Scanning Methods 
2.7.1 fMRI 
The first experimental method used to investigate the process of improvisation considered in 
this section is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This technique uses a scanner 
to detect differences in the levels of oxygenated blood in different regions of the brain during 
experimental tasks. The blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast is used as a 
proxy for brain activity in a given region on the basis that more active regions have a higher 
energy demand. This triggers a haemodynamic response such that oxygenated blood is 
delivered to the active regions in the brain. The technique has a temporal resolution of 2-3 
seconds (Posse et al., 2012) and can sometimes give a good indication of which brain areas 
are relatively active or inactive during experimental tasks compared to a control task or rest. 
To what extent can this method elucidate the role of auditory imagery in improvisation? Beaty 
(2015) presents a synthesis of the findings of fMRI studies and discusses their implications for 
Pressing’s model. He finds that many studies report that a network of prefrontal brain regions 
is involved in improvising, including the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) and the dorsal premotor cortex (PMD).  
 
Given the hypothesised functional roles of these regions in the literature, Beaty finds some 
support for Pressing’s cognitive model. For example, the left IFG is associated with controlled 
memory retrieval and the supplementary motor area (SMA) and PMD are associated with the 
coordinated selection of motor sequences. However, there are some discrepant results 
between studies, for example Limb and Braun (2008) found deactivations in the DLPFC when 
jazz pianists improvised (on a non-metallic keyboard) in an fMRI scanner, which the authors 
hypothesise is indicative of ‘flow states’ (Csikszentmihalyi & Lefevre, 1989; Ullén et al., 2012), 
characterised by a reduction in executive control. However, other studies found activations 
of the DLPFC (Bengtsson et al., 2007; de Manzano & Ullén, 2012a), so the precise nature and 
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extent of executive control during improvisation is unclear, although these discrepancies 
might be due to differences in task and cohort between the studies (Pinho, Ullén, Castelo-
Branco, Fransson, & de Manzano, 2016).  The improvising experts in Limb and Braun’s study 
were playing over a familiar chord progression, allowing for a high degree of automaticity (cf. 
Goldman, 2013), whereas the other studies involved classical pianists engaged in tasks that 
are akin to pseudo-random generation. Both factors, the difference in relevant improvising 
experience between cohorts, and the level of executive control required to ensure that 
output evinces randomness, are plausible explanations of these differing results. One other 
study which did have expert improvisers as participants in an ecologically valid task but found 
activations of the DLPFC is worthy of note. Donnay, Rankin, Lopez-Gonzalez, Jiradejvong, and 
Limb (2014) had participants ‘trade fours’, which is a form of interactive musical 
communication in improvising. It is possible, as these authors hypothesise, that in trading 
fours the improvised content is constrained in virtue of being a response to an improvised 
idea in a musical conversation. The DLPFC activation is therefore compatible with the need to 
hold elements of the heard phrase in working memory, and to respond with a phrase which 
relates to it. 
 
2.7.2 Direct Evidence for Auditory imagery 
Returning to the question of auditory imagery, there is evidence that this is associated with 
activity in the posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG), (Halpern & Zatorre, 1999; Zatorre & 
Halpern, 2005). Further, functional connections between the pSTG and areas involved in 
movement and planning have been proposed (Lahav, Saltzman, & Schlaug, 2007; Zatorre, 
Chen, & Penhune, 2007), which could serve as a neural basis for the audio-motor coupling 
discussed in the previous section, (for fMRI evidence of both the auditory-motor and motor-
auditory directions of coupling see Bangert et al., 2006). Zhang, Chen, Wen, Lu, and Liu (2017) 
had participants watch silent visualisations of music while imagining the sound. They found 
increased bilateral activation in Wernicke’s area compared to when they listened to the same 
music. Interestingly, they also found connections with the dorsal attention network and the 
motor control areas. This supports the bidirectional auditory-motor coupling view. The 
involvement of Wernicke’s area and its right homologue might also point to an overlap with 
language processing systems in addition to the involvement of Broca’s area and its right 
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homologue in the processing of musical syntax (Cheung, Meyer, Friederici, & Koelsch, 2018; 
Patel, 2003). The involvement of the SMA and pre-SMA in auditory imagery (see Lima et al., 
2016, for a review) is particularly interesting. In studies on notational audiation the authors 
found that imagery was disrupted by articulatory suppression (Brodsky et al., 2003), and by 
using larynx-electromyography that imagery evoked covert excitation of the vocal folds 
(Brodsky et al., 2008). Their interpretation was that reading a score evoked auditory imagery 
in a process of inwardly “singing to oneself”, even though no lyrics were involved (Brodsky et 
al., 2008, p. 442) and cite evidence for the involvement of the SMA as further support. Further 
research is needed to establish whether this is the case phenomenologically, or whether the 
generation of imagery recruits areas associated with language (Broca’s area, Wernicke’s area) 
in domain-general ways. The activation of the pre-SMA and the boundary area between the 
SMA and pre-SMA during auditory processing and imagery could be interpreted as the 
activation of motor representations involved in sound production (Lima et al., 2016), which is 
compatible with embodied and grounded cognition paradigms. The role of the pre-SMA in 
sequential action planning and sensorimotor integration would be crucial to improvisation in 
any case. 
 
 Only two studies were reported by Beaty (2015) to have found increased activation in the 
pSTG compared to a memory retrieval control task (Donnay et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2012), 
implying that direct evidence for auditory imagery is limited. However, this might be because 
both the primary auditory cortex and secondary auditory areas are recruited in music 
perception  (Zatorre & Halpern, 2005) and the fMRI studies surveyed by Beaty all involved 
improvisers who heard what they played and in many cases they also heard an 
accompaniment. It is therefore difficult for fMRI studies to find a signature of activation for 
auditory imagery in improvisation when the same brain regions are involved in music 
perception (Keller, 2012). It is also likely, given the evidence for auditory-motor coupling cited 
above, that imagery is present during tasks which involve playing from memory. In that case, 
brain activation in improvisation in contrast to playing from memory might not detect 
auditory imagery, since this would be involved in both conditions. 
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2.7.3 Further Methodological Problems 
Improvisation involves many simultaneous cognitive processes (Bashwiner, Wertz, Flores, & 
Jung, 2016; Beaty, 2015; de Manzano & Ullén, 2012b; Limb & Braun, 2008; Norgaard, 2014; 
Pinho et al., 2014), and so there is an inevitable trade-off between ecological validity and 
isolating the specific neural correlates of any subset of these processes. Also, it should be 
remembered that fMRI uses the BOLD (blood oxygenation level dependant) response as a 
proxy for increased processing in a brain region but has a limited temporal resolution which 
can be as low as 1 second. The haemodynamic response itself can also exhibit a time lag which 
is of the order of 8-30 seconds (Pillai, 2014, p. 79; for an account of recent advances resulting 
in temporal resolutions of the order of 100ms, see Posse et al., 2012). By contrast, the 
threshold of metrical perception is approximately 100ms (London, 2012). Nor does the fMRI 
technique give much detail of the nature of the processing involved (Linke & Cusack, 2015). 
For example, if the automaticity of a cognitive task via practice results in greater neural 
efficiency, then fMRI would not necessarily find an activation in the relevant brain area, since 
less oxygenated blood would be needed. Evidence for this was found in a study by Pinho et 
al. (2014) where activation in frontoparietal executive areas was negatively correlated with 
hours of improvising experience, but the latter was positively correlated with functional 
connectivity of the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, dorsal premotor cortices, and 
presupplementary areas.  
 
Activity in a brain area does not necessarily imply that the same neural processing is 
happening there on each occasion since the complexity of the brain is such that it is possible 
that the same brain regions contain multiple separate neural processing systems (Grahn, 
2012). Further, there are questions over the validity of the reverse inference from the 
activation of a brain region to the involvement of particular cognitive processes (Poldrack, 
2006). This problem is further compounded by the differing and contentious definitions of 
improvisation that are operationalised in different experiments. For example, if improvisation 
is characterised in terms of the free generation of novel sequences, this could be 
operationalised as a pseudorandom generation task (Berkowitz & Ansari, 2008). As the 
corpora analyses discussed above reveal a high degree of pattern use however, this is not 
necessarily a good way to characterise what improvisers do. On the other hand, experiments 
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with more ecologically valid tasks such as in Limb and Braun’s (2008) study still rely on 
interpreting activation patterns in terms of the hypothesised roles of brain regions from 
previous studies. These are then used to bolster the interpretation of which cognitive process 
are involved in improvising, but without a rigorous cognitive-scientific specification of 
improvisation as a process, this reasoning risks being circular (Goldman, 2015). Finally, a 
recent study casts doubt on the statistical methods used in fMRI studies to infer clusters of 
voxels as indicative of brain activation (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016). These authors 
conducted a study with 499 healthy volunteers in an attempt to validate the statistical 
methods used in fMRI analysis and found false-positive error rates of up to 70% instead of the 
required 5% when using the three most popular analysis software packages. This result 
potentially calls into question the interpretation of fMRI studies to date. 
 
2.7.4 Summary of fMRI Findings 
Notwithstanding the caveats mentioned above regarding the limitations of fMRI methods, 
the studies which investigated improvisation using ecologically valid tasks of relatively 
unconstrained improvisation with expert improvisers (Limb & Braun, 2008; Liu et al., 2012), 
consistently found a signature pattern of activations and deactivations of particular brain 
regions. Activations were found in areas associated with motor control and sensorimotor 
integration (SMA, pre-SMA, PMD) and in areas responsible for the processing of musical 
syntax (IFG, Broca’s Area and right homologue). A focal activation in the medial prefrontal 
cortex (MPFC, Brodmann area 10) was also found. This is thought to be an integrative area 
involved in maintaining a diverse set of subroutines involved in the maintenance of a higher-
order goal (Limb & Braun, 2008; Rutherford, 2014). Deactivations were found in the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the latter 
deactivation was also found by Pinho et al. (2014). These areas are thought to be involved in 
explicit task monitoring, correction and stepwise implementation. This kind of thinking, which 
requires intermediate steps to be stored in working memory, is found in explicit logico-
deductive problem solving. Therefore, the deactivation of the LOFC and DLPFC in 
improvisation is consistent with its characterisation as a largely automatic, unselfconscious 
process (Goldman, 2013; Johnson-Laird, 2002; Kratus, 1995; Norgaard et al., 2016; Sudnow, 
1978). The role of auditory imagery in improvisation remains unclear given the 
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methodological limitations of fMRI but, a meta-analysis by McNorgan (2012) further supports 
the involvement of the posterior Superior Temporal Gyrus (pSTG) in auditory imagery. 
Crucially, the consistent involvement of auditory association, motor, and sensorimotor 
integration areas supports an interpretation of musical auditory imagery as a form of 
grounded cognition (2.6.5). 
 
2.8 EEG and MEG Techniques 
2.8.1 Introduction 
In contrast to fMRI, which has good spatial resolution but poor temporal resolution, 
electroencephalography (EEG) has a temporal resolution of the order of milliseconds, much 
more suitable for the timescales of music cognition (London, 2012), but it has poor spatial 
resolution relative to fMRI and must therefore rely on evidence from other techniques for the 
identification of the brain regions responsible (Pillai, 2014). Some of the EEG evidence in 
support of auditory-motor coupling has already been mentioned, but there is also some 
support for auditory imagery in studies using this technique.  
 
2.8.2 Responses to Notation 
In addition to the fMRI evidence mentioned above relating to aural imagery in response to 
music notation, an electroencephalography study by Schön and Besson (2005) found that N1 
event related potentials (ERPs) were stronger when there was a mismatch between the 
notation and an audible melody. That notation can elicit aural imagery was also supported by 
two studies which used magnetoencephalography (MEG).  Shürmann, Raij, Fujiki and Hari 
(2002) used MEG to test musicians’ brain activity as they imagined the sound of a visually 
presented note in standard notation. A visual control task was used to exclude effects that 
were due to visual processing.  In the second study, MEG was used to test participants’ 
response to mismatches between auditory stimuli comprising randomly generated twelve-
tone sequences and their visually presented scores (Yumoto et al., 2005).  These findings also 
implicate the involvement of the Superior Temporal Gyrus in auditory imagery, however there 
were some differences in lateralization in the results which might be explained by the 
differing experimental tasks. Also, it is possible that pitch contour processing and pitch 
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interval processing are dealt with by different systems with pitch contour processing 
lateralized in the right hemisphere (Hyde, Peretz, & Zatorre, 2008; Lee, Janata, Frost, Hanke, 
& Granger, 2011). It should be noted that these studies did not collect independent 
behavioural data to establish that imagery was used by participants in the experimental tasks. 
This is a weakness of some experimental designs involving brain scanning techniques, because 
they rely on participant self-report or an assumption based on the type of experimental task 
to establish imagery use. This is a problem in research on imagery more generally because it 
is difficult to design experiments with behavioural measures that causally implicate mental 
imagery. An example of a study which did use this kind of behavioural data is Halpern and 
Zatorre (1999), in which the time taken by participants in an imagery condition for short, 
medium and long melodies was analysed, establishing that this varied in line with the duration 
of the actual melodies. 
 
2.8.3 EEG and Altered Auditory Feedback 
Another way to investigate the role of auditory imagery using EEG is via altered auditory 
feedback (AAF). In the context of the common coding paradigm discussed above, auditory 
imagery means that participants form expectations of the perceptual effects of motor 
commands in the form of auditory images. If the notes they hear are sometimes manipulated 
by the experimenter, this ought to produce a mismatch between the image and the perceived 
note. This in turn leads to the hypothesis that EEG will be able to detect a signature of this 
mismatch. Maidhof et al, (2010) analysed the EEG results of participants who played scales 
and patterns bimanually on a MIDI keyboard. One note chosen at random between the 40th 
and 60th played was lowered by a semitone. This was contrasted with a passive listening task 
in which the same stimulus underwent the same manipulation. The results showed a greater 
magnitude early negativity (N200) deflection in the action condition compared to the listening 
condition. The authors conclude that the results “indicate that the feedback ERN/N200 is 
influenced by the expectancies generated by the intention and action of the pianists to 
produce a certain auditory effect” (Maidhof et al., 2010, p. 2410). In addition, the 
hypothesised neural generators for the N200 lie in the Rostral Cingulate Zone (RCZ) which is 
thought to have a role in action monitoring relevant to piano performance (Ruiz et al., 2009). 
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2.8.4 Different Error Related Potentials 
According to the common coding paradigms discussed above, there are two distinct processes 
that could produce an ERP indicative of a mismatch. One involves a difference between the 
efference copy of a motor command and the triggered motor program, the other occurs if 
auditory feedback differs from the anticipated result. Whereas the latter requires knowledge 
of results (KR), the former does not and in some cases the ERP can even precede the 
completion of the action (Ruiz et al., 2009). One EEG study used AAF to manipulate feedback 
so that the wrong tone would be heard even though the correct motor response was given 
(Lutz, Puorger, Cheetham, & Jancke, 2013). Musical novices completed a series of trials which 
allowed them to develop an internal model which mapped key presses to tones. A comparison 
of results from early and late trials showed a modulation of an error related negativity (ERN) 
peaking at 100ms, whilst a later feedback related potential (FRP) at 250ms remained 
unchanged. That the early ERN was affected as a result of learning implies that some 
comparison with an internal representation or prediction, facilitated by training, is being 
carried out by participants. This is because the ERN onset at 100ms is too early to be a 
response to feedback and the effect was seen in later trials after training. These results are 
compatible with common coding, which predicts that the comparison of the efference copy 
with the performed action requires an internal auditory-motor coupling model, which can 
precede the mismatch between the auditory feedback and the anticipatory auditory image 
(audiation). Also, when this mismatch is a result of the manipulation of feedback, there should 
be no discrepancy between the efference copy and the action, since the latter is correct. In 
this way, the experimental design allows for the separation of these components, perhaps 
shedding light on the aforementioned issue of the modality of feedforward mechanisms in 
Pressing’s (1988) cognitive model of improvisation (for a detailed schematic of the 
interrelation of forward and inverse models in the motorcontrol domain, see  Ptak, Schnider, 
& Fellrath, 2017; and in the speech production domain, see Tian & Poeppel, 2010).   
 
2.8.5 Summary of EEG and MEG Findings 
The evidence from studies using EEG and MEG brain scanning techniques offers support to 
the explanatory framework of sensorimotor integration and common coding as well as 
suggesting the involvement of fronto-parietal circuits and the superior temporal gyrus in 
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improvisation. That the latter seems to be implicated both in auditory imagery and working 
memory (Zatorre & Halpern, 2005; Zatorre & Samson, 1991), suggests that a useful strategy 
might be to look more closely at the structure of working memory in musicians. The EEG 
evidence also suggests that error-related potentials and altered auditory feedback could be 
used to investigate the limits of auditory imagery experimentally. 
 
2.8.6 Recent fMRI and EEG Evidence for Differences Between Improvising and 
Score-dependent Musicians 
In section 2.6 it was argued that musical performance is dependent on training-induced 
bidirectional auditory-motor coupling. Although perhaps most music students receive ear 
training and a grounding in different genres of music, improvising musicians train differently 
to score-dependent musicians in their daily practice by emphasising learning by ear as 
opposed to sight-reading and memorising (Berliner, 1994). This suggests the following 
predictions: first, improvisers should have relatively enhanced auditory-motor 
transformation skills and score dependents should have enhanced visuo-motor skills. Second, 
following from the notion that improvisers access musical knowledge-structures differently 
to non-improvisers, they could exhibit genre-dependent responses and expectancies whilst 
perceiving music which reflect this. Evidence for the latter prediction comes from a study 
which combines EEG and behavioural data in a design which exploits jazz musicians’ 
knowledge of chord substitutions which fulfil analogous harmonic functions. Goldman, 
Jackson, and Sajda (2018) created an oddball task in which they systematically manipulated 
chord deviants with respect to whether they were valid substitutions in jazz harmony. The 
results showed significant correlations between improvisation experience and the responses 
to the different kinds of stimuli. This finding is further supported by Bianco, Novembre, Keller, 
Villringer, and Sammler (2018) who also found EEG and behavioural differences, this time 
between classical and jazz pianists during a silent imitation task. The first prediction, that 
auditory-motor skills are enhanced in improvisers compared to score-dependent musicians 
gains support from Harris and de Jong (2015), who found fMRI evidence of increased 
activation in areas involved in audio-motor transformations in the former group.  
 
54 
 
2.9 Toward an Experimental Paradigm 
2.9.1 Introduction 
Considering the literature to date, the questions that remain regarding the role of auditory 
imagery in improvisation include: If musicians are hearing in their heads what they improvise, 
how accurate and detailed is this imagery? When does it occur in the generative process, prior 
to phrase generation, simultaneously or post-hoc? What is the size of the musical unit that is 
at the appropriate level of description to be imagined (a note, phrase or something in 
between)? In order to progress toward an experimental method to address these questions, 
I now turn to the issue of working memory. 
 
2.9.2 Working Memory 
Working memory (WM) can be defined as a cognitive process for temporary storage of task-
relevant information for goal-directed behaviours (Huang, Matysiak, Heil, König, & Brosch, 
2016). There is some evidence that musicians use working memory in a different way to non-
musicians. Baddeley and Hitch’s model of working memory (WM) has, to a first 
approximation, a central executive, an episodic buffer, a visuo-spatial sketchpad and a 
phonological loop (Baddeley, 2001, 2010; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). However, in an fMRI study 
comparing musicians and non-musicians, Schulze, Zysset, Mueller, Friederici, and Koelsch 
(2011) found evidence that musicians also have a ‘tonal loop’ for the maintenance of tonal 
information in WM. Furthermore, in addition to the core areas of overlap for WM for verbal 
and tonal material in both groups (including Broca’s Area, SMA, premotor cortex, the left 
insular cortex and the inferior parietal lobe), the additional areas used by musicians for tonal 
material include areas involved in movement (right globus pallidus, the right caudate nucleus, 
and the left cerebellum). This adds further support for the concept of sensorimotor 
integration discussed in previous sections. However, some more recent findings have 
implicated articulatory rehearsal in the maintenance of melodies in working memory (Nees, 
Corrini, Leong, & Harris, 2017; Soemer & Saito, 2015). This is consistent with the core areas 
of overlap for verbal and tonal WM mentioned above and with earlier studies on auditory 
imagery in response to notation (Brodsky et al., 2003; Brodsky et al., 2008). Further research 
is therefore needed to explore which elements of non-verbal sounds require specialised WM 
systems in musicians. 
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2.9.3 Shared Syntactical Integration Resource Hypothesis  
The involvement of Broca’s area also raises the question of the degree of domain-specificity 
or generality of the cognitive processes involved in improvisation, which could be relevant in 
terms of experimental design. In other words, are these processes specific to music, or does 
musical behaviour co-opt cognitive resources that can be used for a number of tasks? Broca’s 
area was thought to be language-specific, with its right homologue being involved in the 
processing of musical syntax. Recently however, Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher (2012) 
found evidence of both language-specific and domain-general regions within Broca’s area. 
Some authors have also offered evidence for shared resources in music cognition, for 
example, Patel (2003) posits the Shared Syntactical Integration Resource Hypothesis, 
whereby both language and music make use of a domain-general syntax processing system 
(but for contrary views, see Bigand, Delbé, Poulin-Charronnat, Leman, & Tillmann, 2014; 
Perruchet & Poulin-Charronnat, 2013).  
 
2.9.4 Experimental Access to Online Imagery 
Despite this possibility of resource sharing, the evidence suggests that the tonal loop is 
specific to the maintenance of tonal materials in WM, hence this might be a suitable target 
for experimental manipulation if there is sufficient reason to suppose that auditory imagery 
in improvisation requires WM for pitches. There is an a priori reason to suppose this if 
improvisation involves prior auditory imagery of musical phrases, since this would include a 
pitch sequence maintained and possibly manipulated in conscious awareness. A number of 
authors also reach the conclusion that WM is involved in musical imagery (Aleman & Van’t 
Wout, 2004; Bailes, Bishop, Stevens, & Dean, 2012; Herholz, Lappe, Knief, & Pantev, 2008; 
Keller, 2012; Schulze et al., 2011). Of particular importance here is the use of ‘online’ musical 
imagery, that is to say, anticipatory imagery during performance as this would constitute 
auditory imagery during improvisation. Although not directly related to improvisation, 
Bishop, Bailes, and Dean (2013) conducted a study to investigate the use of imagery during 
the performance of composed melodies, with a focus on imagery for dynamics and 
articulation. Participants learned two short melodies from scores on a MIDI enabled piano 
and then gave expressive performances, one of which they chose as a baseline performance. 
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They then were presented with dynamic and articulation marks on scores, which were 
revealed as they played via a monitor. The task required them to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as to 
whether the marks coincided with their intentions in three conditions: as they played 
normally (audio-motor), as they played with audio feedback muted (motor only) and as they 
imagined the melodies in response to the score.  An important aspect of the design of this 
study was that participants gave their verbal reports as they were playing, their reaction times 
could be taken, and their responses compared with their baseline performance (they were 
instructed to keep the expressive features the same across performances). Finally, 
participants completed the verbal task in a listening only condition. As the authors point out, 
a frequent and valid criticism of imagery studies is that no independent behavioural data is 
taken to verify that participants actually use imagery to do the task (Hubbard, 2010). In this 
case, an alternative strategy to do the task would be the use of declarative knowledge relating 
to the kinds of dynamics and articulation associated with musical structures, rather than 
imagery. However, the results did not show the faster response times which would be 
expected using declarative knowledge, which would allow participants to skip ahead rather 
than represent the unfolding time course of imagery. Given that the verbal report protocol 
promoted conscious intention rather than implicit or automatic processes, imagery is 
conscious and preserves the temporal properties of the music, slower response times imply 
the use of imagery. Bishop et al. (2013) conclude that the use of online imagery during 
performance facilitates articulation and expressivity, and that strength of imagery improves 
with musical expertise.  Interestingly, although no correlation was found with working 
memory capacity in this study, the involvement of working memory was a premise. Keller 
(2012) states: “Thus, anticipatory imagery facilitates the planning and execution of musical 
actions. This type of imagery is a top–down controlled process to the extent that the 
performance goal—a representation of the ideal sound—is kept active in working memory”, 
(p 209). There are a number of issues of relevance in this and the other studies mentioned in 
this section. Despite Johnson-Laird’s (2002) characterisation of improvisation as not requiring 
working memory for intermediate results, perhaps a different kind of working memory is 
involved in online musical imagery (Schulze et al., 2011). The auditory component of such 
imagery could be characterised as a top-down, deliberate conscious process interfacing with 
lower-level audio-motor associations (Keller, 2012). Rather than thinking of this in terms of 
the computational metaphor such that this use of WM is to store intermediate results in an 
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algorithmic procedure, WM is part of the process which enables the image to be part of 
conscious awareness. So, for this kind of deliberate use of musical imagery in the auditory 
modality, which is the appropriate musical unit to consider as a likely candidate for the 
contents of auditory imagery, and what is its temporal span? 
 
2.9.5 The Temporal Dimension of Improvisation 
For the moment it’s the jazz that’s playing; there’s no melody, only notes, a host of 
little jolts. They know no rest, an unchanging order gives birth to them and destroys 
them, without ever giving them time to recover, to exist for themselves.  (Sartre, 1965, 
p. 37) 
 
Imagining in the auditory modality is something that, by definition, a musician is consciously 
aware of. Conscious awareness itself involves the integration of different modalities of 
perception and cognition within a temporal framework. This poses a problem: how does the 
brain give us an intelligible conscious experience through time when the different sensory 
modalities have different latencies in terms of processing? The answer seems to be that we 
generate a ‘subjective now’ which is a time-frame of approximately 3 seconds, within which 
events are bound together in conscious experience (Bao et al., 2015). This is particularly 
relevant to sensorimotor integration and hence to musical improvisation. In fact there is 
evidence that jazz solos are constructed from the concatenation of ‘mid-level units’ (MLUs) 
of approximately 2-3 seconds (Frieler, Schütz, & Pfleiderer, 2016). Therefore, the MLU is a 
good candidate for the correct level of description of the contents of auditory imagery. The 
MLU lies between the individual note and larger structural units such as a chorus. The average 
duration of MLUs in the corpus analysed by Frieler et al. was 2.3 seconds, which is in good 
agreement with the duration of the subjective present, and roughly corresponds with the 
musical phrase level (Frieler et al., 2016). This means that the musical unit hypothesised to be 
the building block of jazz solos lies within the temporal span of the subjective present, and 
hence the phenomenal contents of auditory imagery is likely to correspond to the MLU. This 
is also of a suitable size to be held in working memory as a target for musical output, which is 
compatible with the findings of studies indicating the involvement of brain areas associated 
with working memory in auditory imagery (Zatorre & Samson, 1991). In a recent analysis of 
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the solos by John Coltrane on his composition Giant Steps, Lehmann and Goldhahn (2016) 
also found units of approximately 3 seconds, which they termed ‘motor-output units’, or 
‘playing bursts’. These authors also make the link with the duration of the subjective present.  
 
2.9.6 Blocking Paradigms 
These considerations suggest that one way to investigate the extent of auditory imagery in 
improvisation is via a blocking paradigm which seeks to prevent or impede the use of tonal 
working memory during the task of improvising. In this kind of design, the assumption is that 
if a concurrent or flanker task which occupies particular cognitive resources impacts on the 
main experimental task performance, then the latter also uses these resources. Here, a 
flanker task which uses the tonal loop, for example remembering a short melody, could fulfil 
this role.  As a control, a flanker task which uses the cognitive resources of the phonological 
loop could be used. The musical output for both conditions could then be analysed in terms 
of entropy and pitch class distribution (Goldman, 2013) and compared with improvisations 
produced in a no flanker task condition (normal improvisation). Some recent studies have 
used concurrent tasks such as counting shoulder taps (Fidlon, 2011; Norgaard et al., 2016) 
and the results suggest that for expert improvisers, the extra cognitive load and divided 
attention in dual-task paradigms do not significantly impact on either task performance, 
although Norgaard’s results show greater pattern use in the dual task condition. However, if 
prospective auditory imagery requires the tonal loop, then a testable hypothesis is that 
improvisation would be impacted more significantly by a dual-task which involves the tonal 
loop than by a comparable one that does not. However, given more recent evidence in favour 
of the role of articulatory rehearsal in the retention of melodies (Nees et al., 2017), more 
research is needed before undertaking such a study. 
 
2.9.7 AAF and EEG 
A second experimental design is suggested by the literature on altered auditory feedback 
(AAF), this time in order to investigate the accuracy of auditory imagery. If an improviser has 
an accurate auditory image of their musical output, then experimental manipulation of the 
output which is fed back to them should elicit a feedback related negativity (FRN) (Lutz et al., 
2013; Maidhof et al., 2010). By contrast, if their auditory image is not always accurate, for 
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example during very complex improvisation, then they might fail to detect a mismatch 
between the altered feedback and the normal perceptual consequences of their actions. In 
this case the FRN would be absent. Participants could improvise monophonically whilst some 
random pitch manipulations are carried out on the auditory feedback, and EEG data taken. 
Although this might be a promising direction for future research, given the noisy nature of 
EEG data and its corresponding need to be carried out multiple times on the same task, much 
more work is needed to develop this paradigm for improvisation (although see Mouraux & 
Iannetti, 2008 for some techniques for single-trial ERPs). An alternative approach with AAF 
which tests the validity of the Ideal Model of improvisation is described in Chapter 4. 
 
 
2.9.8 The Need for Further Research on Auditory imagery 
Despite the difficulty of studying auditory imagery in improvisation experimentally, two 
experimental methods have been proposed in outline to begin to address questions arising 
from the gaps identified in the literature. As auditory imagery is a form of mental imagery, 
open to introspection by the participant but difficult to access for the experimenter, could it 
be argued that as long as improvisers know that they audiate, their self-report renders such 
research superfluous? In this section I argue that improvisers perceive the use of prospective 
auditory imagery as a moral imperative which validates the authenticity of improvisation, but 
that the nature of imagery is complex and our introspection is not necessarily clear or reliable. 
Hence a better understanding of auditory imagery will allow for a re-examination of its role 
in the process of improvisation with a potentially positive impact on self-efficacy.  
 
2.9.9 The Normative Aspect of Auditory imagery 
One issue that recurs throughout the literature on improvisation is that the role of auditory 
imagery has a normative aspect, even to the extent that accurate auditory imagery is 
regarded as necessary for improvisation to be valid: “Playing with a friend helped one student 
who was also a teaching assistant realize the importance of playing only what one was 
honestly hearing… We need to tell students that if you don’t hear a thing, you’re cheating!!” 
(Nettl, 2009, p. 177). Berliner (1994, p. 248) reports New Orleans musicians’ advice: “if you 
can’t sing it, you can’t play it”, interpreting this as “exhorting soloists to perform melodies 
60 
 
that they can conceptualize clearly in their singing minds.” The jazz pianist Chick Corea has 
reputedly said: "Only play what you hear. If you don't hear anything, don't play anything" 
(Rutherford, 2014, p. 15), which is reminiscent of Miles Davis’s injunction: “Play what you 
hear, not what you know” (reported in Berliner, 1994, p. 263). The injunction to play only 
what one honestly hears is identified by Day (2000) as arising from a kind of moral 
perfectionism, which he characterises as a commitment to speaking and acting authentically, 
as true to oneself, coupled with a dissatisfaction with one’s current state of development. A 
related injunction entailed by moral perfectionism in the context of the jazz solo is the 
rejection of the formulaic in favour of the new. As mentioned in the first section, musicians 
do in fact value improvisations that evince novelty (Macdonald & Wilson, 2005), and there is 
evidence of a correlation between success on divergent thinking tasks, which involve the 
suppression of habitual associations in favour of novel ones, and improvisational expertise 
(Berkowitz, 2010). The tension between these injunctions consists on the one hand in 
improvisers’ ability to produce formulaic material via a motoric generative strategy without 
auditory imagery (Hargreaves, 2012; Kratus, 1995), whilst on the other auditory-motor 
coupling is weaker for novel and hence unfamiliar material. Therefore, it might be difficult to 
play something new and know how it will sound in advance. Nothing prevents prospective 
auditory imagery strategies from producing formulaic material of course, and one solution 
would be an abstract schema-level mapping which could predict the perceptual 
consequences of novel movements. However, it is not clear that the evidence supports this. 
 
2.9.10 Jazz Improvisation as a Social Practice 
It could be argued that jazz improvisation, considered as a social practice with attendant 
norms, is best considered within the framework of virtue ethics (Banks, 2012), an excellent 
modern explication of which is given by MacIntyre (1981). Indeed, although Day’s context 
draws on Kant’s moral and aesthetic theories, he also mentions ‘practical wisdom’ (Day, 2000, 
p. 100), which, along with virtue and Eudaimonia, is a central concept in virtue ethics. From 
this standpoint, the ability to audiate is seen as a standard of excellence toward which to 
strive in the social practice of improvisation. There is a resonance between Day’s notion of 
moral perfectionism and MacIntyre’s conception of a social practice: “A practice involves 
standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter 
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into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own 
performance as judged by them” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 190). Prospective auditory imagery is a 
standard of excellence that is necessary (though not sufficient) to validate jazz soloing as 
authentic. 
 
2.9.11 The Experience of Improvisers 
Regardless of the precise theoretical and sociological standpoint taken, given the evidence 
from the literature cited above and the emphasis given on ear training in jazz educational 
programmes, there is a prima facie case that auditory imagery is seen as important by jazz 
students, educators and practitioners. This raises important questions: how is auditory 
imagery in improvisation experienced by improvisers? How does their experience relate to 
the normative aspect of auditory imagery promulgated by jazz pedagogy? Given the gaps in 
the literature on the nature and limits of auditory imagery, what should an experimental 
programme try to find out that might enhance the teaching and practice of improvisation? To 
address the first question requires engagement with musicians using a qualitative 
methodology to generate rich data reflecting the complexity and nuance of their experience 
of improvisation. Some qualitative studies have asked improvisers about various aspects of 
their experience (Macdonald & Wilson, 2005; Norgaard, 2011, 2016) but although some have 
addressed idea generation, none have specifically asked musicians about their experience of 
auditory imagery during the improvisation process. Nor have any studies specifically 
addressed whether musicians’ concepts and experience of auditory imagery is compatible 
with the experimental findings on improvisation to date, or with the normative portrayal of 
auditory imagery by jazz educators. Study 1 investigates musicians’ experience of improvising 
using semi-structured interviews with a focus on the role of auditory imagery in idea 
generation.  
 
2.9.12 The Possibility of a Mismatch 
The ideal model of improvisation offered in the literature is one in which musical ideas are 
pre-audiated, that is, the process of idea generation involves conceiving a sequence of novel 
musical phrases in the aural imagination. These are converted into musical output by 
automatic motor processes modulated by feedforward models and feedback. In order to be 
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confident they were living up to this ideal, an improviser would need to know that: their aural 
images were of high enough fidelity to specify a unique musical phrase, they occur prior to 
the motor behaviour and the musical output matches the aural image. Taking these issues in 
turn, the first point to make is that although we might assume that we have the ability to form 
imagery which resembles perception, that resemblance can easily break down. Dennett 
(1993) gives the following example for visual imagery. Imagine a simple square three by three 
crossword grid. In your mind’s eye, starting with the leftmost column, fill in the following 
words down the columns: GAS, OIL, DRY. Can you read off the horizontal words? If the grid 
were printed in front of you, the horizontal ones would be difficult not to perceive, whereas 
this is not the case in imagination. Even a simple 3D object such as a cube, which might seem 
easy to imagine and inspect in the mind’s eye, resists the kind of simple interrogation that 
would be easy with the perceived object. For example, imagine you are balancing a cube 
resting on a single vertex on a table in front of you with your finger touching the top vertex 
vertically above the point of contact with the table. Indicate with the index finger of your 
other hand the location in space of the other vertices. When faced with this task, many people 
indicate four corners of a square in a horizontal plane equidistant from the top and bottom 
vertex (Hinton, 1979). But this is in fact a tetrahedron. What this suggests is that despite the 
debate between Kosslyn and Pylyshyn on the nature of imagery having largely been settled 
in favour of the former (Eysenck & Keane, 2015), images may still be structured by semantic 
elements. This means images might have limitations that are not apparent unless they are 
probed in a certain way.  
 
Is there evidence that such limitations might obtain for musical imagery? One context in 
which musicians report the use of auditory imagery is silent score reading. Results from two 
studies suggest auditory imagery is used by musicians in response to a written score (Brodsky 
et al., 2003; Brodsky et al., 2008). It is interesting to note that the results also suggest limits 
to aural imagination, as the authors report that when silently reading a score, only one third 
of participants could distinguish an embedded familiar melody from a lure. In contrast, when 
heard externally, the embedded melody was easily identified. This seems especially 
significant given that participants had been selected on the basis of their high aural abilities, 
yet the majority could not imagine how a score would sound with the necessary fidelity to 
reliably complete the experimental task. How confident can an improviser be, in the midst of 
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this complex set of cognitive tasks, that their imagery is accurate? What of the second point, 
that imagery is prior to production? Keller (2012) posits both top-down prospective imagery 
using inverse models and bottom-up imagery triggered by the motor behaviour, which is 
concurrent or post-hoc. Fidlon (2011) doubts that improvisation uses prospective imagery, 
based partly on his interpretation of Johnson-Laird’s (2002) prohibition on the use of working 
memory for the storage of intermediate results, and also on the results of two studies he 
conducted. The first was the shoulder tap concurrent task experiment mentioned above, 
which he interprets as supporting evidence for the lack of involvement of working memory. 
The second study involved interrupting solos and asking musicians to describe what they were 
to play next. The results showed that the more improvisational expertise a participant had, 
the less detailed their descriptions of upcoming content was. This is consistent with abstract 
superordinate goals being expressed as sketch planning, whilst the detail of forthcoming 
musical events are filled in by automatic unconscious processes (Norgaard, 2014; Pressing, 
1988). However tonal working memory might be of a different nature than that prohibited by 
Johnson-Laird’s principle of algorithmic demand. One example he gives of improvising in a 
way requiring the storage of intermediate results is that of producing solos that are 
palindromes. Intuitively, this kind of computational demand seems qualitatively different to 
the kind of demand from the maintenance of imagery, but that might be because of the 
computational metaphors we use and the fact that the latter seems much easier. Can a 
musician tell when in the temporal sequence imagery occurs? Since anticipatory imagery is 
linked with intention and agency, and there are well documented problems with accurate 
ascription of the temporal sequence of mental events and judgements of agency and causality 
(Bear & Bloom, 2016; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008; 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), this seems problematic. On the third point, to be confident that 
the output matched the auditory image, and notwithstanding the difficulties of interrogating 
imagery, the improviser would need an accurate memory of the image for comparison, whilst 
performing all of the other cognitive tasks involved in improvising, which again seems 
problematic. Finally, it could be argued that an inverse model generates anticipatory imagery 
but the process is unconscious. However, this seems contradictory as surely it is constitutive 
of imagery that it has phenomenal content. 
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2.9.13 Self Efficacy 
Self-efficacy is the task-specific set of beliefs and attitudes that constitute the conviction that 
one can execute the task successfully (Ritchie & Williamon, 2011). In order to develop self-
efficacy, students must experience mastery, which in turn requires that clear goals be 
attainable. Self-efficacy has also been shown to be a significant factor in jazz improvisation 
achievement (Ciorba, 2009), as have self-evaluation and aural imitation (May, 2003). The 
central paradoxes of improvisation are that it is free, yet constrained, flow-state-effortless as 
if the music plays the musician, yet deliberate, think-ahead, agent-driven. Given the need for 
clear attainable goals, the need for further research into the role of auditory imagery seems 
clear also. These concerns in conjunction with the findings of Study1 informed the design of 
a survey (Study 5), whilst Studies 2, 3 and 4 assess the influence of hand shape familiarity on 
the accuracy of anticipatory auditory images (forward models) using altered auditory 
feedback. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
Investigating Improvisers’ Perspectives Using Video-
Stimulated Recall 
3.1 Introduction 
The perspectives offered by the ethnographic literature and pedagogical materials portray 
improvisation as a creative process whereby the products of musical imagination are 
translated into music-producing actions. Many of the interviews with artists in this literature 
suggest that the involvement of auditory imagery in the generative process is necessary to 
validate improvisation as a creative act. However, such interviews with artists are not usually 
conducted with specific reference to an improvisation they have recently undertaken, with 
the experience of what they did fresh in their minds. This raises questions about the extent 
to which artists who discuss the process of improvisation in general terms are accessing their 
own direct experiences and to what extent they are also reflecting social norms, such as the 
imperative to pre-hear their output. Study 1 therefore asked participants to comment on 
video recordings of their improvisations immediately after being recorded. Semi-structured 
interviews were used to investigate how improvisation was perceived by participants with a 
focus on the following specific research questions: what strategies (if any) are improvisers 
aware of using when they improvise? To what extent did they think they used prospective 
auditory imagery? How did they experience the timing of their thought processes relative to 
what they played? How conscious do they think their processes were? Finally, participants 
were asked about what motivated them to improvise. 
 
3.2 Background 
As discussed in Chapter 1, tonal jazz improvisation can be seen as a complex, hierarchical 
internally goal-directed set of behaviours, which in experts is likely to involve a degree of 
automaticity at the level of note choice and motor intentions (Ashley, 2016; Beaty, 2015; 
Berkowitz, 2010; Pacherie, 2008; Pressing, 1988). If conscious involvement in these processes 
is limited, this in turn limits what is available to introspection and hence what can be 
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verbalised in a retrospective report. There is therefore a concern that when participants are 
asked for a verbal report of processes that are inaccessible to verbalization, they could offer 
a kind of confabulation, in which their account reflects what they deem to be the ‘right 
answer’, either in terms of the study (task demand) or norms of the social practice of 
improvisation. Thus although both Berliner (1994) and Monson (2009) conduct interviews 
with jazz musicians about their thought processes, they illustrate the responses with musical 
examples from those artists’ extant recordings, which were not usually made near the time 
of the interviews.  There is therefore some doubt about how accurate these accounts are in 
their portrayal of the actual thought processes involved.  
 
Some studies have used ‘thinking out loud’ protocols to remove the retrospective aspect to 
reports, for example having participants verbalise the thought processes involved as they 
solved arithmetical problems (Pirie, 1996). In this kind of design, participants verbalise their 
thought process as they carry out a task. Although this strategy addresses the problems of 
retrospective reports, it introduces a complication in that verbalising whilst carrying out a task 
can alter the cognitive processes used (Ericsson, 2003). In any case contemporaneous verbal 
reporting does not suit all tasks and is not suitable for the present study, for example a 
saxophonist would be unable to verbalise whilst improvising. Even for instruments such as 
the piano, where verbalising whilst playing is physically possible, given the speed and 
cognitive demands of improvisation, it would not be possible for verbal reports to track 
thinking without interference with the task. Some studies have sought to mitigate the 
retrospective element by eliciting reports immediately after a musical performance 
(Norgaard, 2011, 2016; Wilson & MacDonald, 2015) and the method of using a video 
recording to help stimulate participants’ memories of their thought processes has an 
established history (Mackenzie & Kerr, 2012; Pirie, 1996; Rowe, 2009; Wilson & MacDonald, 
2015).  
 
Mendonça and Wallace (2004) used this combination of methods to study the thought 
processes of improvisers. Three professional jazz duos were each video recorded playing and 
improvising on three jazz standards and one improvised piece. Each participant was then 
interviewed immediately afterwards as they watched the video playback and commented on 
their performance. The interviews were also video recorded and then analysed and coded 
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according the principles of retrospective verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), 
using an analytic framework informed by the literature. Their focus was twofold, coding for 
instances of creative cognition (including idea generation and evaluation), and for temporal 
aspects of improvising. Their results showed a consistency in proportions of coding types 
across groups and, surprisingly, between the tonal and ‘free’ improvising conditions. The 
authors report that the improvised pieces were idiomatic in nature and this offers a possible 
explanation for this latter result. The results did not report much detail in terms of specific 
thought processes and there was not a focus on auditory imagery in this study, but the 
authors’ interpretation of one instance of idea generation is worthy of note. One participant 
reported ‘hearing melodies’ and trying to play them and this is interpreted by the authors as 
a process of retrieval rather than of composition, however it is not clear why this is necessarily 
the case. This raises an important issue regarding the role of memory retrieval in 
improvisation which relates directly to the role of ‘formulas’ discussed earlier. The implication 
seems to be that the inner hearing of a musical unit as large as a melody indicates retrieval 
from long term memory. However, if the participant was using the term ‘melodies’ to denote 
the end product of a process of concatenation of smaller mid-level units then perhaps these 
units (or melodic fragments) could be held and manipulated in working memory. This is 
compatible with the interpretation that auditory imagery has a role in idea generation as a 
compositional rather than merely a retrieval process, since those musical materials being 
recalled could in principle be recombined and manipulated during performance in ways that 
are responsive to their anticipated sound.  
  
Two other case studies worthy of note each used a single improvising duo and deployed 
audio-stimulated retrospective recall within minutes of the participants recording their 
improvisations (Pras, Schober, & Spiro, 2017; Schober & Spiro, 2014). The focus of these 
investigations was to interrogate the extent to which successful improvisation involves a 
shared understanding of musical events and their meaning whilst improvising, rather than 
idea generation or auditory imagery. The findings were that agreement between participants 
on statements about the improvisations was low. Further, the agreement between 
statements produced by the performers was not higher than that produced by each 
performer and an expert listener. These results challenge some assumptions about the 
privileged access performers might have to shared meaning, notwithstanding the caveats that 
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there was some compromise to ecological validity represented by the performers not having 
met before, and playing behind a screen so they could not see each other. These were single 
case studies, which indicates that caution is needed to interpret these results, but they do 
suggest that there is a potential discrepancy between participants’ verbal reports and the 
processes they use to improvise successfully. This is because the improvisations worked 
despite a lack of shared narrative about what was happening, which could indicate that the 
kind of declarative knowledge on which such narratives are based is epiphenomenal. Rather, 
perhaps forms of implicit or procedural knowledge are more important in successful 
improvisation. 
 
Two more studies (Norgaard, 2011, 2016) have also sought to investigate the thought 
processes involved in improvisation using stimulated recall immediately after participants 
improvised. In these studies, individuals improvised to a backing track, which sacrifices the 
ecological validity of having the interactive element of duos in return for focusing in much 
more detail on the thought processes of individuals. Instead of video recordings, audio 
recordings and notation were used to aid recall. In the first study, elite-level jazz artists 
listened to recordings of their solos whilst they viewed an approximate transcription and were 
asked to offer a commentary on the solo during semi-structured interviews. A thematic 
analysis was carried out yielding six main themes: evaluative monitoring and sketch planning 
were general processes, whilst melodic priority, harmonic priority, idea bank and re-use of 
ideas were generative processes. The second study replicated this design but with developing 
jazz musicians aged 12-17 years and used an a priori coding scheme based on the results of 
the first study. Considering both studies, the results showed that all the participants used 
these generative strategies and engaged in evaluative monitoring but the degree of planning 
ahead varied with expertise. Experts planned their improvisations to a greater extent than 
novices, which is in line with other research (Fidlon, 2011). The generative categories also 
show some overlap with those derived from the literature by Hargreaves (2012) but whereas 
the latter specifically mentions audiation (in the sense of auditory imagery) as a possible 
source of ideas, this is not a focus of Norgaard’s studies. It is possible that having participants 
study the transcription of their solo in standard notation as they listened and commented 
biased them toward a more music-theoretic ‘product’ view, rather than thinking of 
phenomenological aspects of process (Goldman, 2015).  Study 1 therefore sought to address 
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these issues by replicating some of the features of Norgaard’s studies whilst opting for video 
rather than audio-stimulated recall, without notation and also by adopting a specific focus on 
auditory imagery. 
 
3.3 Aims 
The aims of the study were to obtain accounts of musicians’ experience of idea generation in 
improvisation, with particular reference to the role of auditory imagery, consciousness, 
strategy use and the perceived timing of mental events. Participants were also invited to talk 
about why they improvise and what they value in the practice. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
As the research questions were informed by the literature prior to coding and influenced the 
design of the semi-structured interview, a deductive ‘top-down’ approach was taken to 
identifying themes in the data.  Thematic Analysis was selected as a suitable method because 
its epistemological and ontological commitments are compatible with this mixed-methods 
research programme, which is situated within a Critical Realist stance (Sims-Schouten, Riley, 
& Willig, 2007). Other qualitative methodologies such as Grounded Theory, Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis and Discourse Analysis were rejected, since emergent themes are 
more compatible with an inductive rather than deductive analysis, whilst the meaning of 
experience for the participants, although important, was not the primary research focus and 
nor was the role of language (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
 
3.5 Method 
3.5.1 Participants 
An opportunity sample of six musicians who self-identified as improvisers participated in the 
study. They were selected on the criteria of being expert improvisers and being available to 
do recordings and interviews at the Royal Northern College of Music, UK. Three participants 
were students at the college, a snowball sample comprising a male guitarist aged 21, a male 
pianist aged 26, and a female saxophonist, aged 19. The other three were musicians who were 
active in the Greater Manchester jazz community as well as having played nationally and 
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internationally. Table 3.1 below gives the list of participants. The interpretation of ‘Years of 
Study’ included individual instrumental lessons as well as formal courses. 
Table 3.1 
 
List of participants with demographic information 
Participant ID Age Gender Main Instrument Years of Playing 
Main Instrument 
Years of 
Study in 
Music 
1 21 M Guitar 17 5 
2 26 M Piano 20 20 
3 32 M Guitar 22 13 
4 49 M Trombone 38 38 
5 27 M Saxophone 20 16 
6 19 F Saxophone 5 10 
M age = 29, SD = 10.83, M Years of Playing = 20.33, SD = 10.60, M Years of Study = 17, 
SD = 11.49 
3.5.2 Setting 
Five of the video recording and interview sessions were carried out in Studios within the Royal 
Northern College of Music. These rooms were sound proofed and had stereo playback 
facilities, so the backing track could be played to participants at a suitable volume. The other 
interview took place at the participant’s home. 
3.5.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval was obtained from the ethics committee of the Royal Northern College of 
Music. Each participant was given an information sheet (Appendix 1), briefed about the 
procedure and informed about the track they would be playing along to, and then filled out a 
short biographical information form (Appendix 2). All participants played with a backing 
version of John Coltrane’s “Blue Train”, which is a medium jazz blues swing in E flat (from the 
Hal Leonard Jazz Play Along series, volume 13). Participants were given the opportunity to 
see the music chart and warm up before the recording but did not rehearse this specific tune. 
They were then video recorded whilst playing along to the track, which began and ended with 
the melody played on saxophone and had six choruses with piano, bass and drums as backing 
71 
 
to participants’ improvised solos (total track duration 4:01 minutes). Due to a technical 
difficulty with the recording, Participant 4 did a second take. 
 
In the next phase of the session, as close to immediately after the recording as practicable, 
participants were interviewed whilst watching the video playback of their improvisations. 
Both the improvisations and the subsequent interviews were video recorded on a Zoom Q8 
video recorder and a back-up audio recording of the interview phase was made using Voice 
Recorder software on an iPhone 4s. The video playback was viewed on a Toshiba Satellite 
laptop; participants having been invited to control the playback, pausing, rewinding or 
skipping as they saw fit, during the interview. Each participant was invited to give a 
commentary on their solo, analogous to a director’s commentary on a DVD (Norgaard, 2011), 
focusing on their thought processes, where ideas came from and the timing of decisions they 
made about what to play. The same set of prompt questions was used for the interviews 
(Appendix 3), but interviews were semi-structured, in that questions for clarification could be 
asked if necessary, and interesting responses developed further in dialogue (Rubin & Rubin, 
2011). Participants were aware of the research focus of the study on auditory imagery and 
although this was not emphasised in the briefing, it was the theme of one of the prompt 
questions: “How much of what you played do you think you heard in your head?”  
 
3.5.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
Interviews were transcribed into the Nvivo 10 qualitative analysis software package and 
within this kind of qualitative design, data analysis begins at the data collection stage (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006; Creswell & Creswell, 2017). The level of detail in the transcription included 
duplicate syllables and words, dysfluency markers, and indications of laughter and other non-
verbal gestures, but not precise timings of pauses or notation to precisely indicate 
simultaneity of speaking, as for example in a Jefferson transcription. This level was chosen in 
order to strike a balance between detail and readability, given that the relevance of such 
dysfluencies and non-verbal data could not be ruled out prior to data analysis. Each interview 
was transcribed before the next was carried out and these were then read and re-read for 
familiarization with the data. After all the transcriptions of the interviews were complete, the 
phase of generating initial codes was carried out, leading on to the phases of gathering codes 
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into provisional themes, comparing codes with codes and reviewing these with reference to 
the source material at those codes. Subsequently, overarching themes were identified and 
the relationships between them used to develop the structure of a thematic map (Creswell & 
Creswell, 2017). The Nvivo CAQDAS programme facilitated easy access to all the quotations 
under a given code across the interviews and provided ways to visualise and organise the 
code structure. The programme associates sections of text in the transcribed interviews with 
‘nodes’, which can be given a label and arranged in a hierarchical structure. Nvivo also allows 
easy recording of the thought processes that led to decisions to change codes and coding 
structure by via the creation of memos linked to nodes, thereby aiding reflexivity. 
 
3.6 Results 
The process of thematic analysis yielded five main themes: Generative Processes, Romantic 
Ideals, Moral Perfectionism, Evaluation and Comfort Zone. These themes were further related 
to the categories Cognitive, Affective and Motivation. Another important attribute was 
Consciousness, which tracked participants’ judgements and experiences in terms of how 
conscious they were of what they were doing while they improvised. As this was an attribute 
applying in different degrees to all other processes, it was treated as a potential property of 
all themes rather than a theme in itself. Table 3.2 gives a list of the main themes and 
subthemes, Figure 3.1 gives a pictorial representation of the data in the form of a thematic 
map. Subthemes are colour-coded purple, with necessarily conscious processes in green. 
Overarching categories that organise the main themes are shown as octagons, whilst main 
themes are ellipses. Single relation arrows signify that main themes are associated with 
categories (or subthemes with themes) and bidirectional relationships are shown as double 
arrows.  
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Table 3.2   
Table of Main Themes and Subthemes 
 
Main Themes Subthemes Category 
   
Generative Processes Music Theoretic, Idea Bank, Interface 
with Instrument, Rhythmic, Auditory 
Imagery, Planning. 
 
Cognitive 
Evaluation Over-playing, Positive, Gap Between 
Intent and Execution. 
 
Cognitive/Affective 
Arousal & Valence Comfort Zone, Enjoyment, Confidence. Affective 
 
Moral Perfectionism Improvisation as a Social Practice, 
You’ve Got to Train Your Improvisation. 
Motivation 
Romantic Ideals Creativity, In the Moment, Freedom. Motivation 
   
 
74 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Thematic Map of the coded interview data. The five main themes are shown as 
ovals, with their subthemes connected to them by arrows.  Subordinate relationships are 
shown as single arrows and bidirectional interactions by double arrows. The octagons 
represent higher order organising principles. Subthemes which imply a necessarily 
conscious process appear in green. 
 
3.4.1 Main Theme: Generative Processes 
This theme was the most represented in the data with 288 references across all six 
participants. There is some researcher judgement involved in deciding what counts as a single 
reference given that the boundary between a single utterance and multiple sequential 
utterances for a given code is blurred. Although the number of references is indicative of the 
prevalence of this theme across the data, this is not a counting exercise and the significance 
of a theme in relation to the research question cannot be judged by measures of relative 
frequency. The high number of references also reflects this theme’s breadth and the 
correspondingly high number of subthemes.  
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The subtheme Music Theoretic had 57 references by five of the participants. This subtheme 
includes instances where participants described musical phrases in their improvised solos in 
terms of particular scales, named intervals, fitting phrases to named chords or harmonic 
structures, and anything else the researcher considered as within the domain of music theory. 
The 21-year-old guitarist, for example, described how he was using one particular scale in 
preference to another “Yeah, Bb Whole Tone...I think on the...in place of the Lydian 
Dominant.” The pianist described a part of a phrase as “I think, sort of a resolve on to the Ab 
almost to get that sort of dissonance initially of the 6th and the sharp 9”. This subtheme 
resembles idea generation strategies identified in the literature, but with important 
differences. Hargreaves (2012) identified three categories of idea generation, Strategy-
generated, Audiation-generated and Motor-generated. Music Theoretic bears a relation to 
the first category, which includes the use of music-theoretic strategies. The important feature 
of this category in Hargreaves’ theoretical framework is that strategies are conscious methods 
that allow improvisers to solve musical problems. Other strategy types include rhythmic 
displacement (included here in the subtheme Rhythmic) and chromaticism. It is important to 
recognise that participants describing what they did in music-theoretic terms in a 
retrospective protocol does not necessarily imply that they were consciously deploying such 
declarative knowledge during the improvisation. Consciousness was one focus of the 
interviews (see Appendix 3) and the corresponding node in Nvivo contained 126 references 
across all 6 participants in the present study. For example, this quotation from the pianist 
illustrates the point: “Well I think I articulated it quite well, it's only in retrospect... it wasn’t 
that I was coming up to it and thinking ‘right I'm gonna play the minor 7’, I was just playing”. 
Often, participants were not sure how much of their thought processes were conscious, so 
the current theoretical framework differs from that offered by Hargreaves, in that music-
theoretic descriptions are taken to indicate one way in which participants make sense of what 
they did in the context of their musical practice habits. These were retrospective accounts 
informed by their knowledge of music theory, rather than reports of necessarily conscious 
explicit theory-driven strategies. 
 
Norgaard (2011) codes instances involving music-theoretic descriptions as ‘Idea Bank’, on the 
basis that some stored ideas are abstract patterns that need to be fitted into current 
improvisations by changing some parameters (Pressing, 1988; Schmidt, 2003). The current 
76 
 
study also includes a subtheme of Generative Strategies called Idea Bank, coding for 
precomposed materials and this itself has separate subthemes for processes involving 
abstract structures. For example, the following quotation from the male saxophonist was 
coded as ‘algorithmic’ (a subtheme of Idea Bank), even though it was described partly in 
music-theoretic terms: “So it's starting on concert Bb, going up Bb, Eb, Ab and then moving 
that up in minor thirds.” All participants reported using preformed musical materials, some 
of which were developed from their own ideas and worked on in the practice room, others 
being derived from the work of other artists, with varying degrees of adaptation. The above 
example of selecting a start note, playing the note a perfect fourth above, then a perfect 
fourth above that and then shifting the whole pattern in ascending minor thirds, is clearly 
expressible as an algorithm. The saxophonist said that he took the idea from John Coltrane, 
and so this was also coded as an influence of a specific artist. 
 
Another important subtheme was Interface with Instrument (34 references, 5 participants, 
which expresses not only the idea that a given instrument places constraints on what is 
improvisable, but also that particular instruments offer affordances that a musician can use 
as generative strategies during improvisation (Bailey, 1993; Baily & Driver, 1992; Goldman, 
2013; Windsor & De Bézenac, 2012). “I think there's that thing of the fight with the mechanics 
is... provides some of the interest of the instrument” (Male Trombonist, 49). This subtheme 
clearly bears a relation to Hargreaves’ (2012) Motor-generated category, but gives emphasis 
to the role of the instrument interface in idea generation without assuming the primacy of 
motor processes:  
I think there's as you say there's like the technical boundary of you've got to end it in 
this position here in terms of frets or like keys on the piano or... I dunno fingerings on 
the saxophone or something (Male Guitarist, 21). 
The present study has a focus on the role of auditory imagery and the node ‘Imagery’ 
contained 43 references and included all six participants. 37 of the references were specific 
to the auditory modality, with the remainder being visual, multimodal or unspecific. The 
subtheme Auditory Imagery is colour-coded green in Figure 3.1 to denote that this is 
necessarily a conscious component of the improvising process, however some participants 
were unsure of the timing of the imagery relative to what they played, for example the 
twenty-one-year-old guitarist remarked that “I dunno whether it was… hearing the idea first 
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and then it coming out, or the the idea being there, hearing it.” In contrast, the male 
saxophonist said “so I think of them as instantaneous things,” and the thirty-two-year-old 
guitarist stated “Yeah, no I think, er er yeah certainly today I think that the delay's an example 
of there being a delay between the thought and the action”. Auditory Imagery is shown as 
connected in bidirectional relationships with the main theme ‘Moral Perfectionism’ and the 
subtheme Creativity (Figure 3.1). These relationships will be discussed below, under the 
relevant theme and subtheme headings. 
 
The subtheme Rhythmic (21 references, 5 participants) relates to generative strategies where 
the rhythmic aspect was a primary feature of how the musical material was generated. There 
is some overlap with the preceding subtheme Auditory Imagery, as this quotation from the 
pianist (male, 26 years old) illustrates: “I think it will come through practice because I'm 
getting better at it... singing the actual notes themselves, but yeah rhythmically, I think I'm 
able to translate exactly what I'm hearing to the piano.” The notion of translation was alluded 
to by four of the participants and will be discussed further under the main theme ‘Moral 
Perfectionism’.  Another example of a rhythmic generative strategy was given by the male 
saxophonist: 
Yeah, so that that, yeah obviously there wasn't much of a a melodic component to to 
that little four-bar stretch or whatever it was, but then y'know, carries on into a a 
phrase but erm I think that that's comin' off the back of erm yeah, well yeah it's just 
playing around with rhythm. 
‘Planning’ (22 references, all 6 participants), is a subtheme referring to the process of 
attending to aspects of solo development and architecture. This theme is closely related to 
Norgaard’s (2011, 2016) theme ‘sketch planning’ which he derived from interviews with elite 
and emerging jazz artists. He hypothesises, in keeping with Pressing’s (1988) model, that 
automaticity in processes lower in the hierarchy free cognitive resources for such super-
ordinal tasks as attending to the overall shape of the solo. This subtheme has bidirectional 
relationships with Generative Processes and with Evaluation (Figure 3.1) because evaluation 
can relate to how well the solo is meeting the objectives of the current plan, which in turn 
might be updated as a result of the evaluation. Such updating might also influence the choice 
of generative strategies and vice versa. The following quotation from the trombonist (Male, 
49) is illustrative: 
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…but it's planned kind of through experience of, er you know, wanting to put 
something across that has some kind of impact and that's how to do it if you want to 
kinda carry a solo over a few choruses, you... you build it er and then 'n try and give it 
some kind of finish that people will...  y'know can can applaud er and enjoy, so it's like, 
an audience satisfaction kind of approach to it. 
In keeping with Norgaard’s (2011,2016) findings, the two most experienced improvisers (the 
trombonist and the male saxophonist) indicated that they had planned the solo, while the 
less experienced improvisers indicated that they did not plan their solo.  Participants were 
not sure how explicit or conscious this process was. The trombonist’s quotation above 
suggests solos are “… planned kind of through experience”, which could be interpreted as 
indicating procedural knowledge rather than conscious deliberation: 
Yes. Yeah, I'd say... that again maybe isn't so much of a conscious thing but again, like 
you were saying about structuring and and developing through a solo, y'know, at the 
start playing longer notes, phrases that are are more in, y'know you have to you have 
to go on some sort of journey (Saxophonist, Male 27). 
 
The pianist reported forming a sketch plan for the upcoming chorus based on his evaluation 
of how the previous chorus had gone, despite having stated that he hadn’t planned the solo 
at all:  
That came out there, because I thought, great, this chorus has gone down the pan a 
little bit... let's stick something in that I know will spice it up [laughs] yeah I think that's 
that's what happened there and then at the end of this chorus I thought " I've played 
too much, I'm gonna take it right down... and yeah… lots of space...  
A plausible explanation for this is that he interpreted the question about how much he 
planned his solo to mean how much he had planned in advance of starting, rather than 
referring to plans formed during the solo. 
 
3.4.2 Main Theme: Evaluation 
All the participants reported their evaluations of aspects of their solos (135 references). In 
many instances they were reporting the evaluations they had made at the time of playing and 
sometimes also how this affected what they played next, as was discussed above under the 
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subtheme Planning. In other instances what was reported was a retrospective evaluation at 
the time of watching the playback, sometimes noticing a discrepancy between their memory 
of what they had intended and their appraisal of what the playback had revealed, as in this 
quotation from the thirty-two-year-old guitarist:  
…and there were a couple of moments when watching back and I was like oh 
rhythmically that's not what I thought... like erm playing... it's like oh I can see what 
you meant but you're slightly... oh it’s just slipping out of the pocket? 
Evaluation is shown with a bidirectional relationship to planning, as discussed above, and also 
with bidirectional links to the main themes ‘Arousal & Valence’ and ‘Moral Perfectionism’ 
(Figure 3.1). In the former case, this is because the evaluation of playing can affect emotions 
and vice versa. The relationship between Evaluation and Moral Perfectionism will be 
discussed under the latter theme. 
 
The majority of evaluations were coded as ‘negative’ which had 107 references compared to 
14 positive references. It is possible that the experimental situation promoted a 
disproportionate amount of self-criticism, or perhaps there is a degree of self-selection in the 
sample, in that more contemplative musicians given to introspection might be more likely to 
volunteer and such a cohort might be prone to self-criticism. Further research would be 
needed to determine how representative this level of negativity is. The subtheme Positive 
contains all positive evaluations, whereas negative evaluations contained the main 
subthemes ‘Gap between Intent and Execution’ and ‘Over-playing’.  
 
Some of the references in Positive were about accuracy and could be considered opposite to 
references coded in Gap between Intent and Execution, as in this quotation from the pianist: 
“I've found that generally it's spot on rhythmically…” The female saxophonist’s remark 
“…something kind of clicked and I was kinda like 'ok, I kind of know what I'm doing now’” 
reports her positive evaluation as she was playing. Other references were reports of 
retrospective evaluations upon seeing and hearing the playback: “…there's some interesting 
bits in there that I think, that was quite interesting what I did there”, (Guitarist, Male 32). 
Participants also talked in terms of liking what they had done and a “good experience”. 
All the participants contributed to the subtheme Gap between Intent and Execution, which 
given the complex nature of improvisation is not surprising. The trombonist, who was the 
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most experienced participant, explained the concept of the ‘musical save’ (Berliner, 1994, p. 
210): 
…especially if you get higher through the register, you might go to play a note and nah 
that's not gonna,,, it's gonna come out and er you're gonna end up in trouble, so er 
and as an experienced performer you you knock out a completely wrong note and you 
just and you pull that into something you turn that into something so that it sounds 
like oh obviously that's what I meant! 
Sometimes these instances were seen as ‘happy accidents’ leading to novel idea generation: 
“…there have also been times where something comes out that I didn't intend, that actually 
by happenstance I s'pose more than anything else, erm actually is quite interesting and can 
take you down another way” (Saxophonist, Male 27). However, most were negative 
evaluations describing instances where what was played was different to what was intended. 
Sometimes participants offered explanations in terms of a deficit in their ability to translate 
their ideas: “But there are times when something else will come out, y'know erm and er as 
far as I would view it it's just because I haven't practiced those things enough yet for the link 
to be properly established…” (Saxophonist, Male 27). This notion of translation, and the 
striving of participants to get better at it has links to the themes Auditory Imagery and Moral 
Perfectionism. 
 
Participants described portions of their solos in which they rambled, lacked cohesion or 
became lost, but the next most common negative evaluation description became the 
subtheme Over-playing (12 references, 2 participants). This quotation from the pianist 
exemplifies the kinds of judgements which were coded to this subtheme: “Just kind of, er 
notes... yeah, I felt, I felt I remember that distinctly 'cos I thought I've just played far too much 
in the second half of that chorus.” The implication of playing too much meaning that there 
are “just notes” is subsequently clarified by the same participant: “I'm playing too much and 
I can't make sense of what I'm playing, and it's almost just sort of watching my fingers do their 
thing without y'know, it sort of becomes a muscle memory thing at points.” The inability of 
the participant to make sense of what he was playing exemplifies an opposition between 
auditory and motor-generated ideas. As Hargreaves (2012) points out, it is possible to execute 
motor patterns without knowing how they will sound (see also Sudnow, 1978). 
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3.4.3 Main Theme: Arousal and Valence 
Whereas Evaluation has both cognitive and affective components, Arousal and Valence 
reflects emotional responses and is therefore connected to only one organising principle, 
Affective (Figure 3.1). It has a bidirectional relationship with Evaluation and three main 
subthemes, Comfort Zone, Enjoyment and Confidence.  
 
Comfort Zone gathers responses that relate to how comfortable participants were while 
improvising. These related to the familiarity with the genre (jazz blues), to aspects of the 
playing situation, such as playing to a backing track or being video recorded, and to how far 
they pushed themselves in their playing in various ways. An example of the issue of being in 
a more or less comfortable register is exemplified by the following: 
I think you can definitely tell, in terms of like the... like my relation with the 
instr[ument] like how I can definitely tell that when I get down to the lower sections 
where it like, where it's a bit less… comfortable and in terms of actually playing, I tend 
to end up kind of starting phrases and going low and then, because I'm not 
comfortable in that part of the instrument as much as I am in the middle, it's kind of 
like sometimes it just kind of dies off (Saxophonist, Female 19). 
Some participants were more comfortable improvising on the jazz blues format than others, 
the female saxophonist remarked that “it's just a case of getting more used to playing 
something that's slightly different harmonically to what I'm constantly doing”, whereas the 
male saxophonist said “and then it's fine afterwards. I mean this is all the first bit's just fairly 
sort of standard blues stuff, I don't think I'm.... not reinventing any wheels...” The 
experimental setting and playing to a backing track seemed to allow some participants to be 
in their comfort zone because they were not being stretched by interaction with other 
players:  
Whereas this, this is almost...it's quite easy to do, 'cos nothing...nothing's going to 
challenge me, nothing's going to kick me up the bum and push more, er and try and 
pull the carpet from under me as well, there's that... (Trombonist, Male 49). 
All the participants commented on how playing to a backing track differed from their normal 
experience of improvisation. These were coded in Nvivo under the node Ecological Validity, 
which will be discussed in the section on the limitations of the study. 
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Some participants also commented on how much they enjoyed playing with other people, as 
in this quotation from the trombonist: “the joy of playing with other people is that they might 
just suddenly disappear, or... or it might just like push and give more.” The subtheme 
Enjoyment captures these, and also sources of enjoyment more intrinsic to the music, as in 
this example from the pianist: “I just really enjoy the sound of sort of jumping around in 4ths.” 
The thirty-two-year-old guitarist contrasted the subjective enjoyment of his band with the 
indifference of the few audience members at one gig:  
Like, his friends stayed right at the other end of the room or outside, smoking er and 
it was great it was really really, like erm really enjoyed what we... what we did and we 
had a really good time, despite there being no atmosphere and it being, y'know, awful 
er in terms of attendance. 
The pianist also alluded to the distinction between a performer’s and the audience’s 
enjoyment, albeit in the negative in this case: “I don't know how many people are enjoying 
this, but probably less than were before"...  maybe not but... I'm certainly not enjoying it as 
much.” 
 
Confidence is a subtheme which relates to participants’ level of confidence during their 
improvisation. This was affected by issues such as familiarity with the genre, interface with 
the instrument and evaluation and planning. The following quotations illustrate these issues 
in turn. “Blueses aren't one of my favourite things to play over, yeah and… just quite often 
just not as confident on that as I would feel on other things I think” (Saxophonist, Female 19). 
“Yeah, I think so just because not feeling confident enough to move it on to the second 
string... and being content to just land... land on the...stay on the first string for that whole 
phrase I guess” (Guitarist, Male 21). “So, first time I was like 'Alright, I can hear delays, that's 
where it's goin’, I want some delays, oh I've bottled it! Move on'” (Guitarist, Male 32). These 
comments from the three subthemes are informative about the relationship of the main 
theme Arousal and Valence to the main theme Evaluation. The level of confidence affected 
and was affected by the unfolding plan, and evaluation of how the solo had progressed 
affected enjoyment and confidence. 
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3.4.4 Main theme: Moral Perfectionism 
Day (2000) describes moral perfectionism as “a thinking whose distinctive features are a 
commitment to speaking and acting true to oneself, combined with a thoroughgoing 
dissatisfaction with oneself as one now stands.” Day develops this concept in the context of 
the practice of jazz improvisation in terms of how the improviser’s training facilitates their 
ability to eschew conventional responses and achieve "the sound of surprise", (Day, 2000, p. 
100). The present study relates this concept more directly to auditory imagery and situates it 
within improvisation as a social practice (MacIntyre, 1981). Moral Perfectionism therefore has 
a close bidirectional relationship with Auditory Imagery and its subthemes are Improvisation 
as a Social Practice and You’ve Got to Train Your Improvisation. The role of evaluation is 
crucial: participants described how they strive to get better at improvising and how this was 
informed by their judgement of their own playing. Hence the relationship between the main 
themes Evaluation and Moral Perfectionism is bidirectional, to reflect the iterative process of 
training, performance and evaluation. The urge to self-improvement is related to motivation 
and so this organising principle (blue octagon) links to Moral Perfectionism (as well as 
Romantic Ideals, Figure 3.1).  
 
Jazz improvisation meets the criteria to be counted as a social practice in that it is a complex 
socially situated activity with internal standards of excellence which are necessary in order to 
realise goods intrinsic to the activity (MacIntyre, 1981). To achieve these standards not only 
requires many hours of instrumental practice but also listening to and transcribing the 
relevant music, playing with others and learning from more experienced practitioners 
(Berliner, 1994). In this way, improvisers learn the norms and conventions of jazz as well as 
genre-specific and performance skills. The subtheme Improvisation as a Social Practice (41 
references, 6 participants), reflects these facets of participants’ contributions: 
And I think it's maybe sort of part of the same thing that there's erm, there’s a scene 
or y'know, a way of playing these days that kind of uses free improvisation and all of 
that, erm but doesn't discount things like form. and the i... like, there are improvisers 
who er...so me and […], my brother used to do this... like we'd improvise but then we'd 
remember what we started with and so we'd maybe like come back to that...  
(Guitarist, Male 32) 
84 
 
Here, the guitarist was contrasting the norms of two sub-genres of jazz improvisation, in ‘free 
improvisation’ as normally conducted form and structure are avoided, but he indicates that 
in his experience, attending to structure and returning to themes has become an acceptable 
aspect of non-idiomatic improvisation more recently. Many participants mentioned the 
importance of playing with others, but in this example the same participant questions the 
boundary of the practice of improvisation itself: 
Then you get the erm, then you get the debate of whether or not you're improvising 
if you're playing by yourself. Which, a few people, Peter Brotzmann included, that I've 
been reading recently...Yeah. sort of saying, nah! It's not improvising if you're playing 
by yourself because there's no conversation. 
Participants also indicated their knowledge of the canonical version of the tune ‘Blue Trane’ 
(the backing track), as well as their wider listening in order to gain familiarity with the genre. 
The following quotations are illustrative: “At the second chorus, at the beginning... I was 
wondering ‘could I do it’? And I know in the John Coltrane recording there is a harmony”, 
(Trombonist, Male 49).  
Obviously if I didn't listen to loads of jazz I wouldn't swing, I wouldn't articulate 
correctly, I wouldn't understand the tone, all that sort of thing, so much of what is 
integral to whatever I imagine and then comes out of my horn is just purely through 
listening to loads of stuff. And there are also a lot of moments on gigs where, I'll start 
to play something... and then it'll trigger in my head, y'know y'know, either a phrase 
that I've heard, y'know Dexter Gordon play… (Saxophonist, Male 26). 
This quotation underscores the importance of enculturation via listening extensively to jazz, 
whilst also implicitly endorsing the view that improvisation involves prospective imagination, 
which is informed and educated through listening and absorbing the norms of the genre. The 
trombonist also mentions the importance of listening, but gives an emphasis to improvisation 
being a socially situated creative process: 
I have practiced improvising, and I and I do still practice improvising... but er... a lot of 
the practice that I do is playing with other… other musicians and hearing them and 
listening to other music, so er to try and get that to influence what I'm doing, to kinda 
give more repertoire (Trombonist, Male 49). 
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You’ve Got to Train Your Improvisation was an ‘in vivo’ code, which is to say that a 
participant’s own words were used for the title of this theme. Participants related not just the 
training involved in achieving technical mastery of an instrument, but also training to link this 
technique with their musical imagination:  
…in the long run it's like one of the things I'm most looking forward to...it's like er I 
was talking to Jason Rebello when he came and did a masterclass here... it was 
brilliant...and he was saying that all of his practice is oriented around there being no 
sort of translation in between thinking of the idea and it happening, and like trusting 
that your ideas your ideas are appropriate to that musical moment… (Guitarist, Male 
21). 
This resonates with Day’s conception of the role of training being to educate experience so 
that in the unrehearsed activity of jazz improvisation, that experience is worthy of trust. Four 
of the six participants spoke explicitly in terms of the improvising process as one of the 
translation of musical ideas into musical output. Here, the asymptotic ideal is that having the 
idea becomes one with producing the corresponding output: the intervening translation 
process having tended to zero.  One of the strategies to achieve the link between idea and 
output mentioned by some participants was singing: “I mean what I'm trying to do, as an 
exercise, is try and practice singing what I'm hearing as I'm playing” (Pianist, Male 26). This 
participant was clear about the required priority and ordering of the process, attributing the 
following piece of ‘jazz lore’ to the pianist Gerald Clayton: “Don't sing what you play, play 
what you sing!” 
 
3.4.5 Main theme: Romantic Ideals 
The three subthemes Creativity, In the Moment, and Freedom, all relate to participants’ 
transference of Romantic concepts of musical agency to the domain of improvisation 
(Warren, 2009). Most of the responses coded under this theme were gathered in response to 
the question on the interview schedule which related to motivation: “What draws you to 
improvising? Could you say more about why you do it?” The female saxophonist’s response 
to this question mentioned issues of self-expression and identity, “I feel in a lot of ways it's a 
lot more expressive than written… well I think it very much depends on what it is for me 
personally like as a saxophone player”, as well as freedom “it's quite liberating to be able to 
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improvise and kind of just do what you want in your head rather than having something 
written down”. Her response also links creativity with being in the moment: “…generally it 
just it feels more interesting to play something that's just in the moment, kind of make it up 
as you go along!” The pianist’s response also links creativity and time: “Yeah I think it's.. it's 
just 'cos it's such a creative... a creative thing, and I'm a composer as well, and I just think they 
go hand in hand, 'cos it's almost like real-time composition.” This echoes definitions of 
improvisation found in the literature and further underscores improvisation as a creative 
process (but see Sarath, 1996 for an explication of the distinction between improvisation and 
composition). Some participants explicitly made the link between creativity and novelty: 
“You're kinda creating music, you're making different... you're making the music different 
every time”, (Trombonist, Male, 49). The link between creativity and auditory imagery (Figure 
3.1) is clear from the context of the references to translation of ideas throughout the data: 
the ideal is that musical ideas are created by being heard in the head and translated 
seamlessly into musical output.  
 
For some participants, being in the moment seemed to have particular significance:  
Well I, er I think it's 'cos I, in terms of erm, what I strive for in improvising, certainly  
in free improvising is to be expressing myself right now and present in in the moment… 
reading around and playing lots of free improvised music, it's... that erm, reacting and 
being present is... is kind of the whole point... I think (Guitarist, Male 33). 
Being in the moment was sometimes associated with ‘flow states’ (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Lefevre, 1989) and in one case even with what could be called ‘transcendental’ experiences:  
…it's almost that feeling of y'know, the numinous and greater connection 
y'know, when you really lose yourself and you're... in the moment, with other people 
around you and you're creating something y'know you feel like you're plugged into a 
bigger thing, it's amazing, yeah it's the best feeling (Saxophonist, Male 27). 
These subthemes were interconnected in that they all relate to Romantic concepts of the 
improviser as autonomous creative artist. The final subtheme, Freedom is integral to this: 
“And, I do kind of find it more rewarding in terms of like the freedom of it, within reasonable 
restrictions, than say, playing repertoire that's already been written”, (Guitarist, Male 21). 
The idea of freedom within constraints was implicit in many of the responses to earlier 
questions about improvising strategies. For example, although the improvisations were not 
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always conceptualised as completely novel, in that some fragments had been used before, 
participants considered themselves free to combine these fragments in novel ways in the 
moment so that no two improvisations would ever turn out to be identical. Freedom was one 
element that motivated participants to improvise, although sometimes this was expressed as 
a negative freedom, that is as a ‘freedom from’ constraints such as having a restricted role in 
which a score has to be followed:  
I didn't like it, being just being sat there and having to play when I was told and play 
these notes on the page, erm which was what I was training to do, er and I found it 
easier to have minimal direction er and just to kind of go off that made that made a 
lot more sense to me than having a lot of music written down (Trombonist, Male 49). 
 
3.7 Discussion 
3.7.1 Summary 
Six participants were video-recorded whilst improvising to a backing track, and each gave a 
commentary on their solo whilst watching the video playback. Semi-structured interviews 
focused on their use of strategies for improvising, the timing of their decisions, degree of 
conscious awareness, the use of auditory imagery and finally, their motivation for 
improvising.  A thematic analysis of the transcriptions of the interviews yielded five main 
themes: Generative Strategies, Evaluation, Affect and Valence, Moral Perfectionism and 
Romantic Ideals.  
 
3.7.2 Idea Generation Strategies, Timing and Consciousness 
These improvisers each used multiple strategies for their improvisations, including 
recombining and adapting musical material from their ‘idea bank’, music-theoretic-inspired 
thinking, motoric-influenced thinking, rhythm-focussed strategies and auditory imagery. 
These results are compatible with previous findings (Berkowitz, 2010; Berliner, 1994; 
Hargreaves, 2012; Norgaard, 2011, 2016; Pressing, 1988), and also offer further insights into 
the role of auditory imagery in the context of multiple strategy use. Participants were less 
sure of the relative timing and degree of consciousness of their decisions as these got closer 
in time to actual playing. So, planning at the level of the next chorus was mostly reported as 
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totally conscious and experienced in a determinate time window, for example at the end of 
the preceding chorus. Decisions relating to strategy selection, or upcoming rhythm placement 
or note choice are lower in the hierarchy of the improvisation process and likely to be more 
automatic. Some participants judged that they made these decisions immediately prior to 
enacting them whilst others were unsure if their awareness was prior, simultaneous or post 
hoc. There was a corresponding lack of consensus on the level of awareness involved in the 
different strategies. With imagery-based strategy, participants reported being conscious of 
the image, but with motoric and idea bank strategies, participants often reported not being 
conscious, or not thinking about it, or acting ‘instinctively’. It might be thought that the use 
of music theory would be a conscious process, involving accessing declarative knowledge 
about, for example, chord-scale relationships. Although it could be used in this way 
(Hargreaves, 2012), these participants often reported the music-theoretic aspect 
retrospectively, without the implication of conscious prior choice of musical material on 
music-theoretic grounds. This is not to say that chord-scale relationships were 
epiphenomenal, rather these relationships were converted from explicit declarative 
knowledge into implicit procedural knowledge via many hours in the practice room (Berliner, 
1994).  
 
3.7.3 Auditory Imagery 
The responses of participants to the question: ‘how much of what you played do you think 
you heard in your head?’ raise the question of the extent to which auditory imagery played a 
causal role in the improvisations. The least experienced improviser (participant 6) responded 
by saying “about fifty/sixty percent probably” and went on to say “I think if it was something 
that I was I'd played loads and knew really well and kind of had… knew it under my fingers 
really well, then…what I was hearing in my head would come out a lot more…” This is 
compatible with the results of studies which suggest that the strength of auditory-motor 
coupling for a given musical pattern increases with practice (Bangert & Altenmüller, 2003; 
Lahav et al., 2007; Maidhof et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2013; Zatorre et al., 2007). However, 
this same participant’s motivation for improvisation linked freedom, novelty, creativity and 
being ‘in the moment’: “it's quite liberating to be able to improvise and kind of just do what 
you want in your head… it just it feels more interesting to play something that's just in the 
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moment, kind of make it up as you go along!” Here is an illustration of a tension between two 
imperatives: novelty and authenticity. The more novel and hence less familiar the prospective 
musical utterance is, the weaker the auditory-motor coupling which allows it to be the 
translation of an idea in the moment. Given that the ideal of authenticity in creativity is 
identified by these participants with hearing an idea and translating it seamlessly, this tension 
must be resolved in order for their improvisations to be successful in their terms. This is a 
concern which is central to Day’s (2000) concept of moral perfectionism: how do improvisers 
avoid habitual responses and yet remain creative? The participants in this study were unsure 
how much they heard in their head of what they played. Even the most experienced 
improviser amongst the participants (Trombonist, Male 49): “I think I'd probably be modest 
and say not a great deal, but then I think I'd probably find that yeah there probably was more 
er more of the sounds in my head.” The male saxophonist and the twenty-one-year-old 
guitarist were the most confident of the six participants that they had mostly used auditory 
imagery: “I'd say the majority of it, but it's hard to know because they're they're 
instantaneous, aren't they?” (Saxophonist, Male 27). However, the guitarist was unsure about 
when the inner hearing was taking place, while the saxophonist regarded it to be 
simultaneous to playing, such that he knew when his output diverged from his idea. Both 
stated that some of what they experienced as auditory imagery was not novel, in the sense 
that it was already in their ‘idea bank’, suggesting fluency/novelty trade-off. The lack of 
certainty regarding the temporal ordering of imagery and playing is reinforced by evidence 
that judgements of temporal ordering and causality are not necessarily accurate (Bear & 
Bloom, 2016; Wegner, 2004; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Taken together, these findings raise 
further questions about the causal role of imagery and the characterisation offered by these 
participants, namely of creativity involving the translation of ideas into musical output.  This 
looks very like the Ideal Model (figure 2.1) discussed in Chapter 2 and this interview study has 
provided further evidence for its endorsement by musicians but also for its limitations as a 
viable model.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The interview data offered by these participants give a rich and detailed portrayal of the 
improvising process which extends the findings in the literature and poses interesting 
90 
 
questions of how to reconcile different aspects of their accounts. These improvisers reported 
using multiple strategies for improvising, they engaged in planning and evaluation, and were 
clearly motivated by notions of freedom and creativity. Some of them also spoke of their 
excitement and enjoyment in the process and these were also likely motivating factors. 
Although the use of auditory imagery was seen as essential to creative improvising, 
participants were not sure how much imagery they had used, or whether it was prior to 
playing or contemporaneous with musical behaviour. Some participants expressed a striving 
to improve in their ability to translate musical ideas from their heads to the instrument, 
evincing a moral perfectionism within the social practice of improvisation.  
 
3.9 Limitations and Further Research 
Given that the participants knew that auditory imagery was a focus of the study and all of 
them were asked the probe question: “how much of what you played do you think you heard 
in your head?”, it is not surprising that all the participants were coded for this subtheme. This 
also raises the issue of task-demand, in other words, to what extent were participants giving 
what they thought were ‘right answers’ in terms of the research question? A related issue 
concerns the extent to which participants were self-selecting regarding auditory imagery. 
However, most of the participants agreed to the interview before they knew the focus of the 
study, and in terms of task-demand, the responses are in line with the literature (Berliner, 
1994; Coker et al., 1970; Gordon, 1989; Kratus, 1991; Norgaard, 2011). Even if an element of 
conforming to the social norms of improvisation is a factor in participants’ expression of the 
desirability of pre-hearing musical material, this would nonetheless be evidence for the 
finding that these improvisers recognise that norm and feel some pressure to conform to it.  
 
All the participants in this study mentioned that improvising to a backing track was not the 
same as improvising with other musicians. Future research could address this issue of 
ecological validity by studying ensembles. As this researcher conducted the interviews with 
research questions informing the design, there is a risk of bias. To counter this, a selection of 
the coding and transcripts were checked by more senior researchers. As the video data of the 
improvisations were available some triangulation was also possible, in that where participants 
reported using particular scales or melodic intervals, these were checked against the 
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recording. This is a small sample size (N = 6), in keeping with such qualitative studies (Creswell 
& Creswell, 2017).  
 
This study did not investigate the reasons for participants’ endorsement of Romantic notions 
of creativity. It could be that the image of the jazz musician portrayed in the literature as 
someone whose creativity depends on prospective auditory imagery acts as a role model. 
There could also be a kind of implicit Cartesian dualism (Demertzi et al., 2009; Hamilton & 
Hamilton, 2015; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Stanovich, 1989) which predisposed musicians to 
prioritise conscious imagination over implicit or embodied paradigms. To investigate whether 
the findings of this study are reflected in a larger population of improvisers, Study 5 (Chapter 
6) administers an online survey to improvisers who identify primarily as students, 
practitioners or educators.  Study 5 also examines the possible connection between Dualist 
thinking and the relative importance to improvisers of prospective auditory imagery.   
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Chapter 4: Study 2 
The Effect of Hand Shape Familiarity on Guitarists’ 
Perceptions of Sonic Congruence: An Altered Auditory 
Feedback Study  
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, musical performance involves complex coordination between 
motor control and its intended action-effects (perception-action coupling). It could be argued 
that the development of the link between motor behaviour and intended sound is part of 
what constitutes musical skill. Studies also suggest that the strength of auditory-motor 
coupling is greater for musical materials which have been practiced (D’Ausilio et al., 2010; 
Lahav et al., 2007). This raises the question of the level of description at which this coupling 
operates. One possibility is that musicians have trained on their instruments so much that 
they have developed a veridical mapping from an auditory image of the sound to be produced 
and an abstract representation of pitch-triggering events on their instrument. For example, a 
pianist might have the sound of a chord in mind, which maps to a pattern of notes on the 
keyboard in a way which does not depend on the particular movements or fingers used to 
play it. In contrast, the correct level of description could be at the level of musical gestures, 
such that musical training links a given set of movements used to a produce a musical phrase 
or chord to the corresponding action-effect, namely the sound of the phrase or chord. This 
view is compatible with some of the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2, such as 
motor simulation/emulation theories (Grush, 2004; Jeannerod, 2001), common coding 
paradigms (Hommel, 2009; Novembre & Keller, 2014) and embodied cognition (Maes, 2016), 
which emphasize the interaction between movement, cognition and perception. It follows 
that the findings of this experiment cannot provide evidence for a specific form of ideomotor 
theory or speak to the question of whether motor simulation theories or embodied paradigms 
should be favoured. The findings can however bear on the question of whether the Ideal 
Model (Figure 2.1) of improvisation discussed in Chapter 2 could be instantiated or needs 
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revision in order to take into account the role of the familiarity of the sound-producing 
gestures that musicians make.  
 
There is some evidence from behavioural studies that in the case of two-tone sequences, 
hearing a task-irrelevant but incongruous stimulus can induce motor errors (Drost et al., 
2005b). Pianists played pairs of tones in response to notation in the presence of auditory task-
irrelevant distractor intervals, which could be congruent or incongruent. In subsequent 
experiments, coloured squares were used as imperative stimuli to control for expertise in 
music reading, and non-musicians were also tested. Pianists but not non-musicians had 
slower reaction times in incongruent conditions and experienced induced false responses. 
Simultaneously hearing an incongruous chord also slowed reaction times (Drost, Rieger, 
Brass, Gunter, & Prinz, 2005a). These findings are compatible with bidirectional auditory-
motor mapping, such that anticipatory auditory images of tones and chords are linked to the 
movements used to enact them, and vice versa. More recently, several studies have shown a 
link between movements and their intended effects in a number of domains (Camus et al., 
2017; Kilteni, Andersson, Houborg, & Ehrsson, 2018). Crump, Logan, and Kimbrough (2012) 
conducted an experiment in which guitarists and non-guitarists were asked to name a chord 
either from its sound or from a photograph of a hand playing the chord on a guitar 
fingerboard. The non-guitarists received some pre-trial training, so they could recognise the 
chords. In each trial, the sound was either congruent or incongruent with the visual stimulus. 
In half of the trials participants had to ignore the visual presentation and name the heard 
chord, in the other half the situation was reversed. The authors found a significant Stroop 
effect with the guitarists only and they conclude that guitarists have multimodal 
representations of chords involving visual, auditory and kinaesthetic modalities. One 
prediction that could be made on the basis that visual, auditory and kinaesthetic modalities 
interact is that music composed or improvised using a given instrument will bear some 
signature of the affordances offered by that instrument. In terms of the guitar, there have 
been several studies looking at how the layout of the guitar fingerboard and how guitarists’ 
hands move in response to it, affects the music (Dean, 2014; Finkelman, 1997; Scott, 2003). 
Directly relevant to the current study is that “Guitarists are likely to associate heard chords 
with particular finger configurations on their instrument” (Baker, 2001, p. 251). 
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Auditory-motor coupling has been investigated using altered auditory feedback (AAF) 
paradigms in which the expected auditory result of an action is artificially manipulated in 
order to probe the nature of action-effect representations (Furuya & Soechting, 2010; 
Maidhof et al., 2010; Mathias, Gehring, & Palmer, 2017; Pfordresher & Mantell, 2012). 
Typically, participants play a MIDI keyboard whilst they listen to the electronically generated 
sound. This technology is relatively easy to use experimentally, and such keyboards are both 
readily available and of high enough quality so as not to jeopardise ecological validity. The 
auditory feedback can be manipulated online as the participant plays with very low latency, 
and the timing and accuracy of their playing is again relatively easy to extract from the MIDI 
data. As musical performance requires the sequencing of a complex series of actions under 
time constraints, auditory-motor coupling operates in different ways to facilitate the process. 
Waiting for feedback and checking for divergence from the intended outcome is too slow to 
be the sole error correction mechanism in musical performance. In addition to feedback error 
checking, auditory-motor coupling can facilitate error correction and action planning via 
feedforward processes. As different parameters of musical performance make different 
cognitive demands on performers, AAF offers an opportunity to vary the corresponding 
feedback parameters separately and study the effects. The studies mentioned above have 
interrogated auditory-motor coupling by disrupting the auditory feedback, separately altering 
the timing, loudness or pitch of musical notes as participants played. By observing the 
disruptions to musical performance resulting from these manipulations, the way these 
separate aspects place demands on action control and are managed by feedback and 
feedforward processes can be inferred. For example, the way that delayed auditory feedback 
disrupted the timing of performance in a tapping task was found to depend on the 
participants’ finger trajectory (Pfordresher & Dalla Bella, 2011). In a piano task, loudness 
alterations disrupted note velocity in an inconsistent way and pitch alterations increased the 
error rate (incorrect notes) and perturbed the velocity and timing in both hands (Furuya & 
Soechting, 2010). The effects of altered auditory feedback support the hypothesis that during 
musical performance, the planning of future actions co-occurs with the perception of auditory 
feedback. Mathias et al. (2017) altered the pitch of notes so that they resembled either the 
next, the present or a past note. Only the next note condition disrupted behaviour by causing 
a slowing following feedback. This was accompanied by a larger evoked auditory N1 potential. 
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The authors conclude that interference with the forward model due to the feedback 
resembling the upcoming note explains this effect. 
 
It should be noted that because the studies with instruments used MIDI piano keyboards, 
which have a one-to-one mapping of keys to pitches with a left-right association with pitch 
height, this represents a subset of musician-instrument interfaces. Whilst this is not a problem 
in principle for these experimental designs, it would be desirable to extend the paradigm to 
other instruments. This experiment extends the AAF paradigm to the guitar and exploits its 
many-to-one mapping of fingerboard locations to pitches. This allows the investigation of 
auditory-motor coupling at the level of musical gesture, by varying the hand shape used to 
play the same chord in two different locations on the guitar. Although it is technically possible 
to vary the hand shape to play a given chord on the piano, this can result in using the hand in 
ways that would not usually arise in a playing context (Novembre & Keller, 2011). In contrast, 
on the guitar it is possible to use a hand shape usually associated with a given chord and a 
less familiar shape for the same chord which is still ecologically valid. This study investigated 
whether the familiarity of the hand shape used to play a chord affects participants’ 
judgements of whether the action-effect is congruent or not. There were two main 
hypotheses:  
 
1. Judgements of sonic congruence would be faster and more accurate on average in the 
familiar compared to the unfamiliar hand shape conditions. 
2.  Participants with more improvising experience would perform better on the task than 
participants with less improvising experience. 
  
The motivation for the second hypothesis was a prediction that the practice of ‘playing by 
ear’ which is more common in improvisers would facilitate more accurate forward models in 
this task due to enhanced audiomotor transformation ability (Bianco et al., 2018; Harris & de 
Jong, 2015; Harris, van Kranenburg, & de Jong, 2016). 
 
Non-improvising musicians’ training involves sight-reading and memorising complex pieces. 
By contrast, improvisers often train and learn by doing a lot of listening and imitating. These 
differences of emphasis promote the development of visuo-motor and audio-motor 
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transformation skills respectively. A prediction that follows from this is that these two groups 
would show different responses to music indicative of the differences in these skills. In more 
general terms, the different priorities involved in different genres affect training which in turn 
should lead to differences in skills which are testable. Some recent studies have found 
evidence in support of this, for example Bianco et al. (2018) collected EEG and behavioural 
data and found that jazz pianists were more flexible in updating their action plan in response 
to harmonically incongruent chords in comparison to classical pianists. The classical pianists, 
however, were more accurate in fixing local parameters of fingering. Przysinda, Zeng, Maves, 
Arkin, and Loui (2017) found that jazz musicians differed from non-improvising musicians in 
terms of expectancy, preferring unexpected chord sequences. In a study of pianists with 
differing amounts of improvising experience, Goldman et al. (2018) collected EEG and 
behavioural data during an oddball task. Participants responded to different kinds of deviants 
within chord sequences, some of which corresponded to substitutions used in jazz and others 
which did not. The amount of estimated improvisation hours predicted the responses to the 
different types of deviant. Harris and de Jong (2015) conducted an fMRI experiment with a 
between-groups design. They compared classically trained-score-dependent keyboard 
performers and classically-trained improvising keyboard performers. The task was either a 
passive appraisal listening task or a listening task in which participants imagined they were 
playing along with the music. The authors found greater activations in right-lateralised 
posterior-superior parietal and dorsal premotor cortices. In contrast, score-dependent 
musicians recruited left hemisphere motor areas and the posterior part of the right superior 
temporal sulcus. The implication that the authors draw from this is that improvising musicians 
have enhanced auditory-motor transformation abilities, whilst score-dependent musicians 
develop a mapping between aural and symbolic representations. In a follow-up study, Harris 
et al. (2016) compared participants from the same groups who had participated in the fMRI 
study in an imitation task. Participants listened to short unfamiliar two-part excerpts and 
attempted to play them on a digital piano. Improvising musicians were better at replicating 
the rhythm and pitch of heard music than their score-dependent counterparts. What these 
studies suggest is that different musical training and genre experience affects how musicians 
access musical knowledge-structures. This study allows two hypotheses to be tested using 
altered auditory feedback on the guitar, in a new ecologically valid motoric context not 
covered by the existing literature.  
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants (N = 21, 19 males, 2 females; M age = 26.52 years, SD = 9.00) were all guitarists 
who played right-handed and were university/conservatory students or professionals in the 
Manchester and Leeds areas (Table 4.1). Participant 12 was excluded from the analysis 
because they seemed to have difficulty in doing the task according to instructions and their 
accuracy was very close to chance level (55.7%).  
   
Table 4.1 
 
Participant Information. 
Participant Age Sex Self-Identification  
as improviser (1-7) 
Imp hours Total Hours Handedness 
1 20 M 7 2184 4836 -100 
2 22 M 6 4862 8970 50 
3 33 M 7 4550 4940 100 
4 20 M 6 312 4628 100 
5 26 M 7 2704 18408 100 
6 26 M 5 5980 15340 100 
7 21 M 5 1404 4264 87.5 
8 19 M 5 1196 4004 100 
9 21 M 7 2054 6552 -100 
10 22 M 6 4576 8424 -100 
11 36 F 5 2808 19968 87.5 
13 20 M 7 4420 6448 62.5 
14 22 M 5 3328 4368 25 
15 20 M 7 5850 11700 37.5 
16 18 M 6 689 2444 87.5 
17 43 M 6 10608 46540 100 
18 39 F 2 1248 24960 100 
19 34 M 3 15912 21840 100 
20 50 M 7 9984 13702 100 
21 23 M 6 2600 4160 100 
Mean age = 26.75 years (SD =9.18). 
 
Recruitment was via college faculty members asking for volunteers, and snowball sampling of 
Manchester and Leeds musicians. None of the participants were compensated, in accordance 
with RNCM’s ethics policies.  
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4.2.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
A short form was given to participants to collect demographic information, an estimate of 
improvising hours and a self-rating as an improviser (Appendix 5) and a short form of the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Veale, 2014) was administered (Appendix 6). The 
imperative visual stimulus in each trial was in the form of a tablature diagram depicting one 
of 16 possible guitar chords (Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1. Two of the visual stimuli, one familiar, the other unfamiliar, both corresponding to 
the chord Cmaj 9. Participants see only one stimulus at a time and just the horizontal lines 
and numbers with no captions or labels. 
 
Tablature diagrams were created with the Encore music software program. These were 
visually presented on a Toshiba Satellite laptop via custom software created with MAXMSP 
(version 7.3.1), which also delivered auditory feedback and recorded response data. 
Participants used Bose QuietComfort 25 noise cancelling headphones, which cancelled the 
sound from the actual guitar strings such that only the computer-generated sound could be 
heard. Participants played chords on a guitar fitted with a Fishman Tripleplay MIDI guitar 
pickup and responded via a Fishman FC-1 foot controller. Because MAXMSP takes some 
amount of time to render the MIDI sound, a latency test was conducted to ensure the jitter 
between the MIDI input and the sound rendering was low. To do this, a version of the 
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MAXMSP software was created which emitted a sound when the congruence choice was 
made and tested without headphones so that the chord onset was also audible. An audio 
recording of the experiment running with two trial blocks was then made on a separate 
laptop. The inter onset intervals between chord and selection noise in the audio recording 
were then compared with the reaction times recorded by MAXMSP, and confirmed the setup 
had an acceptable amount of jitter (3.55 ms). 
 
4.2.3 Design 
Four conditions comprised two factors with two levels each. The factors were familiarity of 
guitar chord shape (familiar, unfamiliar) and auditory feedback congruence (congruent, 
incongruent) (see Procedure section below for details). 
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
After giving informed consent and reading an information sheet (Appendix 4), each 
participant completed the short form including demographic information and estimates of 
playing and improvising hours and the short form of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Veale, 2014). The participants were seated wearing headphones in front of the laptop screen 
at a comfortable viewing distance. An experimenter stood behind each participant at an angle 
to observe their responses and take notes. The experimental phase consisted of four blocks 
of sixty-four trials each. Tablature diagrams were placed in a different random order for each 
participant using MATLAB. Each diagram specified one of eight distinct four-note chords in 
either a familiar or less familiar position on the guitar fingerboard.  Due to the layout of notes 
in standard tuning, chords in less familiar positions required either a less familiar hand shape, 
or a shape not usually associated with the given chord type, despite producing the same 
auditory result as the familiar hand shape version of that chord (keeping in mind that the MIDI 
setup controlled for timbral differences that would otherwise occur on an acoustic guitar).  
 
In each trial participants were presented with a fixation cross lasting 1500ms followed by a 
tablature diagram, which was displayed for between 1500–2500ms (the precise time was 
randomly determined on each trial in order to introduce jitter and prevent participants from 
knowing exactly when they would play the chords). When the diagram disappeared from the 
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laptop screen, participants played the corresponding chord on the same Fender Esprit guitar 
and heard only the audio generated by the MAXMSP patch through the headphones. Each 
chord shape had a congruent and incongruent feedback condition so that altered feedback 
was counterbalanced across familiarity. Thus in half of the trials the auditory feedback was 
altered by changing the pitch of one of the notes and the stimulus order was randomised 
differently for each participant. The alterations were always such that the resulting chord was 
of a type already present in the stimulus set to prevent participants using an oddball strategy 
to solve the task. Participants then judged whether the feedback was altered or not, 
responding as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing either a left or right button on 
the FC-1 foot controller. Whether left or right corresponded to congruency was 
counterbalanced across participants. Feedback was given onscreen with the words ‘correct’ 
or ‘incorrect’ for responses, ‘too slow’ if they did not respond within 4 seconds, ‘error’ if they 
played the chord incorrectly and ‘didn’t play’ if they did not play the chord within 8 seconds. 
Reaction times and error rates were collected by the presentation software for analysis. In a 
subsequent session, approximately two weeks later, participants ranked the familiarity of the 
stimuli by means of a survey (see Chapter 5 for details).  
 
4.2.5 Data Analysis 
 
Several options were considered for data analysis. Reaction time (RT) data tend not to be 
normally distributed because the limits for short reaction times operate differently to long 
ones. This is because there is an inherent latency involved in cognitive processes, such that 
times of the order of 100ms or lower are likely to be fast guesses or accidents (Whelan, 2008). 
By contrast, there is no absolute constraint on how slowly participants can react. Hence some 
very long reaction times can be the result of inattention or confusion or might reflect slower 
more deliberate cognitive strategies which are not the target of study. The resulting 
distribution has a long tail on the right and could be modelled as an ex-Gaussian distribution, 
a convolution of exponential and Gaussian distributions, or a shifted Wald. Although some 
researchers have attempted to interpret parameters for the different parts of distributions in 
terms of cognitive processes, these efforts lack a clear theoretical basis and were not 
attempted here (Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009).  
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A number of possible statistical techniques and models can be used for this type of data. The 
combination of the error and RT data into an inverse efficiency score, given by dividing the 
mean or median reaction time by the percentage of correct responses in each participant in 
each condition, was rejected in this case because the overall percentage correct was 79% 
which falls outside the recommended threshold of 90% accuracy (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011). 
Two other transforms of the data, inverse RT and log RT were considered, but rejected on the 
basis that data becomes more difficult to interpret after transformation, and no significant 
advantages were seen. Drift diffusion models are also used (Goldfarb, Leonard, Simen, 
Caicedo-Núñez, & Holmes, 2014; Wagenmakers, 2009), but were rejected as too complex. 
Another commonly used approach for RT data with this design is a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA. However a linear mixed-effects model (LMM) approach was chosen on the 
basis of its ability to test random effects (item, subject) within one structure rather than with 
separate ANOVAs (Matuschek, Kliegl, Vasishth, Baayen, & Bates, 2017). 
 
So, to assess the effect of congruence and familiarity, a linear mixed effects model was 
constructed to predict reaction times with the fixed effects of congruence (congruent vs. 
incongruent auditory feedback), familiarity rating and the congruence * familiarity 
interaction. To account for the possibility that participants got faster over the course of the 
experiment due to a training effect,  an additional fixed effect of occurrence was included, 
which was the number of times that particular chord had occurred over the course of the 
experiment by that trial (e.g., the reaction time associated with the fourth time a particular 
chord type was presented would have an occurrence value of four, regardless of the 
congruence of the feedback—a maximum occurrence value is thus 16). The random effects 
of participant number and chord number were also included, the former to take account of 
participants’ overall differences in reaction times, and the latter because chord types 
themselves may have introduced additional variance if some were easier to identify than 
others. Reaction times that were longer than 2500ms were excluded from analysis (6.69% of 
the data). 
 
The model was constructed in R using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2015) and the statistical significance of the factors was assessed using the lmerTest package 
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(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017), which uses likelihood ratio tests with the full 
model compared to the model without each variable of interest. An initial model that allowed 
for random slopes was constructed. The random slopes model allows each participant and 
chord number to have a different slope for the fixed effects in case some participants and 
chord numbers are more affected by congruence than others. This model did not converge 
and so was replaced with a fixed-slopes model. A mixed effects logistic regression with the 
same fixed and random effects was also conducted, but to predict whether the participant 
correctly responded (including trials in which participants were too slow to respond as 
incorrect). This model did not allow for random slopes. Familiarity data on the 1-7 scale was 
z-scored to produce standardised units of familiarity, to deal with the variability in the range 
of the scale used by different participants. 
 
4.3 Results 
In response to the statement on the form ‘I identify as an improviser’ on a scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), participants mean score was 5.71 (SD = 1.35). Participants 
were also asked to estimate their total playing hours and their total improvising hours on the 
guitar (Pinho, de Manzano, Fransson, Eriksson, & Ullén, 2014), M TotalHours = 11695.05, SD 
= 10382.07; M ImpHours = 4267.10, SD = 3813.53. Neither ImpHours nor TotalHours were 
significant predictors. The Edinburgh Handedness inventory scores did not reach significance 
either and so these factors were omitted from the final model. 
 
For the model with the overall chord familiarity rating, congruence had a significant effect, 
with incongruent stimuli increasing reaction times by 81.87ms ± 33.61ms, t(3264.00) = 2.44, 
p = .015. Familiarity rating also had a significant effect with each additional standardized unit 
of familiarity lowering reaction times by 19.58 ± 4.91ms, t(3269.00) = -3.99, p < .001. 
Participants responded more quickly with congruent auditory feedback, and when the stimuli 
were familiar. Occurrence was also significant, with each occurrence lowering the response 
time by 11.41ms ± 1.60ms, t(3261.00) = -7.12, p < .001. The congruence * familiarity 
interaction was not significant (see Table 4.1, model 1). For the model with the hand-shape 
familiarity rating, again, congruence had a significant effect, lowering reaction times by 
62.77 ± 15.02ms, t(3067.80) = 4.18, p < .001. Each additional standardized unit of the hand-
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shape familiarity rating lowered reaction times by 66.26 ± 10.71ms, t(3068.10) = -6.19, 
p < .001. Occurrence still had a significant effect here with each occurrence lowering the 
response time by 13.88 ± 1.63ms, t(3063.00) = -8.53, p < .001. The congruence * familiarity 
interaction was also not significant in this model (see Table 4.2, model 2).  
 
It should be noted that visual inspection of a plot of the residuals of these two models as a 
function of the fitted values suggested heteroscedasticity (see Appendix 8), with higher fitted 
reaction times having larger residuals than lower reaction times. A Spearman correlation test 
(Yin & Carroll, 1990) indicated that this relationship was significant (for the overall familiarity 
rating, rho = .36, p < .001, and for the hand-shape familiarity model, rho = .37, p < .001). 
Heteroscedastic models can potentially inflate Type I errors (Caudill, 1988). However, when 
the mixed effects models were recomputed with log-transformed reaction times, this reduced 
this heteroscedasticity (for the model with the overall familiarity rating, rho = .15, p < .001, 
and for model with the hand-shape familiarity rating, rho = .17, p < .001), while preserving 
the statistical significance of the same fixed effects. Also, a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted by transforming the familiarity rating into a categorical variable (familiar vs. 
unfamiliar) using a median split of the ratings and ignoring ‘occurrence’. In this case, the 
median reaction time for each participant in each condition was used, and still returned very 
similar effects. These additional models were consistent with the main findings and thus 
increase confidence that the effects in the original model are not in fact Type I errors. The 
mixed effects logistic regression used to predict whether participants answered correctly or 
not returned similar results. For the model with the general familiarity rating, congruence 
significantly increased the probability of a correct response, B = -0.87, z = -10.81, p < .001, as 
did the familiarity rating, B = 0.16, z = 2.53, p = .011, and the occurrence, B = 0.03, z = 2.93, p 
= .003. There was no interaction between familiarity and congruence. In the model with the 
hand-shape familiarity rating, congruence was a significant predictor of a correct response, B 
= -1.07, z = -11.46, p < .001, as was the hand-shape familiarity rating, B = 0.24, z = 3.31, p = 
.001, and occurrence, B = 0.05, z = 4.54, p < .001. In both models, congruence, familiarity, and 
later-occurring stimuli predicted a higher probability of a correct response.  
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Table 4.2  
 
Model 1 
 
Estimate Std. 
Error 
df t value Pr(>|t|) Significance 
(Intercept) 1722.495 86.746 27 19.857 < 2e-16 *** 
Congruence 81.872 33.614 3264 2.436 0.0149 * 
Familiarity (overall) -19.581 4.91 3269 -3.988 6.81E-
05 
*** 
Occurrence -11.408 1.601 3261 -7.124 1.28E-
12 
*** 
Congruence:Familiarity -5.571 7.013 3261 -0.794 0.427 
 
Model 2 
 
Estimate Std. 
Error 
df t value Pr(>|t|) Significance 
(Intercept) 1622.631 85.229 22.5 19.038 2.22E-
15 
*** 
Congruence 62.773 15.021 3067.8 4.179 3.01E-
05 
*** 
Familiarity (hand shape) -66.264 10.713 3068.1 -6.185 7.02E-
10 
*** 
Occurrence -13.875 1.627 3063 -8.528 < 2e-16 *** 
Congruence:Familiarity 5.68 15.758 3063.2 0.36 0.719 
 
Summary statistics for the linear mixed effects models with the overall familiarity rating of each 
chord (Model 1) and the familiarity rating specifically for hand shape (Model 2). Reaction times 
are in ms. Significance codes: <.001***, <.01**, <.05*. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
This experiment investigated the role of familiarity in the acuity of anticipatory auditory 
images with the following hypotheses.  
 
1. Judgements of sonic congruence would be faster and more accurate on average in the 
familiar compared to the unfamiliar hand shape conditions. 
2. Participants with more improvising experience would perform better on the task than 
participants who less improvising experience. 
 
105 
 
The results supported the first hypothesis but not the second. When participants played more 
familiar chords, they were faster and more accurate in their judgements of the congruence of 
the auditory feedback. This study tested both for the familiarity of each chord shape and also 
the hand shape used to play each chord, in separate surveys conducted with the participants. 
The results were similar regardless of which measure of familiarity was used in the models. 
The estimated number of improvising hours was not a significant predictor of task 
performance. 
 
These results suggest that despite years of exposure to repeated associations between 
individual locations on the fingerboard and their corresponding musical pitches, guitarists do 
not simply use this place-to-pitch mapping of individual notes and combine these to form 
expectations of how a chord will sound. Instead, guitarists move and place their left hands 
into more or less familiar shapes to play the chords such that some hand shapes have a 
stronger coupling to the intended sound of a familiar chord than others. This might seem at 
odds with some findings suggesting that in musical experts there is a flexibility in the way 
musical goals are realised motorically. For example, Palmer and Meyer (2000) conducted 
learning transfer experiments with expert and novice pianists. Whilst novices exhibited 
transfer on both motoric and pitch dimensions, experts only exhibited transfer when the pitch 
class sequence was preserved. The authors interpret this to show that expert musicians have 
motor independence in the realisation of musical goals. However, some of the stimuli 
involved playing a black key with the thumb which could be argued to be motorically (and 
haptically) different. This might have hindered task-transfer in the condition that was 
designed to be motorically similar, casting the motor independence interpretation into doubt.  
 
Novembre and Keller (2011) conducted a study in which pianists watched silent videos of 
right-hand piano chord sequences and were required to copy these on a silent keyboard. 
Some of the chords were harmonically incongruent in that they violated expectations 
generated by the tonal context. Others were tonally congruent but with nonstandard 
fingering. The pattern of responses was such that the more experienced participants were 
slower on the incongruent compared to the nonstandard fingering condition, whilst this was 
reversed for relative novices. As there was no auditory stimulus or feedback, the authors 
conclude that this effect represents an ‘action-grammar’, but they also do not rule out the 
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contribution of auditory imagery as anticipated action-effects. Moreover, they also conclude 
that experts are biased toward higher level goal-dependent features and have flexibility in 
how to implement them. However, this does not rule out that even for experts, the familiarity 
of hand shape can facilitate performance, all other things being equal. One unavoidable flaw 
in Novembre and Keller’s study is that because of the one-to-one key-to-pitch mapping of the 
piano, the way that familiarity of motor representation was manipulated introduced unusual 
hand shapes for the chords that pianists would not normally use. In contrast the stimuli in the 
present study exploit the many-to-one mapping of the guitar fingerboard to allow the same 
hand shape to play a familiarly associated chord or a less familiar one. The finding that 
responses were slower in the latter case raises interesting questions about how the 
affordances offered by different instruments influence the way in which different motor 
representations facilitate the implementation of musical goals.  
 
Evidence was not found for the second hypothesis. Each participant estimated their total 
improvising hours (Pinho, 2014) in order for the second hypothesis to be tested, that 
improvisers’ enhanced auditory-motor representations would facilitate task performance. 
Neither this nor the estimate of total hours (overall experience) was significant in the model. 
One reason for this could be that forward models are equally strong for familiar shapes for 
both groups in the context of individual chords, since both groups have had similar exposure 
to the links between individual chord hand shapes and resulting sounds. Even if the familiarity 
of certain hand shapes differed across groups, it is the participant’s own rating of familiarity 
that is the predictor, so this study was deliberately designed to control for this difference. 
This interpretation rejects the idea of a general auditory-motor advantage for improvisers. 
Indeed, the studies quoted above found context dependent differences which directly related 
to genre-specific practices, within harmonic contexts. The present study tested judgements 
of sonic congruence of chords in the absence of harmonic context and it could be argued that 
improvisation does not bear directly on this ability. Another possible reason is that the sample 
did not contain a sufficient number of participants who could be classed as non-improvisers. 
The mean percentage of estimated total playing hours that were spent improvising was 43% 
(SD = 25). Only four participants reported having spent less than 20% of their total playing 
time improvising and in the Likert scale rating, only two participants rated ‘I identify as an 
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improviser’ lower than 5. Finally, a training effect was observed, suggesting that the 
unfamiliar auditory-motor couplings could be learned relatively quickly.  
 
A surprising result is that the interaction between congruence and familiarity did not reach 
significance in either the chord shape or hand shape model. This means that regardless of 
whether participants rated the familiarity of the chord in its location on the finger board or 
the familiarity of the hand shape they used to play it, incongruence adversely affected task 
performance to the same degree on average in both the familiar and unfamiliar conditions. 
Whilst remaining somewhat agnostic on the level of representation or embodiment which 
best characterises auditory-motor coupling, a main premise of this study is that participants 
are partly facilitated in their perceptual judgements by familiarity of movement or 
proprioception. This could be interpreted in a theoretical framework involving the use of an 
internal forward model of some kind to solve the task, as in motor control or motor imagery 
theories but is also compatible with multi-modal emulation theories and simulation theories 
including the grounded cognition paradigm. It will be argued in Chapter 7 that this last 
framework best accounts for musical performance, but for now the use of the term ‘forward 
model’ will serve as shorthand for the anticipatory process which facilitates judgement, 
without intending a specific commitment to one of these theories. What the finding that hand 
shape familiarity facilitates task performance supports is the interpretation that rather than 
being a purely abstract amodal form of processing or simply an anticipatory image in the 
auditory modality alone, movement and/or proprioceptive and haptic modalities play a part. 
This is because different hand shapes require different movements to execute them, when in 
place the fingers of the left hand vary in how they are arranged (proprioception) and the feel 
of different strings in different locations is not uniform (haptic).  
 
It might be expected that as the familiar hand shapes facilitate accurate forward models, the 
mismatch with incongruent feedback impacts on reaction time due to the use of cognitive 
resources involved in error monitoring and response conflict (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; 
Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, & Endrass, 2014; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). However, the 
situation in this experiment is different to those which describe slower responses on Stroop 
or Simon task in incongruent conditions (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Yeung et al., 2004). 
In a Stroop task, the stimuli are either congruent or incongruent between aspects of the same 
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stimulus array. For example, participants might be asked to indicate the font colour of a colour 
word like ‘green’. Responses are faster on average when the word and font colour are 
congruent (Adleman et al., 2002). The word ‘green’ written in a red font has a manifest 
incongruency between the word meaning and the font colour. An example of a Simon task 
could be to press a key on the right in response to red objects on a screen, and a left key for 
green objects. In this case, congruent trials in which red objects appear on the right of the 
screen and green on the left are faster than incongruent trials (Simon & Berbaum, 1990) and 
although the positioning of the response on left or right is not relevant to the task, the 
incongruency affects performance. In contrast to these situations, in the present study the 
altered auditory feedback is only incongruous with the unaltered chord, which is not part of 
the presented auditory stimulus, unlike a Stroop task. The response of left or right foot does 
not have any correspondence with an aspect of the auditory feedback, unlike a Simon task. 
There is some evidence that expectancy violations produced by altered auditory feedback do 
involve at least some of the same neural mechanisms that are involved in the Stroop and 
Simon cases, however. Maidhof et al. (2010) found N200 and P3a responses to altered 
auditory feedback in pianists which were consistent with the involvement of the anterior 
cingulate cortex. This structure is thought to be involved in error detection and conflict 
monitoring, serving to trigger alterations in cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2004). The use 
of these cognitive resources could be responsible for the slowing of reaction times in the 
incongruent condition in this study. If the slower reaction times on incongruent trials are a 
result of expectancy violation processing, then the question arises as to why this effect does 
not vary with the strength of the expectancy. In other words, it seems likely that familiarity 
and congruence would interact, because if the forward model is less accurate or distinct in 
the unfamiliar condition then the mismatch due to incongruence would be less acute and be 
less disruptive. To take an extreme case for illustrative purposes, if the shape is so unfamiliar 
that the forward model is absent or not accurate enough to distinguish between congruent 
and incongruent feedback, then incongruence ought not to have any impact at all on reaction 
time. In other words, the ‘system’ has no way to know that the feedback is incongruent, so 
there should be no shift of attention or extra demand on cognitive resources. 
 
One explanation for the lack of interaction between familiarity and congruence is that even 
in the unfamiliar condition, the proportion of the forward models that were accurate enough 
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to be impacted by incongruence was sufficiently high to render the interaction not significant. 
That is, even in the unfamiliar condition, forward models were present and facilitated 
performance, just not as much as in the familiar condition. This interpretation is supported 
by the idea of redundancy (Pressing, 1988), in that different modalities can contribute to the 
forward model. There might therefore have been a threshold effect rather than a continuum 
of facilitation due to hand shape familiarity. Given that reaction time data was taken from 
correct trials only, this might have had a higher proportion of unfamiliar trials in which the 
forward model reached this threshold. Another explanation is that incongruence acts at a 
lower hierarchical level, such that a mismatch response is triggered by incongruency but is 
not accessible to the higher-level process which discriminates between complex musical 
phenomena such as chords. There is some support in the literature that incongruence could 
trigger an error detection response as an automatic low-level process that does not require 
attention (SanMiguel, Widmann, Bendixen, Trujillo-Barreto, & Schröger, 2013; Schröger et al., 
2015). However, this process alone cannot serve as an explanation for the findings of this 
study, because the fact that incongruence impacted performance at all would then be 
unexplained. What is needed is a theoretical basis for the possibility that attentional 
resources are impacted by incongruence, but that this does not influence the component of 
the cognitive process of judgement whereby hand shape facilitates a forward model. This will 
be discussed further in the next section. 
 
4.5 Limitations and Future Research 
Response times were collected only after the participants had already moved their left hand 
to form the chord shape, so it is not clear whether familiarity of movement or proprioceptive 
familiarity was responsible for these results. However, in either case, features of the person-
instrument interface have an influence on the speed and accuracy of responses. No 
behavioural evidence was gathered to determine whether participants’ forward models used 
auditory imagery, although many participants commented that they did try to imagine how 
the chord should sound. Some also mentioned using explicit declarative knowledge of music 
theory to try to solve the task, for example realising that a given shape was a major 9th chord, 
but they would then compare the actual sound with their memory of how a major 9th should 
sound. An assumption informing the experimental design was that such deliberate processes 
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invoking music theoretical concepts would be too slow to be useful in a speeded response 
task (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983). The visual stimulus 
disappeared before participants could play, to minimise any effect of the tablature diagram 
itself on performance. However, because participants had 8 seconds to form the shape on the 
guitar prior to them playing the chord and the timer starting, it cannot be ruled out that they 
could have used this time to access theoretical knowledge from long term memory. In this 
case, what could be driving the main effect is that familiarity with the chord shape indexes 
the familiarity with how the chord sounds, via an internal chord lexicon which pairs shapes 
and familiar chord types (major 9th, dominant 7th etc) in an amodal music-theoretic format. 
One response to this is that no significant differences in the results were found between the 
model in which participants rated chord shape familiarity and the one in which they rated 
hand shape familiarity. Further research is needed to fully investigate this possibility however. 
 
The lack of interaction between congruence of auditory feedback and the familiarity of 
chord/hand shape discussed above raises questions about how possibly different cognitive 
processes used to solve the task could operate together. One experimental approach which 
has the potential to make progress in this area is to use electroencephalography (EEG) in 
combination with behavioural data. Altered auditory feedback can elicit an auditory N1 
component at about 100 ms after stimulus onset, a feedback related negativity (FRN), 
maximal between 150 to 250 ms, and a P3 component (Mathias et al., 2017; Proverbio, Cozzi, 
Orlandi, & Carminati, 2017). The time course and scalp distribution of these EEG 
measurements together with their hypothesised neural generators could offer some insights 
into how quickly incongruence is detected and whether the use of attentional resources is 
responsible for increased reaction times in the incongruent condition.  
 
Further research with the guitar could extend this result for chords to involve melodic phrases 
implemented in different fingerboard configurations, thereby further elucidating the role of 
its instrumental affordances in music cognition. More broadly, future research could be 
extended to other instruments, for example aerophone instruments such as brass or 
woodwind which not only present a motorically different interface to the piano and guitar, 
but also do not have the same kind of pitch-to-place mapping. 
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Given that a training effect was observed, it could be inferred that learning new motor or 
proprioceptive patterns to the extent that anticipation is facilitated is a relatively speedy 
process. Further research could investigate whether general musical expertise or a genre-
specific skill profile modulates learning. It could also be the case that the kind of training given 
by this experimental procedure could have benefit in a pedagogical context. Further research 
could establish whether incorporating a training regime involving unfamiliar shapes for 
familiar chords with a sonic congruence judging task under AAF would enhance musicians’ 
flexibility of musical goal realisation in comparison to standard ear training programmes. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In the broader context of perception-action coupling, the study of musical expertise offers an 
excellent opportunity to investigate the cognitive processes involved in the context of 
training-induced differences. The extension of the AAF paradigm to the guitar, which differs 
from the piano both motorically and in its pitch-to-place mapping, sheds further light on the 
role of instrumental affordances in musical perception and cognition. These results are 
compatible with the theoretical framework of grounded cognition, according to which 
cognition, movement and the person-instrument interface are all enmeshed and 
incompatible with the Ideal Model of improvisation proposed in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 5 
Two Chord Familiarity Studies 
5.1 Introduction 
The stimuli for Study 2 above were designed by this researcher based on over three decades 
of experience as a guitarist and guitar tutor to include eight chords, each of which had two 
versions. Each version was the same chord voicing (the same notes in the same order) but 
differed in terms of the location, physical pattern and geometrical pattern of notes on the 
guitar fingerboard (see Appendix 9 for the full stimulus set). One of each pair was intended 
to be a more familiar shape than the other. Familiarity in this context is a relation between 
either a configuration of notes in a location on the guitar fingerboard (Study 3) or the left-
hand shape used to play the chord (Study 4) and a given participant in Study 2. The familiarity 
of a shape is likely to depend on how many times a guitarist has played the chord before. This 
in turn will depend on the genres of music they are most used to playing, their musical 
education and breadth of musical knowledge and experience. Given that chord familiarity was 
hypothesised to be a predictor variable in Study 2, it was important to obtain measures of 
familiarity for each chord for each participant. A behavioural measure of familiarity would be 
difficult if not impossible to obtain. For example, a measure of the time taken from visual 
stimulus to being able to play the chord would have a potential confounds of the physical 
ease of playing a chord, and the visual complexity of the stimulus. Studies 3 and 4 therefore 
collected self-report familiarity data from the participants of Study 2. 
 
5.2 Study 3 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
The participants of Study 2 all agreed to take part in Study 3 as a follow up and there was no 
attrition.  
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5.2.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimuli were identical to those used in Study 2 and were presented on the same Toshiba 
laptop in MATLAB. Participants used their own guitar as an aid to recall. 
 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
Participants took part in this study typically 2-3 weeks after they did Study 2. The main reason 
for the time delay was to minimise any influence of task performance in Study 2 on familiarity 
ratings. In addition, Study 2 usually took more than an hour to complete and including 
familiarity rating would have made the session too long. After giving written informed consent 
(Appendix 13), participants were seated at a comfortable viewing distance from the laptop 
screen and were told to respond to each tablature diagram by playing the chord on their own 
guitar. The reason for this was that it was the familiarity of playing the chord that was being 
investigated, whereas if they had responded to the diagrams alone this might have involved 
more abstract declarative knowledge. Participants were instructed to disregard the sound 
features such as the chord quality or how familiar the chord sounded but instead were to 
concentrate on the familiarity of the chord shape. The MATLAB programme displayed a 
screen with instructions to respond by pressing keys 1-7 on the laptop keyboard along with 
the corresponding Likert ratings ranging from ‘1 = very unfamiliar, almost never use’ to ‘7 = 
very familiar, almost always use this’. Participants were also given a printed copy to look at 
during the procedure in case they forgot the precise ratings to which the keys corresponded. 
They began by pressing any key when ready. 
 
Tablature diagrams were then presented on the screen individually in a different random 
order for each participant, with each diagram appearing a total of three times. The next 
diagram was prompted by the rating key press from the previous stimulus, so this was not a 
timed task; participants could take as long as they wanted to try the shape on their guitar and 
respond when they were ready. The procedure usually took about 10 minutes to complete. 
Rating data were collected by the same MATLAB script for analysis. 
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5.2.4 Data Analysis 
A separate MATLAB script was used to prepare the familiarity rating data for inclusion in the 
first linear mixed effects model used for the data analysis in Study 2. As each chord was rated 
three times by each participant, the mean of these scores was calculated to give each 
participant’s final rating figure. To account for the likelihood that participants might use the 
Likert scale differently, for example some avoiding the end range values more than others, 
each participant’s set of final ratings was then z-scored to give standardised ratings of 
familiarity. The fixed effect of familiarity in the model was treated as a continuous predictor 
variable using these standardised units of familiarity. Although there has been some 
controversy over the validity of using ordinal data, aggregating items and treating the 
resulting interval data as measuring a continuous latent variable, the risks of Type 1 errors 
have been overstated (Norman, 2010). 
 
5.3 Results 
Each chord had two versions: a shape intended to be familiar and its unfamiliar counterpart. 
The standardised familiarity rating for each chord and each participant is shown in Appendix 
10. Participants rated the familiar versions as more familiar than their unfamiliar counterparts 
and a paired samples t-test showed this difference was significant, t(20) = 13.67 p < .001. This 
parametric test was carried out on ordinal data on the basis that the averaged familiarity 
values track a latent variable which can be treated as interval. However, subsequent tests 
were non-parametric so as to err on the side of caution. Figure 5.1 shows the mean 
standardised familiarity rating for each chord. 
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Figure 5.1. shows the means of the standardised familiarity ratings for the chord shapes. The 
chords designed to be familiar are numbered 1-8 and the unfamiliar ones are 9-16 (11-18 in 
the original stimulus list. 
5.4 Discussion 
These results show that on average, these participants agreed with the judgement of 
familiarity of the shapes which was made in creating the stimulus set. Although there are 
some examples where individual participants rated some chords in the opposite direction, 
this is not relevant to the familiarity rating in the model, since the predictor ‘familiarity’ uses 
each participant’s rating for each chord.  Further research could find out if these familiarity 
judgements hold for a larger population of guitarists so that these stimuli could be used in 
further experiments to test the effects of familiarity with higher participant numbers. Some 
of the individual differences in familiarity rating might be traced to differences in genre 
specialism. For example, two of the participants who gave chord 14 a relatively high familiarity 
rating had reported that they play rock or metal. Sometimes in these genres, the low E string 
is down-tuned to a D which provides a shape similar to chord 14 as a staple ‘power chord’ 
frequently used in these genres. Subsequent studies could refine the stimuli to be targeted 
for specific genres to investigate the role of familiarity in a more ecologically valid way. 
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Study 2 used the familiarity rating as a predictor and found that it facilitated judgements of 
sonic congruence under conditions where auditory feedback was manipulated at random in 
half the trials. The hypothesis was that the physical movement and/or proprioceptive factors 
of the different hand shapes was driving this effect.  However, because of possible ambiguity 
in the instructions given that might have led participants to rate the familiarity of the chord 
shape in the context of its fingerboard position rather than the hand shape they used, Study 
4 was designed for the same participants to focus specifically on the familiarity of the hand 
shape that they used to play each chord, irrespective of its position or chord quality. 
 
5.5 Study 4 Method 
5.5.1 Participants 
Of the original 21 participants who took part in Study 2, 18 took part in this survey. This 
represents an attrition rate of just over 14%. 
 
5.5.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimuli were again identical to those used in Study 2 (Appendix 9). In contrast to Study 3, 
Study 4 was delivered as on online survey using the Bristol Online Survey platform. The 
question responses featured the same 7-point Likert rankings with the same wording. A 
MATLAB script was used to generate a random sequence of stimuli such that each chord 
appeared three times and there were no consecutive occurrences of the same chord. This 
sequence determined the order of questions written in the survey. As the Bristol Online 
Survey platform lacks the facility, a separate randomisation for each participant was not 
possible. 
 
5.5.3 Procedure 
Participants were sent a link to the online survey about six months after Study 2. They were 
told that they were not obliged to take part, that their information would be treated 
confidentially, and they could stop at any time without consequence, in accordance with 
RNCM ethical policy. Their completing the survey was taken to indicate that they had given 
informed consent. Participants were instructed to use their guitar to play the shapes before 
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making their judgement as in Study 3. The main difference between this and Study 3 in terms 
of the instructions, was they emphasised that the familiarity rating referred to the hand shape 
used to play the chord rather than any other attribute, such as fingerboard location, which 
strings were played, or whether the shape was usually associated with the given chord or its 
sound. The survey was estimated to take about twenty minutes to complete. 
 
5.5.4 Data Analysis 
The data analysis was as in Study 3, with each participant’s average familiarity scores being z-
scored to produce standardised familiarity units for use in the second Linear Mixed Effects 
model in Study 2. 
 
5.6 Results 
Participants’ ratings of hand shape can be seen in Figure 5.2. As with Study 3, Participants 
rated the shapes designed to be familiar as more familiar on average than their unfamiliar 
counterparts. See Appendix 10 for the standardised hand shape familiarity ratings for each 
chord and each participant. 
 
Figure 5.2. The mean standardised hand shape familiarity rating for each chord.  
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The chord shape results were obtained from the 21 original participants and 18 of them also 
participated in the hand shape study. Although the attrition limits the direct comparison of 
data, it can be seen from Figure 5.3 that there was some similarity in the ratings. 
 
Figure 5.3. A comparison of hand shape and chord shape familiarity ratings. Error bars show 
1 standard error. 
5.7 General Discussion 
The emphasis of the second study was on the familiarity of hand shape rather than chord 
shape. The second linear mixed effects model in Study 2 used this new measure of familiarity 
and returned very similar results to the first model. One interpretation of this is that the effect 
of familiarity is robust irrespective of which measure is used, but this raises questions about 
what precisely is being measured by each type of familiarity. In addition to the well-known 
limitations of self-report protocols when investigating expert behaviour (Beilock, Wierenga, 
& Carr, 2002; Bermúdez, 2017; Ericsson, 2003), familiarity judgements in these studies could 
have been informed by elements that were difficult to disentangle. The chords had different 
degrees of harmonic tension and complexity, some were potentially familiar shapes in terms 
of fret pattern but appeared on a different set of strings than they normally would, some 
shapes were played in locations where the frets were widely spaced at the bottom of the neck 
and others higher up where the frets are close together, and so on. Despite the fact that 
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participants were instructed to ignore any of these factors that did not relate to hand shape, 
they might have found this difficult in some cases. For example, when viewed as an abstract 
juxtaposition of dots, the shapes in Figure 5.4 below could be interpreted as identical. 
However, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test analysis of the hand shape familiarity rating data for 
this chord pair shows that they were in fact rated differently (Z = -2.86, p = .004).  
 
Figure 5.4.  Chord 2 (familiar) and chord 13 (unfamiliar). Both chords are played with a 
common finger pattern. The centre diagram shows the finger numbers (1-4, with 4 as the little 
finger), as well as the geometrical pattern of locations on the fingerboard of the guitar. 
 
There are two other chord pairs which have this property of having identical abstract finger 
patterns, namely 7, 12 and 11, 17. However, in each of these pairs, the first chord was not 
rated significantly differently to the second (Z = -1.50, p = .133 and Z = -.85, p = .394 
respectively). Figure 5.5 shows the mean standardised familiarity rating for the three pairs of 
chords for each participant.  Whether factors such as fret spacing or string thickness changed 
the experience of playing the chord (proprioceptively, haptically), or despite the instructions 
to the contrary, participants were still judging familiarity in terms of the common or 
uncommon association between shape and chord is not completely clear from the available 
data. A consideration of the properties of these chord pairs is inconclusive. Chords 7 and 12 
are in the same fret position but on different strings, therefore their relative fret spacing is 
also the same. This might suggest that it is fret spacing driving the difference in rating for 2 
and 13 and explain why there was no significant difference in the rating for 7 and 12. 
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Figure 5.5. A comparison of the standardised mean hand shape ratings for the chord pairs 2 
and 13, 7 and 12, and 11 and 17. Each pair has chords with the same abstract ‘dot’ pattern of 
fret locations but on different strings. 
 
In contrast, chord 2 is at frets 2 and 3 where the fret spacing is considerably wider than chord 
13’s at frets 9 and 10. A wider fret spacing means that the fingers of the left hand are more 
spaced out, leading to different proprioceptive feedback. However, the remaining pair 
(chords 11 and 17) also has a large difference in fret spacing but was not rated significantly 
differently, which seems to contradict this explanation. One explanation for this might be that 
both chords in this pair were designed as unfamiliar, whereas the other two pairs comprised 
a familiar and unfamiliar chord. Hence, it could be that although the fret spacing was 
different, both chords were rated as roughly equally unfamiliar but for different reasons, by 
most participants. Although this could be tested in future studies, fret spacing seems unlikely 
to be the decisive factor. Fret spacing differs for very familiar shapes such as chord 2 as they 
are played higher up the neck of the guitar, guitarists are used to this and so it seems unlikely 
that they would rate a C9 chord at frets 2 and 3 as more familiar than F9 at frets 7 and 8. The 
most likely explanation is that participants were unable to separate the association of the 
chord shape  to the heard chord from the hand shape used. Chord 13 is part of a class of 
altered dominant chord voicings which are less common on strings 3-6. However, caution 
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must be exercised with these results, as one final possibility is that the small sample size in 
Study 4 (N = 18) was such that a few of the participants who did not follow the instructions 
skewed the results. 
 
5.8 Limitations and Future Research 
These studies had small sample sizes, so no measures of internal validity could be calculated 
for the familiarity survey rating data. This limitation was mitigated to some extent by the 
within-subjects design, as it was each participant’s familiarity rating for each chord that was 
used as the predictor variable in the linear mixed model in Study 2. This model was not 
therefore relying on a consensus measure of familiarity for chord or hand shapes which would 
have needed a larger sample size. It was not possible to randomise the order differently for 
each participant in Study 4 due to the limitations of the online survey platform used. There 
are concerns about the reliability of self-report measures for introspective states (Berger, 
Dennehy, Bargh, & Morsella, 2016; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In the case of Studies 3 and 4, 
these were not cognitive processes that might be unavailable to introspection, nor were the 
questions asking respondents to reflect on things they have done some time ago, or that they 
generally do. Instead, they were asked to rate their subjective feeling of familiarity 
immediately after playing the chord. Although these factors might alleviate some of the 
reliability problems, familiarity itself could involve different elements which depend on 
musical context and which might be inaccessible to participants playing them in these studies. 
As pointed out in the discussion, it might be difficult for participants to ignore other factors, 
such as the most familiar chord sound to chord shape mapping. As testing the embodied 
feeling of familiarity involved participants playing the chord, they would have heard the chord 
they played, which could therefore be a confounding factor.  
 
Future research could address this in several ways. A larger sample could be asked to rate 
familiarity with a more extensive set of chords and genre specialism data could be taken to 
see if some shapes were more familiar to, for example, rock versus jazz players. Another 
familiarity rating study could be done where the sound of the heard chord is masked to 
remove this as a potential confounder. It might also be possible to gather behavioural data, 
such as the time taken to play a chord from a visual stimulus, although this runs the risk of 
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introducing further possible confounds, such as visual complexity of the stimulus and physical 
playability of the chord. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Two studies were carried out with the participants of Study 2 to measure the familiarity of 
the chords used as the imperative visual stimuli. The first study measured chord shape 
familiarity, taking into account the shape-chord association of the shape in the given location. 
The second study emphasized the hand shape used to play the chord as the index of 
familiarity. The ratings of familiarity differed from each other but both sets of results rated 
the familiarity of chords designed to be familiar higher than their unfamiliar counterparts. 
Each measure was incorporated into separate models used for analysis of Study 2’s results 
and both models returned very similar results, showing a significant facilitating effect of 
familiarity on judgements of how the chord should sound. 
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Chapter 6 
Study 5: The Improvisation and Mind-Body Survey 
6.1 Background 
6.1.1 Auditory Imagery, Authenticity and Moral Perfectionism 
The responses of the participants of Study 1 and subsequent thematic analysis confirmed that 
prospective auditory imagery as a generative strategy is important to them. Not only was this 
connected to moral perfectionism (Day, 2000), it was also accompanied by concepts relating 
to Romantic notions of creativity, freedom and ‘being in the moment’. Participants also 
reported multiple generative strategies, which do not need auditory imagery, for example 
motoric strategies (Hargreaves, 2012). This is a coherent picture insofar as the practicalities 
of improvisation require a degree of redundancy in order to keep the flow of improvisation 
going, so that if one strategy is not available at a given moment, there are others to use 
(Pressing, 1988). Moral perfectionism could then arise as a consequence of the dissonance 
between these Romantic ideals and what improvisers know they do, in the following way. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, moral perfectionism is characterised by a commitment to authenticity 
coupled with a dissatisfaction with one’s current state of development. Prospective auditory 
imagery has the status of being necessary to validate improvising as a creative activity for 
these participants and this is also linked to the concept of authenticity: “He, I had a lesson 
with him once, and he was like ' Right, just play me something'. So I improvised something, 
and he stopped... and he was like 'you didn't hear that though, did you?' Was like 'Nooo...' 
[laughs]” (participant 3 in Study 1, Guitarist, Male 32). In further responding to questioning 
about the timing of his imagining, the same participant said this a few sentences later: “Yes 
so I...  I guess what I'm trying to think now is whether I... erm if it's... whether I'm a fraud or 
not!” He had seen the tension between his aesthetic of ‘being in the moment’ and the 
necessity of imagining how things would sound in advance. Playing something true, in other 
words improvising authentically, is linked to prospective auditory imagery for these 
participants and in the literature also (Berliner, 1994). Given that these improvisers are aware 
that some of their generative strategies do not use auditory imagery in advance of playing, it 
follows that they know that they are not always improvising authentically in these terms. 
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Since they clearly value and strive for authenticity, this means they are dissatisfied with their 
current abilities to pre-hear in their mind’s ear and are trying to improve them. 
 
6.1.2 Why Prioritise Prospective Auditory Imagery?  
 
In some ways the reason the auditory modality is privileged is obvious. The aesthetic 
appreciation of music is primarily a response to how it sounds. It might be objected that other 
aspects of the performance colour an audience’s appreciation. For example, studies in which 
participants are asked to rate performances in which the audio and the video are transposed 
show that visual aspects have an effect, as does the impact of blind auditions for orchestras 
(Goldin & Rouse, 2000). However, whilst we might close our eyes to listen or listen to an audio 
only recording, it is unlikely that we would watch a video of music without the sound. That 
auditory imagery must be prospective for improvisation to be considered authentic relates to 
the Romantic notions of creativity and freedom. As mentioned above, there is a tension 
between this imperative and the other ideal subtheme from Study 1, ‘in the moment’ which 
is related to feelings of connectedness, flow states and the feeling that the music is playing 
the musician rather than vice versa, which is sometimes called the creator and witness 
phenomenon (Berkowitz, 2010). Participant 1’s quotation given in Chapter 3 perhaps contains 
an attempt to resolve this tension “…no sort of translation in between thinking of the idea 
and it happening…”. What could this mean? That an idea is ‘thought of’ is taken as a premise; 
the context suggests that this is a musical idea which is imagined in the auditory modality. 
That the idea ‘happens’ implies a claim that what is played stands in a certain relation to the 
idea. A literal interpretation that this is an identity relation would depend on a dual-aspect 
conception, whereby the phenomenological aspect of imagining the sound is copresent with 
the sound-producing movements. In other words, the auditory image and the movements 
that manipulate an instrument are both aspects of the same entity. This interpretation makes 
clearer what could be meant by ‘no translation’. It is not necessary to translate an idea into 
movement if the idea and the movement are different aspects of the same thing. This also 
resolves the tension between being in the moment and imagining how something will sound 
in advance, since thinking of the sound is contemporaneous to action.  
 
126 
 
The dual-aspect strategy resolves one tension between prospection and being in the moment, 
but at the expense of creating another. Collapsing the idea and the action into different 
aspects of the same thing removes the justification for considering the idea as having a causal 
role. For the idea to cause the sound we hear, it must be prospective, as this condition is 
constitutive of causation, in that causes precede effects. An important and related issue is 
whether the idea in the form of an auditory image needs to be veridical. In other words, it is 
one thing to ask whether the auditory image causes the music played to be a particular way, 
it is another to ask whether this causal role depends on the image being an accurate 
representation of the music. This could be argued to be a matter of degree, but if the 
creativity of improvisation is predicated on playing what we hear in our head, then clearly the 
auditory image must resemble what we play enough to uniquely specify the important 
parameters of musical content. If this were not the case, then there would be no basis for the 
proposition that what is played represents the particular sound that is imagined. The ultimate 
consequence of this would be that the vaguest impression of imagined sound with little 
correspondence with the musical output could be adduced as inspiration. Whilst this might 
not be absurd, it is a long way from the ideal we are discussing. Which musical parameters 
count as important depends on the context and the priorities of improvisers. Melodic and 
rhythmic content seem to be fundamental in idiomatic contexts (Berkowitz, 2010; Berliner, 
1994), whereas timbral and dynamic properties could be emphasized in non-idiomatic 
improvisations. (It is interesting to note that one participant in Study 1 indicated a dissociation 
whereby he had a strong image of rhythmic content but not the specific notes for some 
phrases). These considerations are more generally the basis and motivation of ideomotor 
theories in connecting thought, action and action-consequences which were discussed in 
Chapter 2. In proposing that action goals are represented in terms of their perceptual 
consequences, they offer a possible theoretical grounding for prospective auditory imagery. 
However, given these consequences are multi-modal, the motivation for singling out the 
auditory modality is likely to come from other factors and influences. One such is the 
Romantic ideal of the creative artist. 
 
6.1.3 The Romantic Ideal of the Creative Artist 
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Why does the Romantic ideal of creativity necessitate that the process of creating music is 
one in which the sound of the music is imagined in advance? For those enculturated in the 
traditions of Western art music, the answer is perhaps again intuitively obvious. A musical 
work is the product of the creative imagination of a composer, who then writes it down as a 
score. Improvisers have adapted this concept in seeing improvisation as real-time 
composition by bypassing the writing down stage and substituting the transduction of the 
idea into the corresponding sound-creating movement (Berliner, 1994). The idea that the 
imagination is the source of creativity in this way has a long history and a comprehensive 
review of the relevant literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, some key ideas 
relating to the ontology of music, creativity and dualism will now be developed. 
 
The development of the concept of forms takes place throughout the writings attributed to 
Plato (Plato, 428-328 BCE/2018), the central idea being that the world as we experience it is 
populated by entities which appear to have properties such as, for example, beauty or of 
being large. They appear this way because they partake of (or resemble, depending on which 
theory of forms is adopted) the form which is beauty or largeness. A form is unchanging and 
eternal, whereas a physical object which instantiates it is subject to change and decay. This 
idea is dualist in that there are two distinct ontological realms. It has been extremely 
influential in the history of philosophy and consequently on considerations of what music is 
and what it might mean to create it. To be a Platonist with respect to a domain such as 
mathematics or music is therefore to hold that numbers or musical works are themselves 
abstract objects. When we use numbers or hear a performance of a musical work, we are 
dealing with instances (or instantiations) of those abstract objects. This worldview directly 
informed the (relatively late) development of the modern concept of the musical work itself 
(Dahlhaus, 1991). The terminology of Peirce’s type/token distinction (Peirce, 1906) has been 
adopted by Platonists to describe the relationship of musical works to their performances. In 
this schema, a type is analogous to a form, for example the word ‘the’ in the English language. 
In the sense of being a type, there is only one word ‘the’, but there are thirty-five tokens of it 
on this page. The main division in contemporary musical ontology is between Platonists and 
Nominalists (those who hold that abstract objects do not exist, see for example Kania, 2013). 
It is the former position that informed the development of the Romantic ideal of the creative 
artist. Dualist metaphysics in the Renaissance developed the idea of a timeless immaterial 
128 
 
mode of existence which was separate from material reality, in part to try to solve problems 
of how to reconcile a universe which appeared mechanistic with free will. Descartes identified 
our being as free agents with an immaterial soul which interacted with the material brain and 
body via the pineal gland (Lokhorst, 2017). Although the cognitive-scientific worldview rejects 
this theory, dualism is still an implicit position for many people even within the scientific 
disciplines (Demertzi et al., 2009). That artistic creativity has its source in a nonmaterial realm 
and is the deliberate act of a free agent via their imagination then finds its articulation in 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement. Kant’s philosophy is explicitly dualist: 
Such representations of the Imagination we may call Ideas, partly because they at least 
strive after something which lies beyond the bounds of experience, and so seek to 
approximate to a representation of concepts of Reason (intellectual Ideas), thus giving 
to the latter the appearance of objective reality, - but especially because no concept 
can be fully adequate to them as internal intuitions. (Kant, 1790/1914, p. 66) 
Kant’s figure of the artistic genius, developed by subsequent philosophers such as 
Schopenhauer is the compliment of the idea of absolute music (Dahlhaus, 1991). The latter, 
the ineffable inhabitant of the Platonic realm of ideal forms, is brought into being as a willed 
act, in the imagination of the former. 
 
This is the context from which the idealised model of improvisation described in this thesis is 
developed, and this makes clear why within this model prospective auditory imagery is seen 
as a necessary condition for improvisation to be creatively valid. Improvisation, seen as real-
time composition, is like musical composition in general in that what is created is an abstract 
sound structure in the imagination of the composer. This is not sufficient for creativity as 
normally understood. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ‘standard definition’ of creativity links 
originality and effectiveness, which in the case of art is associated with aesthetic value. Runco 
and Jaeger (2012) make the case that the definition has a longer history than is usually 
supposed (or attributed); they trace its first unambiguous formulation back to Stein in 1953 
but the concept can be inferred from The Critique of Judgement. Kant states that: 
We thus see (1) that genius is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can 
be given; it is not a mere aptitude for what can be learnt by rule. Hence Originality 
must be its first property. (2) But since it also can produce original nonsense, its 
products must be models, i.e. exemplary. (Kant, 1790/1914, p. 63) 
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In this dualist worldview, originality is such that no definite rule can be given to the creative 
process, a position which is the antithesis of the notion that creativity is computable (Johnson-
Laird, 2002).  This situates creativity in the non-deterministic Platonic realm rather than the 
deterministic physical one, because if creativity were deterministic then, in principle, a set of 
rules could be specified. This is also entailed by the Romantic ideal of freedom, which regards 
free will as non-deterministic. Freedom was also a motivating factor for improvising for 
participants in Study 1. 
 
In summary, Romantic ideals of creativity and freedom and the influence of dualist philosophy 
have informed a view of improvisation in which prospective auditory imagery is necessary but 
not sufficient for validation as a creative process. Platonism, Cartesian dualism and the 
concept of absolute music have also contributed to a view that creative improvisation is a 
non-deterministic free act of imagining sound structures which are instantiated in real time 
during performance. This is in contrast with Johnson-Laird’s (2002) model which sees 
creativity as computable and more broadly with cognitive-scientific perspectives on 
improvisation. This raises the question of whether the still prevalent idealised conception of 
improvisation is partly due to implicit dualism on the part of improvisers and perhaps their 
educators. The next section will briefly review the evidence on contemporary dualism, leading 
to the aims of Study 5. 
 
6.1.4 Contemporary Dualism and the Mind-Body Problem 
Cognitive models of improvisation involve three levels of description, the computational level 
describes and operationalises the task goals, the algorithmic level describes the cognitive 
processes necessary to meet them and the implementation level specifies the neural 
substrates of cognition (Loui, 2018).  What this exemplifies is the prevailing computational 
metaphor used to understand the mental aspect of complex human activity. This cognitive-
scientific perspective is implicitly physicalist (materialist) in the sense that our thoughts and 
experiences are taken to belong to one level of description of what brains do, whereas the 
neural substrates of these belong to another level of description of the same phenomenon. 
This is incompatible with Cartesian dualism because the different levels describe only one 
kind of substance, namely matter. (For simplicity, matter and energy are considered here as 
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aspects of the one material reality). There are different philosophical positions available 
within physicalism, for example property dualism holds that one kind of substance can have 
physical and mental properties, whereas reductive physicalism is the view that mental states 
simply are physical states (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018).  However, despite the cognitive-
scientific consensus that rejects it, substance dualism is still influential in the contemporary 
debate which has become known as the mind-body problem (McGinn, 1989), a rough 
description of which is: what is the relationship between the physical body, often focusing on 
the brain, and the mind? One reason dualism might still have an intuitive appeal relates to 
our abilities to infer the mental states of others even though we know that these states are 
hidden, which gives rise to an implicit division into covert-mental and visible-physical 
(Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018). Another reason for the intuitive appeal of dualist views is what 
David Chalmers named the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ (Chalmers, 1995). This refers to 
the intuition that conscious processes, such as directing attention, integrating information or 
motor control are relatively easy to explain in terms of neural mechanisms without the sense 
that something has been left out. The hard problem refers to how to explain how and why 
any neural mechanism gives rise to conscious experience. The dualist solution is to say that 
the mind and the brain are separate, fundamentally different ontological kinds. Several 
studies have been carried out to investigate the prevalence of dualist beliefs, using different 
instruments, often to see if the measure of dualism correlates with other attitudes, for 
example belief in the paranormal. Stanovich (1989) developed a 27-item self-report measure 
of dualistic beliefs regarding the mind-body problem and found that among a sample of 
American undergraduates, their dualism score was positively correlated with their level of 
belief in extrasensory perception. Dualist views were relatively common even amongst 
medical and paramedical professionals, according to the findings of a study carried out by 
Demertzi et al. (2009), using a four-item dualism scale. Their first sample included 250 
students at Edinburgh University, studying different academic disciplines. Those studying 
humanities-based courses were more likely than those studying the sciences to have higher 
dualism scores. A more surprising finding was from their second sample, comprising 1858 
participants attending public or scientific meetings on consciousness in Liege, 782 of whom 
were medical professionals and 290 from paramedical professions. 39.5% of the medical 
professionals and 38.2% of the paramedical professionals endorsed a statement which 
distinguished the mind and brain as separate. Dualist preconceptions were also amongst the 
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most popular responses by students of various disciplines (including psychology) to a mind-
body questionnaire (Fahrenberg & Cheetham, 2000), who also thought that these views have 
practical consequences within their professional domains. There is also evidence from a study 
carried out with Swedish university students that dualistic beliefs are related to personal 
values. Grankvist, Kajonius, and Persson (2016) used a five-item Likert scale to assess dualistic 
beliefs and found a correlation with the results from a personal beliefs inventory. Participants 
with stronger dualistic beliefs attached less importance to power (prestige, social status, 
control of resources and people). These findings raise the question of the practical 
consequences that holding various positions on the mind-body problem might have for 
improvisers. 
 
Hamilton and Hamilton (2015) advocate a set of pedagogical approaches for psychology 
students designed to engender a more critical approach to the implicit dualist assumptions 
they might hold. The authors argue that Cartesian dualist epistemology can be detrimental to 
learning and cite several studies in support of this assertion. There are, however, two 
problems with their position. The first is that although the literature they cite does associate 
having a dualist epistemology with poorer learning outcomes (for example Lonka & Lindblom-
Ylänne, 1996; Ryan, 1984), the link between Cartesian dualism and epistemic dualism is not 
made. Whereas the former is a variety of substance dualism with direct implications for the 
mind-body problem, the latter relates to different conceptions of knowledge. In this context, 
dualism refers to an absolutist right-versus-wrong worldview and is contrasted with 
constructivist and relativist positions (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Muis, 2004). The second is that 
there are problems with the psychometric instruments used in the literature to measure 
epistemic beliefs (DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2008). Some of these 
relate to a lack of rigour in the conceptualisation of epistemic belief, for example some 
measures include items about learning which are not strictly epistemic. For example, the 
Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) (Schommer, 1990) has items such as “Successful students 
understand things quickly“, which expresses a belief about learning rather than about 
knowledge. Others pertain to low levels of internal consistency and an over-reliance on 
empirical rather than theoretical foundations. One study did consider the effects of epistemic 
beliefs in the domain of music. Nielsen (2012) found that music students who believed that 
ability is fixed were less likely to use metacognitive and effort regulation strategies for musical 
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practice. An interesting result of the multivariate analysis was that jazz students were more 
likely to hold that the ability to learn an instrument is fixed.  Another finding of this study 
linked more sophisticated views on the structure of knowledge with the use of metacognitive, 
organisation and elaboration strategies. These findings need to be treated with caution 
because the measure of epistemic belief used was adapted from the Epistemological 
Questionnaire (EQ) (Schommer, 1990) in order to relate to music. Not only does the EQ 
contain items which are about learning rather than epistemic beliefs, the factor structure 
resulting from this multidimensionality has been criticised for being unstable (DeBacker et al., 
2008). Nielsen’s study therefore potentially inherits these problems from the EQ by also 
blurring the distinction between epistemic and learning beliefs and using an instrument with 
questionable reliability. The author carried out a factor analysis, partially replicating 
Schommer’s factor structure with modest internal reliability (α’s between .66 and .50). 
Despite these caveats, this study lends further evidential support for the link between 
attitudes to learning and self-regulation to musical practice and performance. This is directly 
relevant to this thesis, as the self-regulation has been found to be an important component 
of expertise in jazz improvisation (Biasutti & Frezza, 2009; May, 2003; Wopereis, Stoyanov, 
Kirschner, & Van Merriënboer, 2013).  
 
6.2 Aims 
The thematic analysis from Study 1 generated some themes which described some of the 
processes involved in improvisation for the participants. The use of multiple strategies, having 
an ‘idea bank’ of preformed ideas, being ‘in the moment’ and the need to pre-hear what is 
played were amongst those which are also mentioned in the literature (Berliner, 1994; 
Norgaard, 2011), but due to the nature of qualitative research the number of participants was 
small (N = 6). The primary aim of this study was therefore to see whether these themes were 
endorsed by a larger population of improvisers. A second aim was to see if there were any 
significant differences between students, musicians and educators, with the hypotheses that 
students would rate items relating to conscious processes and basic skills higher than the 
other groups. In addition, this study tested the hypothesis that the prioritisation of 
prospective imagery is positively correlated with implicit Cartesian dualism.  
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6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants 
Participants who were self-declared as either a music student whose instruction or practice 
included improvisation, a musician who improvises or an educator whose teaching includes 
improvisation were eligible to take part in the study (N = 114, 24 students, 74 musicians, 16 
educators, 72 male, 39 female, 3 preferred not to say). The modal class of self-reported 
estimates of improvising experience (5-year intervals until over 30) was over 30 years. 
Recruitment was via distribution to students and staff by administrators in UK conservatoires 
and universities and via social media. One participant was excluded from the Likert analyses 
because they did not answer any of the rating questions. Participation was anonymous and 
the data confidential in line with the relevant ethics policies. 
 
6.3.2 Materials 
The survey was administered online on the Bristol Online Survey platform (Appendix 7). There 
were two sections, section 1 comprised questions about improvisation derived from Study 1 
and the literature, whereas section 2 was a validated dualism scale (Preston, Ritter, & Hepler, 
2013; Stanovich, 1989).  
 
Section 1. There were 16 rating questions which invited a response on a seven-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). There were three versions of 
section 1 which differed slightly in the wording of five of the questions, depending on whether 
the routing in the survey directed the participant as a student, musician or educator. For 
example, a student or musician would see “I am completely free to play what I want to play 
while improvising”, whereas an educator would see “My teaching encourages students to 
develop to a stage where they are completely free to play what they want to play while 
improvising”. The reason for changing the wording for the educators was to focus their 
responses on this role rather than on their own practice as improvisers. Although for many in 
this group their practice could match their pedagogical stance, there also might be some who 
are no longer performers themselves. If so, wording that is appropriate for eliciting responses 
from students and musicians that reflect what they do during improvisation would not be 
appropriate. The sacrifice of direct comparisons between all groups involving these questions 
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was therefore judged to be worth making for inclusivity. Questions 1 and 5, “When 
improvising, it is important to play in time” and “Good instrumental technique is needed for 
effective improvising” were designed to measure attitudes to the element of improvising 
expertise that Wopereis et al. (2013) named “basic skills” in their cluster map. Question 2 
“Improvising well involves playing something new” relates to the creativity theme in Study 1. 
Question 3 “You have to take risks to improvise well” is informed by Study 1’s subtheme 
‘comfort zone’ and the cluster ‘Risk-taking’ from Wopereis et al. (2013). Question 8 counter-
balances this in asking participants to rate their agreement with: “It is important to avoid 
errors while improvising”. The ‘sketch planning’ theme from Norgaard (2011) also featured in 
Study 1 so Question 4 addresses this “During an improvisation, it is important to think of a 
plan for what will come next, so the improvisation has some structure, or ‘tells a story’.” 
Question 6 tackles the issue of prospective auditory imagery “Creative improvising involves 
pre-hearing in your imagination what you are going to play on your instrument before you 
play it”. Interaction with other musicians and the audience were subthemes in Study 1 and 
was also captured by Wopereis et al.’s item “…who responds to other musicians” in their 
Responsivity cluster. In the present survey, Question 7 asks for a rating of agreement with the 
statement “Effective improvisers are aware of their environment and respond to what is going 
on”, and therefore interrogates the wider concept of listening and responding to external 
factors including other musicians, the audience and features of the context. Question 9 refers 
to the degree to which improvisers value appropriateness to the idiom “Improvising well 
involves playing in a way that fits the idiom or style of the music”. The extent to which 
improvisation involves conscious processes was an issue that arose in Study 1 and was treated 
as a potential feature of all the themes. Participants in that study expressed a lot of 
uncertainty about how conscious they were of the processes and strategies they used during 
idea generation. Question 10 “Generating ideas in improvisation mostly involves deliberate 
conscious processes” addresses the issue. Another theme from Study 1 ‘Idea Bank’, which is 
also found in the literature (Berliner, 1994; Norgaard, 2011) motivated Question 11 “I have 
an ‘idea bank’ of musical ideas that I can use when I improvise”. Similarly, multiple strategy 
use was investigated by Question 12 “I have many different ways to generate ideas while 
improvising”. The subtheme ‘in the moment’ inspired Question 13 “Improvising is about being 
in the moment”, while the ‘creator and witness’ phenomenon mentioned above motivated 
Question 14 “When I am improvising well, the music seems to happen without my being 
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aware of how I am doing it”. Freedom was a motivating factor for participants in Study 1, so 
Question 15 probes the Romantic notion of the free agent: “I am completely free to play what 
I want to play while improvising”. Finally, there was a question relating to the creator/witness 
idea and to expert automaticity “My body knows what to do to improvise and I don’t know 
or imagine what I will play before I play it.” This question directly counterbalances Question 
6 in that it can be interpreted as contradicting the idea of imagining the sound in advance. As 
such, this question offers an embodied alternative which should be anticorrelated with 
Questions 4, 6 and 10 and might correlate to an extent with Questions 13 and 14, since being 
‘in the moment’ and the music happening without the feeling of conscious awareness of how, 
are consistent with not overthinking and letting the body get on with doing what it knows. As 
questions 4, 6 and 10 involve conscious processes, the mean rating for these three questions 
was calculated as a conscious processes index. Questions 13, 14 and 16 reflect non-conscious 
processes in the sense that being ‘in the moment’, the creator/witness phenomenon and the 
body ‘knowing’ what to do are the antithesis of conscious processes. These were therefore 
also combined to form a non-conscious processes index, with the hypothesis that the two 
indices would be negatively correlated. Questions 2, 6 and 15 correspond to Romantic Ideal 
subthemes of creativity and freedom in Study 1 and were therefore combined into a romantic 
ideals index. The section concluded with a free text response question which was worded 
slightly differently for each group. Students saw “Which elements of improvisation do you 
think your teachers emphasise as most important? Please comment briefly below.” The 
version for musicians was “Which elements of improvisation do you think you emphasise as…” 
Educators saw “Which elements of improvisation do you think you emphasise as most 
important in your teaching? Please comment briefly below.” 
 
Section 2. This validated scale (Appendix 7) was the same for all participants, comprising 14 
seven-point Likert questions and a free text response question at the end where participants 
were invited to give any further thoughts. This section asked participants about their attitudes 
to the mind and body. The original scale was developed by Stanovich (1989) as a measure of 
implicit theories on the mind/body problem held by non-specialists in this area and had 27 
items. Factor analysis by subsequent authors and considerations of item complexity and 
questionnaire length resulted in scales with fewer items being developed (Demertzi et al., 
2009; Grankvist et al., 2016; Hook & Farah, 2013). The dualism scale used in this study was a 
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14-item scale derived from items used in two experiments by Preston et al. (2013). Items such 
as “people have a non-physical soul (or spirit) that animates the physical body” and “A 
person’s soul persists after one dies” are compatible with Cartesian (substance) dualism. 
Reverse-coded items included “The mind is equivalent to the brain” and “One’s thoughts, 
personality, preferences, and choices are all just a product of brain functions”, which 
correspond to a physicalist view of the mind. The scores for the items on this scale which 
explicitly mentioned the soul were combined into a subscale called ‘substance dualism’, for 
theoretical reasons which are discussed in the next section.  
 
6.3.4 Procedure 
The following instructions were given at the beginning of the survey:  
In this part of the survey, you will be asked about different aspects of musical 
improvisation. Each question asks you to indicate on a scale (1-7) how much you agree 
or disagree with a statement about improvisation. For singers, where statements 
include a reference to your instrument, this refers to your voice. Please try to respond 
to each question according to your judgement and experience. If you find yourself 
thinking 'the answer depends on...', please use your judgement to give what you think 
is the best answer you can. 
 
At the beginning of section 2, these instructions were given: 
In this section, the statements are about the mind/body. Philosophers have been 
debating what is called the mind-body problem for thousands of years, and there is 
still no broad agreement on the main issues. There are no 'right' answers and these 
questions are not dependent on the questions in section 1. Please indicate your level 
of agreement or disagreement with each statement (1-7). 
 
In accordance with RNCM and CUK ethics procedures, respondents were advised that they 
could withdraw from the survey at any time without penalty and could decide not to answer 
some questions. They were told that by filling out the survey they were taken to have given 
informed consent. The final page thanked respondents for participating and gave contact 
details for myself and my supervisor in case they had concerns or questions.  
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6.3.5 Data Analysis 
Statistical analysis was carried out using IBM SPSS version 22. Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests 
were carried out to test normality. As this was an exploratory survey using ordinal data, a 
cautious approach was taken to avoid type 1 errors. There is some controversy over the use 
of parametric tests with ordinal data (although see Norman, 2010, for a defense of their use) 
and non-parametric tests with Bonferroni corrections were used where appropriate. 
Reliability analyses (Cronbach’s alpha) were conducted on the improvisation and dualism 
inventories as a whole and also on each of the subscales derived from the improvisation 
section (Table 6.5). These were the basic skills index (BSI, questions 1, 5, 8, 9), the conscious 
processes index (CPI, questions 4, 6 and 10), the non-conscious processes index (nCPI, 
questions 13, 14, and 16) and the romantic ideals index (RII, questions 2, 6 and 15). Due to 
the multidimensionality of the dualism scale, Cronbach’s alpha was also computed for the 
substance dualism subscale (SD), which combined questions 5, 6, 7, 11 and 14 from the main 
dualism scale (Table 6.5). Exploratory factor analyses were carried out on the improvisation 
measure to see to what extent the factor structure of the improvisation section of the survey 
corroborated the derived subscales. This procedure was repeated for the dualism scale to 
investigate the nature of its multidimensionality. The method used was principal axis factor 
analysis with varimax rotation using Kaiser normalisation. Correlations and group 
comparisons between the students and musicians for these subscales were carried out 
(Tables 6.6 and 6.7).  
 
The thematic analysis was carried out with the aid of the Nvivo 10 CADQAS software. This 
program codes text at nodes which form a data structure which can be visualised and 
manipulated. The free text response for both questions for each respondent was copied into 
Nvivo as a separate source. This allowed for easy comparisons between their response to 
each section and cross referencing with their rating data. The next stage involved generating 
initial codes for the entire data corpus. Following this, these initial codes were aggregated 
into provisional themes, by comparing the contents coded at different nodes with each other 
and reviewing these to look for similarities and differences. Subsequently, overarching 
themes were identified which were separate for the improvisation and dualism responses. 
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Improvisation Likert Questions 
The mean ratings and standard deviations (relating to a 7-point Likert scale) for each 
improvisation question are shown in Table 6.1. It should be noted that questions 11, 12, 14, 
15 and 16 have slightly different wording for the educators only, therefore direct comparisons 
involving the educators with these questions are not valid (questions indicated with a *). The 
students saw an identical set of rating questions to the musicians, with the only difference in 
wording being in the free text question, which invited them to comment further on the 
elements their teachers emphasised. As such, their rating results are directly comparable with 
those of the musicians.   
 
There was a bias toward agreement for these questions, with only two having mean ratings 
below the midpoint of neither agree nor disagree (4) and Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests showed 
that the data is not normally distributed, apart from in the case of two of the subscales, the 
Basic Skills Index and the Conscious Processes Index which are discussed below. This is 
probably because all the suggestions for possible elements of improvising were at least 
credible, however the data still clearly show which items were most endorsed. Considering 
first the results for all groups (Table 6.1), the importance of listening and being responsive 
was the highest rated, closely followed by ‘being in the moment’ and the idea of multiple 
generative strategies. 
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Table 6.1 
 
Mean Improvisation Question Ratings 
Group Students Musicians Educators All Groups 
Question Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)   
7. Effective improvisers are aware of their environment and respond to what is going on. 6.42 (0.88) 6.64 (0.65) 6.40 (0.63) 6.56 (0.71) 
13. Improvising is about 'being in the moment'. 5.71 (1.04) 6.23 (1.27) 5.87 (1.55) 6.09 (1.28) 
12. I have many different ways to generate ideas while improvising.* 5.13 (1.45) 5.81 (1.22) 6.27 (0.88) 5.73 (1.28) 
3. You have to take risks to improvise well. 5.08 (1.77 5.89 (1.36) 5.33 (1.80) 5.64 (1.54) 
14. When I am improvising well, the music seems to happen without me being aware of 
how I am doing it.* 
5.04 (1.68) 5.66 (1.62) 5.33 (2.16) 5.49 (1.72) 
5. Good instrumental technique is needed for effective improvising. 5.63 (1.24) 4.81 (2.08) 4.93 (2.02) 5.00 (1.94) 
9. Improvising well involves playing in a way that fits the idiom or style of the music. 5.29 (1.46) 4.85 (1.88) 4.60 (2.23) 4.91 (1.84) 
15. I am completely free to play what I want to play while improvising.* 3.58 (1.77) 4.80 (1.84) 6.27 (1.03) 4.73 (1.89) 
11. I have an 'idea bank' of musical ideas that I can use when I improvise.* 5.21 (1.56) 4.47 (2.05) 4.67 (1.84) 4.65 (1.94) 
1. When improvising, it is important to play in time. 4.96 (1.92) 4.15 (2.05) 5.27 (2.12) 4.47 (2.06) 
6. Creative improvising involves pre-hearing in your imagination what you are going to 
play on your instrument before you play it. 
4.54 (1.89) 4.27 (2.01) 4.80 (1.82) 4.40 (1.95) 
4. During an improvisation, it is important to think of a plan for what will come next, so 
the improvisation has some structure, or 'tells a story'. 
4.88 (1.90) 4.12 (2.01) 4.53 (1.81) 4.34 (1.97) 
16. My body knows what to do to improvise and I don't know or imagine what I will play 
before I play it.* 
3.88 (2.85) 4.19 (1.76) 5.80 (1.08) 4.34 (1.84) 
2. Improvising well involves playing something new. 3.67 (1.79) 4.49 (1.92) 2.13 (1.92) 4.27 (1.91) 
10. Generating ideas in improvisation mostly involves deliberate conscious thought 
processes. 
4.75 (1.80) 3.27 (1.88) 3.07 (1.39) 3.56 (1.90) 
8. It is important to avoid errors while improvising. 2.96 (1.63) 2.53 (1.69) 2.13 (1.41) 2.57 (1.65) 
A summary of the mean Likert ratings and standard deviations for each improvisation item, the rank order is for all groups. Starred items have 
a slightly different wording for the educator group.  
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 The lowest rated item was “It is important to avoid errors while improvising” (2.57) which 
contrasts with the third highest rated “You have to take risks to improvise well” (5.64). The 
other item below neutral was ‘’Generating ideas in improvisation mostly involves deliberate 
conscious thought processes” and was anticorrelated with ‘improvising is about ‘being in the 
moment’’ (rs = -.339, 95% BCa CI [-.490, -.164,], p < .01). As expected, the conscious and non-
conscious process indices were negatively correlated (rs = -.382, 95% BCa CI [-.544, -.191], p < 
.01). This lends support to these indices measuring different dimensions of improvising, the 
first relating to consciousness and prospection, whilst the second tracks flow-like 
unselfconscious states. The educator group was excluded from this comparison because the 
non-conscious process index includes questions with different wording for them. Although 
the item ‘Creative improvising involves pre-hearing in your imagination what you are going to 
play on your instrument before you play it’ only had a mean rating of 4.40 with a standard 
deviation of 1.95, it was still the case that 35% of all participants either moderately or strongly 
agreed, and 55% agreed with the item to some extent. Some of the items in the improvisation 
(and dualism) sections were aggregated to form subscales. This was done based on the results 
of Study 1 and on theoretical considerations based on the literature. In this initial exploratory 
step, the mean of the scores for each item in the subscale was used without weightings. Table 
6.3 gives a correlation matrix for all the subscales created in this way, for the student and 
musician groups. Educators were excluded due to them having five differently worded 
questions. Educators were excluded from the factor analysis for the 16-item improvisation 
survey due to the slightly different wording in five of the questions for this group, leaving 98 
respondents. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure for sampling adequacy was in the 
acceptable range, KMO = .70. The KMO results for individual items were all above the 
minimum of .5 apart from item 2 (Field, 2013). Five factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s 
criterion of 1 and when combined they explained 63.18% of the variance. The analysis was re-
run, omitting item 2, giving an increased KMO of .73 with all the individual results over .5. 
Four factors had eigenvalues over 1 in this case, explaining 58.08% of the variance in 
combination. Due to the relatively low sample size and the number of items, Kaiser’s criterion 
might not be the best indicator of the most sensible solution in this case so after examination 
of the scree plot and the factor loadings, a three-factor solution was chosen, explaining 
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49.50% of the variance. The results of the exploratory factor analysis and reliability tests for 
the improvisation scale are shown in Table 6.6. 
 
6.4.2 Dualism Scale Likert Questions 
The mean ratings and standard deviations for the dualism inventory are shown in Table 6.2. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests showed that the dualism data is normally distributed, but the 
substance dualism subscale (discussed below) is not. An additional respondent was excluded 
from this part of the analysis because they only answered four questions in the dualism 
section. Two other respondents had one missing data point each in the dualism scale and 
these were replaced using the mean of their other ratings (Downey & King, 1998). The mean 
dualism score was 3.99 (SD = 1.02). The correlation between the dualism score and the 
prospective auditory imagery item in the improvisation section (Question 6) was not 
significant, (rs = -.131, 95% BCa CI [-.310, .053] p = .156). The results of the factor analysis for 
the 14-item dualism scale are given in Table 6.7. As the questions were the same for all 
groups, only two respondents were excluded due to missing values, leaving 112 respondents. 
The KMO measure for sampling adequacy was in the acceptable range, KMO = .80. The KMO 
results for individual items were all above the minimum of .5 (Field, 2013). Three factors had 
eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and when combined they explained 59.12% of the 
variance. After examining the points of inflexion in the scree plot and the factor loadings, this 
solution was chosen. 
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Table 6.2 
 
Mean Dualism Scale Question Ratings 
Group Students Musicians Educators All Groups 
Question Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
2. It is impossible for science to ever have a complete understanding of the 
mind. 
4.92 (1.72) 4.30 (2.01) 4.40 (2.06) 4.44 (1.96) 
4. Whether one is a good or bad person can be completely altered by changes 
in the brain.* 
3.88 (1.73) 4.11 (1.85) 4.50 (1.87) 4.11 (1.82) 
12. The mind is a non-physical property. 4.63 (1.41) 3.82 (2.07) 4.57 (1.95) 4.09 (1.95) 
10. In the future, it may be possible to know someone's personality by looking 
at their brain activity.* 
4.42 (1.41) 3.91 (1.78) 3.71 (1.77) 3.89 (1.70) 
6. People have a non-physical soul (or spirit) that animates the physical body. 4.58 (2.02) 3.53 (2.17) 3.79 (2.15) 3.79 (2.16) 
9. The mind interacts with the brain, but is separate from brain. 3.79 (1.38) 3.68 (1.79) 3.93 (1.49) 3.74 (1.66) 
13. In the future, it may be possible to know exactly what another person is 
thinking by looking at their brain activity.* 
3.71 (1.57) 3.81 (1.96) 2.80 (1.70) 3.65 (1.87) 
3. One’s thoughts, personality, preferences, and choices are all just a product 
of brain functions.* 
4.38 (1.66) 3.58 (2.05) 2.53 (1.77) 3.61 (2.00) 
5. Aspects of mind that science cannot explain are best explained by the soul. 4.38 (1.61) 3.24 (1.94) 4.21 (2.19) 3.61 (1.96) 
1. The mind is equivalent to the brain.* 4.08 (1.64) 3.57 (2.03) 3.00 (2.24) 3.60 (1.99) 
7. A person's soul persists after one dies. 3.92 (2.02) 3.30 (2.16) 4.07 (2.34) 3.53 (2.16) 
14. I believe the mind and soul are the same thing. 3.46 (1.38) 3.65 (1.88) 2.71 (1.49) 3.49 (1.76) 
11. The true self is not governed by the brain, but by a person's soul. 4.00 (1.44) 3.16 (1.76) 3.71 (1.77) 3.41 (1.72) 
8. Free will is an illusion produced by the brain.* 3.29 (1.81) 3.41 (1.94) 3.21 (2.15) 3.36 (1.93) 
 The mean ratings and standard deviations for the dualism scale are shown. The rank order is for all groups. The starred items are reverse 
scored. 
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6.4.3 Correlations, Group Comparisons and Reliability Analyses 
Some correlations and comparisons of interest were carried out based on theoretical 
considerations, before the main body of statistical tests. The correlation between the 
Substance Dualism score and Improvisation Question 6 was not significant (rs = .08, 95% BCa 
CI [-.098, .266], p = .405). Improvisation Question 16 correlated with improvisation Question 
13 (rs = .49, 95% BCa CI [.317, .624], p < .01) and 14 (rs = .54, 95% BCa CI [.376, .701], p < .01). 
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed the higher rating for Improvisation Question 5 than 
Improvisation Question 1 was significant (T = 2243.50, p = .021, r = .15). There was also a 
significant positive correlation between the BSI and the CPI (rs = .54, 95% BCa CI [.335, .628], 
p < .001). 
 
The following group comparisons were also carried out. Levene’s test showed that the 
homogeneity of variance assumption was met except for the novice/expert comparison with 
question 5. Question 10 was rated significantly higher by those with 5 years or fewer 
estimated years of improvising experience (U = 669.50, z = -2.22, p = .027, r = -.21). The 
student group also rated Question 10 higher than musicians (U = 503.50, z = -3.22, p = .001, r 
= -.23). Comparison of the CPI between these groups did not show a significant difference (U 
= 727.50, z = -1.70, p = .088, r = -.11). The means for the BSI for students and 
musicians/educators showed a significant difference (Ms = 4.52, SD = 1.43, Mm/e = 4.11, SD = 
1.31, U = 772.50, z = -2.02, p = .044, r = -0.13). A similar comparison of the BSI between the 
relative novices and those with over 5 years’ improvising experience was not significant (U = 
797.00, z = -1.25, p = .211, r = -.12). Both groups rated the item on technique (Question 5) 
highly (Mnovice = 5.48, SD = 1.36 and Mexpert = 4.90, SD = 2.04) and the difference was not 
significant (U = 865.00, z = -.76, p = .446, r = -.07). As these were hypothesised and tested 
before the other comparisons, the significance level is not corrected and the correlations 
involve the educators because these subscales have no differently worded questions. 
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Table 6.3 
 
Spearman’s Rho Correlation Coefficients 
Sub-scales 1 2 3 4 
Substance 
Dualism 
-    
Romantic  
Ideal 
.07 -   
Conscious 
Process 
.019 (.20) -  
Non- 
Conscious 
.08 (.45**) -.38** - 
Basic Skills .15 
 
.30** .54** -.06 
Note: * = p < .05, **= p < .01, Bonferroni corrected. Figures in brackets refer to correlations 
between subscales with one shared item. 
 
Table 6.4 gives the significance levels for comparisons between the student and musician 
groups for each subscale, Table 6.5 gives internal reliability results for the initial 
scales/subscales. 
Table 6.4  
  
Comparison of Mean Scores between the Student and Musician Groups 
Subscale Significance Level 
Substance dualism p = .027 
Romantic Ideal p = .010 * 
Conscious Processes p = .022 
Non-conscious Processes p = .090 
Basic Skills p = .048 
The significance levels are for Mann-Whitney U-tests. * = significant p < .05, Bonferroni 
corrected.  
  
Table 6.5  
  
Internal Reliability Tests for the Initial Scales and Subscales 
Variable Cronbach’s Alpha 
Improvisation (all questions) .59 
Dualism Scale (all questions) .81 
Substance Dualism .79 
Romantic Ideal .16  
Conscious Processes .67 
Non-conscious Processes .75 
Basic Skills .68 
The educators were not included in analyses involving differently worded questions. 
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Table 6.6 
 
Summary of the Exploratory Factor Analysis Results for the Improvisation Survey 
 Rotated Factor Loadings 
Question 1 2 3 
α = .78 .79 - 
6. Creative improvising involves pre-hearing in your 
imagination what you are going to play on your instrument 
before you play it. 
.74 
 
 
9. Improvising well involves playing in a way that fits the idiom 
or style of the music. 
.64 
 
 
5. Good instrumental technique is needed for effective 
improvising. 
.62 
 
 
4. During an improvisation, it is important to think of a plan for 
what will come next, so the improvisation has some structure, 
or 'tells a story'. 
.60 
 
 
1. When improvising, it is important to play in time. .55 
 
 
8. It is important to avoid errors while improvising. .50 
 
 
10. Generating ideas in improvisation mostly involves 
deliberate conscious thought processes. 
  
 
11. I have an 'idea bank' of musical ideas that I can use when I 
improvise. 
  
 
14. When I am improvising well, the music seems to happen 
without me being aware of how I am doing it. 
 
.80  
15. I am completely free to play what I want to play while 
improvising. 
 
.71  
16. My body knows what to do to improvise and I don't know 
or imagine what I will play before I play it. 
 
.68  
13. Improvising is about 'being in the moment'. 
 
.61  
3. You have to take risks to improvise well. 
  
 
12. I have many different ways to generate ideas while 
improvising. 
  
 
7. Effective improvisers are aware of their environment and 
respond to what is going on. 
  
.73 
2. Improvising well involves playing something new. (Excluded, KMO < .5) 
Factor loadings above .5 are shown. This level is regarded as significant for this sample size. 
Reliability for factor 3 could not be tested as it had only one item loading above .5. 
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Table 6.7 
 
Summary of the Factor Analysis Results for the Dualism Scale 
 Rotated Factor Loadings 
Question 1 2 3 
α = .92 .75 .50 
6. People have a non-physical soul (or spirit) that animates the 
physical body. 
.93 
 
 
5. Aspects of mind that science cannot explain are best 
explained by the soul. 
.88 
 
 
11. The true self is not governed by the brain, but by a person's 
soul. 
.81 
 
 
7. A person's soul persists after one dies. .75 
 
 
2. It is impossible for science to ever have a complete 
understanding of the mind. 
(.50) 
 
 
12. The mind is a non-physical property. (.41) 
 
 
10. In the future, it may be possible to know someone's 
personality by looking at their brain activity.* 
 
.83  
13. In the future, it may be possible to know exactly what 
another person is thinking by looking at their brain activity.* 
 
.70  
3. One’s thoughts, personality, preferences, and choices are all 
just a product of brain functions.* 
 
(.50)  
14. I believe the mind and soul are the same thing. 
  
 
8. Free will is an illusion produced by the brain.* 
  
 
1. The mind is equivalent to the brain.* 
  
.66 
9. The mind interacts with the brain, but is separate from 
brain. 
  
-.57 
4. Whether one is a good or bad person can be completely 
altered by changes in the brain.* 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Factor loadings above .5 are shown. A factor loading above .512 is regarded as significant  
for a sample size of 100 (N = 112). 
 
 
In addition to the scale ratings, participants stated what their main instruments were and 
gave an estimate of how many years of improvising experience they had.  
 
6.4.4 Thematic Analysis of Free Text Responses 
The survey gave an opportunity for respondents to add comments at the end of each section 
via a free text response question. As discussed in 6.3.2, the improvisation question for 
musicians invited further comments on which elements of improvisation they emphasise as 
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important, with slightly different wording for students and educators. 92 participants 
responded to this question, whereas 35 participants responded to a similar question at the 
end of the dualism section, which invited further thoughts on the mind and body. The five 
main themes from the thematic analysis of the improvisation data is given in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 
 
Main Themes and Example Subthemes, Improvisation Data 
Main theme Subthemes 
Basic Skills Idiom, Technique, Rhythm 
Awareness Listening, Communication with Other 
Players, Responsivity,  
Attitudes, Emotions Risk Taking, Openness, Centred 
Creativity Spontaneity, Originality, Creating Colours 
in Sound 
Non-cognitivist In the Moment, Intuitive, Movement 
The main themes are listed from highest to lowest number of references per theme. 
 
The Basic Skills (95 references) theme included references relating to core skills in 
improvisation.  The subtheme ‘’inner hearing” was included in this theme based on the 
exploratory factor analysis of the improvisation survey data. An example response coded at 
Idiom was “Make sure what is played is suited to the piece in the given genre” (student, 
female, drums, 1-5 years improvising experience).  There were 10 responses that either 
explicitly mentioned technique or an equivalent concept, as in the following “Facility on your 
instrument” (educator, male, trombone/voice, experience not disclosed). The theme Rhythm 
also had 10 responses, often in the context of a list of important elements, which is to be 
expected given the question “Which elements of improvisation…” as in this example 
“Listening, intonation, tuning, rhythm” (musician, male, piano, 16-20 years).  
 
Awareness (50 references) captured those responses relating to listening, being aware of the 
environment, being aware of others and responsivity. Some examples include “Listening and 
responding” (musician, male, guitarist, over 30 years improvising experience), “If improvising 
with others, listening out to what they are playing”, (music student, female, pianist, 25-30 
years’ experience) and “an ability to dialogue” (educator, preferred not to answer, pianist, 
over 30 years’ experience).  
 
148 
 
Responses related to attitudes, such as being open, being in the correct frame of mind 
(centred) and the attitude to risk taking were included in Attitudes, Emotions (21 references) 
along with emotional aspects like pleasure, or fear of making errors. The following quotation 
was coded at the subthemes Risk Taking and Fear of Making Errors “…and mistakes can 
happen since we experiment, but if we don't dare because of fear of making a mistake then 
the improvisation might become not alive, boring, drilled in and predictable” (musician, 
female, violin, 1-5 years).  
 
Creativity (20 references) included references to spontaneity and originality as well as those 
which explicitly used the term “creativity”, as the following quotation illustrates “time alone 
exploring your instrument to come up with new things - new pitches, things that have never 
been tried by you before such as chords on flutes” (musician, female, flute, 21-25 years). 
 
The final main theme was Non-cognitivist (18 references), which gathered together responses 
evincing the opposite of conscious, deliberate processes that invoke the cognitive metaphor. 
The title is not meant to imply that cognition is not a feature of the processes, rather it implies 
that their basis can be distributed and embodied rather than conforming to cognitive models. 
The following was coded at the subtheme In the Moment “being in the moment, high degree 
of presence and attention” (musician, male, saxophonist, over 30 years’ experience). Three 
responses were coded at Intuitive, this being a good example “sometimes to ignore the 
conscious mind & completely embrace the intuitive” (musician, male, saxophone, 26-30 
years). Other responses were coded under subthemes Movement, Body and Flow. 
The results of the thematic analysis for the dualism scale are given in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 
 
Main Themes and Example Subthemes, Dualism Scale 
Main theme Subthemes 
Non-Dualist Scepticism, Reductive Physicalism, 
Philosophical 
Dualist Substance Dualism, Other Dualist 
Categories  
Critique of Questions Bad Questions, Definition of Terms, Good 
Questions 
  
The main themes are listed from highest to lowest number of references per theme. 
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Non-Dualist had the largest number of references (22) in the dualist section. As fewer 
participants responded to the dualism free text response question than to the equivalent 
question at the end of the improvisation section, the number of references and subthemes is 
lower. This main theme aggregated the different kinds of non-dualist responses. The following 
quotation is representative of many responses coded at Scepticism “The soul is an abstract 
concept requiring blind faith. The mind and body constitute a more reasonable and tangible 
means of quantifying human traits using evidence. I prescribe a healthy dose of skepticism for 
the rest” (musician, male, double bass, 26-30 years).  
 
The Dualist main theme has 17 references. Its largest subtheme Substance Dualism contains 
responses which endorse the existence of a soul or non-material mind as distinct from the 
brain, as in this example “However, I believe the soul occupies more than just a person's brain 
(or mind)” (musician, female, voice/piano, over 30 years). Dualist positions such as 
interactionism and property dualism which were not based on differences in substance were 
coded at the subtheme Other Dualist Categories. The following quotation is an example of 
property dualism “I think consciousness is just a property that arises from information 
interacting with itself in an extremely complex manner” (musician, male, piano, 11-15 years). 
 
The Critique of Questions main theme was the third largest (16 references) and apart from 
the three references in the subtheme Good Questions these responses were critical of the 
dualism questions. The following quotations give an indication of the kind of objections 
raised: 
Most of the questions are bad questions since the questioner does not define his 
understanding of mind, soul, etc. No differentiation between traditional 
understandings of nous, psyche , areas such as emotion, desire or appetitive function. 
A ghost in the machine notion is proposed but most research today no longer thinks 
along these lines nor does it ignore the role of emotion. It is also not clear what is 
understood by the word ‘science’ or whether this is conceived as only what we can 
currently measure or in its older and perhaps newer meaning of what we can know 
(from ‘scire’?). For these and other reasons I find these questions unanswerable and, 
lm sorry to say, invalid from a research point of view unless you want to show that 
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people have very fuzzy ideas about what they think these words might mean to them 
(musician, prefer not to say, pianist, over 30 years’ experience). 
In this example, the respondent expresses what could be interpreted as the inability of the 
questions to capture the nuances of her position: 
I think we have an embodied mind and that improvising involves highly sophisticated 
processing at an essentially physical level. I do not consider the soul to be an 
explanation of this & that some questions were misleading - so I answered these as 
neither agree nor disagree (musician, female, piano/percussion, over 30 years’ 
experience). 
 
6.5 Discussion  
This study investigated the importance of some elements of improvisation and possible links 
with implicit dualism by means of a survey. The main aims were to see whether themes from 
Study 1 generalise to a larger population of improvisers, and to test the hypothesis that the 
rating of the importance of prospective imagery in improvisation positively correlates with 
dualism score. Two group difference hypotheses were tested, that the conscious processes 
item would be rated higher by students than the other groups, and that they would rate basic 
skill elements as more important. Some additional hypotheses were developed during data 
analysis and will be discussed below. The study found that the tested themes from Study 1 
were endorsed by respondents. However, no correlation was found between the prospective 
auditory imagery rating and the dualism score. Evidence was found in support of the group 
difference hypotheses. 
 
In terms of the similarities and differences in rank order between groups in the improvisation 
section, all groups rated Question 7 highest and question 8 lowest. As only one of the 
individual item comparisons between the students and musicians reached significance after 
corrections for familywise error, conclusions based on these group-wise rank order results 
should be treated with caution. It should be noted that Bonferroni corrections result in 
conservative significance values, however. The item which was significantly different was 
Question 10 “Generating ideas in improvisation mostly involves deliberate conscious thought 
processes”. This was rated significantly higher by students than by musicians. The same 
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caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the dualism scale rankings as with the 
improvisation items. The dualism scale has shown good internal reliability in previous studies 
(Preston et al., 2013), and the value of Cronbach’s alpha for this study was .81, also showing 
good reliability. The student and educator group sample sizes are small (24 and 16) and 
running multiple tests to compare ratings of items within groups would inflate familywise 
error (Field, 2013). However, looking at the pattern of ranking for the starred (reverse-scored) 
items in all participants, as well as individual groups, is at least suggestive that the responses 
were not consistent with a unidimensional interpretation of dualism. This also raises 
questions about the construct validity of the items. For example, in the student group, 
question 4 “Whether one is a good or bad person can be completely altered by changes in the 
brain*” has the highest mean rating, whereas question 3 “One’s thoughts, personality, 
preferences, and choices are all just a product of brain functions*”, has the lowest. The 
possibility of interpreting these findings in the context of dualism being a multidimensional 
construct is discussed in the next section.  
  
Some of the themes from Study 1 have been reflected in the responses in this survey, 
suggesting that they might generalise to a wider population of improvisers. That the highest 
rated improvisation item was about being aware and responsive reinforces the finding from 
Study 1, that participants commented on how different playing to a backing track is to 
improvising with others and having an audience response (coded under Ecological Validity 
and Communication). No one disagreed with this item and the main theme from the thematic 
analysis in this study Awareness, which relates to this item, had the second highest number 
of responses. This finding also agrees with the literature, for example, Biasutti (2015, p. 3) 
characterises improvisation as an “Interactive process. It has an adaptable nature, it allows 
you to answer to context variables, it can be adjusted instantly. Challenge between 
performers, taking risks.” The item about risk taking also scored highly in the survey, whereas 
the lowest scoring item “It is important to avoid errors while improvising”, was one of the two 
with a mean rating in the ‘disagree range’. A risk in improvisation is that one might commit 
errors which cannot be revised or edited, in contrast to the process of composition. It is 
reasonable to interpret this result as a relative valuing of the risk side of the trade-off between 
being musically adventurous and striving to be error-free. The responses coded at Risk Taking 
in the thematic analysis also support this interpretation, the quotation from the subtheme 
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above characterising not taking risks leading to improvisation becoming boring and 
predictable. It might be thought that the item “Improvising well involves playing something 
new” would relate to the concept of risk taking because it requires the inherently risky 
avoidance of the familiar, but this item was ranked fourth from lowest. A visual inspection of 
the distribution of the responses from each group shows that risk taking ratings are skewed 
towards the higher end, whereas ratings for novelty are more evenly spread (Appendix 11). 
The questions are worded slightly differently, but if anything, the greater emphasis in you 
have to take risks ought to have produced the opposite effect, with participants who were 
unsure of the absolute necessity being more neutral or disagreeing. 
 
The items pertaining to ‘being in the moment’ (question 13) and the creator and witness 
phenomenon (question 14) also both scored highly, although another item that might have 
been expected to be associated with these “My body knows what to do to improvise and I 
don't know or imagine what I will play before I play it” (Question 16) was rated fourth from 
lowest. However, it was significantly positively correlated with the “in the moment” and the 
creator and witness items. These comparisons excluded the educator group due to the 
involvement of differently worded questions. That the second lowest scoring item was 
“Generating ideas in improvisation mostly involves deliberate conscious thought processes” 
(mean score = 3.56) raises interesting questions. Improvising is clearly not regarded as a 
simple opposition between Romantic ideals and a cognitive-scientific view informed by the 
embodied cognition paradigm. If improvisers value being in the moment and flow states in 
which the music seems to happen without conscious deliberation, then it could be that 
participants see the source of the improvising behaviour as situated in the unconscious mind, 
but do not see the mind as embodied to the extent that they would ascribe agency to the 
body per se. That the indices denoting conscious versus non-conscious processes were 
negatively correlated does suggest an opposition between deliberate thinking and conscious 
imagination on the one hand, and states that are much less self-conscious on the other. 
Arguably, the non-conscious processes index could be associated with an appreciation of the 
importance of ‘flow’ in improvisation (Biasutti & Frezza, 2009). Flow states are characterised 
by pleasurable absorption in a task which balances the required (high) skill with an agent’s 
capabilities and sometimes results in distortions in the perception of time (Csikszentmihalyi 
& Lefevre, 1989). The main theme non-cognitive had subthemes in the moment, flow and 
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body. Seven responses specifically referenced ‘being in the moment’ or the ‘now’ and two 
mentioned flow explicitly. Participants in Study 1 linked pleasurable absorption as motivating 
states with being ‘in the moment’ and with instances “where you're just kind of, creating and 
not thinking about it” (Pianist, Male, 26, Study 1). Flow states have also been linked to 
creativity in musical composition (MacDonald, Byrne, & Carlton, 2006). Although being ‘in the 
moment’ might also indicate a transformation of time and some of the other characteristics 
of flow such as lack of self-consciousness, the creator/witness phenomenon might represent 
a distinct state. It is sometimes portrayed as a feeling of the ‘music playing the performer’ 
(Berkowitz, 2010), a kind of letting go of control, which contrasts with the ‘sense of control’ 
dimension of flow. Question 14 is framed in terms of a lack of awareness of how the music is 
produced rather than a lack of control per se, but the extent to which people feel in control 
when they are unaware of how they are carrying out an activity is a complicated issue. Further 
research could clarify how closely the index created here reflects an endorsement of flow as 
being important in improvisation.  
 
A finding from previous dual-task paradigm and speak aloud protocol experiments is that 
experts tend to be less consciously aware of what they are doing (Fidlon, 2011; Norgaard et 
al., 2016), leading to the prediction that those with less improvising experience should rate 
Question 10 “Generating ideas in improvisation mostly involves deliberate conscious thought 
processes” higher than those with more experience. A comparison of the ratings of those who 
reported up to 5 years of improvising experience with those with over 5 years’ experience 
showed that this was also the case with these improvisers, with the former group rating the 
item significantly higher, in line with the prediction. However, a similar comparison for the 
conscious processes index score between the same expertise-level groups was not significant. 
These comparisons involved the educators group because none of the consciousness 
questions have different wording. Interestingly, the one comparison between of mean ratings 
of individual improvisation items between the student and musician groups which was 
significant after Bonferroni correction was question 10. The inclusion of the modifier 
‘deliberate’ was to make a distinction between conscious skilled but often automatic 
behaviour, as for example when driving we only become fully aware of the process if 
something unusual happens (like a cat running into the road) and being aware of the thought 
processes involved in thinking of what to play next. Students rated this significantly higher 
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than musicians, which is in line with the hypothesis mentioned above that experts exhibit less 
conscious deliberation over what to play next.  
 
The ratings for questions 1, 5, 8 and 9 all relate to basic skills (Wopereis et al., 2013) like 
playing in time, having good technique, avoiding errors and playing in a genre-appropriate 
way. These items were therefore combined to form a basic skills index (BSI) with two 
hypotheses. The first is that this index would have a higher average rating for music students 
than musicians or educators. The idea behind this was that for those currently receiving music 
education, their focus would be more likely to be on the importance of developing basic skills, 
whereas working musicians might have a different focus, emphasising listening, creativity and 
communication. That is, basic skills might be taken as a given by working musicians and 
educators, therefore other factors which discriminate between able and less able improvisers 
might be seen as relatively more important. The second hypothesis is that the BSI should 
positively correlate with the conscious processes index (CPI) because those who are still at a 
stage where they are focused on basic skills are less expert, which in turn is associated with 
more conscious deliberation. The data supports both hypotheses, with the means for the BSI 
for students and musicians/educators showing a significant difference. As was expected, 
there was also a significant positive correlation between the BSI and the CPI, because those 
focusing on basic skills are likely to be less experienced. It might be thought that the difference 
in BSI would also been seen in a comparison between those with less than 5 years’ improvising 
experience and experts, with relative novices having a greater emphasis on basic skills, 
however, this was not significant. This could be because some of those with the most 
experience are educators, who might still hold the inculcation of basic skills as important. 
Also, it might be the case that some of the items for the scale, such as instrumental technique, 
are still endorsed as a necessary condition even if they are not a primary focus. This is 
supported by the mean ratings for each group for the instrumental technique item being high 
and not significantly different. Table 6.3 shows the correlation matrix for all the subscales. CPI 
and nCPI were negatively correlated as expected, although this was a lower correlation than 
is desirable. The correlation between the RI and nCPI can be partially explained by the 
overlapping item shared by both indices, which is question 13. BSI and CPI were positively 
correlated as noted above, but less expectedly the RI and the BSI had a small positive 
correlation. The explanation for this is that the RI was not found to be reliable (α = .16) and 
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as it shares one item with the CPI (question 6) and one with the nCPI (question 13) correlations 
involving the RI and these scales should be disregarded.  
 
 
Another subtheme of improvising described in Study 1 and endorsed by the survey 
respondents was the item on multiple strategy use, which had the third highest average rating 
(5.73). This result agrees with previous findings (Hargreaves, 2012; Norgaard, 2011, 2016) and 
adds support to the results of Study 1 regarding generative strategies in improvisation. 
Harmonic, melodic and rhythmic elements were often mentioned, as in the following 
“intuitive understanding of harmonic theory that can be applied on the fly, a good sense of 
what a beautiful melody is and the ability to take a theme and incrementally develop it” 
(musician, male, pianist, 11-15 years’ experience). Another participant mentioned the 
interrelation of melodic and harmonic features “involvement in the music (sound, rhythms, 
melodic/harmonic relations) [line break] interaction” (musician, saxophonist, male, over 30 
years’ experience), raising the issue of whether generative strategies have clear boundaries. 
Norgaard (2011) identified the generative strategies harmonic priority in which ideas are 
inspired by the chordal accompaniment and melodic priority in which intervallic relations and 
melodic considerations are most important. In practice the particular melodic priorities that 
are applicable might well depend to a large extent on the harmonic context, making for a 
melodic/harmonic relation strategy. 
 
The theme from Study 1 which also featured in Norgaard’s (2011, 2016) studies was 
investigated with the item “I have an 'idea bank' of musical ideas that I can use when I 
improvise.” Educators saw: “I encourage students to develop an 'idea bank' of musical ideas 
that they can use when they improvise.” Eight of the sixteen educators agreed with this to 
some extent, whereas 18 out of 24 students and 47 out of the 74 musicians agreed with their 
version of the item. The mean rating (4.65) was lowered by the 21 musicians who strongly 
and moderately disagreed, which could be due to this group having a contingent of non-
idiomatic improvisers, but as genre data were not collected it is not possible to verify this.  
 
Of the two ‘basic skills’ items, the importance of good instrumental technique was rated 
slightly but significantly higher than playing in time. This could be due to good instrumental 
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technique being regarded as a given by idiomatic improvisers, which is also supported by the 
thematic analysis: “Having a good technique allows you to concentrate on generating the 
improvisation rather than the physical playing”, (musician, male, saxophonist, 16-20 years’ 
experience). Although the ability to play in time is arguably also a given and partly constitutive 
of technique, there is perhaps some ambiguity in the statement “When improvising, it is 
important to play in time”, as this could be interpreted as the necessity for ‘strict’ time. The 
following quotation illustrates this: “Knowing how to play around with the the musical pulse 
whilst remaining in time.” (student, female, viola player, 1-5 years’ experience). Whilst both 
the students and the educators had a positively skewed distribution for the playing in time 
item, the musicians were more polarised, 12 strongly disagreeing, 13 strongly agreeing and 
21 being neutral. This item had the highest standard deviation. 
 
Freedom, creativity and being in the moment were related themes from Study 1 which, as 
was argued in the introduction to this chapter, are elements of Romantic concepts of the 
improviser. Given that creativity is not seen as algorithmic or deterministic within this 
worldview, freedom is seen as a necessary condition of creative improvisation.  It is also a 
motivation for improvisers: “I think there is, in anybody who improvises, a desire for some 
version of freedom, or their idea of freedom” (David Toop, quoted in Burnard, 2012, p. 156). 
The item “I am completely free to play what I want to play while improvising” was deliberately 
framed with the modifier ‘completely’ such that strong agreement was intended to situate 
respondents within the Romantic idea of freedom, rather than a more cognitive freedom-
within-constraints stance. (The version for educators asked if their teaching encouraged 
students to develop to this stage). Despite the high bar set by ‘completely’, the item was still 
rated eighth (just inside the highest half), with an average rating of 4.73 (1.89). That the 
notion of freedom as linked to being in the moment and taking risks, in contradistinction to 
the mechanistic and the predictable was evident from the thematic analysis and illustrated 
by the quotation on p 149. Other responses link freedom to intuition, to the body and to flow, 
whereas the following coded at freedom seems to recognise that freedom is circumscribed: 
“Freedom is not freedom to 'do anything'. Freedom is dealing with consequences those of 
your actions and the actions of others and rubbing them together till [sic] they spark” 
(musician, male, ‘whatever is to hand’, 21-25 years’ experience). This recognises that 
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freedom, be it negative ‘freedom from’ or positive ‘freedom to’ is situated within a context 
of encounters with others and a responsibility to the integrity of improvising (Peters, 2009). 
 
The hypothesis that the rating for the prospective auditory imagery item would be positively 
correlated with the dualism score was not supported by the data. One reason for this could 
be that the necessity to employ prospective auditory imagery is not specifically related to 
dualistic beliefs or a Romantic conception of the improviser-as-creative-artist. Rather, pre-
hearing in the imagination could be a norm of improvisation that is not only compatible with 
non-dualist views but also one that is just as likely to be adhered to by non-dualists (in the 
Cartesian sense). There is no necessary contradiction in an improviser holding a physicalist 
stance whilst thinking she should play what she means and to really mean it, she must first 
imagine the sound of it. The set of norms within the social practice of improvising can 
therefore be adopted irrespective of implicit dualism or its lack. Conflict would only arise if 
there were an explicit consideration of the ramifications of a worldview that was incompatible 
with this conception of improvising. To be experienced as conflict, this incompatibility would 
have to result in a form of cognitive dissonance. This is perhaps unlikely, as the kind of 
philosophical reasoning that would reveal such an incompatibility is a specialist pursuit and 
even then, could equally be used to find a compatible solution given the cognitive bias of 
motivated reasoning (Kahan, 2012). In any case, people can and must tolerate internal 
inconsistency in practice however much they value it as an ideal. For example, even if one is 
committed to the norm of consistency within a domain where it might seem appropriate, like 
assessing the truth of propositions, the paradox of the preface (Makinson, 1965) bites in the 
following way. Suppose an agent A believes the propositions p1, p2, … pn are true, but also, due 
to knowledge of their own fallibility, that they are likely to be wrong about at least one of 
them. If we call the proposition that at least one of them is false pf, then the set p1, p2, … pn , pf 
is such that to believe all of them is inconsistent, even though A has good reason to do so. If 
the impossibility of consistency arises in such an arid domain as formal logic, then it is likely 
that some inconsistencies in beliefs could be encountered by improvisers. The results of Study 
1 showed that improvisers were aware of not meeting ideals and had strategies to deal with 
this despite their tendency to moral perfectionism. So, even if they became aware of an 
inconsistency between their physicalist stance and their image of the creative improviser, 
they might simply compartmentalise in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Bortolotti, 2003). 
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That is, someone can hold mutually incompatible sets of beliefs in separate ‘compartments’ 
in their minds to avoid any two contradictory beliefs being brought to conscious attention 
simultaneously. More succinctly, they might just avoid over-thinking it. 
 
Another reason that no correlation was found might be due to the limitations of the dualism 
scale used to measure attitudes. The results of the factor analysis will be discussed in the next 
section (general limitations will be considered in the final part of this chapter). Although the 
dualism scale has good internal reliability (Preston et al., 2013; Stanovich, 1989), there are 
some doubts as to its unidimensionality, in other words it is not clear that the items are really 
measuring a single construct. In developing the original scale, Stanovich (1989), explicitly 
states that different items reflect different aspects of dualism (substance dualism, property 
dualism) and philosophical positions (identity theory, eliminative materialism), but still used 
the scale to produce a single dualism score. Riekki, Lindeman, and Lipsanen (2013) adapted 
the scale by simplifying some items, excluding others and introducing new items which 
targeted monism (minds and bodies are the same) and emergentism (minds are qualitatively 
distinct from brains, but interrelated). Their factor analysis identified three factors which they 
identified with monism, emergentism and reflective dualism (mind and body are qualitatively 
different). Forstmann and Burgmer (2018) conducted a factor analysis on a similar twelve-
item scale and concluded that it measured two separate concepts, substance dualism (the 
mind and brain are separate substances) and reductive physicalism (the mind can be reduced 
to the physical brain), which were negatively correlated with each other. Moreover, they 
found that substance dualism but not reductive physicalism predicted belief in free will. The 
free will issue is directly relevant given that Romantic conceptions of creative improvisation 
involve willed creative acts of imagination, for which free will would be a prerequisite. This is 
also relevant to the present study given that the dualism scale used here has a free will item: 
“Free will is an illusion produced by the brain”. Using this item in a scale designed to produce 
a single dualism score is problematic, because there is a popular current philosophical stance 
on free will which holds that it is compatible with determinism (Fischer & Ravizza, 2000; 
Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005). What this 
means is that it is perfectly possible to be a reductive physicalist (even if this is also held to 
entail determinism) and yet reject the notion that free will is an illusion, providing one 
interprets this as compatibilist free will. A consideration of the items of the dualism scale used 
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in the present study suggests that they too track distinct concepts just as the scale used by 
Forstmann and Burgmer (2018), but there are more than two concepts involved. For example, 
items that mention ‘the soul’ as non-physical or as surviving death, are measuring substance 
dualism. On the other hand, items such as “the mind is equivalent to the brain” seem to be 
measuring reductive physicalism, whilst “The mind is a non-physical property” is clearly a 
framing of the label property dualism into a question. This is problematic in part because 
these categories are far from exhaustive in this complex area. One could adhere to variety of 
property dualism such that there is only one substance, but also hold that although the mind 
is a property of the physical brain, it is not reducible to it. This non-reductive physicalism 
would not be adequately disambiguated by the scale; a property dualist might not agree that 
the mind is equivalent to the brain, but nor would they agree that the mind and brain are 
different ontological kinds. By contrast, a property dualist might give a high rating to the item 
“The mind is a non-physical property” depending on their ontology of properties. This is 
because it is not clear that a property is a physical entity. This item seems therefore to fail to 
disentangle substance and property dualism, despite these stances being distinct and having 
very different ontological commitments. Further, items such as “In the future, it may be 
possible to know exactly what another person is thinking by looking at their brain activity” 
conflates the epistemic issue of what it might be possible to know in principle with the 
ontological issue of the relation between mind and body. This shows the difficulty of assessing 
beliefs in such a complex domain with a questionnaire. Even if a factor analysis and reliability 
measure are conducted, this is no guarantee that what is measured corresponds with how a 
researcher interprets the construct. For example, in measuring free will beliefs, Forstmann 
and Burgmer (2018) include items such as “A supercomputer that could know everything 
about the way the universe is now could know everything about the way the universe will be 
in the future” in a determinism subscale. However, this conflates determinism with 
predictability which are not only distinct but more importantly, determinism does not imply 
predictability even in principle, as in mathematically chaotic systems future states can be 
unpredictable and deterministic. It might be thought that such esoteric concerns might not 
be relevant to the issue of improvisation but there is evidence that implicit and intuitive ‘folk’ 
beliefs about dualism and free will can affect judgements and behaviour (Forstmann, 
Burgmer, & Mussweiler, 2012; Mehta, 2011). To explore whether the multidimensionality of 
the dualism scale is a factor in this study, a substance dualism subscale was created by scoring 
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all the items that explicitly refer to the soul (5, 6, 7, 11 and 14). However, this was not 
correlated with ratings for the prospective imagery question either.  A factor analysis 
involving both sections of the survey was therefore carried out to investigate the data further. 
 
The rotated factor solution for the improvisation section of the survey yielded three factors 
(Table 6.6). As questions 1, 5, 8 and 9 loaded onto factor 1, this closely resembles the basic 
skills index (BSI), but with two additional items, questions 4 (importance of planning) and 6 
(pre-hearing what is to be played). This is consistent with the interpretation given above that 
the norm of prospective auditory imagery is seen as a basic skill of improvisation and is 
independent of metaphysical considerations. Norgaard’s (2011, 2016) theme of sketch 
planning was also a theme of Study 1, and the responses of the participants were compatible 
with this being part of the craft of improvising. It seems reasonable that this factor should 
retain the name ‘basic skills’. Factor 2 resembles the non-conscious processes index, 
combining ‘in the moment’, the creator/witness phenomenon, and the body knowing what 
to do, with the extra item of being free (questions 13, 14, 15 and 16). These items all suggest 
that a suitable designation for the factor is ‘flow’. Even though the creator/witness 
phenomenon differs from some definitions of flow (Csikszentmihalyi & Lefevre, 1989) in that 
control is in a sense ceded to the music, all of these items are compatible with an immersed 
engagement and connection with music which characterises flow states. The third factor had 
only one item with a significant loading, which was question 7 “Effective improvisers are 
aware of their environment and respond to what is going on”. This factor was therefore called 
‘responsive awareness’, although the loading by only one item is probably indicative of the 
need to refine the design of the survey. This item had the highest mean rating, lowest 
standard deviation and nobody disagreed with it. The other two factors had an acceptable 
level of internal reliability (α = .78, .79) for this exploratory stage of research (Lance, Butts, & 
Michels, 2006). The Romantic ideals and conscious processes indices were not supported. The 
former had a very low value of Cronbach’s alpha (α = .16 Table 6.5) and Question 6 features 
in both sub-scales, and ordinarily items do not appear in more than one factor, hence the 
factor structure revealed by the analysis is more rigorous.  
 
The factor analysis for the dualism scale also suggested that three factors best represent the 
data. Forstmann and Burgmer (2018) carried out a principal component analysis and 
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extracted two factors which they equated with substance dualism and reductive physicalism. 
They did this on the basis that the items that they found which loaded on the first factor were 
predominantly those relating to the concept of a soul, whereas on the second the items 
related to whether the mind is reducible to attributes of the brain. This study used exploratory 
factor analysis with a smaller sample size, which might explain why the solution is different. 
The two solutions do agree regarding substance dualism, however. Table 6.7 shows that the 
four items with significant loadings on factor 1 all explicitly mention the soul, hence a suitable 
designation for this factor is substance dualism. Given that question 6 specifically identifies 
the soul as non-physical and question 7 mentions the possibility that the soul persists after 
one dies, two different kinds of substance are implied for anyone who accepts the existence 
of the material universe. One is a physical substance which constitutes matter and includes 
the brain and the other is non-material and can exist independently after the brain 
decomposes. However, factor 2 differs from Forstmann and Burgmer’s reductive physicalism 
factor in the following way. The two significant loadings on factor 2 are both epistemic rather 
than ontological questions (10 and 13). They are suggesting that it might be possible to know 
what someone is thinking or their personality from their brain activity. The underlying 
assumption motivating these questions might be that in order to know A given B, A must 
completely depend on B in some way. For example, suppose that what someone is thinking 
supervenes on their brain processes. That would mean that there could be no changes in what 
they were thinking unless there were corresponding changes in their brain processes. A 
further deduction is required to identify this as reductive physicalism, which is that the 
supervenience relationship between thought and brain processes, rules out an immaterial 
soul. This assumption is made by Riekki et al. (2013) as evidenced by their inclusion of one of 
Stanovich’s original items “For each thought that I have, there exists a certain state that my 
brain is” in their monism factor. Although this deduction has an intuitive appeal on the 
grounds that it seems to make the soul redundant in explanatory terms, it does not strictly 
follow. One could be a Cartesian dualist and think that the soul interacts with the brain and 
both are necessary for what we call thought in the material realm. In other words, if the 
physical brain is an essential mediator between the thoughts originating in an immaterial soul 
and the material realm in which they can influence behaviour, the supervenience relation 
implied by this item could still hold. Also, as pointed out above, respondents could fail to 
endorse these items purely on epistemic grounds if they thought that there were limits in 
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principle to what could be found out by brain scanning techniques. Since this could be 
independent of their ontological stance, it can be argued that these items do not measure 
dualism effectively because a dualist can hold that thoughts are predictable from brains and 
reductive physicalists could hold that they are not, and vice versa. Factor 2 is therefore called 
supervenience. Factor 3 in this study most closely resembles reductive physicalism as the 
items which load onto it posit mind-brain identity and one negatively correlated alternative 
(interactionism), hence this factor is called reductive physicalism. This factor does track 
dualism more effectively than factor 2, since endorsing mind-brain identity is non-dualist. 
Interactionism is dualist by definition and could be interpreted as noncommittal between 
substance and property dualism, but endorsing either is antithetical to reductive physicalism, 
which is why the item is negatively correlated. In summary and bearing in mind caveats about 
the relatively small sample size in this study, more research is needed to develop a suitable 
instrument to target Cartesian substance dualism so that its relationship to improvisation can 
be investigated. 
 
The thematic analysis of the responses to the free text question on the mind-body problem 
also suggest that this scale might not have captured the nuances of respondents’ beliefs, as 
the quotation from the female pianist/percussionist on p.150 illustrates. She alludes to 
embodied cognition and yet also invokes the computational metaphor from a reductive 
physicalist stance in her critique of the questions. Six responses were coded at No Idea, two 
of them contained the phrase and the others intimated that the respondent either didn’t feel 
qualified to answer or didn’t think much about the issues. This could be a reason why there 
were much fewer responses than to the improvisation free text question, although other 
factors like being close to the end of the survey might have played a part also. 
 
One participant who had to be excluded from the Likert analysis because they did not answer 
any of the questions did respond with “Play what you hear. ‘What you hear’ can be an 
eternally expanded lexicon/resource, always open to expansion.” He apologised for not being 
able to deal with the questions, saying of the dualism section that they were not qualified to 
answer (educator, male, double bass, over 30 years’ experience). However, as with the 
second example above some respondents evinced sophisticated philosophical thought in 
their responses, for example explicitly espousing property dualist, embodied or enactive 
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paradigms. One of the respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with the dualism questions 
gave this as a reason for answering ‘neither agree nor disagree’ to all of them. 
 
6.6 Limitations and Further Research 
Although useful to investigate whether the themes from Study 1 generalise to a wider 
population of improvisers, there are some limitations to the present study. Firstly, self-report 
measures are not necessarily reliable when asking experts about the strategies and processes 
they have used because a high degree of automaticity leads to a kind of ‘expertise-induced 
amnesia’ (Beilock et al., 2002; Bermúdez, 2017). A similar limitation also applies with ratings 
of the importance of different elements of improvisation. Respondents are asked to 
deliberate and judge in the absence of the activity, possibly leading to discrepancies between 
what they say is important and what they actually do. There is also the issue of social 
desirability bias, but as with Study 1 this is mitigated by the goal of the study being to enquire 
about the norms of the social practice of improvising that influence respondents. 
Consequently, if a response is made desirable it will be precisely because it is a norm. Also, 
this bias is less of an issue with computer-administered questionnaires than with face to face 
interviews (Richman, Kiesler, Weisband, & Drasgow, 1999).  
 
Measuring dualism is a very complex endeavour and the scale used was unsatisfactory in that 
it was likely multidimensional in structure and conflated some epistemic and ontological 
issues. This was confirmed by exploratory factor analysis which was in partial agreement with 
Forstmann and Burgmer (2018) in finding that substance dualism was only one factor in a 
multidimensional scale. One of the other two factors gave support to the concern over 
separating epistemic concepts and the final factor identified mind-brain identity as a separate 
construct. In addition, some of the responses suggest that the instructions given were not 
sufficient to contextualise the questions and reassure respondents that there are no agreed 
definitions of notions such as the soul. Future studies could refine the items on the scale to 
address these issues. As discussed above, given that the subscale relating to substance 
dualism differentially predicted belief in free will (also multidimensional) and that the latter 
might play a role in concepts of creativity, further research could devise both a more 
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comprehensive and nuanced instrument to interrogate which factors play an important role 
in improvisers’ self-concept.  
 
This study took a first step in investigating a possible correlation between dualism and the 
role of prospective auditory imagery as a norm of improvising. A limitation of this part of the 
study was that a single item (Question 6 of the improvisation section) was compared with a 
dualism score derived from multiple questions. In a first step to remedy this, a Romantic Ideal 
index was created by combining items 2, 6, 13 and 15 of the improvisation section. These 
addressed creativity (playing something new), prospective auditory imagery, being in the 
moment and freedom respectively. Although this was hypothesised to be positively 
correlated with the substance dualism subscale, this was not significant (Table 6.3). A 
reliability analysis gave some support to the other theory-derived constructs, although a 
future project could take this further and devise multiple items designed to be combined into 
a score to assess commitment to prospective auditory imagery, rather than asking a single 
question. Putative items would be subject to a vetting process by a panel of experts and then 
a sample size of 300 or more would be ideal to carry out a factor analysis and assess reliability. 
Although the sub-scales for this study were derived from the literature and theoretical 
considerations, a factor analysis and reliability analysis should be part of an iterative method 
to develop future measurement instruments for this research area. Other potentially related 
constructs, such as freedom/free will, moral perfectionism and creativity could also be 
included in addition to dualism for a more comprehensive investigation. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This study tested whether some of the themes from Study 1 would be endorsed by a larger 
cohort of improvisers belonging to three groups; students, musicians and improvisers. Some 
elements of improvisation that feature in the literature, such as basic skills were also included. 
In addition, a new approach was adopted whereby the possible correlation between 
respondents’ rating for the importance of prospective auditory imagery and their level of 
Cartesian dualism was investigated. This represents first steps in this research area as no 
other studies have so far looked at dualism in relation to improvisation.  
 
165 
 
The highest rated item underscored the importance of improvisers being responsive and 
aware, which was expressed by participants in Study 1 as a dissatisfaction with the lack of 
interactivity in playing to a backing track. The importance of prospective imagery, multiple 
strategy use for idea generation, having an ‘idea bank’, being free and being ‘in the moment’ 
were all themes from Study 1 which gained further evidential support from this present study. 
The risk side of the risk-taking/error avoidance trade-off was favoured. That improvising is 
largely a result of conscious processes was not endorsed but the finding that improvising 
experience negatively correlates with the rating for this item needs further investigation. Four 
exploratory subscales based on Study 1 and theoretical considerations were created, a basic 
skills index (BSI), a conscious processes index (CPI), some non-conscious processes index 
(nCPI) and a romantic ideal index (RII). The CPI was found to be higher in students than 
musicians, in line with previous research. The BSI was hypothesised to be positively correlated 
to the CPI and the data supports this. The RII was not found to be reliable. An exploratory 
factor analysis on the improvisation scale found three factors, the first of which (basic skills) 
was an equivalent BSI but with the addition of the prospective auditory imagery item. This 
suggests that pre-hearing in the imagination is taken to be a basic skill of improvisation. The 
second had all of the items of the nCPI but added the freedom item, suggesting that this factor 
should be called flow. The third factor (responsive awareness) had only the awareness item 
with a significant loading, with which no one disagreed. The importance of prospective 
auditory imagery was endorsed but not correlated with the dualism score, or the substance 
dualism subscale. The limitations and complexities of the dualism scale were discussed. This 
was hypothesised to be multidimensional and flaws such as confusion between 
epistemological and ontological concepts were identified. Factor analysis of the dualism scale 
supported the hypothesis of multidimensionality and a separate factor containing only 
epistemological items was identified. Finally, strategies for future research to address these 
issues were outlined. 
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Chapter 7  
General Discussion  
I don’t care if it’s John Coltrane, or the Art Ensemble of Chicago, or the greatest or the 
worst improvisers that ever lived, if you play 200 nights in a row, you are not going to 
be playing different shit every night. You’re just not. There’s this mystical version of 
what jazz improvisation is that implies that every single time you play, that you’re 
going to go to this far off mystical place and you’re going to discover this universe. (Pat 
Metheney, cited in Dean, 2014, p. 70) 
7.1 Overview 
This thesis comprised five studies conducted as part of a research programme investigating 
the role of auditory imagery in improvisation. A review of the existing literature motivated 
the following research questions: 
1. What is improvisers’ experience of their use of auditory imagery in improvisation? 
How important is it to them? How does it fit with other aspects of the process? 
2. Does the familiarity of bodily aspects of music-producing gestures affect musicians’ 
anticipation of the resulting sound? 
3. Is improvisers’ privileging of auditory imagery related to the extent to which they have 
a dualist worldview? 
 
Study 1 addressed the first research question, by enquiring into the experience of improvisers 
using video-stimulated recall, semi-structured interviews and thematic analysis. The second 
research question was investigated by Study 2, which is the first study to extend the altered 
auditory feedback paradigm to the guitar, to look at the effect of hand shape familiarity on 
judgements of whether auditory feedback had been altered. Studies 3 and 4 provided chord 
shape and hand shape familiarity survey data respectively, for use in Study 2. Finally, Study 5 
involved the creation of an improvisation survey to extend the findings of Study 1 in 
addressing improvisers’ experience to a larger population, including students, performers and 
educators. Study 5 also investigated the role of mind-body dualism using a validated dualism 
scale and looked at the connections between what these respondents believe about the 
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importance of different components of the improvisation process and their level of dualistic 
beliefs, thereby addressing the third research question. After a brief recap of the important 
points of the literature review, the findings of each study are summarised in more detail, 
starting with Study 1. Then the linked studies 2, 3 and 4 will be summarised, followed by a 
discussion about the implications of the findings for the plausibility of the Ideal Model. Then 
the findings of Study 5 will be considered as a prelude to some suggestions for a revised model 
which preserves improvisation as a valuable creative activity whilst being consistent with the 
cognitive-scientific paradigm. This will lead to a discussion of the implications for 
improvisation pedagogy. Finally, limitations of this research and some possible future studies 
will be considered. 
 
7.2 Summary of Literature Review 
The first important theme arising from the literature is the portrayal of auditory imagery. 
Some of the ethnographic literature on jazz improvisation suggests that improvisers are 
exposed to an idealised model of improvisation, which prioritises prospective auditory 
imagery to the extent that its status as a norm is that of a necessary condition to validate 
improvisation as a creative practice (Berliner, 1994; Sudnow, 1978, 2001). The following 
example from Sudnow’s autoethnographic account of learning to improvise on the piano is 
illustrative: 
How do I know just what each of these little slices of space will sound like, as a joint 
knowing of my voice and fingers, going there together, not singing along with the 
fingers, but singing with the fingers?  (Sudnow, 2001, p. 129) 
This is reinforced by improvisation pedagogy. The influential music educator Edwin Gordon, 
using his term audiation for auditory imagery stated: 
Unless one can audiate what he is going to create and improvise before he 
performs it or even attempts to notate it, all that may be heard at best are the 
mechanics of scales and arpeggios, and at worst, mere exploration. (Gordon, 1989, p. 
78) 
This principle was adopted by Kratus (1991) in his seven-stage developmental approach to 
improvisation education and is expressed widely in different forms within jazz education 
(Azzara, 1993; Coker et al., 1970; Gordon, 1989; Kratus, 1995; Wiskirchen, 1975). A nuanced 
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interpretation is that an ability to know how something that is about to be played will sound 
is not the same as conscious prospective auditory imagery. Thus, it is the ability rather than 
imagery which underwrites meaningful improvising in this view. Sudnow’s account is certainly 
consistent with this interpretation. This view also gains support from Kratus (1995) who states 
that audiation allows improvisers to make predictions about what sounds will occur, but that 
these are likely to occur in a split second and be unconscious. However, this nuance seems 
lost in the talk of pre-hearing in the mind’s ear in much of the literature (Berliner, 1994; Coker 
et al., 1970; Wiskirchen, 1975). This in turn contributes to a kind of moral perfectionism 
whereby musicians are dissatisfied with their current ability to pre-hear what they play and 
are always striving to improve (Day, 2000). In combination with the influence of dualist 
philosophy and Romantic ideals on the development of the idea of absolute music (Dahlhaus, 
1991; Warren, 2009), this emphasis on auditory imagery promotes the Ideal Model (Figure 
2.1). 
 
The second important theme derived from the literature is the portrayal of improvisation in 
the cognitive-scientific domain. This has a very different emphasis from that described in the 
ethnographic and pedagogical literature and this thesis argues that there are tensions 
between these perspectives. Two main cognitive models of improvisation were considered in 
Chapter 2, Pressing’s model involving hierarchical retrieval of stored patterns (Pressing, 1988, 
1998a, 1998b), and Johnson-Laird’s algorithmic model (Johnson-Laird, 2002). Pressing’s 
model gained some evidential support from neuroscientific sources and corpus analysis 
(Beaty, 2015; Norgaard, Spencer, et al., 2013). Johnson-Laird’s algorithmic model’s prediction 
that working memory is not used in improvisation is supported by behavioural results (Fidlon, 
2011). However, the cognitive view relies on the information processing metaphor, which has 
been challenged by competing paradigms forming mutually incompatible explanatory 
frameworks for the complex interplay between different cognitive processes. What these 
frameworks have in common is that they cast doubt on the feasibility of an idealised model 
that puts such an emphasis on conscious auditory prospection. It is particularly the case with 
grounded, enactive or embodied paradigms but also with simulation theories of motor 
control, that the anticipation of the sound of what is being played on an instrument is affected 
by other modalities than audition, including how the body moves (Jeannerod, 2001; O’Shea 
& Moran, 2017). Even if the computational metaphor is accepted, cognitive models of 
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improvisation are informed by theories describing complex sensorimotor tasks in terms of a 
hierarchical structure with chunking of lower-level automated units (Fidlon, 2011; Pacherie, 
2008; Pressing, 1988), leaving little opportunity for conscious prospection. The aims of this 
research programme were therefore to find out about improvisers’ experience with a focus 
on auditory imagery, and to investigate the effect of the body on the anticipation of the 
intended sound. An overarching goal is to suggest possible ways to reconcile these two very 
different accounts, the first being influenced by Romantic ideals and dualist philosophy and 
the second being rooted in the scientific worldview.  
 
7.3 Study 1: Investigating Improvisers’ Perspectives Using 
Video-Stimulated Recall 
Study 1 investigated not only the participant improvisers’ own conceptions of their cognitive 
processes and strategies for idea generation, it looked specifically at their views on auditory 
imagery and more broadly at their motivation for improvising. The findings suggest that 
auditory imagery does fulfil the role of a norm of the social practice of improvisation for them. 
In line with the Ideal Model (Figure 2.1) and the Romantic notion of the creative artist, 
participants saw the goal of improvising to be the translation of music created in the 
imagination into sound, via their instrument. They also reported using multiple generative 
strategies, some of which do not necessarily involve prospective auditory imagery. This was 
accompanied by a moral perfectionism which expressed their current dissatisfaction with this 
translation ability. Moral perfectionism is by its nature the pursuit of an unattainable ideal, in 
this case that the idea becoming sound becomes effortless, to the extent that the musician is 
no longer conscious of it. One participant described a masterclass with a renowned jazz 
pianist: “all of his practice is oriented around there being no sort of translation in between 
thinking of the idea and it happening, and like trusting that your ideas your ideas are 
appropriate to that musical moment…” (Guitarist, Male 21). This precisely echoes Day’s (2000, 
p. 100) quoting of Stanley Cavell on moral perfectionism: “The moral of this practice is to 
educate your experience sufficiently so that it is worthy of trust” and was coded in the 
thematic analysis with an in vivo code, you’ve got to train your improvisation. Freedom was a 
motivating factor to improvise, both in terms of a negative freedom, expressed as the 
freedom from the restrictions of fulfilling the prescribed role of playing from a score or part, 
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and a positive freedom to be creative. Another important theme was being in the moment 
which was both an ethos and a motivating factor, as participants linked this to flow states 
which they found to be intrinsically rewarding: “high as a kite when I'm doing those sorts of 
gigs” (Saxophonist, Male 27). Study 1 also elucidated some of the tensions and contradictions 
between some of the different imperatives in improvising. Being ‘in the moment’ was 
sometimes subordinate to thinking about what to do next or using and developing ideas that 
had already been played. The imperative to pre-hear was balanced with the use of other 
generative strategies, such as music-theoretic and motor-generated ideas. Participants also 
recognised that originality is circumscribed by the need to have an idea bank of precomposed 
materials and more abstract ideas of how to negotiate harmonic structures.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, originality can be construed as the concatenation and 
parametrisation of precomposed ideas: “How you put it together, how you sort of dissemble 
it..and reassemble it..“ (Pianist, Male 26). Given these ideas have been rehearsed, auditory-
motor associations should be more established than with less familiar musical fragments 
(D’Ausilio et al., 2010; Lahav et al., 2007). Although this does not imply prospective auditory 
imagery, it does suggest that the player is likely to know if what they played was what they 
intended. One participant in Study 1 expressed this well in echoing the analogy to language 
(section 2.3.2):  
…it's just happening it's it's like speech, I'm not thinking beforehand, the words're just 
coming out of my mouth, the notes are just coming out of the instrument, 
where...when it does become obvious, like say when your tongue trips up, while 
you're trying to speak then that's when you become ... aware of what you're saying. 
(Saxophonist, Male 27) 
Study 1 gives some insight into how the processes of improvisation are experienced by this 
small sample of jazz musicians and music students. Both the Ideal Model picture and the 
cognitive-scientific view were apparent in their account. The former was expressed by an 
adherence to Romantic ideals of being in the moment, creativity and freedom compatible 
with the role model of the creative artist, which is itself a legacy of dualist philosophy and 
German Romantic thought. The latter was expressed by participants’ reporting of multiple 
idea generation strategies in line with Pressing’s (1988) cognitive model and Norgaard’s 
studies (2011, 2016). In addition, they were unsure as to the degree to which conscious 
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thought was involved in improvisation and sometimes said that processes were intuitive 
rather than conscious, suggesting a degree of automaticity at lower hierarchical levels. A 
degree of uncertainty in the timing of their thoughts relative to the time of music production 
was also reported, which supports some of the points made above about the epistemic limits 
to which improvisers are subject.  
 
Study 1 yielded rich data from a small number of improvisers suggesting that they privileged 
prospective auditory imagery. This informed the design of Study 2, which investigated 
whether the familiarity of hand shape affects anticipation of how a chord will sound, rather 
than this being purely restricted to the auditory modality. These findings also motivated Study 
5 which had the aims of investigating whether the results of Study 1 were reflected in a larger 
population of improvisers, and whether there were any differences between students, 
musicians and educators. Study 5 also sought to further investigate whether there was a 
correlation between dualism and the aspect of the Ideal Model that privileges prospective 
auditory imagery. The parallel strand of research that motivated Study 2 was informed by the 
cognitive-scientific literature, particularly studies which suggest that imagery is multimodal 
rather than just auditory (Berkowitz, 2010; Keller, 2012; Schiavio & Timmers, 2016) and the 
theoretical frameworks which support the concept that perception and cognition are 
embodied. What this means is that the way musicians encounter and think about music is 
affected by bodily aspects of performance, such as how they have learned to move and the 
shapes their bodies make to enact music-producing gestures.  
 
7.4 Studies 2, 3 & 4: The Effect of Hand Shape Familiarity on 
Guitarists’ Perceptions of Sonic Congruence 
 
This study is the first to extend the altered auditory feedback (AAF) paradigm to the guitar, 
which differs in some important ways from the keyboard instruments which are most often 
used for AAF experiments. Each key on the piano maps to only one pitch and the keys are laid 
out so that low pitches are on the left and pitches get higher in the left-to-right direction. 
Hence there is a left-right spatial musical association of response codes (SMARC) effect which 
could be a factor in the way anticipations of auditory feedback affect action control. 
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Furthermore, the tradition of piano pedagogy is such that the hand shapes used to play chords 
tend to be prescribed. This means that it is difficult to separate familiar hand shapes from the 
chords associated with them without using a hand shape which would not normally be used, 
thus compromising ecological validity. Motorically, the nature of bimanual coordination on 
the piano is characterised by each hand producing sounds independently by pressing keys. In 
contrast, the guitar fingerboard is laid out so that the same note can be played in different 
locations. For example, the C at fret 1 on string 2 can also be played at fret 5 on string 3 or 
fret 10 on string 4, and so on, representing a many-to-one place-to-pitch mapping in contrast 
to the piano’s one-to-one mapping. In consequence, there are two orthogonal directions that 
can be associated with pitch height, one is along any string, with ascending pitch in the 
direction of the guitar body. The other has ascending pitch in the direction from the thickest 
string to the thinnest (spatially this is vertically downwards on a normally strung instrument 
with the neck held horizontally). This has the consequence that ecologically valid hand shapes 
that are both familiar and unfamiliar can be used to play chords. The unfamiliar shapes are 
ecologically valid in the sense that they do not violate the prescribed ways to play the chord 
they express. The reverse possibility of using a familiar hand shape on a different set of strings 
so that the shape-chord association was less familiar was also exploited in this study. 
Motorically, the guitar differs from the piano in that except for specialist two-hand tapping 
playing techniques, the two hands work together to produce the sound. The focus of Study 2 
was on the left-hand shape, which is used to fret the notes on the fingerboard.  
 
The task of Study 2 was a two-alternative forced choice discrimination judgement in which 
participants had to decide whether the auditory feedback had been altered or not when they 
played chords in response to tablature diagrams. The alterations consisted of one of the notes 
of the chord being raised or lowered, either by a tone or a semitone. The main findings were 
that reaction times were shorter, and accuracy was greater when chord (or hand) shapes 
were rated as more familiar, and when the auditory feedback was congruent. Reaction times 
were recorded from the onset of the chord when the participant had already moved the left 
hand into position, so the movement involved only the right hand either strumming or 
grabbing the strings. As this did not vary between left hand shapes, the facilitation of the task 
must have derived from some attribute of the familiarity of the chord shape, hand shape or 
the strength of the association between either kind of shape and the sound of the chord. 
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Although no direct measure of auditory imagery is yet possible and no independent 
behavioural measure was taken to verify that participants used anticipatory auditory imagery 
to solve the task in Study 2, previous studies have suggested that such imagery is used to 
facilitate both musical and experimental task performance (Keller, 2012; Keller et al., 2010). 
As this was a timed task, slow deliberative judgements based on music theory are less likely, 
although participants could use the time between the presentation of the visual stimulus and 
when they played the chord (up to 8 seconds) to prepare their expectation. A few participants 
who reported using theoretical considerations during the debrief spoke in terms of realising 
that a chord was for example a major 9th, and then they used their knowledge of how a major 
9th should sound to solve the task. The form of knowledge of how something should sound is 
very likely to be an auditory image retrieved from long term memory. It is not clear what 
alternative forms of knowledge could have this role and phenomenological quality, in fact. 
These findings therefore bear on the central question of the role of auditory imagery in 
improvisation, in ways which will now be discussed.   
 
The results suggest that auditory-motor coupling is heterogeneous with respect to the guitar, 
which builds on previous work suggesting that the quality of improvisation can be affected by 
the familiarity of different musical keys on the piano (Fidlon, 2011; Goldman, 2013; Norgaard 
et al., 2016). Improvising on the piano over a blues in Bb is motorically different to improvising 
over the same progression in B, because the piano keyboard has an irregular pattern of white 
and black notes. These studies similarly demonstrate a heterogeneity in auditory-motor 
coupling, but at the level of melodic patterns. Whereas they show that fewer motor patterns 
for melodic fragments are available in unfamiliar keys, Study 2 looks at the effect of familiarity 
in the motor-to-auditory direction. If participants are using a prospective auditory image to 
compare the actual feedback, then the findings suggest that familiarity facilitates the 
comparison. Because the different shapes expressed the same chord heard via MIDI, this 
effect cannot be due to factors like familiarity with chord quality, timbre or harmonic tension. 
If the effect is driven by the familiarity of the hand shape, then this would imply that 
proprioceptive or haptic rather than kinaesthetic or motoric factors influence the 
effectiveness of the anticipatory image, given the left hand is held still executing the chord 
for the timed part of each trial. An alternative explanation is that in the unfamiliar condition, 
the auditory-motor link itself is less robust, or takes longer to retrieve. This second possibility 
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does not directly implicate the embodied aspect of musical cognition, because it is compatible 
with a semantic or amodal retrieval process from memory, even if the format of the 
anticipation that is retrieved is an image. In other words, whilst grounded and embodied 
theoretical frameworks would favour the first explanation because what have been regarded 
as abstract or semantic cognitive processes use simulation or perceptual symbols, the second 
explanation is consistent with amodal theoretical positions. A third possibility in terms of 
motor control theories is that the motor program that enacts the hand shape uses a forward 
model (efference copy), and an inverse model (reafference, in the form of the expected 
sensory consequences of the action including the sound), and neither are conscious. In this 
case, participants would detect the discrepancy in retrospect, which could mean that any 
reports of anticipatory images are postdictive or due to task demand. As the quotation from 
the saxophonist in Study 1 suggested (Section 7.3), this is how improvisation and 
conversational speech seem also, in that we know in retrospect when what we have played, 
or said, was what we intended. 
 
What these three explanations have in common however, is that they all suggest that the 
affordances offered by instruments involve a heterogeneity of auditory-motor coupling which 
undermines the Ideal Model of improvisation. One way that music could be conceived in the 
imagination and translated to the instrument is if the improviser simply has a veridical 
mapping from pitch image to its place on the instrument that is accessible in real time. In this 
way, any novel (for the agent) melodic phrase is matched to a series of places on the 
instrument. Heterogeneity of auditory-motor coupling is incompatible with such a simple 
mapping. What this suggests is that even if an improviser had the good sense to imagine 
melodic phrases that were physically playable, the more novel a phrase is for them, the less 
motorically available it is. This could be a reason for the novelty/fluency trade-off as implied 
by some of the responses by participants in Study 1, as in this example “I think it wasn't, yeah 
it wasn't that I thought it was wrong, it was that I wasn't ...think I wasn't confident enough 
because I haven't done it before perhaps...” (Pianist, Male, 26). This contrasted with the 
saxophonist’s description of part of his solo “I mean this is all[I] the first bit's just fairly sort of 
standard blues stuff, I don't think I'm.... not reinventing any wheels...“ (Saxophonist, Male, 
26). These participants talked of practicing standard ways around chord sequences to play 
fluently. The notion of such a trade-off was also supported by the inverse relationship 
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between the rating of risk-taking and error avoidance in Study 5. Auditory-motor couplings 
that are well established via practice can be automatic and have a low risk of error, but at the 
cost of having less novelty, hence solos perceived to be the concatenation of well-rehearsed 
‘licks’ are less valued (Macdonald & Wilson, 2005) 
 
Study 3 was carried out in person with each of the participants from Study 2 to ascertain their 
familiarity with each chord shape in the stimulus set. Participants were instructed to rate how 
familiar each chord was on a scale from 1-7, in the position on the neck and on the given 
strings in the experiment. For example, stimulus 2 (C9) is a very common shape, especially for 
guitarists versed in jazz or funk. As discussed in Chapter 5, this is the same shape as stimulus 
13 if viewed as an abstract dot pattern (see Figure 5.4), but stimulus 13 is at a higher fret and 
on strings 3-6 instead of strings 2-5. Stimulus 13 (Appendix 9) is actually the unfamiliar version 
of stimulus 3; both express D7#9, again a very common chord which is used in jazz, rock and 
funk. Participants were encouraged to try each chord on the guitar before rating it. The reason 
for this was to allow for the possibility that semantic retrieval of the chord type from the 
visual stimulus alone might represent a different cognitive process from rating the familiarity 
of the experience of physically playing it. Given that Study 2 hypothesised that the latter kind 
of familiarity would facilitate the task, trying to make the familiarity rating experience match 
this aspect of the experimental one made sense. The protocol for Study 4 differed in that it 
was an electronic survey and was therefore not conducted in the presence of a researcher, 
although the instructions asked the participants to play the shapes on their guitar, as in Study 
3. The main difference from Study 3 was that participants were explicitly instructed to ignore 
the location on the neck and which strings the chord was to be played on and focus only on 
the familiarity of the hand shape they used to play it. Again, if the shape is viewed as an 
abstract pattern of dots, as in a chord diagram, following these instructions should have 
yielded similar ratings for stimulus 2 and stimulus 13, but in fact they were significantly 
different.  
 
The two main possible reasons for this align with two of the candidate explanations for the 
main findings of Study 2. It could be that playing the chords on the guitar before rating their 
familiarity did evoke the familiarity of the physical experience and this included some 
differences that are not apparent from the perspective of chords-as-dot-patterns. Stimulus 2 
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is near the headstock end of the guitar where the fret spacing is wider than at stimulus 13’s 
location. This would involve a more spread out finger spacing in the former case, leading to 
different proprioceptive feedback. Contributing further to this difference, the wrist angle and 
angle of the forearm to the upper arm change as the left hand moves along the fingerboard. 
Strings 3-6 feel different to strings 2-5 since three instead of two are wound rather than plain. 
On electric guitars it is often the case that the thickest three strings have a steel core which 
has a wire wound around it, so that they have a ridged texture.  Also, the higher number 
(lower pitch) strings are thicker so both of these factors could lead to different haptic 
feedback. If these reasons contributed to the different familiarity ratings, then this is 
compatible with the embodied explanation of the findings of Study 2, namely that physical 
familiarity of the hand shape facilitated task performance. However, this explanation also 
involves extending the familiarity both to the arm and wrist, and to haptic as well as 
proprioceptive feedback. The second possibility is that participants were rating the familiarity 
of the chord shape to chord sound relationship in both Study 3 and Study 4. This means that 
in effect their responses were compliant with the instructions for Study 3 in Study 4 also. 
Considering stimulus 2 and stimulus 13 again, 2 was originally designed to be familiar, 
whereas 13 is not usually played with its root on string 6, so it looks like the common shape 
for a 9th chord but expresses a 7#9th instead. Participants rated 13 as less familiar than 2 on 
average in both studies and this was the same for all the stimulus pairs which had the same 
abstract dot shape. This fits with the explanation that it was the chord shape to sound 
mapping that was being rated, since stimulus 2 resulted in the familiar C9 sound, whereas 
stimulus 13 is much less commonly used to play D7#9. It could be that participants could not 
ignore the salience of the mapping despite the instructions to the contrary. This explanation 
could be interpreted in terms of heterogeneity of auditory-motor coupling within an 
embodied paradigm, if it is the hand shape to sound mapping that is being rated. However, it 
is also compatible with the second amodal processing explanation given for the main findings, 
namely that the familiarity of the chord-to-sound mapping depends to an extent on semantic 
memory for the chord type which is associated via an abstract internal lexicon with an 
expected sound.  
 
Given that the familiarity ratings were on average in line with the intended design of the 
stimuli and that the statistical models gave similar results regardless of which familiarity rating 
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was used, the findings of Study 2 call the role of prospective auditory imagery in improvisation 
into question. This is because shape familiarity is not an intrinsically musical property, but it 
affects the anticipation of how the music will sound, which suggests that there is not a straight 
forward translation from imagined sound to actual sound. Rather than the abstract schema-
level mapping which could predict the sound made by novel movements (2.9.9), what is most 
motorically familiar has the strongest auditory-motor link. Therefore, this is likely to act both 
as a constraint and a generative strategy. This is not to say that improvisers never experience 
prospective auditory imagery, of course. The participants in Study 1 reported doing so, but 
not all the time, and they also reported other generative strategies which did not involve pre-
hearing in the imagination. These findings therefore further support an alternative view of 
multimodal engagement and multiple strategy use, suggesting that a reassessment of pre-
hearing in the imagination as the ‘gold standard’ of improvising would be appropriate.  
 
7.5 Study 5: The Improvisation and Mind-Body Survey 
Study 5 was the first study to specifically investigate the relationship between respondents’ 
conceptions of the important elements and processes involved in improvisation and their 
beliefs regarding the relationship of mind to body. An online survey comprising a first section 
on improvisation and a second section on mind-body dualism gleaned 114 respondents in 
total. In addition to 7-point Likert questions there were two free text response questions, one 
per section. The primary aims of the study were to build on the findings of Study 1 by asking 
a larger cohort of improvisers about some of its central themes. Further, respondents were 
asked whether they identified mainly as students, musicians or educators to find out about 
possible differences between these groups, to address questions such as whether experience 
level or playing context changes the perceived importance of different elements of 
improvisation. The final aim was to test the hypothesis that the rating of importance given to 
prospective auditory imagery is correlated with respondents’ score on the dualism scale.  
 
The improvisation section of the survey was derived specifically for this study based on the 
results of Study 1. This included questions designed to find out whether multiple strategy use, 
sketch planning, idea bank (Norgaard, 2011),  and prospective auditory imagery would be 
endorsed by a larger sample of improvisers than the six participants of Study 1. In addition, 
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four questions were included on basic skills and one on the importance of taking risks 
(Wopereis et al., 2013). Questions on the importance of playing something new and being 
free were inspired by the Romantic Ideals theme in Study 1. Finally, some questions on being 
in the moment, body-knowledge, the creator-witness phenomenon and being aware of the 
environment were included, based on some themes in Study 1 and the literature. The mind-
body dualism section of the survey was adapted from a scale created by Stanovich (1989) in 
a study which had the aim of investigating the prevalence of dualistic beliefs and their 
relationship to religiosity and belief in extrasensory perception. The version chosen for this 
survey was a combination of the dualism items used by Preston et al. (2013) in two 
experiments. The reasons for this were that as some authors have noted (Hook & Farah, 2013; 
Riekki et al., 2013), some of the items on Stanovich’s original scale were ambiguous and the 
scale used by Preston et al. was shorter but retained a good measure of internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s α = .84).  
 
The main findings of this study were that items derived from the themes of Study 1 were 
rated as important components of improvisation by improvisers (N = 113, one participant 
having been excluded because they gave no ratings). The importance of prospective auditory 
imagery was endorsed and reinforced by some of the free text responses. This suggests that 
the Ideal Model of improvisation introduced in Chapter 2 has some currency. Two of the 
themes of Norgaard’s (2011) thematic analysis were replicated, the use of multiple generative 
strategies and the concept of a store of ideas which can be called upon in improvisation (idea 
bank). Also in line with previous research (Fidlon, 2011; Norgaard et al., 2016), the rating of 
items that mentioned necessarily conscious processes were on average lower for musicians 
than for students. This finding gives further support to the hypothesis that experts rely less 
on conscious processes than novices. An exploratory factor analysis gave a three-factor 
solution, with factors basic skills, flow and responsive awareness. No support was found for 
the hypothesis that the importance of prospective auditory imagery was correlated with 
implicit mind-body dualism as measured by the 14-item dualism scale. Factor analysis for this 
scale also yielded three factors, which is in line with previous research showing the 
multidimensionality of the measure (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018; Riekki et al., 2013). The 
factors were substance dualism, supervenience and reductive physicalism. A consideration of 
the philosophical complexities surrounding this issue strongly indicates that further work is 
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needed to develop a suitable measure to assess dualism which clearly targets different 
ontological and epistemic commitments. As substance dualism most closely reflected the 
Romantic concepts that were influential in ethnographic portrayals of the improviser-as-
creative-artist, the correlation of this with the rating for auditory imagery was also tested but 
was not significant. However, the loading of the prospective auditory imagery item onto the 
basic skills improvisation factor suggests that pre-hearing in the imagination is regarded as 
central to improvisational competence. Hence even if the Ideal Model has been influenced by 
Romantic notions and dualist philosophy, the norm of prospective auditory imagery that it 
advocates can be adopted regardless of whether a musician holds dualist beliefs or not. The 
Ideal Model of improvisation is incompatible with the findings of Study 2 and with some of 
the findings of cognitive science (as discussed in Chapter 6) but there is an irony that the 
dualist and cognitive views can both can be criticised for a reliance on the computational 
metaphor (Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2016). Whilst cognitivism is more explicit in this reliance, 
framing improvisation in terms of input, representation, information processing and output, 
dualism just adds something to the mechanism: a connection to a non-material reality. 
 
7.6 Implications 
The results of this research indicate that the norm of prospective auditory imagery has 
currency. However, the idealised model of improvising to which it contributes is not informed 
by the findings such as those from Study 2 which suggest that multimodal factors including 
movement and proprioception play an important part in the process. Further, there are 
difficulties and contradictions within the idealised model of improvisation which need to be 
addressed to provide a coherent account which reconciles improvisers’ experience with the 
findings of cognitive science. This thesis proposes that there are philosophical solutions 
available which could benefit the practice and pedagogy of improvisation. I will therefore 
begin this section by clarifying some of the paradoxes and difficulties that were explored in 
previous chapters.  
 
7.6.1 Paradoxes 
Chapters 1 and 6 indicated some internal difficulties with Platonist ontologies of music. 
Platonism suggests three propositions which form an inconsistent set (Cameron, 2008): 
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 P1. Musical works are created. 
 P2. Musical works are abstract objects. 
 P3. Abstract objects cannot be created. 
 
P1 has an intuitive appeal for composers and improvisers alike: music is brought into being 
by what they do. The motivation for P2 is a connected set of intuitions about the ontology of 
musical works arrived at by considering the differences between performances of works and 
the works themselves. The work is heard in performance, but this is taken to be an 
instantiation of a pre-existing entity because even if there were no further performances, it 
would seem counter-intuitive to suppose that the work would cease to exist. If works are not 
identical to their performances, then they must be something else. Similarly, if all the scores 
of a piece of music were destroyed, it would not follow that the work itself no longer exists, 
as it could be performed from memory. The kind of thing that has this property according to 
Platonism is an abstract object, but this raises a further problem expressed by P3: abstract 
objects are generally taken to inhabit an acausal, atemporal, ideal realm. Since creation is the 
causing of something to exist there is a contradiction. One way out of the impasse is to reject 
Platonism, for example by holding that musical works are their performances or that they do 
not exist, but either option seems counterintuitive.  Platonists might seek to deny one of P1-
P3. For example, P2 could be denied by saying that musical works are brought about by a 
composer indicating an abstract sound structure and giving instructions for its performance. 
The work is not identical to the sound structure and the contradiction is avoided, but at the 
expense of having to introduce the concept of indicating an abstract structure, which is rather 
vague and counterintuitive in that it does not easily fit with ordinary language use relating to 
what composers take themselves to be doing. In the context of improvisation, these 
difficulties are compounded by apparently contradictory definitions, for example:  
1) “The creation of a musical work, or the final form of a musical work, as it is being 
performed” (Sadie & Grove, 1980, p. 31) 
2) “A necessary condition of improvisation is that it not be the performance of a work.” 
(Wolterstorff, cited in Burnard, 2012, p. 151).  
 If improvisation is not the performance of a work, is this compatible with the notion of the 
creation of a work as it is performed? This raises the problem of how to distinguish between 
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the creation of a work as it is performed and the performance of a work as it is created, to 
which there might not be a solution even in principle and the latter fails to meet Wolterstorff’s 
essential criterion. If what is meant is that improvisation is not the performance of a prior 
musical work, then how far in advance is an improviser allowed to conceive of or assemble 
ideas for the performance? Perhaps we could stipulate that the work is not by somebody else 
other than the performer, but then there are similar sorites paradoxes regarding how much 
material could be borrowed or part of a collective lexicon. A sorites paradox (Horgan, 1994) 
refers to a situation analogous to the following. Suppose there is a heap of sand. It seems 
reasonable to take as a premise that removal of a single grain will not cause the heap to cease 
to be a heap. Another apparently reasonable premise is that if this process of removing a 
grain is repeated a sufficient number of times, the heap will cease to exist. The resulting 
contradiction expresses a difficulty with definitions involving vague criteria when applied in 
contexts where there is a continuum. How then do we disambiguate a composer performing 
her own work and her improvising? Is there a principled distinction between expressive 
interpretive variations and those that characterise improvisation? Returning to the debate 
between Platonist and nominalist accounts of a musical work, the former is problematic in 
the context of improvisation, given doubts about the ontological status of created abstracta 
and Platonism’s appeal to type/token duality. So, in improvisation, we have an instantiation 
of a type via a singular unique token which is the only possible token of the type, which seems 
unsatisfactory. A nominalist account faces similar difficulties, in that if a work is a set of 
concrete particulars then an improvisation creates a work of which the only particular is itself. 
Whilst this is not strictly contradictory it is difficult to see what explanatory work is being done 
by the definition (for a discussion of these issues, see Bertinetto, 2012). It could be argued 
that, as with the definition of music the problem might be that it is not possible to specify 
improvisation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. However, a similar problem 
with the definition of ‘game’, which motivated Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance, 
has perhaps yielded to Bernard Suits’ “the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary 
obstacles” (Suits, 2014, p. xiii). Therefore perhaps a better way to resolve these contradictions 
and difficulties regarding the ontology of musical works in relation to improvisation is to make 
the product/process distinction mentioned in 2.3.3 and abandon the work concept in favour 
of considering how musicians relate to musical knowledge structures as a set of processes 
(Benson, 2003; Goldman, 2013, 2016).  
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Whilst the process focus facilitates a cognitive-scientific research programme to investigate 
improvisation, it does not resolve the apparent tensions between the Ideal Model discussed 
in Chapter 2 and the findings of cognitive science. To recap, according to the Ideal Model an 
essential element of improvisation is pre-hearing in the imagination what is played on an 
instrument. The Romantic ideal of the improviser suggests three conditions must be met by 
auditory imagery, it is: 
1) Prior 
2) Veridical  
3) Causal 
A further condition, which is epistemic, is implied by the role of auditory imagery in its 
validation of improvisation as a creative activity:  
4) It must be known that conditions 1-3 are met.  
Condition 4 is a necessary condition of validation because if it is not possible to know whether 
the conditions that validate an activity obtain, then it follows that it is not possible to know 
its validity and establishing validity is constitutive of validation. The cognitive-scientific 
perspective casts doubt on whether 4 can be met in ordinary improvising situations however. 
The reason is that there are experimental findings relating to conditions 1-3 which call into 
question both their truth and knowability and these will now be considered in turn. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, auditory imagery must be prior to the decisions which determine 
the movements necessary to enact music-producing gestures to conform to the ideal of the 
creative artist who creates music in their imagination. However, the timing of events from a 
phenomenological point of view does not necessarily correspond with the temporal ordering 
of their occurrence (Dominik et al., 2018; Libet et al., 1983; Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008). These 
findings suggest that the process of preparation to move begins before participants are 
consciously aware of their choice to move, yet their experience of agency is such that the 
choice causes the movement. Another example which is illustrative is that of the illusion of 
apparent motion (Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1. We experience motion as happening before the second dot appears at t + 0.01 but 
the second dot must be perceived before apparent motion can be inferred. 
 
The illusion of apparent motion involves the experience of motion followed by experiencing 
the second dot as its terminus. Since motion cannot be inferred by the visual system before 
the second dot is perceived but is experienced afterwards, it follows that the temporal order 
of experience is not a simple representation of the temporal order of events in the brain. 
This also occurs in the auditory domain, such that the experience of sounds on small 
timescales does not match the temporal order of the sound-causing events, for example the 
‘octave illusion’ created by a misattribution of time across perceptual streams (Mehta, 
Jacoby, Yasin, Oxenham, & Shamma, 2017).  Hence it is not clear whether musical imagery is 
in fact prior, and even if it is experienced as preceding movement, there is no guarantee that 
this experience is reliable.  
 
Turning to condition 2, this states that the auditory image must be veridical in that it must 
resemble the music that is played. If this were not the case, it would not be meaningful to 
assert that image was of the music. As mentioned in section 2.9.12, the accuracy of mental 
images is circumscribed. For another visual imagery example, imagine a tiger. Can you count 
its stripes? As with the example of the object made of cubes in the Introduction and the 
imaginary cube balanced by its vertex on the table top given in 2.9.12, the limitation in the 
image is not necessarily apparent until a particular question is asked. One difference between 
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imagery and perception is the way the perceptual field can be ‘resampled’ with attention to 
certain details if these had not been already noticed. We do not have to expend effort on 
cognitive control to hold the percept in mind whilst we do this.  There is some evidence that 
auditory imagery ability varies considerably amongst individuals both in terms of its vividness 
and control (Gelding, Thompson, & Johnson, 2015). Interestingly, self-reports of auditory 
imagery ability have also been correlated with behavioural and neural differences (Halpern, 
2015; Pfordresher & Halpern, 2013). As mentioned in Chapter 2 though, even musicians 
selected for their notational audiation ability were poor at spotting embedded (embellished) 
melodies in scores in silent compared to listening conditions (Brodsky et al., 2008). The 
veridicality of auditory imagery and the ability to know it are both therefore questionable. 
 
Finally, whilst conditions 1 and 2 are necessary for 3, they do not entail it. Even if an accurate 
auditory image precedes the movements made to enact the music, it does not follow that the 
image played a causal role. For example, suppose a well-established motor programme is the 
cause of the movement, but during its execution it not only produces an efference copy to 
aid in predicting the future motor state of the system (forward model), it also produces a 
reafference copy (inverse model) to predict the sensory consequences of the action, in the 
form of an auditory image. Suppose further that there are no execution errors, and because 
of the unreliability of judging the temporal order of events discussed above, the image seems 
to precede the decision to execute the motor programme, even though it does not. Then in 
terms of the causal chain that results in the music being played, the auditory image is 
epiphenomenal. Moreover, even if it were causal in some cases, it is difficult to see how this 
could be known (condition 4), as not only is judgement of temporal order problematic, so are 
judgements of causality and agency. These are also related, for example by manipulating the 
timing of a priming word Wegner and Wheatley (1999) were able to induce a misattribution 
of mental causation in participants; convincing them they had caused a mouse pointer to stop 
on a given image on a screen even though this was in fact done by an experimenter. Not only 
does the temporal order of events effect judgements of causality, the relationship is 
bidirectional. Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016) used simple Michotte-style displays in which 
simple objects move on a screen and participants perceive them as interacting causally. The 
authors manipulated these apparent causal connections with the result that participants 
changed their interpretation of the temporal order of events to match. Hence, it is plausible 
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that if a musician believes that imagery is causal, this might also cast doubt on their judgement 
that it is prior (condition 1). In summary, the foundation of the Romantic ideal of 
improvisation is based on potentially paradoxical definitions, a problematic ontology and has 
unresolved tensions with the findings of cognitive science. 
 
7.6.2 Resolutions 
 
If the Ideal Model of improvisation is untenable on these grounds, it would be useful to 
consider alternative philosophical and psychological bases for improvising which are 
compatible with current scientific knowledge. The first step is to employ the product-process 
distinction in saying that improvisation is a way of making music characterised by a flexibility 
in accessing musical knowledge-structures (Goldman, 2016; Goldman et al., 2018). This 
flexibility allows for spontaneous music making which is responsive to the situation and to the 
musical offerings of other musicians. Whereas in classical music, examples of flexibility involve 
expressive timbral manipulations, rubato and changes of articulation, what is usually called 
idiomatic improvisation in the jazz genre involves harmonic substitutions and flexibility of 
note selection. In this way, music making is seen as a collection of activities within which some 
parameters can vary according to context. Those parameters which differ most with respect 
to improvisation reflect the norms of the activity as a social practice rather than a 
fundamental ontological difference. This still perhaps leaves the ontology of music as an 
unresolved problem in philosophy but not one that needs to be a particular issue for 
improvisers. It is not necessary to assume that a musical work is being created, which removes 
one motivation for the Cartesian view. Only in thinking of music as a product do the intuitions 
arise that works must have an ideal Platonic existence. Next, the epistemic difficulties of 
establishing the priority and causal role of auditory imagery matter because of how creative 
music making is conceptualised. These difficulties subside if prospective auditory imagery is 
not necessary for creative improvising. This might sound counter-intuitive. Take for example 
the autoethnography by Sudnow (1978), or the jazz improvisation education programme 
offered by Kratus (1995). These accounts are teleological; they both describe stages of 
development which progress through exploratory phases to develop “the skill to hear musical 
patterns inwardly as they are about to be played“ (Kratus, 1991, p. 38). Or as Sudnow put it 
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“I take my fingers to places so deeply ‘mindful’ of what they will sound like that I can sing at 
the same time” (Sudnow, 1978, p. 150, emphasis in original). Yet Sudnow is aware of the 
epistemic issues outlined above, as he goes on to say, “Am I really singing along behind the 
sounds at a rapid rate, with a differential lag in timing I do not notice, some split-second 
‘neurological’ delay?” (ibid, p.151). In a footnote (ibid p. 149-151) he gives some details of his 
attempts to settle this issue. Sudnow set up his electric piano through an amplifier with a 
footswitch which could mute the sound in the room. Whilst recording the signal from the 
piano and the sound in the room, he would play and sing with the intent of the singing and 
playing being melodically matched in terms of pitch. Some of the time, he muted the piano 
whilst continuing to play and sing, allowing for a comparison between the played and sung 
pitches on the recording. Sudnow reports that when auditory feedback from the piano was 
absent, the sung and played pitches often diverged. This is not a report of a peer reviewed 
study and so the account is suggestive rather than definitive. Its potential as a future direction 
of research will be discussed in the relevant section below. However, whilst Sudnow’s account 
is compatible with the hypothesis that singing relies on auditory feedback, such that singing 
tracks playing rather than vice versa, there is an alternative interpretation more in keeping 
with Sudnow’s central thesis. This is that movement and sound are so intimately intertwined 
that one in the absence of the other violates ecological validity to the extent of disrupting the 
process of playing-singing. It might be objected that there are studies which show that 
performance by expert pianists is not significantly disrupted by a lack of auditory feedback 
(Finney & Palmer, 2003; Finney, 1997; Repp, 1999). Whilst these findings do support this, by 
necessity, to test accuracy of performance against a fixed target, these pianists were playing 
a piece either from memory or a score. This is not the same set of cognitive processes as in 
improvisation and so is not directly comparable. 
  
Sudnow’s work can be read as an embodied account and interpreted from the ecological 
perspective (Borgo, 2007; Love, 2017; Torrance & Schumann, 2018; Windsor & De Bézenac, 
2012). This rejects the computational metaphor whereby improvisation involves input which 
is converted into abstract symbols which are manipulated algorithmically to give an output 
which is converted into movement. Although some simulations of improvisation using 
computer programs and drawing on the models proposed by Pressing (1988) and Johnson-
Laird (2002) have had modest success (Norgaard, Montiel, & Spencer, 2013; Pachet, 2012), 
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simulation is not instantiation. Nobody gets wet during a computer simulation of a weather 
system and it is unlikely that anyone would assume that the model operates in a way that 
resembles weather. The ecological perspective rejects the computational metaphor in favour 
of a navigational one in which the improviser has ways of moving to traverse the musical 
landscape. The affordances offered by the improviser’s instrument are complemented by 
those offered by the referent (Pressing, 1988). Within the computational metaphor, the 
referent forms a conceptual frame encompassing meter, harmonic structure and melodic 
forms which serves to restrict the space of possible action and therefore make processing 
easier. From an ecological perspective, the referent offers affordances, ways of moving to 
navigate the musical space, and will depend on the individual’s previous experience of moving 
in relation to the referent (Love, 2017). The relation of these affordances to the referent is 
not rule-based and music-theoretic, it is a non-conceptual kind of “absorbed coping” which 
“does not require that the agent’s movements be governed by an intention in action that 
represents the action’s success conditions” (Dreyfus, 1999, p. 4). Torrance and Schumann 
(2018) refine this view of skilled action in the context of jazz improvisation to include a 
superordinate level of mindful monitoring which fits well with the hierarchical models 
discussed earlier. Their enactivist interpretation also utilises the navigation metaphor whilst 
acknowledging that we lay down our paths in interacting with the world according to our 
abilities and our sense-making natures. One of the participants in Study 5 summed up this 
perspective very well “Cognition is embodied, extended, enacted and embedded. This applies 
significantly to improvisation” (educator, female, live electronics, 11-15 years). As with any 
theoretical framework there are different positions and emphases, some of which are 
incompatible (Menary, 2010), but the enactive approach shares important elements with 
grounded cognition. Both are committed to embodiment, and situatedness (embedded). The 
extent to which cognition is extended into the environment is still a matter of active debate 
but both perspectives recognise the role of what an organism does in cognition, the enactive 
aspect (Menary, 2010). The crucial aspect shared by these approaches is their rejection of the 
computational information processing metaphor and as such they offer further resolutions to 
the problems summarised in 7.6.1. Firstly, these perspectives are compatible with findings 
from cognitive science (Goldman, 2013; Maes et al., 2014) so adopting a view of improvising 
informed by them removes a potential tension between improvisers’ conception of their 
practice and their knowledge of scientific findings. Second, the emphasis on the enmeshed 
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nature of cognition and movement follows on from the product/process distinction and 
further undermines the philosophical basis for the primacy of prospective auditory imagery. 
If how musicians move is integral to how they think, why are motoric modes of musical 
cognition not just as valid as auditory modes? The evidence that music is not purely the result 
of auditory cognition is found in the influence of instrumental affordances in musical 
composition and improvisation. For example, in considering folk blues guitar practice, Baily 
and Driver (1992) contend that musical patterns are not remembered and represented solely 
in the aural modality, but instead are represented as movement patterns with kinaesthetic, 
visual and tactile elements as well as auditory consequences. Their central thesis is that the 
guitar is laid out in such a way as to encourage spatial thinking, and they give musical 
examples in support of this view (Lay Lady Lay, p. 67, All Day and All Night, p. 68). The motor 
structure of a musical style, comprising the ways of moving used to enact the style is affected 
in part by the morphology of the instrument. Musicians form a style-specific motor grammar 
through learning canonical works within the style. Further evidence for the influence of the 
layout of the guitar fingerboard on musical output comes from an analysis of the improvised 
solos of the jazz guitarist Pat Metheny by Dean (2014). Baker (2001) gives examples including 
Beethoven, Stravinsky and Schubert to show that even orchestral or string quartet works 
evince keyboard influenced structures. Further, the extended and distributed aspects of 
cognition inherent in grounded and enactive frameworks undermine the Cartesian and 
Romantic ideas of creativity. If the creative improviser is seen as a distributed set of 
interacting, extended and embodied cognitive systems, this means that it makes no sense to 
locate creativity in a single modality. If it is accepted that the kinaesthetic, auditory, visual, 
tactile and proprioceptive modalities are enmeshed and form a creatively valid whole, the 
epistemic problems of establishing that auditory imagery is prior, veridical and causal 
disappear. In summary, embodied, grounded and enactive perspectives are compatible with 
cognitive science and in removing the problems associated with the Ideal Model of 
improvisation (Figure 2.1) offer a fruitful alternative basis for informing improvisation 
pedagogy and interpreting practice. 
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7.6.3 Pedagogy 
Self-efficacy is an important predictor of success in music performance (Bonneville-Roussy, 
Vallerand, & Bouffard, 2013; McPherson & McCormick, 2006) and jazz improvisation (Ciorba, 
2009). An individual’s self-efficacy is “the conviction that one can successfully execute the 
behavior required to produce the outcomes” (Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977, p. 126). Self-
efficacy beliefs are task-specific within a domain, for example a musician could have high self-
efficacy for playing a classical piano piece whilst having low self-efficacy for piano 
improvisation on a jazz standard (Ritchie & Williamon, 2011). A view which promotes 
prospective auditory imagery as the sine qua non of improvisation is likely to have a negative 
impact on self-efficacy for improvising because, as the results of Studies 1 and 5 suggest, this 
does not align with experience. Participants were aware of multiple strategy use, that 
auditory imagery was only sometimes present and were not sure of the timing of imagery as 
being prior. In contrast, if a grounded/enactive/ecological approach were adopted and 
advocated within jazz pedagogy, this has the potential to enhance self-efficacy as well as 
promote a better learning environment for improvisation (Borgo, 2007).  
 
The rejection of dualism which characterises the ecological perspective could also be of 
benefit in the pedagogical context. Dualist epistemic beliefs are associated with poorer 
academic performance in a number of domains (Hamilton & Hamilton, 2015; Lonka & 
Lindblom-Ylänne, 1996; Muis, 2004; Ryan, 1984; Schommer, 1990) and in music with less 
adaptive practice strategies (Nielsen, 2012). There is evidence that epistemic beliefs are 
malleable and that explicit examination of such beliefs can be beneficial in bringing about 
positive change toward more sophisticated non-dualist views of knowledge (Muis, 2004). One 
possibility to address this would be to introduce critical thinking into improvisation pedagogy 
so that improvisers would have enhanced opportunities to examine any implicit beliefs they 
might hold about the nature of improvisation. As with the concept of epistemic beliefs, there 
are still debates and issues in the field relating to the definition, theoretical basis and 
measurement of critical thinking (Larsson, 2017), but the definition “critical thinking is 
reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1993, p. 180) 
is a starting point. This definition gives a good indication of the meaning of the concept but 
by itself is vague, so Ennis gives elaborations, including “Judge the credibility of sources”, 
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“Identify conclusions, reasons, and assumptions” and “Judge the quality of an argument, 
including the acceptability of its reasons, assumptions, and evidence”. Recent meta-analyses 
have suggested that critical thinking interventions can be effective, but that they work best 
when they are explicit and domain-specific (Abrami et al., 2008; Huber & Kuncel, 2016; Lee, 
Lee, Gong, Bae, & Choi, 2016). Given that critical thinking also has links to creativity (DeHaan, 
2009), its inclusion in an ecological jazz education programme could help to provide a fertile 
environment for developing improvisers. 
 
7.7 Limitations 
Many of the limitations of this research programme have been discussed in the chapters 
relating to individual studies. However, some important general points will be mentioned 
here. Improvisation is unpredictable by nature and this sharpens the difficulty in striking a 
balance between ecological validity and experimental control. Study 1 used a backing track, 
which gave a degree of control in that participants all responded in the context of the same 
referent. This was also decided upon with practical considerations in mind. This does 
represent an important limitation and the participants indicated that they felt that they did 
not improvise as they would have done with a live band.  
 
Study 2 did not address improvisation directly for similar reasons, in that introducing a 
paradigm for guitar and altered auditory feedback involving the precise measurement of 
reaction times necessitated the experimental control given by a predictable task. Imagery is 
also challenging to study experimentally because it is a conscious state to which a participant 
can have introspective access, but the experimenter does not. An array of self-report 
measures, brain scanning techniques and behavioural evidence has been used to combat this 
difficulty, but this remains a limitation in this area. That the relation of Study 2 to auditory 
imagery is inferential rather than direct is a limitation of this study which could be addressed 
in future studies. 
 
Studies 3 and 4 encountered problems relating to the complexity of operationalising and 
measuring the familiarity of chords. These are complex phenomena with potentially distinct 
dimensions along which familiarity could operate, which necessitates further work to develop 
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robust measures. A similar limitation affected Study 5 also, improvisation is a complex human 
activity and further work is needed to develop measures which can more accurately and 
specifically target the elements of interest to researchers. Much conceptual work needs to be 
done to improve the philosophical rigour of the measurement of dualism and related 
positions on the mind-body problem if their relation to other constructs is to be investigated. 
 
7.8 Future Directions 
There are some possible developments which follow the ethos of this research programme 
and some specific directions suggested by its findings. Research into the relation of 
instrumental affordances and improvisatory behaviour could follow on from studies with 
pianists (Goldman, 2013) by using the MIDI guitar technology used in Study 2. Whereas 
Goldman’s study looked at improvising in two different musical keys which are very different 
in their motoric familiarity (B, Bb), the guitar is a transposing instrument and does not have 
this property. It does offer a different set of affordances which could be tested, however. For 
example, playing in the same key in a relatively unfamiliar position on high frets could be 
investigated.  
 
If auditory imagery is usually used by improvisers then its disruption in a dual-task paradigm 
experiment might result in detectable alterations in improvisations, even if other strategies 
are used to compensate. Given it is likely that musical imagery in improvisation would involve 
working memory (Kalakoski, 2001) and that recent findings suggest that working memory for 
tonal material is disrupted by articulatory suppression (Nees et al., 2017), a dual-task 
experiment could explore this by using articulatory suppression and a control task and 
comparing measures such as transitional entropy and pattern use applied to musical output 
(Goldman, 2013; Norgaard et al., 2016). 
 
Hargreaves (2012) theorises that audiated ideas are conceived in relative pitch and must be 
converted to absolute pitch to be played in a given musical context. One prediction that 
follows from this is that if improvisers use auditory imagery in improvisation, the brain areas 
involved in such a conversion would be more active than in a control musical performance 
that does not require this process. Studies using fMRI have used contrasts between 
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motorically balanced memorised performance and improvising tasks to investigate which 
brain regions are differentially activated/deactivated (de Manzano & Ullén, 2012a; Donnay et 
al., 2014; Limb & Braun, 2008). One potential brain region of interest for future experiments 
is the intraparietal sulcus which seems to be part of a domain-general system associated with 
such transformations and has been implicated in musical transposition (Foster & Zatorre, 
2010). 
 
Two surprising findings from Study 2 suggest possibilities for further studies. The first is that 
improvisers did not do better on the task, despite the more prominent role of auditory-motor 
transformations in improvisers’ practice compared to non-improvisers. One reason for this 
might be that the participants did not contain enough genuine non-improvisers. A follow-up 
experiment could be done with a between-groups component and in addition independent 
measures of auditory imagery ability could be taken to investigate whether this correlates 
with task performance. The second possibility is suggested by the puzzling lack of interaction 
between familiarity and congruence. Study 2 could be extended with the introduction of EEG 
techniques to investigate the nature and time course of event related potentials to clarify 
what strategies are being used in different conditions. Comparison of N200 and P3 responses 
could indicate the extent to which an incongruity is registered even if it does not facilitate 
performance, whilst timing and scalp distributions could suggest possible cognitive processes. 
 
Finally, the procedure that Sudnow (1978) described, in which he sang along to his improvised 
melodies on an electric piano and periodically muted the sound of the piano in the room, 
could form the basis of an experiment. As he kept recording the signal from the piano, he 
could find out to what extent his singing and playing diverged in the piano muted condition. 
Although challenging in terms of technological issues like latency and jitter, it might be 
possible to answer Sudnow’s question about the relative timing of singing and playing. It is 
likely that some improvisers would diverge more than others and the correlation between 
divergence and scores on auditory imagery measures, as well as other parameters (tonality, 
key, tempo) could be tested. 
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7.9 Conclusion 
The research conducted for this thesis investigated the role of auditory imagery in 
improvisation and found that its role was important as a validating principle of improvisation 
for these participants. The role of embodiment in the anticipation of musical sound was 
investigated in the first study to use altered auditory feedback with guitar. This contributed 
the novel findings that the familiarity of the hand shape affects both the accuracy and timing 
of judgements of sonic congruence. The first study to investigate the possible relationship of 
dualism to beliefs about improvisation made significant progress in developing measures to 
further investigate this relationship. This thesis represents part of an ongoing cognitive-
scientific inquiry into improvisation and offers some philosophical resolutions to the tensions 
between the norms of improvisation practice and the findings of cognitive science. This thesis 
started from the question “are we really hearing in our heads what we think we’re hearing?” 
Inevitably perhaps, no definitive answer can be given, but a tentative one could be “possibly 
not, but it does not matter.” 
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Appendix 1 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Research Project Title  
 
‘Are we really hearing in our heads what we think we’re hearing?’: the role of audiation in musical 
improvisation. 
 
Invitation 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask me if there is anything 
that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish 
to take part.  
 
Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of the project?  
 
The purpose of this project is to find out about what people hear in their heads while they improvise. 
The project is expected to last three years. 
 
Why have I been chosen?  
 
You have been chosen because you are an expert improviser. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. Refusal to take part will involve no penalty or loss 
of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this 
information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form). If you decide to take part you are 
still free to withdraw at any time, without penalty or loss of benefits, and without giving a reason. 
211 
 
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
 
You will be asked to play an improvised solo over a backing track whilst being videoed. The video will 
then be played back to you and you will be asked to comment on your solo, focusing on where your 
ideas came from and what you were thinking as you played. Your comments will be audio recorded, 
transcribed, and checked with you for accuracy before analysis. The recording and interview 
procedure should last about 90 minutes. 
 
What do I have to do?  
 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to commit to come with your instrument to a 90-minute 
recording and interview session at The Royal Northern College of Music, or if this is not convenient it 
might be possible to do the session at another venue, for example your home or studio. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
  
You might find improvising in a research context unfamiliar and this is potentially stressful, however I 
will do my best to put you at your ease during the process and you will be debriefed afterwards. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is hoped that 
this work will add to our knowledge of the process of improvisation and will help to improve its 
teaching and practice. 
 
What happens if the study has to be terminated? 
  
If the study has to be terminated, then you will be told why this has happened. 
 
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?  
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential. Any information about you that is disseminated will have your name and address 
removed so that you cannot be identified by it. 
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What happens immediately after data collection? 
 
You will be debriefed soon as the data collection is complete. During the debrief you will have the 
opportunity to ask any questions about the research or raise any concerns you have. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research project?  
 
The results of this research will be published as part of a PhD thesis on improvisation and might also 
be published in journals and presented at conferences. You will be able to get a copy of the thesis 
from me using the contact details below. 
 
Who has reviewed the project?  
 
This project has been reviewed by the RNCM’s Research Ethics Committee (REC) overseen by the 
Research Committee.  
 
Contact for further information  
 
Keith Phillips 
3 Cleveland Road, 
Heaton Mersey, 
Stockport 
SK4 4BS 
Email: keith.phillips@student.rncm.ac.uk 
Mobile: 07984902507 
Dr Freya Bailes 
UAF in Music, Media and Mediation 
School of Music (Faculty Performance, Visual 
Arts & Comms) 
University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
f.bailes@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
 
You will be given a copy of this Participant Information Sheet and a signed Participant Consent Form 
to keep. 
 
Thank you for spending the time to consider taking part in this research project! 
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Appendix 2 
Biographical details 
This information will assist in the analysis of your interviews, but you are under 
no obligation to complete this questionnaire. Please feel free to omit any 
questions if you so wish. Your answers will be kept confidential and any data 
published will be anonymized. 
Name: 
Age: __________ 
If you play any instruments other than the one you played in the recording, 
please list them below:  
Please give estimates for the following questions. 
Number of years you have been playing your instrument: _____ 
Number of years of formal musical training: _____ 
Number of years of formal training which includes instruction in improvisation 
(if any): _____ 
The age at which you started playing: _____ 
If you have played professionally, what year did you play your first paid gig? 
_____ 
On average how many gigs do you play per month? _____ 
On average, how much time do you spend playing your instrument per day? 
_____ 
On average, what portion of time spent playing your instrument involves 
improvisation? _____ 
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Appendix 3 
Interview Schedule-reading copy 
Introduction 
Is it ok to record the interview? Do you agree that the video and audio recordings can be used 
for research purposes? (The data will be kept securely and the data anonymized before any 
results are shared of course). 
So, I’m going to play back the video of your improvisation, try to commentate on what you 
did, like a director’s cut commentary on the special features section of a DVD. Try to focus on 
things like, what you were thinking, where ideas came from, when did you have ideas for 
what you played, and so on. 
 If you want to pause playback during your commentary, just press this button [INDICATE 
PAUSE]. L might sometimes pause or rewind playback to ask particular questions if relevant. 
You can stop or take a break at any time 
Starter Questions 
Have you participated in research before? 
How did it feel to improvise while being video recorded in this setting? 
Main Section 
Where did the ideas come from do you think? 
What strategies, if any, did you use to generate ideas? 
When did you take the particular decisions that informed what you played? 
How planned was your improvisation overall? 
To what extent were conscious processes involved? 
How much of what you played do you think you heard in your head? 
How much of what you played came from your ‘idea bank’ and how much represents material 
that you think you haven’t played before? 
Did you modify any ideas in your repertoire for this improvisation? 
Follow up 
What draws you to improvising? Could you say more about why you do it? 
Is there anything else you would like to add about your solo or your experience of the process 
today? 
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Close 
Thank you very much for doing this today, please feel free to contact me via email if you have 
any questions, goodbye. 
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Appendix 4 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Research Project Title  
 
The Effect of Hand Shape Familiarity on Guitarists’ Perceptions of Sonic Congruence: An Altered 
Auditory Feedback Study. 
 
Invitation 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask me if there is anything 
that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish 
to take part.  
 
Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of the project?  
 
The purpose of this project is to investigate how the accuracy of guitarists’ judgement of sonic 
congruence is affected by chord shape familiarity. The project is expected to last ten weeks. 
 
Why have I been chosen?  
 
You have been chosen because you are an expert guitarist. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. Refusal to take part will involve no penalty or loss 
of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this 
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information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form). If you decide to take part you are 
still free to withdraw at any time, without penalty or loss of benefits, and without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
 
Firstly, you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire. You will then be asked to play some chords 
on a MIDI (Music Information Digital Interface) enabled guitar. Each chord will be presented using 
tablature notation on a laptop screen. You will be able to hear the MIDI output through headphones 
which will also screen out any acoustic feedback. On some occasions at random, the MIDI output will 
be altered by changing one of the notes in the chord. You will be asked to indicate as quickly as possible 
via foot pedals, whether you think the heard chord has been altered or not. I will ask a few short 
follow-up questions about your experience. Your responses and reaction times will then be analysed. 
The experiment comprises four blocks of sixty-four trials, each trial lasting a few seconds. The 
experiment is expected to last about 90 minutes in total. You will be asked to complete a rating of 
familiarity on the chord shapes within a few weeks of the experiment by pressing response keys on a 
laptop as each tablature image is presented. This should last between 10 and 20 minutes. 
 
What do I have to do?  
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to commit to participate in a 90-minute experimental 
session and one follow up 10-20 minute rating session (as detailed above) at The Royal Northern 
College of Music.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
 You might find participating in research unfamiliar and this is potentially stressful, however I will do 
my best to put you at your ease during the process and you will be debriefed afterwards. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is hoped that 
this work will add to our knowledge about auditory imagery which could help to improve music 
teaching and practice. 
 
What happens if the study has to be terminated? 
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If the study has to be terminated, then you will be told why this has happened. 
 
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?  
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential. Any information about you that is disseminated will have your name and address 
removed so that you cannot be identified by it. 
 
What happens immediately after data collection? 
 
You will be debriefed soon as the data collection is complete. During the debrief you will have the 
opportunity to ask any questions about the research or raise any concerns you have. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research project?  
 
The results of this research will be published as part of a PhD thesis on improvisation and might also 
be published in journals and presented at conferences. You will be able to get a copy of the thesis 
from me using the contact details below. 
 
Who has reviewed the project?  
 
This project has been reviewed by the RNCM’s Research Ethics Committee (REC) overseen by the 
Research Committee.  
 
Contact for further information  
 
Keith Phillips 
3 Cleveland Road, 
Heaton Mersey, 
Stockport 
SK4 4BS 
Email: keith.phillips@student.rncm.ac.uk 
Mobile: 07984902507 
Michelle Phillips 
Head of Undergraduate Programmes 
Royal Northern College of Music 
124 Oxford Road 
Manchester 
M13 9RD 
 
 
You will be given a copy of this Participant Information Sheet and a signed Participant Consent Form 
to keep. 
Thank you for spending the time to consider taking part in this research project!  
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Appendix 5 
This information will assist in the analysis of the experiment, but you are under no obligation 
to complete this questionnaire. Please feel free to omit any questions if you so wish. Your 
answers will be kept confidential and any data published will be anonymized. 
Name: ________________________   
Age: __________  Sex: Male ☐ Female ☐ Prefer not to disclose ☐ 
Do you have normal hearing? (Y/N):  _____ Do you have absolute (perfect) pitch? (Y/N)____ 
I identify as an improviser (please circle or highlight a number): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
  Strongly 
agree 
 
Please list the instruments you play, the number of years you have formally studied each and 
the number of years you have improvised on each.  
Instrument Years of Formal Study Years of improvising 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
For each of the following age ranges, please give an estimate for the average number of hours 
of guitar playing you did per week, and the average number of these hours that involved 
improvising: 
Age Range Average playing 
hours/week  
of which improvising 
< 11 years   
12-17 years   
18 years +   
 
  
Please give a short description of your experience with improvisation: 
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Appendix 6 
Name: ___________________   Date: 
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Appendix 7 
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This section repeats twice, with only slightly different wording (see Chapter 6 in the main 
text).  
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Appendix 8 
Residual plot for Model 1 (Study 2), showing heteroskedasticity. 
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As above but for Model 2. 
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Appendix 9 
The full stimulus set for Study 2. 
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Appendix 10 
Familiarity Rating for Each Chord, All Participants Study 2/3 
       Stimulus 
Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 1.59 1.38 0.32 1.38 0.32 0.11 -0.10 0.53 -0.53 -0.96 -1.17 1.38 -1.17 -1.38 -0.96 -0.74 
2 0.97 0.64 1.30 0.97 1.14 1.30 1.14 -0.19 -0.19 -0.35 -1.01 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.01 -1.18 
3 1.00 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.52 1.00 1.00 -0.92 -1.08 -0.92 -0.12 -0.92 -1.40 -1.40 -0.92 
4 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.88 0.88 -0.44 -0.44 -0.22 -0.22 -2.20 -2.42 0.22 0.88 
5 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 0.93 1.30 -0.18 -0.56 -0.18 -0.56 -0.93 -0.93 -0.93 -0.93 -1.30 -0.93 
6 -0.74 0.34 0.52 1.42 0.88 -0.56 -0.38 1.96 -0.74 0.34 -0.56 -1.11 -1.11 -1.28 -0.56 1.60 
7 0.42 1.43 0.22 0.01 1.63 0.42 0.82 0.22 -0.59 0.42 1.02 -0.19 -1.40 -1.80 -1.20 -1.40 
8 1.27 1.10 1.27 0.94 -0.52 0.13 -1.00 1.43 1.10 -0.52 -0.19 -0.52 -1.49 -1.49 -0.84 -0.68 
9 1.29 1.29 1.29 0.77 1.29 1.03 0.64 -1.06 -0.41 -0.28 -1.06 -1.06 -1.06 -1.06 -0.54 -1.06 
10 0.78 1.08 0.93 1.08 1.08 0.63 1.08 0.63 -0.87 -1.33 -0.87 -0.58 -1.63 -1.63 -0.27 -0.12 
11 1.01 1.01 0.88 -0.40 1.13 1.13 0.24 1.13 -1.16 -0.14 1.01 -1.16 -1.16 -1.16 -1.16 -1.16 
12 0.74 1.40 0.41 0.57 1.40 1.07 -0.08 1.40 -1.23 -0.57 -0.57 -0.24 -1.56 -1.56 -0.24 -0.90 
13 0.70 1.22 1.22 0.36 -0.16 1.22 -1.03 1.05 -1.03 -1.03 0.88 0.88 -1.55 -0.68 -1.20 -0.86 
14 0.82 0.82 1.53 -1.08 0.82 0.82 0.58 0.82 -0.14 0.10 0.82 -0.61 -2.03 -1.32 -1.08 -0.84 
15 1.26 1.51 1.51 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.02 -0.73 -1.23 0.51 0.76 -1.72 0.02 -1.23 -1.48 0.51 
16 1.30 1.30 1.30 -0.51 0.55 -0.81 -0.06 1.30 -0.36 -0.66 1.00 0.55 -0.96 -1.11 -1.41 -1.41 
17 1.10 1.10 0.97 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 -0.37 -0.23 -0.63 -1.30 -0.63 -1.30 -1.30 -0.63 -1.17 
18 1.23 1.23 1.23 -0.27 1.23 1.23 1.23 0.10 -1.03 -1.03 -1.03 -1.03 -1.03 -0.90 -0.65 -0.53 
19 0.94 0.94 0.94 -0.12 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 -1.80 0.03 0.03 0.03 -1.35 -1.04 -1.80 -0.58 
20 0.27 1.19 1.19 -0.34 1.19 1.19 1.19 0.89 -0.65 -0.81 -0.96 -1.12 -1.27 -1.27 0.41 -1.12 
21 -0.38 1.18 1.70 0.14 -0.55 -1.07 -0.90 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55 -0.90 1.70 1.53 -1.42 0.14 0.49 
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Table of Standardised Hand Shape Familiarity Ratings Study2/Study4. 
 Stimulus                
Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 -0.30 0.81 0.44 -0.30 0.81 -0.30 -1.41 -1.22 -1.96 -1.41 
2 0.59 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.40 -0.92 0.21 -0.35 -0.16 -1.11 -1.48 -1.67 -1.29 
3 1.46 -0.23 1.46 0.89 0.89 0.33 0.33 1.46 -0.99 -0.61 -0.05 -0.42 -1.17 -1.17 -0.80 -1.36 
4 0.43 0.43 0.89 0.43 0.89 0.89 -0.95 -0.03 -1.87 0.43 0.89 -2.33 0.43 -0.03 -0.95 0.43 
5 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 -0.02 -0.02 0.53 0.53 0.53 -0.39 0.53 -2.05 -2.79 -0.02 0.53 
6 -0.58 1.05 0.51 0.51 2.14 0.51 -1.12 1.05 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 0.51 -1.12 -0.03 -0.58 0.51 
7 -0.19 0.97 0.74 0.04 0.97 0.51 0.04 0.97 -0.88 0.51 0.74 0.27 0.51 -1.34 -1.58 -2.27 
8 0.34 -0.43 1.49 1.49 -1.20 0.72 -0.82 1.49 -0.43 -0.82 -0.82 1.49 -0.82 -0.43 -0.43 -0.82 
9 1.49 1.49 1.49 0.64 1.49 0.50 -0.48 -0.48 -0.91 -0.76 -1.05 -0.34 -0.62 -0.91 -0.62 -0.91 
10 1.10 0.93 0.77 1.10 1.10 0.43 0.77 0.60 -1.39 -1.05 -0.72 -0.39 -1.72 -1.39 -0.39 0.27 
11 0.91 1.21 1.50 -0.84 0.91 0.62 0.04 1.21 -0.55 -0.55 0.04 0.33 -0.84 -1.72 -1.42 -0.84 
15 0.17 1.35 1.35 -1.00 0.95 -0.61 -0.22 1.35 -0.61 -0.22 0.95 -2.18 -1.00 -0.22 0.17 -0.22 
16 0.33 0.63 1.23 -0.26 1.23 0.33 -0.26 1.23 -1.75 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.04 -0.26 -2.04 -1.45 
17 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 -0.16 -1.85 -0.16 0.69 0.69 0.26 -0.58 -1.85 -1.85 
18 0.71 0.71 0.71 -1.15 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 -1.52 0.71 0.71 0.34 -1.40 0.34 -1.52 -1.52 
19 1.16 1.16 1.16 -0.97 0.52 -0.12 0.73 1.16 -0.12 -0.55 0.09 -0.12 -1.40 -1.40 -1.83 0.52 
20 0.97 0.97 0.97 -0.15 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 -0.38 -1.05 -1.50 -1.05 -1.72 -0.83 0.29 -0.38 
21 -0.57 1.44 1.44 0.34 -0.02 -1.49 -0.02 -0.76 0.34 -0.39 1.44 0.89 -0.21 -1.85 -0.94 0.34 
Participants 12, 13, 14 from Studies 2 and 3 did not take part in Study 4 
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Appendix 11 
Distributions of Answers by Group, Questions 2, 3, Study 5. 
Qu2 Students 
 
Qu3 Students 
 
Musicians 
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Educators 
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Appendix 12 
Transcribed interviews Study 1. 
Participant 1 
KRP: Ok, so basically, as I described I'm gonna be asking you to..to sort of do a commentary and just 
comment on the ideas as you're.... 
01: Yeah 
KRP: er listening to the playback and watching the playback of yourself 
01: Will it just be a case of er watching it once through and documenting it as I remember? Or will it 
be watching it a few times? 
KRP: Yeah, but,  do feel you can...you can watch it through a number of times, you can also erm press 
pause... 
01: Yeah 
KRP: ..at any time, if you feel like something's happening there that takes longer to describe than  
01: Yeah 
KRP: the event itself, so you need to pause it to describe it, that's fine. 
01:Yeah 
KRP: er You can stop and take a break any time you like as well obviously... 
01: Ok 
KRP: ..and just stop.. 
01: [Laughs] 
KRP: ..any time you like... That's the ethical side...Yeah... 
01: I just don't wanna hear myself... 
KRP: I just don't have to take this anymore... [paraphrasing film quote].. so erm...ok..have you...have 
you actually done research before, have you actually ever participated er in a kind of, er have you been 
a participant in research before? 
01: Not in..not in terms of practical research 
KRP: No? 
01: it being a reflection on what I'm doing. 
KRP: Right. So you don't..you might have done a questionnaires or, something 
01: Yeah that's true 
KRP: but but not this kind  
01: No... certainly not this kind.. 
KRP: and and how did it..feel to improvise under that..kind of different scrutiny, because you are a 
performer obviously, but it might feel a bit different...I dunno? 
01: I s'pose it was slightly different, in the sense that ..y..like it made me think of almost.. y'know... the 
nomenclature behind what was actually going on as opposed to ah that's the...that's the effect...that I 
want...it's kind of like, ok this is the scale I'm gonna do.....occasionally 
KRP: So are you saying that you..you felt it might...it.. 
01: It wasn't that different... 
KRP:..you might have had more explicit thoughts at the time you were doing it? Or...are you saying? 
01: Possibly, yeah 
KRP: Interesting...OK...well let's let's start off, if you 
01: I mean...I'll [inaudible (I)] shall I press play from there? 
KRP: Yeah you you can have control of it, you just play..[audio from playback (AP)]...thIis is you 
warming up I think..and then I paused it 
01: Ah it's erm... I think it's going to stop in a sec.....ok this is tho one isn't it? 
KRP: Yeah 
AP 
KRP: Nice development of the melody there... 
01: I think that's [I] Coltrane version...trombone and sax harmony... 
KRP: Yeah 
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01: Sounds empty without it 
KRP: Mmm.. 
01: So...[/A] you...you know how Coltrane starts his solo kind of based off the...I think it's some kind 
of quartal idea 
KRP: Yeah 
01: ..that revolves around the 4 and the 9... 
KRP: Yeah 
01: So my initial thought was to..like g-go there... start on the 9th umm.. 
KRP: Mmm 
01: ...but it ends up with...as quartals..[A] .in [I]...just general bluesy style...major..[/A].and then.. a sort 
of.. turnaround using the natural...seven 
KRP: Uh hmm... 
01: Erm... a II V I basically.. 
KRP: Uh huh 
01; [Hums] Erm...[A] yeah double stops...[/A]...yeah erm..that's sixths isn't it.. 
KRP: Yeah 
01: Yeah sixths, erm.. and using melodic minor I think...yeah..[demos on guitar]...yeah that's 
right..[A]..er arpeggios...ah ok...[/A] using the flat 5...like a little motif thing...and then ending up on 
the natural 5 [do be do uh..do be do uh] [A] [I].. yeah minor 9...[/A] Bb whole tone? 
KRP: That was an interesting one, yeah.. 
01: Yeah, Bb whole tone...I think on the...in place of the lydian dominant... 
KRP: Ok 
01: 'Cos I guess you got the sharp 4 in there haven't you and the..[demos on guitar DG]..yeah and the 
dominant 7 [A] [/A]....I think I aimed to do more of that but it just didn't come out actually...but I 
guess..B- like Blue Trane has quite a bit of scope for that [A] 
KRP: Mmm 
01: yeah...the same...[/A] yeah like Stanley Turrentine maybe [A] [hums] er I'll just go back [I] 
KRP: Yeah sure 
01: [/A] Altered isn't it? Erm...from Bb minor to...Bb altered..to prepare the 4th [demos on guitar]...yeah 
[A] [/A] [hums] Natural 7 again..[DG] er...I think it...I think it's dominant preparation on the... on A7. 
KRP: I was just..if you just go back like 2 seconds or something it sounds like you're gonna go into a 
erm a more lydian dominanty.. 
01: Yeah [A] 
KRP...thing. 
01: Ah yeah [/A] 
KRP: That's off the arpeggio on the top isn't it? 
01: Yeah 
KRP: Yeah? [DG] 
01: Yeah 
KRP: Yeah 
01: yeah that's the lydian dominant....yeah as I say I kind of probably intended for more of that to come 
out but, you know how it is,  it just didn't go that way erm [A] 
KRP: Oh, I do! 
01: Laughs yeah [/A]...and that's a...that's just an augmented shape isn't it? 
KRP: Yeah 
01: Going down in whole tones.. 
KRP: Yup 
01: Onto the...and then landing on the 9 of the Eb. 
KRP: Uh hum [A]....do you think you were aiming for the 9? 
01: Yeah..[/A]..Yeah I think so..just because [DG] not feeling confident enough to move it on to the 
second string... and being content to just land... land on the...stay on the first string for that whole phrase 
I guess.. 
KRP: Uh hum 
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01; Yeah...I think that was intentional...[DG] .there were several things in here that weren't intentional 
[A]. This is probably where I finish [I] Ah ok...a bit of like, call and response...[/A] That's probably the 
first time I started listening to the piano. 
KRP: Right, yeah yeah...interacting with the backing. 
01: Yeah...I guess that's the difference isn't it, like, playing with a backing track you tend not to really 
be that concerned? 
KRP: Yes, I suppose you don't... 
01: I suppose I should be more.. 
KRP: ...see it, well quite rightly, it's not an agent, 
01: Yeah 
KRP: it's not something with whom you're reacting 
01: it's almost providing a timing [I] 
KRP: and who can react to what you play, so you probably don't..erm feel it's something to interact 
with, so you don't use that part of the improvising so.. 
01: Which is a shame because there's actually..there is enough in there to..to go off...and that, for me, 
was probably the most enjoyable bit of of the, like, the choruses with, interacting with.. 
KRP: Mmm 
01: with like the theme that the piano's laying down and then responding to it 
KRP: Yeah 
01: For, I don't know how many bars, it was only about 4 bars I guess. Yes it's an interesting point, I 
don't play much with backing tracks...erm so I guess that in itself effects how you.. how you play in 
these conditions. 
KRP: Yup, yeah, I think it does, I think there's there's a challenge to ecological validity in that as you...as 
they call it but.. on the other hand.it controls for other factors I guess.. 
01: Yeah 
KRP: because everybody gets the same...so.. 
01: Exactly... 
KRP: So it's a trade-off, it's always a trade-off 
01: It's er...oh er like in science when you have fixed conditions? Erm er ah...thinking back to 6th form 
days... 
KRP: Oh right... 
01: conducting experiments and you've got to keep...oh, controlled variables! 
KRP: Yeah yeah 
01: [A] Er...[I]...[/A] er Whole tone again... 
KRP: uh hmm 
01: .. based on what the piano was doing I think 
KRP: You've got quite a lot out of the whole tone in this, haven't you I think? 
01: yeah probably, that's probably the [cough] like [cough] 
KRP: 'Cos as you say, it's lydian dominant/whole tone it's quite, y'know, there's a lot of overlap isn't 
there? 
01: yeah 
KRP: And and that's imp.. sort of spelled out, particularly on the 4 chord... 
01: Yeah 
KRP: ..in the accompaniment isn't it? You've.. 
01: Yeah 
KRP: ..got quite a lot of that #11...9/#11y  
01: Yeah... 
KRP: ..harmony in the ah.. 
01: ...definitely. In the original! 
KRP: Yes 
01: It's there...and then the colour [DG] of just it being like a #9 harmony on the 4...I mean on the 5 
sorry. [A] 
KRP: Um 
01: [I] some octaves....whole-half diminished [/A] 
KRP: Uh huh  
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01: [DG]  Yeah, whole-half diminished...[DG]  [A] on the dominant.. 
KRP: Uh hum 
01: Oh and that's the end of it yeah, but I think there was something else taking off....[/A] yeah, which 
was like... arpeggios...ascending up...up the scale in terms of starting on the ascending scale.. 
KRP: Which scale? 
01: F....dorian...yeah dorian [DG] 
KRP: Yeah? That's interesting... 
01: ... and then it kind of... 
KRP: And you're in the... 
01: [A] died... 
KRP: I did look over at you...but you were...[mimes focus] 
01: laughs yeah I caught the erm...tsk tsk [mimes cymbal] ... 
KRP: Yeah... 
01: ...and thought 'oh oh, I should have paid more attention to that!' but yeah thanks for the head's up.. 
KRP: Yeah, erm that, that was great, so so can I ask you just a few other, like, questions around that? 
So.. 
01: Yeah 
KRP: So, erm, if  I asked a general question where did ideas come from do you think? What would you 
say? 
01: Er... several places I suppose...one, like not recently having listened to it, but in the past being 
familiar with the 'Trane...so...knowing some of Coltrane's solo... 
KRP: Yeah, 'cos you said a couple of things, you said that the harmony you put into the head was in the 
original... 
01: Yeah...exactly.. 
KRP: and the Coltrane  
01: Yeah 
KRP: ...solo starts off in quite the way.. ...in a similar way to the way you do 
01: Yeah on the on the 9th...and then...I suppose it's kind of...that's prevalent in like all the jazz we're 
making... in that it comes from somewhere else, it's like...erm... the recycling of ideas...and reforming... 
KRP: There's a sense in which, I mean there's a danger here perhaps that...that when...you report 
verbally what you did, there might be an inherent bias in terms of you report what is more easily verbally 
reportable... 
01: yeah...exactly... 
KRP: It doesn't necessarily sa...y'know mean that you didn't have other things that are perhaps harder 
to articulate, I mean would you say that? 
01: Yeah 
KRP: I mean, what...'cos if I say "strategies" that sort've...y'know...'cos I've got a question here "what 
strategies if any did you use to generate ideas?", but then again. that a...in a sense a loaded question, 
'cos it's... 
01: Yeah 
KRP: ...like saying, you were strategic...but maybe you were intuitive? Maybe you... 
01: yeah, I'd say... It's intuitively strategic, in the sense that, you're trying to make...you're attempting 
to kind of make use of the the colour changes... 
KRP: Mmm 
01: So basically I...I guess, in a blues you're kind of guided by the voice leading and the changes of 
colour available.. 
KRP: Yes. 
01: ..in it. So it's not necessarily like..I don't think I was very kind of motivic... but rather sort of [pause] 
not ...that is to say, not trying to write a motif that I can carry on through a chorus for example. Which 
would have worked fine..I guess erm but rather to create motifs, almost kinda independently, based on 
the kind of the colour qualities of the harmonies. erm 
KRP: That makes sense. 
01:The...another source of ideas was the listening... 
KRP: um 
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01: Which is a.. which is a big thing...for exa...and as we were discussing earlier like, if there'd been 
musicians in the room the visual connection with them would probably lead you on to more ideas. 
KRP: Yes. 
01: Er, in relation to what they were doing..or otherwise...just inspired by what they're doing. 
KRP: Yeah, uh when we do it usually, unless we're doing it on our own, in which case there wouldn't 
be a backing, there is...the interaction is a..is a real kind of important part of it, I would say. 
01: Hugely, yeah I find that a lot within my band with the drummer, he's really er inventive. 
KRP: Did you have any idea about when you were taking decisions relative to when you played them? 
01: Er, what d'you mean? 
KRP: I suppose, erm decisions that informed what you played, so... 
01: Yeah.. 
KRP: ...so you in retrospect you've said "oh I've...I did that because, or I did this and I ended up on 
there, but looking back at it do you have any sense of in terms of the timing, in terms of the timeline of 
think of something - play something, or play something - think of something, or..simultaneous, do you 
think it was prior to? A lot prior to? Simultaneous?  
01: Er 
KRP: After the fact? 
01: I'd say it's largely...it's interesting..thinking about it, but largely immediately prior to. 
KRP: Right. 
01: Erm..and sometimes while you're playing something you do the next idea occurs out of it so that is 
present with the idea 
KRP Hmm 
01: Erm I think the very fact that you have to come up with ideas, kind of keep..carries that on in a sort 
of chain reaction. 
KRP: Ah, so so you're kind of responding to what you have done.. 
01: Yeah 
KRP: an idea you have had or you have articulated and that spurs... 
01: yeah the danger of that being if you're not happy with your previous idea.. 
KRP: True! 
01: ..it's very..or not being able to spur an idea 
KRP: Well, would you say then that you might deploy a different strategy if that arises? I mean, or.. 
01: yeah.. 
KRP: How planned overall do you think your solo was? 
01: Er not not very planned at all.. 
KRP: and.. 
01: Although saying that we have like, y'know long term preparations... like continual day to day 
preparations which is almost a tactile familiarity that we have with the instrument.. 
KRP: Yeah 
01: Almost like the key you're in prepares what, can prepare to an extent what's gonna come out.. 
KRP: Yeah 
01: Which is the interesting factor behind this one, because say it was in F 
KRP: Umm? 
01: Then, like the number of times we've played Billie's Bounce and stuff, and all those bebop tunes.. 
KRP: Yeah 
01: ..would have just led to a load of, I don't know, like name dropping...lick dropping and stuff.. 
KRP: Yeah, because it's very very familiar and.. 
01: Yeah 
KRP: ..say under the fingers? 
01: Exactly 
KRP: Erm so that leads I suppose neatly to to what extent you think conscious processes are 
involved...in...in this? 
01: Er...I ...I guess it's all consciously processed, isn't it in the extent that we're very conscientious with 
trying to formulate ideas? 
KRP: Are you? ...did did you find...that... 
01: Although we're not massively conscientious of it are we... 
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KRP: I suppose it's a hard question because it depends what it means, it depends ...'cos I think to some 
extent, you might think that, some of the processes have to be below conscious awareness.. 
01: Yeah.. 
KRP: but when they culminate in an idea that you articulate, some of the automated things have been 
kind of, taken care of? 
01: Yeah 
KRP: Y'know, in the extreme example, you wouldn't be thinking consciously, well I need to move my 
second finger to there, and then I.. 
01: Yeah, true, true 
KRP: I suppose I'm thinking of it in terms of...on the level of description of ideas...'cos I'm thinking 
about idea generation...obviously the thing behind it was, what I'm getting to as well is how much you 
think you, how much of what you played do you think you heard in your head? 
01: yeah, ah yeah I know what you mean... 
KRP: Which is like the theme, you know... whereas 
01: In terms of what you mentioned about the technical...conscious of the technical nature of it all? 
KRP: Mmm 
01: And there being that idea of like er, conscious of inconstance consciousness of constance and 
unconsciousness of inconstance...and consciousness of constance..and there's like four.. 
KRP: oh, that sounds like a Johari Window or something.. 
01: He he yeah... 
KRP: Doesn't it? Yes it's like Donald Rumsfeld... 
01: Ah, I dunno... 
KRP: The known knowns. The known unknowns, the unknown unknowns... 
01: Yeah exactly 
KRP: so on... 
01: I think that's what it comes out of there was an interesting seminar in college about that.. 
KRP: Ah right 
01: but it is it is that kind of thing of we play so much on our instrument that we're no longer thinking 
about the technical boundaries, most of the time.. 
KRP: Mm 
01: Apart from when that hinders what we're hearing in our heads I guess. [I] 
KRP: Yeh, so in..in terms of that, I mean playing there, did you did you feel.. that happened at all? 
01: No, and that's probably largely tempo related, like erm so if I was playing like Cherokee at 
breakneck speed, I'd probably be hearing things and it not being able to come out. 
KRP: Right 
01: Because of not being technically correct 
KRP: Yeh 
01: It not being practical for me at the moment and things erm 
KRP: So how much of what you played then do you think you heard in your head? 
01: Erm I had more time to hear things in my head'n although sayin'... that's a bit of a conundrum...I'd 
say most of it... 
KRP: Yeah? And how much would you say, kind of came from an idea bank? I mean you mentioned 
that idea 
01: Yeah 
KRP:... before if it were something like a blues in F, Billies Bounce something like that, then you might 
have had more of an idea bank that's specific to that, but of course we can have..which are more like 
quotations or adaptions of actual phrases, but I guess we can have idea banks...of our own repertoire of 
phrases and vocabulary.. 
01: That I was about to say...I guess..like, an amount, a certain proportion of what we hear in our head 
is or comes out of that- our idea bank, in itself. So so I.. I'd say there's quite a bit of crossover, it kind 
of being like a.. like a venn diagram approach to it 
KRP: Mmm 
01: Er..I dunno whether it was..hearing the idea first and then it coming out, or the the  idea being there, 
hearing it, and then it coming out.  
KRP: Exactly! 
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01:But  I think it's.. I think it's one of the two for most of that I reckon. 
KRP: Right... that's I.. that's interesting...yeah... 'course we're not ourselves necessarily the reliable 
judge of that. 
01: No, exactly... 
KRP:  ..all the time, which is what I'm trying to get at I guess... 
01: Yeah, it's hard to be impartial actually... 
KRP: Impossible, probably.. 
01: Yeah 
KRP: Erm...were you conscious of modifying any of the ideas that you have in your idea bank for this 
solo, d'you think? 
01: In terms of specific examples? 
KRP: Yeah..I mean, did you...d'you remember doing that, or.. or d'you think... 
01: Yeah, probably the lydian dominant ones.. 
KRP: Yeah 
01: like, ah I'm trying to think...erm...I tend to find with scales like that that aren't your typical 
major/minor er.. sort of harmonies..if you do something that is based on a scale, like an altered scale, at 
this stage, for me they come from like the idea bank, so I reckon that I was pretty consciously drawing 
from those ideas and modifying them according to how long I had to play.. like in terms of bars... 
KRP: Yeh 
01: .. and just actual kind of seconds worth, to fit them in  
KRP: Yeah, so that's almost like... online tweaking to fit 
01: Yeah 
KRP: .. what what was...errr.. the context? 
01: Yeah.. 
KRP: Yeah? Erm... 
01: Like I guess like the shifting er augmented er triad  
KRP: Yeah 
01: ..is probably an idea that I I've thought about before but you you rarely get the opportunity to kind've 
multiply it like, four. five times. 
KRP: Mmm... yeah I s'pose.. 
01: in sequence, so.. 
KRP: That's one of...that was an interesting example and that's one of the reasons I I was sort of asking 
about whether you aimed to land on the 9th 
01: Yeah... 
KRP: 'cos in order...and  that relates to the timing whether conscious or otherwise, that if you had in 
your head, you knew where the endpoint was because you can anticipate the harmony, you know when 
you wanna end on the 9th, and there's no other ways I guess, in terms of how it seems to you in your 
head that you can aim for that, you can aim for the sound maybe, 
01: Mmm 
KRP: if you had a sound image of the 9..or you can just know..that that's a nice place to end.. 
01: To end it.. 
KRP: and not...not necessarily need to..you would in some sense need that implicit knowledge at least 
of how long you've got so how many iterations of that you can fit in 
01: Yeah and where that's gonna..  you're gonna have to land 
KRP: so that you have to land on there when the chord change comes.. 
01: Yeah 
KRP: .. which is probably all handled subconsciously, but I don't know, you might think differently? I 
mean I.. 
01: I'm not sure if it is handled subconsciously, that kind of thing 
KRP: Right, yeah? 
01: I think there's as you say there's like the technical boundary 
KRP: Yeah, 
01: of you've got to end it in this position here in terms of frets or like keys on the piano 
KRP: yeah 
01: or... I dunno fingerings on the saxophone or something 
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KRP: yeah, I don't I don't know  
01: I I'm not sure about that but...but I think there are probably like there's probably two or three notes 
that I would've been content with landing on.. 
KRP: Yeah 
01: ...in that specific example 
KRP: interesting..erm...so  I've just go er a couple of questions to sort of draw it to a close, erm, so the 
first thing is is what draws you to improvising would you say, could you say more about why you do 
it?  
01: Er..like .. 
KRP: Assuming you are drawn to it and you don't just hate every minute! 
01: I guess I started out improvising so I kind of... I don't really feel like... I feel... y'know I I would 
improvise before I would read music kind of when I was growing up as a kid, so for me it just feels...like 
a more natural thing to do than to read off the page anyway..so and then you've got to train your 
improvisation, that's something I'm kind of like really fascinated by.. 
KRP: Mmm 
01: and in the long run it's like one of the things I'm most looking forward to...it's like er I was talking 
to Jason Rebello when he came and did a masterclass here... 
KRP: Oh, right! 
01: it was brilliant...and he was saying that all of his practice is oriented around  erm there being no sort 
of translation in between thinking of the idea and it happening. 
KRP: Right yeah 
01: and, and like trusting that your ideas your ideas are appropriate to that musical moment and stuff 
and so I think one of the things that draws me to improvisation is like eventually hopefully reaching 
that stage. 
KRP: Ah.. 
01 And, I dokind of  find it more rewarding in terms of like the freedom of it..within within reasonable 
restrictions, than say, playing repertoire that's already been written. 
KRP Ok, so it's like freedom within constraint. 
01: Yeah, like if there were no constraints I wouldn't find it very appealing at all. 
KRP: Right, so you're not necessarily heading for the free improvising cercuit? 
01: no..exactly yeah.....yeah it's erm 
KRP: And then finally is there anything else you'd like to add about your solo or your experience of the 
process today? 
01: [laughs] I wouldn't mind doing another take or two but... 
KRP: Ever the perfectionist... 
01: but erm we probably would have been here all day! 
KRP: Well, yeah so... 
01: No it was a really good that was a really good experience actually... 
KRP: Good! 
01: I I say that as if I'm surprised but...erm yeah it's not something you get to do every day and kind 
of... it's good to think twice about everything 
KRP: Yeah, well er thank you very much for doing this today and and y'know please feel free to contact 
me via the email if you have any other questions and then when anything comes out of it I'll let you 
have copies of.. 
01: yeah I look forward to reading about it and everything yeah, exciting! 
KRP: Great! 
01: Thanks Keith! 
KRP: Alright. 
 
 
 
Participant 2 
KRP: Ok, so have you participated in research before? 
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02: Er... Yes, once once before, er what was it? It was oh it was a long time ago er.... it was someone 
from the psychology department back at Edinburgh University. 
KRP: Mmm 
02: Er... analysing...er.. eye tracking movement I think...and how...yeah Something like that, it was... 
KRP: So, eye trackers, was it was it to do with sight reading? Or something else? 
02: Yeah there were all sorts of things actually, er yeah just sort of clicking on the screen y'know, when 
you saw whatever it was that came up and that kind of thing and, all sorts of...yeah but that's I think 
that's about it.... 
KRP: Mmm  
02:  Yeah...that I can think of right now 
KRP: So, how did it feel to improvise while being video recorded in this setting in terms of research 
setting, rather than say, performance or rehearsal?  
02: Ah, it didn't feel... it didn't feel too much different, I think I felt sort of more relaxed because there 
wasn't a premiss, it was just sort of do...do what you do 'n y'know don't sort of think about it just do it, 
whereas perhaps a rehearsal it's sort of focussed on "I need to achieve this" or...I mean there's still 
something that we're achieving, recording y'know, me improvising, but I think...yeah, it was just a lot 
more relaxed. 
KRP: Yeah, no that's great, well...have a... let's shall we start playing it back, you.. 
02: Yep sure, 
KRP: As I say, you can just.. pause or rewind anytime. 
02: Uh huh. [AP] Hmm maybe have a little look back at that...[/AP] [RW]  
KRP: Sure  
02: [AP] So I think the first left hand voicing that I used...that was just because..it was the same voicing 
from the head, I think...I just thought "that's a good place to start".. I'm sorry I took it back a bit far... 
Yeah, [/AP] I think I just wanted.... I've started, y'know? This is... this is me, in now... I think that's 
what I... yeah. 
KRP: So a strong opening statement.. 
02: Yeah I think just 'cos it's such a strong head I think if it was something a bit more moody a bit 
more... y'know perhaps a sort of ballad or something that's, y'know perhaps you'd come in...creep in a 
bit more gradually, but I just thought mmm...in...'cos it's sort of that...you got that sharp 9 thing going 
on in the head... 
KRP: Yeah... 
02: ...and I just thought... yeah, I think that's, well that's why, I don't know if I thought, like, I'm going 
to do that, but that's why looking back at it, that's why I did it. 
KRP: And what aboout the initial melodic line, the right hand? What do you think about that? 
[Note, at from this point repetitions and dysfluencies are not transcribed unless they are likely to affect 
meaning] 
02: Sort of hit the 6th...yeah I just thought 'cos that's gonna really grind for a second...and I yeah, so I 
used those first four bars to create a bit of tension and then.. I think, sort of a resolve on to the Ab almost 
to get that sort of dissonance initially of the 6th and the sharp 9, I think ah well I've got a sort of 13th 
isn't it? I've got a 13th on the left hand as well, so I think that's initially there that's what's happening 
and then sort of a resolve back to the ah Ab...[AP]...[/AP] and that...that 4ths thing...'babadah boom bah' 
[intoned] is something that it's just come into my playing recently, I'm not sure, it's something that's... I 
just really enjoy the sound of sort of jumping around in 4ths, I think I did it a bit later on as well, anyway 
we'll listen to it...[AP] there babadah bah and then...so that.. heh [/AP] that's a little lick that I stole from 
a trombone player that I used to play in a '20's band with, he played it once on a gig and I stopped him 
after the tune, I said "What was that? Play that again!" [laughs] And then, yeah, it's just... I don't play it 
a lot, it just sort of happened to come out there, works quite well in a blues thing. [AP] Just kind of 
walking 6ths with a kind of chromatic kind of passing... You know what I think there, I actually lost the 
thread a little bit, so [RW] so this is sort of a bit of a line going through here, that's that done, and then 
here, just sort of lose it.. what am I doing what am I doing? And then I sort of find it I think, just that 
sort of meandering about slightly. Oh I just played a little..[/AP] accidentally played a quote from a tune 
I'm learning at the moment, d'yknow 'In Walked Bud' by Thelonius Monk'? 
KRP: I'm not that familiar with it, I've heard it I think...but 
02: baduhbadah bah baduh bum [intoned] Sort of played [AP] 
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KRP: Oh yeah. 
02: So there you go that's maybe where that came from! 
KRP: Do you think, at the time [/AP] at hte time you played that you weren't thinking of it as a quote, 
you've only... 
02: I had no idea I'd played it, until now... 
KRP: right, interesting... 
02: yeah, I had no idea I played that...erm yeah, so that last chorus, actually let's [AP] so the chorus 
where I was meandering, slightly just trying to find something to latch onto...I think this chorus I was 
just playing and there wasn't really much of a purpose, there's not like much of a...just kind of, er notes... 
yeah, I felt, I felt I remember that distinctly 'cos I thought I've just played far too much in the second 
half of that chorus. 
KRP: So, in terms of meandering, when you're feeling, or you feel, that there wasn't much purpose, how 
do you think you generate the content when that's happenening? 
02: For me it's just taking some, just stopping playing, I just gotta stop playing...heh 'cos if you keep 
playing I think it's hard 'cos you're... you need to get.. just take a moment to get a perspective on what's 
happeneng, take a breath and then come back, and I think... 
KRP: So that's how to regain direction or focus or purpose is what you were saying? 
02: yeah, or just sort of find something new, just try to think of something new, that.. 
KRP: Yeah? 
02: Yeah, that you can develop, 'cos I definitely just just play... I was just sort of playing around the 
yeah just sort of arpeggiating the chords, and not actually creating a melody, I mean y'know for an effect 
you can... obviously arpeggiating chords is... is great but, I was try'na here I'm trying to create a melodic 
line... 
KRP: Ok 
02: ..and I just [AP] [I] yeah so that chorus there, I just thought.... and then... then [/AP] I've brought in 
a new rhythmic idea, here which is baduh gah dah [intoned] yeah, and it's just by giving it some space, 
I dunno, I'm able to create something that's that I can, that's I dunno, that I can communicate better. 
[AP] [/AP] So sort of same issue in that chorus, I'd say I had a momentary bit- the beginning, [AP] so 
this is still meandering...here [/AP] [AP] this is the end of the first meandering chorus... and then, anidea 
here... which I liked, then I just started playing...it sort of loses the melodic flow here... and I think I 
just played a sort of a turnaround [/AP], almost like a learnt.. a learnet sort of.. thing y'know, just like 
something to play over a turnaround but not necessarily..it's just  kind of... perhaps more of a muscle 
memory thing? That came out there, because I thought, great, this chorus has gone down the pan a little 
bit... let's stick something in that I know will spice it up [laughs] yeah I think that's that's what happened 
there and then at the end of this chorus I thought " I've played too much, I'm gonna take it right down... 
and yeah.. [AP] lot's of space... that's a bit of Thelonius Monk coming out there, I've been listening to 
a lot of him lately! [laughs] 
KRP: Yeah got a dissertation haven't you so... 
02: This is the head here we go...yeah 
KRP: So, I can definitely here the Monk influence in this in that last one. 
02: Yeah...yeah but I think that's... yeah so that's the way I sort of approach it, if I feel like I've.. I'm 
playing too much and I can't make sense of what I'm playing, and it's almost just sort of watching my 
fingers do their thing without y'know it sort of becomes a muscle memory thing at points... at which 
point I think.. "Stop! .. 'cos, y'know... I don't know how many people are enjoying this, but probably 
less than were before"...  maybe not but... I'm certainly not enjoying it as much because I feel like I'm 
just yeah playing without creating anything er co..like,  cohesive? Basically, so it just sort of feels like 
it's just like learnt things, licks and tricks, just playing those, so my approach is to stop. 
KRP: So when.. so you're when you become conscious of overuse of muscle memory in your terms, 
that kind of generates an interrupt? 
02: Uh hum 
KRP: So it's like you take stock or you take strategies to... 
02: Yeah, sometimes it's really, I mean in this... 
KRP: ...change direction 
02: in this context it's so relaxed, y'know, I'm not nervous or anything I'm just playing that, it's very 
easy to do, and it will just be sort of four bars, y'know like that turnaround at the end... I think that's... 
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that was too much y'know there wasn't much going on there, and I was able to stop, and yeah bring it 
right back down to a single melodic line and take out, y'know take all the texture out and start.. start 
with something smaller basically, whereas if I'm onstage and feeling a bit nervous... er I'll find that I 
just carry on, perhaps playing, sort of learnt licks and tricks for longer, because it takes me in..., I'm sort 
of  "oh I need to keep playing, , y'know I'm, I need to impress, or need to do this or whatever..."  but 
and you s.. yeah, the sort of nerves get the better of you I think. 
KRP: That's what I was thinking before about the.. how does, how do we generate content when we're.. 
it's almost like the inspirational equivalent of treading water or something like that, how do, y'know 
how do you stay afloat whilst in those kinda gaps in inspiration or thought process? 
02: Yeah. 
KRP: Interesting and I think what you've described a little bit is muscle memory and er leaned kind of 
ways round progressions so when you said the the sort of turnaround, when you had a sort of way round 
that you perhaps felt you could rely on/ 
02: Yeah.. 
KRP: Erm, so any any more ideas about strategies you used to generate ideas, that came/cropped up 
there? 
02: Erm..I think I'm quite a rythmic player at points, y'know, I've talked about melody loads and loads 
but...yeah I do like to play with... yeah just sort of create rhythmic ideas that aren't necessarily melodic 
in their content...I'll maybe just have a quick listen back and see if I can find a couple [AP] sort of 
playing with rhythmic accents, y'know and sort of stretching the time or augmenting it or... This is very 
much sort of, straight...sort of there...that's sort of slightly, it's not particularly adventurous but...  
KRP: I detected precessing slightly... it's sort of moving relative to the  
02: Yeah...S o there.. that kind of thing [/AP] I really do try and just, y'know when I play something I 
really like and I think "that's great" however simple it is, I'll then try and develop it, erm yeah, sometimes 
try and take it, y'know I'll try and take it as far as I can, or sometimes..or, well that's not true actually, 
sometimes I'll take it further than others is what I mean...so here, I don't think I take it very far.. [AP] 
sort of new idea there...so yeah [/AP] Yeah, and that sort of pentatonic run down I just, it just sort of...  
feel like it's just kind of lazy! [laughs] 
KRP: [laughs] 
02: Y'know, you're just sort of at that point, because I thought ah.. because I've done so much in that 
turnaround, I need to sort of fill in that gap and keep it moving towards the sort of barline, and so I think 
that..that sort of pentatonic run down was just sort of filler1 [laughs] Rather than...[AP] out of sort of, I 
dunno..[/AP] Yeah, for me the interest I guess is in the left hand there, 'cos it's rhythmic again, rhytmic 
sort of accents there. [AP] [/AP] 
KRP: Erm, how planned overall did you think the improvisation was? 
02: Well I didn't plan any of it [laughs] in advance, I didn't even really think about it... I think the most 
thinking I did was, you said it was going to be Blue Trane, I thought "How does that go?".. bah bah be 
...bah buh... yeah that's the one, and then... that was it... 
KRP: So in the course of actully playing do you think you had like erm, any sketch ideas, in terms of 
how it had gone already informing what you might do next, y'know maybe just on the level of strategy 
or something 'cos I think you've described a little bit about that, about thinking "oh well, I'd played too 
much during that chorus... 
02: Uh hmm. 
KRP: .. this chorus I'm going to empty it out or contrast" ? 
02: Yeah, erm I guess there's y'know there's certain ideas, yeah I mean a lot of that, a lot of it I've played 
before, but just not sort of in that order, there aren't certain points, er, wait in fact.. no that's a lie, I'd say 
the very very end, you know when the head comes back in.. [AP] and I went up to.. that sort of 
this...[mimes] this thing, yeah I think I would've carried on with that sort of thing and that's very much 
a sort of... I mean I didn't predetermine it but, when I start playing a blues, I think " Right, there's that, 
that thing sounds really good if you y'know hit into...build up one chorus, and then hit into the next with 
the.. the little trill on the 5th and 7th. 
KRP: Yeah? 
02: And the flat.. flat 7th yeah... yeah, so that's possibly one thing, erm yeah and what else? Yeah I think 
I did it hitting the flat 3 and the 6, at the  same time.. 
KRP: Uh hmm? 
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02: ...is quite a nice effect, and I think, more ofen than not I'll bring it into a blues, and I think on this 
one, I probably thought yeah, this would be... 'cos I started with that actually...my very first note was 
like the... the sort of 13th... [laughs].. with the flat 3 so, I think immediately I sort of established that 
that could be an idea in the improvisation 
KRP: Mmm, to what extent do you think conscious processes were involved? 
02: I think just in terms of what I mentioned before in terms of the relisation that I'm over-playing, so 
that's the term I was trying to think of before, over-playing, that's er yeah and points, and sort of realising 
that, coming out of your, 'cos it brings you... for me anyway, it brings me out of that sort of in the 
moment state, where you're just kind of, creating and not thinking about it, and then...like when you 
start over-playing and you realise that you start over-playing, it brings you out of that er..yeah, and then 
I sort of become conscious of what I'm doing, and think "Right, how do I, like s...change this? Y'kmow, 
how do I get away from, like the thing I'm not liking and make something I do like? And that's about it. 
Just stopping. [laughs] And just taking a breath really. 
KRP: Mmm, right. Erm, how much of what you played do you think you heard in your head? 
02: Erm I think the rhythmic, all the sort of rhythmic ideas, especially the ones that are more spaced 
out, that definitely all comes, that's all, like I hear all of that and... yeah so I mean like,  I don't do.. I 
was just trying to naturally improvise how I would there, I mean what I'm trying to do, as an exercise, 
is try and practice singing what I'm hearing as I'm playing. 
 
 
 
Participant 3 
 
03: So I'm gonna talk like this and mumble the whole time... [covers mouth] 
KRP: No, don't do that... and do make sure that you.. 
03: Pop! 
KRP: Gotta transcibe that now! 
03: Ha! Ha ha ha ha [drums table] Power! 
KRP: So... 
03: Yeah... shall we just have a listen? [AP] At this point...I'm getting the chords wrong...[/AP]so I think 
it's minor... 
KRP: Ah... 
03: ...and this is from memory...from the... like, from the past.. having done Blue 'Trane before erm in 
my 'ead, it's a minor blues, and now I don't think it's a minor blues... 
KRP: Right, yeah.. 
03: ...having having played it, but at that point I'm playing that E... Eb minor 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: ahh there's a note in the piano.. god.. that isn't quite right, ah well let's try Ab minor for the next 
one... errr! 
KRP: Mmm. I...mm..I think with a sharp 9... 
03: Yeah... 
KRP: ...feel you can...you can work your way into that can't you? That it's not like a straight major blues 
either. 
03: Yes. Yes. Yeahyeahyeahyeahyeah. 
KRP: And the way some arrangements are it can be played... 
03: Either or. 
KRP: Either... 
03: Yeah. Yeah so, at the moment I'm just playing chords behind the head and trying to find the right 
ones! [AP] Ah see, got it! [playback (PB)] I meant to be late there...still haven't worked out what's 
happening on the Ab chord. [PB] My fingering's not great! 
KRP: Dshh! 
KRP: That sounds almost like a quote... 
03: It does doesn't it! [AP] Er... it wasn't...but it sort of was! 
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KRP: Sort of Blue Monk isn't it? 
03: It was Blue..er [hums quote]  
KRP: Yeah. 
03: Is that Blue Monk? 
KRP: Oh no, it's er Straight No Chaser isn't it? 
03: Straight No Chaser! Yeah, so the first... so I noticed it er [AP] so at that [RW] I kind of..played the 
first.. I pl..yeah so at the [hums quote] at that point I was like 'Ahh ohhh... I carried on in the rhythm of, 
but not in..not necessariy the right notes.. 
KRP: Although a similar chromatic contour. 
03: Yeah, yeahyeahyeah. 
KRP: 'Cos I wonder whether you'd been led that way because you started out in a quite chromatic... 
03: Yeah... 
KRP: ...bluesy way... 
03: yes ...yeahyeahyeahyeahyeah. 
KRP: but with chraomaticism and then... it sort of... 
03: Yeah... well I think the first chorus er or whatever, at least the first bit I'm definitely playing like 
I'm playing how I tend to play on blues I think. 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: Which is mostly around like minor pentatonic maybe dorian with chromatic notes in it... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: ...er that kind of [hums example] landing on the major third of the II chord is...that I did a bit earlier... 
is something I think I do a lot... when playing in this. 
KRP: Where do you think it came from? 
03: Dunno...The ether? No, I dunno. Er where did I... as in how I learnt to do that? Or... 
KRP: Yeah, I suppose there's two questions there, one is where.. how did it develop as part of your 
lexicon... 
03: Yep. 
KRP: ... if that's a good way to describe it, and how does it appear as something that's available... what's 
it like for you? 
03: In the moment? 
KRP: In the moment yeah. 
03: Er, I don't know I think it was sort of instinctive then, like it kind of well, so how does it develop....... 
er? I remember, 'cos I was in like a blues band at school, so it's 'blues scale all the way, blues scale all 
the way' and I remember sort of discovering that there were other notes that you could play and I think 
that one was a particularly strong one. 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: Y'know, er when I was first starting to play in a jazz... or what I thought was a jazz kind of way... 
erm it's just a sweeter note, er so maybe it had a lasting effect on me, I don't know? Have to see how 
many times I do it... ha ha, yeah [AP]. Ok, so at this point... [/AP] so at that point, er... I'm thinkin' 'ah 
I should put some delays on here', er and sort of build up a... a thing that I guess made it sound more 
post-rocky than it did., like, so just stacked delays. 
KRP: Sort of rhythmically... is that in a sense of emulating what a pedal does?... Or is it.. 
03: No, as in, I didn't do it, but I thought...I was like 'oh I can hear some delays', like I could... I was... 
yeah. 
KRP: So I'm wondering whether what you're playing rhythmically, has some relation to... 
03: The delays that aren't there? 
KRP:... the delays that happen with a pedal, which then informs how you play anyway... 
03: Ooh... 
KRP: ...which then informs how you use the pedal? 
03: Ooh yeah 
KRP: It's that kind of, reciprocal redefinition maybe? 
03: Er, am I kind of...so you're asking whether I'm trying to emulate what a pedal might do? 
KRP: Maybe unconsciously, that if you're thinking about delays and then you're playing 'di...di...di...', 
er, something like that, I don't know? 
03: Er, I dunno, was I that rhythmic? I dunno, let's have a listen again. 
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KRP: Hmm, the other thing I thought about that was that the voicing you put in is lifted straight from 
the piano part, isn't it?  
03: It could be... 
KRP: Sounds very very... 
03: ...it's a 7... [AP]... 7th... flat 9..  7th sharp 9 again. [PB] [RW several times]. Just before here... Oh 
yeah...yeah I don't know, because... 'cos what I was hear...what I was hearing... oops, shush. [/AP]. 
What I was hearing wasn't, erm... er... wasn't that. Like it wasn't like, it wasn't that I was hearing the 
delays to be like rhythmic like that... it was... I think I'm playing leaving space for delays maybe? Or 
like 'ah this, this would...this would, and everything and this would develop...like, should I stick that 
on, and it'll be like dub dub dlll dcrrr....whhhchhh'.  
KRP: So it shades more into... 
03: Good luck transcibing that by the way!  
KRP: Ahwr... 
03: [Laughs] 
KRP: Why you...! 
03: [Laughs] 
KRP: Erm, so is is it shading into like a sound, or timbre or... 
03: Yes. Yeahyeahyeahyeahyeahyeah... 
KRP:... that you're hearing? 
03: ...yeahyeahyeahyeahyeah. 
KRP: And what d'you think prevented you fro... from enacting that one? 
03: Dunno, er I just second guessed myself, like... er... 
KRP: By the time you'd thought it had gone? 
03: Yeah? Possibly, b-but also, I dunno because we'd had the conversation on the phone earlier, about 
whether to bring pedals... 
KRP: Um. 
03: ...er, I was just, it was jus...I was just unconscious, it was like 'oh...oh I'm hearin', oh I s'pose I did 
bring 'em, oh but I wasn't gonna bring 'em, oh should I have done it? Or like, am I just imagining that I 
wanna play that because I've brought them? Would I be hearing this if this ped... if this wasn't here? It's 
hardly like I'm hearing a like a choir of saxaphones...' I din't think all of that! But I think there's that 
slight bit of doubt...from... 
KRP: Mmm. I think I might code that as 'overthinking'!  
03: [Laughs]. [AP] Bit of chromaticism...[I]...Ha ha ha... landed on the wrong note!  
KRP: When you say...[/AP] ... the wrong note? 
03: Oh I, I hit em... that phrase... hopefully I sort of recover, but I landed on the Bb [AP] [RW] instead 
of an Ab... before this [RW]... you see that ' derrryadaa'?  
KRP: Yeah. So you're saying that wasn't intentional? 
03: I don't think so. I think...just from the way that I...just from the way that ... I like that bit! 
KRP: Yeah! 
03: Erm, so [/AP] 
KRP: Shall we just play that bit again..? 
03: Well just.. just go back and talk about the other bit first...[I] 
KRP: Yea yeah, ok yeah. 
03: Er [AP] So from the way I play this line.. [I] ... in a minute... it lands on Bb, I've... watching me 
now, I know that I meant the phrase to end there. [RW] Like, cos I... yeah [/AP] 
KRP: So you accent that 'ptsch .. deh'  
03: Yeah and it's slightly pushed ahead of the..sort of one innit? '...deh'. And...like I... I don't remember 
thinkin' at the time, but watching me now, I'm like 'oh'... the way that I'm playin', maybe it's, er I've not 
got a like a phrase in mind or er, I'm gonna play this for this amount of time, but I think maybe there's 
this kind of... er like, a sort of rhythmic resolution thing? 
KRP: Uh hm. 
03: Where erm, like just sort of aiming for ... I know where I'm gonna land... and then where I landed... 
heh heh it's like 'oh it's the 9th, ahhh' Erm, but than actually I quite like where it goes next. 
KRP: Hmm ok... 
256 
 
03: Then I... I sort of...[AP] that sort of like becomes a bit of a... that sliding down there, yeah, some of 
the phrases alright. 
KRP: Nice build of tension there! 
03: Yeahhh! At this point I'm thinking 'Oh I'm playing in octaves, yeah it's the jazz thing and arrgh stop 
it...' 
KRP: [Laughs] 
03: But yeah again that... I wasn't...there were the... there it was just a tension thing, like maybe the first, 
I can't remember where I started, but maybe the first note or two were...were, y'know... were in-key or 
something. [RW] 
KRP: Let's see... 
03: In-key, out [RW] so yeah, so the first note was just the...was the Bb... Oh I started singing here as 
well! 
KRP: Oh yeah. 
03: And then stopped... [AP] So the first it's a Bb and then I move up to the B natural, where you might 
do if you were doing a minor blues, you might, er... the ch... the whole chord might shift up there, be 
like a V then a flat VI back to the V, erm, so I sort of did that, and then I was like 'ah I could keep 
going', and then again it wasn't, ah y'know I don't know the relationship between what I was playing 
and the chords, but I know that I'm aiming for that... Eb... 
KRP: And in terms of the target, how is that... how do you experience that aiming? What's it like? 
03: Er... agai...it's it' a tension thing, so I know that I'm ramping the tension up and at this point it's 
gonna, I'm... it's gonna... resolve... 
KRP: Yeah... ah. 
03: Er that.. that is how I felt...I think. 
KRP: Mmm... 
03: Like it's a 
KRP: And the...yrr... 'cos you said you knew you were aiming for the Eb, would you have thought that 
explicitly, in terms of the note value? Or, was it just a destination you could feel ahead? Or hear ahead? 
03: Uh huh... 
KRP: Or... 
03: I mean, er...so I guess there's a few points in th... in this where I play kind of quite chromatically, er 
and...I guess once I'd... maybe it comes more from placement? So once I'd set off on that ascending 
thing, I was like 'right er..the I chord is coming back round again at the top of the form' Right? So, I 
think I was... it's sort of... a turnaround thing, like I was aim... aiming to kinda, resolve, rhythmically 
and like resolve the tension. Er, yeah I don't know if I'd have known that I was aim... aiming for the Eb 
when I set off, because I wasn't planning on doing that when I set off, d'know what I mean, I was playin' 
the Bb and then 'oh I'll move up, to the B', erm and then, I was like 'oh, just keep goin', and then once I 
was, I don't know, up around a C#, D? I don't know, it was... like it sort of.... and then... and maybe my 
sort of, awereness widened a bit? And it was like 'ok well the one is coming back round, so and I'm 
approaching the one, so there... whereas if I'd... maybe done it from somewhere else... and maybe  [I] 
the third or something or don't know. Although having said that, the third is... either of the thirds seema 
little bit... ambiguous in this, so... 
KRP: 'Cos of the sharp 9? 
03: 'Cos of the sharp 9 thing, so I think probably I... I wasn't really [I] so much. 
KRP: Alright, so..[AP] 
03: Uh, I'm Wes Montgomery! [Laughs] 
KRP: love a bit of Wes! 
03: dunno what I did there. [PB] Again I think I might be late. [PB] [/AP] 
KRP: How do you mean? 
03: Er, I think I had the idea, and then... executed it after I... watching back there, stuff that I'm playing 
immediately before... [AP][RW] This... would be... [/AP], like, I think that's [imitates vocally]  it's 
probably where I had the idea, to... to bring the delays in. Erm, and then maybe because I'd bottled out 
of it earlier, I was like 'ah fuck it, I'm doing it anyway!' For the benefit of the tape [both laugh] that is a 
technical term. [AP] And then so at this point, I'm like 'Yep, happy with that'. [/AP] But that pedal 
there... So I'm I'm pointing to the Danelectro reel echo, that isn't on ma board, er enables me to play... 
to leave the tails going? 
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KRP: ooh yeah. 
03: Er, so actually what I wanted to do then was to turn, turn the delay off, but keep play... er keep the, 
[tut] keep the echo going but continue playing without it... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03:... feeding the echo. Which I can do with that one, which I've been using it a lot recently. 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: Er... [AP] and so what I do instead...  is just turn the... just turn the... the level down a bit and then 
eventually just turn it off there. Totally didn't pluck it...[laughs] 
KRP: No, it's... it's a lot to think about, especially in a, kind of setting like this. 
03: And at this point I'm like 'I give it.. give up with playing the thirds and sevenths, I'm just gonna play 
the higher chords! No, noone's happy with that Anton... Ooh, bit of vibrato is it? [laughs] [/AP] 
KRP: [I] So er, yeah...So... 
03: The red light's not on any more... 
KRP: Oh... 
Technical interruption. 
KRP: So er, I guess we're at the stage where... are there any other thoughts or considerations on that 
solo that you want to bring up or anything you wanna go over? 
03: Erm... no? [laughs] 
KRP: Ok... 
03: No, I dunno, this isn't something I would normally do, as in playing like this. 
KRP: Yep. 
03: Erm, I think I have done a lot of it in the past... 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: ... more than I maybe give myself credit for... 
KRP: Hmm 
03:...but I... I enjoyed that but I don... er.. it's a little alien, so it felt a little alien for me. 
KRP: How... how do you think it kind of differs from what you do usually, what's the main differences 
in terms of... 
03: Erm... so most of the improvising that I do tends to be without chord sequences, so it tends to be 
free in that sense, or starting from an idea or working towards an idea, like y'know a riff, or [I] possibilly 
use this tonality here, but... I think er [I] yes it's, yes I think it's rare that I'd play over chords like 
that...these days. 
KRP: Hmm...I suppose one of the focuses of this is, I mean there are some like, guide questions into 
like, what strategies, if any, did you use to generate ideas? 
03: Er [laughs]... 
KRP: How planned was your improvisation overrall? [reading guide questions] 
03: Erm... how...? 
KRP: Things like that, I suppse you're saying those things differ quite a lot in... in what you normally 
do, fom this? 
03: Well... er... well no I can answer the..planned... how planned was the improvisation overrall, not 
very...er... I could like... oh it's gone off again! 
technical interruption 
03: So, I picked a key or worked, or you told me the key, rather so I...  but I didn't think 'oh I'm gonna 
have like, I'm gonna peak at this point, or I'm gonna... so I didn't plan, structure or...yeah, I guess...no 
it's gone off again... I guess, it wasn't planned. But there are things that I do around blues, like like 
watching back 'oh I often do that, oh I often do that'. Yeah. 
KRP: Mmm. So that relates to that conversation we had before and relates to this question of er 'how 
much of what you played came from your idea bank and how muchrepresents material that you... you 
haven't played before?' 
03: Yeah, ok er.. er, so I surprised myself a couple of times watching back, er... there's like a couple of 
points, like when I landed on the wrong note and then I went into the descending thing, that sort of, to 
me that didn't sound... listening back I was like 'oh...ah...ha, hey who knew?', er... 
KRP: So that was like an opportunity to develop an idea... 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: ...that you might not have thought of... 
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03: Yeah. 
KRP: ... consciously ahead of time if it had been straight from... your internal repertoire? 
03: Yeah, but then also like I'm not, I'm not thinking about my internal repertoire. 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: So, I er, like I do that kind of tension... chromatic-y tension thing... I guess... 
KRP Hmm. 
03: ... but it's not like, kind of before we're playing I was like'I'm gonna do some of that chromatic-y 
tension stuff'. 
KRP: Mmm. 
03: Although maybe subconsciously 'cos it's... I couldn't work out the voicings from the piano..., or 
the... y'know the exact chords, er in terms of extensions and things, then maybe that, sort of, fed into 
that a little bit? And also that, er which pleasingly, I don't think I did as much as I suspected I might 
have done, the targeting the sixth of the mode or tha major third of the II chord. 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: Er, it's something that... maybe a little tic of mine? 
KRP: [I] So, to what extent were conscious processes involved? 
03: Er.. generally... as a negative? So when it stopped me using the delays that first time... 
KRP: Hmm. 
03:...or then, also thinking 'oh I wish I'd had the other delay pedal in'. 
KRP: Mmm. 
03: Like 'how... how can I get out of this?'. So there's a little bit of... I think, what I hear... yeah, so first 
time I was like 'Alright, I can hear delays, that's where it's goin, I want some delays, oh I've bottled it! 
Move on'. And then the second time I was like 'Right, ok I can hear some delays, great I got 'em in, oh 
no I meant the other delays!'. 
KRP: [laughs] 
03: Or like, rather like so then it was then there was a bit of conscious 'er how can I do that?' er, problem 
solving- just turn... turn it down rther than killing it straight away. But it's... yeah... I don't think... I 
dunno if I felt particularly conscious? Of, well y'know, whilst I was playing of like note choices and 
things like that. It's not like I felt that it was... all blowing through me unhindered and it was beautiful 
and it was the, what's his name, Kenny Werner? Effortless Mastery... 
KRP: Oh yeah. 
03 :...thing, it wasn't like it was flowing out of me, er...[laughs] so I'm not making a value judgement 
one way or another! I don't think it was... I don't I don't feel... many conscious processes, but then that... 
could that, on the whole I suppose that's up to you, whether that's just me over-romanticising or not! 
[laughs] 
KRP: And how much of what you played do you think you heard in your head? 
03: Prrr... uh ghuh... don't know, jus' some bits sort of stand out as... definitely... er, the delays or no 
delays that we've talked about... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: ... erm that was a definite kind of, oh er ha ha I can hear that, and then either executin' it, or er not 
executin' it, or executing it badly or whatever. Er, that little Straight No Chaser quote, if that was it, was 
that... [sings tune] yeah, erm... think maybe I heard the... I know, played the start of it and then and then 
kind of heard... heard it as part of a bigger thing... and so went with that. Er... yeah, difficult isn't it? 
KRP: Always! 
03: Ha ha... 
KRP: Erm, ... 
03: You'd have to ask Mike Walker, 'cos he would know how much I heard or not! 
KRP: [laughs] 
03: Or Steve Berry! I had a lesson with 
KRP: Yeah...I might ask him actually... 
03: Steve Steve would be great, 'cos he's here anyway a lot. He, I had a lesson with him once, and he 
was like ' Right, just play me something'. So I improvised something, and he stopped... and he was like 
'you didn't hear that though, did you?' Was like 'Nooo...' [laughs] 
KRP: [laughs] Found you out! 
03: Yeah! 
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KRP: In terms of the timing, erm when do you think you took the particular decisions to play what you 
played relative playing them? 'Cos you mentioned something about thinking of the delay... 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: ... but then it being late when you enacted it. 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: So would that imply that sometimes, there's a think of things ahead? Or are you thinking of things 
as you're doing them mostly, or or not? How would you describe it? 
03: Yeah, no I think, er prrr yeah certainly today I think that the delay's an example of there being a 
delay between the thought and the action, erm but with note choice it's more it... it can be more 
immediate I guess. Erm, yeah I dunno, god this is really making me question everything! It's 'orribe! 
KRP: You did sign a waiver! 
03: Ha ha yeah. [laughs] yes, yeah yeah yeah. Endings [I] carreer. 
KRP: Immediately would mean contemperaneously would you say? Is that what you mean by 
immediate? 
03: Er if I knew what that word meant, I might! 
KRP: Like at the same time as... or simultaneous to... y'know inseperable in time from doing it. 
03: From doing it, yeah that's nteresting that I used that choice of language... er, I think I said 'more 
immediate'. 
KRP: Ok. 
03: Maybe. So ther's... ther's less.... Hmm... hmmm.... huh... ha ha ha. 
KRP: Y'see it's... it's difficult to introspect on... 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: ... processes that we just do. 
03: Yeah yeah yeah. Yes soI...  I guess what I'm trying to think now is whether I... erm if it's... whether 
I'm  fraud or not! 
KRP: Ok! 
03: [laughs] As in like, 'cos if I'm saying that there's less delay from the decision to the note coming out 
then that means I'm thinking ahead regardless of how... like...many [I] like frac... fractions of a second 
that is and certainly that was the case with the delays. 
KRP: Yeah. I'm interested to...to explore why one way of thinking or another might be normative in 
that sense, or in other words why it might... why we might charicature it by saying 'am I a fraud'... 
03: Yeah yeah well I think it's 'cos... 
KRP: Why why is one valued more than the other? 
03: Well I, er I think it's 'cos I, in terms of erm, what I strive for in improvisating, certainly in free 
improvising,  is to be expressing myself right now and and present in in the moment so erm er and I'm, 
y'know, that's I guess certainly since , like a workshop with Mike Walker ten thir... twelve or so years 
ago... yeah eleven years ago this summer! Er, ah it was, like that the idea of only playing what you 
hear... erm is has some ki... er some kind of ideal to work towards, for me, I was like, alright that's 
what....yeah. 
KRP: So. let's play Devil's advocate for a minute... 
03: Please! 
KRP: ... and say, what if we hear it in advance? 
03: Yeah... 
KRP: Does that invalidate it? 
03: Well yeah, maybe not... yeah... maybe not. 
KRP: So there's a couple of aesthetics there that you've come up with that are linked but are distinct as 
far as I can tell, one is being in the moment? 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: And the other is playing what you hear. 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: They're logically independent in a way, because ... 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: ... if you heard it all in advance then played it... 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: It... it doesn't strike me at any rate that that would be... of less value. 
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03: Yeah. 
KRP: Other than that you're not then in the moment... 
03: Yeah yeah yeah. 
KRP: ...then again has anyone, to you, or have you made the philosophical argument of why being in 
the moment is of more value than expressing something you've thought of carefully? 
03: Er well again from er... er reading around and playing lots of free improvised music, it's... that erm, 
reacting and being present is... is kind of the whole point... I think. So I think that's where that value 
system came from. 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: It came up recently, we had er... erm, oh I had like er a day in Crewe with a bunch of improvisers, 
that this gur runs, and you... you put a different group together, improvise for fifteen minutes and then 
talk about it. And I was saying I had a really terrible time in one particular grouping and anyway, we 
were discussing the idea of playing something that's disruptive... like being disruptive... which i..., erm 
I say, in this music, I guess if if.. in jazz y'know, you could be, you could play 'out' or you could, as a 
drummer you could push or drag the time, or y'know, stop or, there are things you can do, but someone 
was making the point, was like if you're... if you're being disuptive in free improvisation, surely... surely 
you can't be, 'cos you just hear everything as a contribution to the pallette, so and then someone said 
'well yeah, but y'know you can play thngs that are against the grain' and then I forget who, but made the 
very good point that's like but if you... as a player if you take something and it's disruptive, so if if you 
play something that I take as disruptive, that's my problem because what's... what's being disruptive then 
is my ideas about where it's going to go and then I'm priviledging my like I'm er... make... making a 
heirarchical thing where there shouldn't be one. A heirarchical structure like 'ah, I hear...' ... and I 
definitely... I definitely do this, in terms of... with kind of delays and loops like time-based stuff I'm like 
'ok I can hear a thing here', like... it can build and yeah it's gonna go like this... and then, and so now 
I'm sort of wondering if... like what would it take to stop me! [laughs] 
KRP: [laughs] 
03: D'you know what I mean? If I'm... 
KRP: Interesting! Mmm. 
03: And  there's there's there's there's plenty of um times when I have thought 'ah what I'm playing now 
could really lead into a... a texture, and I kind of set it up and maybe record some stuff into loop pedals 
whilst... yeah it just with whatever it is I'm playing... 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: ... and whilst responding and then not use it, because the the moment's passed. 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: So the like... 
KRP: Isn't it... doesn't that imply potentially a division of attention, which is antithetical to the pure 
notion being in the moment? 
03: Yeah... yes! [laughs] Er, yeah so in terms of.... 
KRP: But that's an artifact of technology in a way? 
03: Yeah, but then it's... 
KRP: 'Cos you have to cue up the loop to make the texture that you think of in advance... 
03: Yeah exactly, yeah [coughs] it's not like... yeah it's not like I've got a pre-made loop/sample with 
bassy texture, scratchy texture- go! Erm, Adam, my supervisor, has written a chapter o...er about erm, 
using idioms in what has previously been referred to as 'non-idiomatic improvisation'. 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: And I think it's maybe sort of part of the same thing that there's erm, theres a scene or y'know, a 
way of playing these days that kind of uses free improvisation and all of that, erm but doesn't discount 
things like form. and the i... like, there are improvisers who er...so me and Johhny, my brother used to 
do this... like we'd improvise but then we'd remember what we started with and so we'd maybe like 
come back to that... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03:... at the end, as a... as a formal thing. Ermand that's not necessarily right or wrong, but it's... it's 
certainly that it's yeah it's that division of attention thing... it's like the the micro and macro... 
KRP: Yeah. 
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03: I'w... in one sense we're improvising with... I guess one view of free improvisation would be that 
it... it's mac... it's micro, right we're just here right now, we're just looking at what's happening right 
now... 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: ...and it...that changes or... really quickly and we're present all the time and then but then also you 
can pull out and free improvising with the macro... the structures actually like improvising structures... 
as aspart of it, if you see what I mean... 
KRP: Mmm. 
03: Dunno how this relates to... what you want... 
KRP: Gold dust! 
03: Is it? [laughs] 
KRP: I think, just as... to draw it to a close, er now you're teetering on the event horizon of the existential 
abyss... we can er... 
03: [laughs] 
KRP: I can do my follow-up question... 
03: Brilliant! 
KRP: Which is... 
03: What are you having for lunch? 
KRP: [laughs] What draws you to improvising, could you say more about why you do it? 
03: [laughs] Fuck... ha ha ha ha ha ha... erm... prrrwww... so I know what I should say... y'know I know 
that I've got stock answers to that question [I] 'cos it's genuine it's different every time and that's exciting, 
to sort of hear why... er hear how things unfold, erm I don't r... I don't really ever remember being drawn 
to it, other than I always did it? Erm and I get bored easily if I have to do a job, as in er so with Beats 
'n Pieces, er I get a couple of solos but they're very prescribed 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: And it's like, ok I'm doing this thing now but I'm... I'm fulfilling a role and I'm... I'm less... I dunno... 
I think I'm... so, I did a couple of gigs recently, myself and Cath Roberts, baritone sax player, some 
some of the stuff we've done has involved written material but this was all free improvised and we 
basically, we played a gig in Antwerp to the bar owner. Like, his friends stayed right at the other end 
of the room or outside, smoking er and it was great it was really really like erm really enjoyed what 
we... what we did and we had a really good time, despite there being no atmosphere and it being, y'know, 
awful er [laughs] in terms of attendance. But with Beats 'n Pieces I think if there's a if.. if the crowd 
doesn't respond, or if there isn't a feeling then I have a bad gig, I think, I think. Erm, which is at odds 
with my stance that I like to take that I'm not interested in what the audience is doing,  I'm like I don't... 
active active disinterest in anything beyond the edge of the stage or circle or whatever we're playing in. 
erm so maybe that's related to why I like improvising because it enables me to... it's just talking to my... 
to the other musicians and that's where my attention is, and when it's like 'oh right well I've gotta play 
this figure for a bit, I've gotta follow that...' then if... then I sort of glance around the room and if there's 
no energy coming back from the audience, then it's like 'oh pfff'. It's depressing maybe, or a bit more 
boring. But then I'm sure I've had bad improv gigs where there's been an audience and y'know that isn't 
into it and maybe maybe it's just... 
KRP: Do you think you've had a bad improv gig where the audiencne has been into it? 
03: Ha! I'll just ring round them and ask! [laughs] Erm... have I had bad improv gigs when the audience 
has been into it? [pause] Possibly? I mean with this... with this day a few weeks ago in Crewe, 
Centrifuge, we were talking about the... sorry 'Centrifuge' is the name of the night, might not work that 
out when you transcribe it, so we were talking about, like I was saying I had a really bad time, and I 
hadn't felt that anything we were trying was working, but people who were listening, who were all 
improvisers themselves, we were all... sort of the day is designed  to help us think about improvising, 
talk in ways that we don't normally talk about it, and erm, they said 'oh it was really great those bits' 
like when when you're uncomfortable, when you're having to work at things, that's when the most 
exciting things happen. Erm, so I think that maybe they had enjoyed and I hadn't.  
KRP: Hmm. 
03: But then that's not necessarily the same thing as having a bad gig, 'cos really if I listen back to it, 
then it might be like 'oh, yeah that was cool!' 
KRP: Uh hmm. 
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03: Erm, doubt it though. [laughs] 
KRP: Well... 
03: But, yeah... 
KRP: ... subjective experience at the time? Does that match, or correlate perfectly with aesthetic value 
in retrospect? 
03: Well yeah, no I guess not! 
KRP: Thankfully I'm not having to answer that question, so... 
03: I didn't answer anything you asked me...  'cos I couldn't remember what you were saying[I] 
KRP: No, you were great, that was absolutely great! Goldmine, honestly. 
03: Ha! 
KRP: Erm, so just to conclude is there anything else you'd like to add about your solo or your experience 
of the process today? 
03: Erm. Errr... I'd like to do it with a real band, or with other musicians. 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: Erm and then have the, I guess it'd be way more complex... 
KRP: Would, er but I th... I think I get what you mean,  in the sense of the ecological validity of having 
an interaction with real people. 
03: Yeah, yeahyeahyeah. 
KRP: Which is the way we've mostly improvised in, when we're doing it for real. 
03: And maybe with a backing track I can afford to kind of... 'cos it's not listening to me... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: I can go wherever I want... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: ... and 'Ohhh well like oooh...back now', and there were a couple of moments when watching back 
and I was like oh rhythmically that's not what I thought... like erm playing... it's like oh I can see what 
you meant but you're slightly... oh its just slipping out of the pocket? 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: That's a... a thing I could use? 
KRP: Certainly! 
03: And there was just sort of ' oh, catching up with where I was up to', I think maybe if there... if there 
was a live band with a bit more like give and take. erm oh I'd probably still be out of time! [laughs] but 
I I don't know not sure where I'm going to here but er yeah it'd be nice, again also because it means 
you're in a world that you're more er comfortable in? Or more frequently in than playing with jazz 
standards. 
KRP: Hmm. Well that might... that's certainly something I could consider for a follow up, or maybe get 
people to just do what they do... 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: ... even if they're just doing it on their own... 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: It's possible... [I] 
03: Then you get the erm, then you get the debate of whether or not you're improvising if you're playing 
by yourself. 
KRP: Yeah? 
03: Which, a few people, Peter Brotzmann included, that I've been reading recently... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: ... sort of saying, nah! It's not improvising if you're playing by youself because there's no 
conversation. 
KRP: Ok, interesting. 
03: Erm, yeah 
KRP: I'll have to look into that one. 
03: Send you a couple of quotes if you like? 
KRP: That'd be great, if you could! 
03: Yeah. 
KRP: That'd be fantastic. 
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03: Er yeah. But that sort of triggered my... the next stage of my research I think. 'Cos I've been getting 
people to record themselves by themselves... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: With a li... with a little bit of stimulus from me, like a little written thing, and then weaving that into 
the fabric of the finished piece. 
KRP: yeah. 
03: So pulling ideas out or... or certain things, but I think now I'm gonna do that but with duos and trios 
so, me actually go and meet up with these people... 
KRP: Yeah. 
03: ... and it's nothing to do with making sure I'm not in Crewe very much. 
KRP: [laughs] No! Yeah be good if you c... 
03: But yeah, but then there is... th... like yeah... that's not that's just a couple of opinions that I've dug 
out recently... 
KRP: What's your stance on it?  
03: [breath/sigh] 
KRP: Or do you not know yet? 
03: Well, I mean I think it is... if the like the dictionary definition of it you are improvising aren't you? 
Because... because! But I think what Brotzmann's saying is that when he plays solo and a lot of people 
have said similar things, you kind of have to plan it... or have areas that you're gonna call on erm in 
order to sustain it for any kind of meaningful period of time 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: Er which is why they're saying it's maybe not improvising... but then but [breath] then a sort of 
counter thing I sort of read was, you're unless you then consider you're having a conversation with the 
space, or with the audience, or y'know there's there's there's things to play off, like if there's a really 
long reverb or... yeah you're improvising with the atmosphere... 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: ... or, er the angry mob [laughs]... or yeah [I] or for me actually or maybe you saw one of the solos 
I did for Rod's thing or not, I'm not sure but it like... pedals as well. 
KRP: Hmm. 
03: And not in a way of like 'oh here's a loop I'm gonna just wail over the top' but in a kind of... yes it's 
still all me, me and me but it's kind of, maybe it's a conversation between myself and the equipment, 
though I don't  I don't know. And maybe improvisation doesn't have to be a conversation, in which case 
a lot of the points are null and void anyway! 
KRP: Well, tha... it's well... 
03: Yes. 
KRP: ... that's just where I'm... I'm wary of erm getting too heavily into the philosophy but there we 
go... 
03: Er yeah, quite. 
KRP: right well, er we're gonna stop there... 
 
 
Participant 4 
KRP: [AP] So you can pause at any time. 
04: [/AP] In terms of ideas, I've got no kind of clear thought of where the... of where it comes from, 
except I'm just playing over a scale, and it's kind of like watching it, it's like really obvious to me, the 
degree to which I'm simply playing over a scale... er and... to a degree, managing the mechanics of the 
instrument within that scale, and possibly adding things from outside the scale...  but expanding it 
around the... yeah. 
KRP: So the core, you would say that you're using to bounce off is... is the scale? 
04: Yes. 
KRP: Which scale? 
04: Er... something based around Eb minor, but effectively... effectively the Eb blues scale. 
KRP: Uh hmm? 
04: So an Eb kind of pentatonic... er... with the with the... but an Eb minor scale. Carry on, please. 
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KRP: [AP] 
04: [/AP] The other thing that's quite interesting of doing this is that... I mean the backing's not as loud 
as playing with er... with live instrumentation, I mean, I know it could have been louder but... erm, that 
was my choice, but but on the other hand, you're also not being accompanied... there is an 
accompaniment, but it's not it's erm... it's not listening to me. so that makes an awful lot of difference 
in terms of what I do, er... in that, for me normally it's like, so there is something of a conversation, at 
least with the drum kit, but often with other members of...  other poeple in the band, that I would expect 
to hear things thrown back, and ideas thrown ack at me to play off. 
KRP: How do you think that affects what you played here? 
04: Erm... I think it probably kept me within more of a safety net. I'd probably be pushed by other people 
to kinda like, play a little bit faster, er and do more and work a bit harder. Whereas this, this is 
almost...it's quite easy to do, 'cos nothing...nothing's going to challenge me, nothing's going to kick me 
up the bum and push more, er and try and pull the carpet from under me as well, there's that... y'know, 
there's always that possibility of someone pulling a carpet, like whether it's a chord or, or a or a or a 
rhythm from the drums that kind of takes things away, er y'know,  it might... er 'cos the joy of playing 
with other people is  that they might just suddenly disappear, or... or it might just like push and give 
more, or... or there might be surprises that kinda take you in a different direction,er  which makes you 
kinda stick more surprises in  and it meant that I couldn't, I had no control... as well, so I was literally 
playing over, playing over an accompaniment.. 
KRP: Do you think you felt that at the time, was there any difference for this being the second take? 
04: Yes there was, yes. Er, I was a lot more...  er confident, I mean it's not a difficult.. not a difficult 
sequence or anything like that, but erm...er..er ...erm but I'd done the working out er, on the first take. 
KRP: Plus, I suppose there's... even though there's no conversation, there's a sense in which the 
accompaniment could be unpredictable the first time you hear it, whereas on some unconscious level 
maybe, having heard it once, it was even more predictable than it was the first time? 
04: Possibly, yeah but I think... possibly I might have... it might have been best to have turned it up 
more... because um...yeah maybe... yeah I wasn't really paying much attention to it, I was hearing the 
ride cymbal...  
KRP: Ah... 
04: ... as much as anything else. Yeah... [indicates I should resume playback] 
KRP: [AP] 
04: See I can just hear the ride cymbal. 
KRP: I think you decided to do a harmony on this didn't you? 
04: Yes. 
KRP: Second time. When did you decide do you think? 
04: At the second chorus, at the beginning,.. I was wondering, could I do it? And I know in the John 
Coltrane recording there is a harmony. 
KRP: Yeah. [AP ends] Book early! 
04: Indeed, every time! 
KRP: So... there are a few times there where you're playing, erm phrases that repeat and change their 
accent over the kind of where they fall on... in the barline... 
04: Um 
KRP: ... erm... is that something that... or is any of it...to what extent do you think any of that was 
planned in terms of the solo... the architecture of it, or... or anything about it? 
04: Er, to refer back to the question you asked earlier how... er how it differed the second time, er I 
think with some understanding of how long it was going to be... with with a bit of an idea of how long 
it was going to be, erm and I think as well alluding to that notion that er knowing what the 
accompaniment would be like, even subconsciously, er yeah I did format to a degree that I would start 
off kinda like somewhere in the middle of er my range, although yeah kinda...er yeah I started off quite 
low, er but built up, not only the range but also er...the kind of... the the intensity of what I was playing 
so, it's quite... it became more intense as it got to the end  er and in the, I think it's in the penultimate 
chorus I go kinda quite high, in my for my... for my register at least. Er, erm so, in a way that's planned, 
it's planned... uh I wasn't standing there thinking of it at that point, but it's planned kind of through 
experience of, er you know, wanting to put something across that has some kind of impact and that's 
how to do it if you want to kinda carry a solo over a few choruses, you... you build it er and then 'n try 
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and give it some kind of finish that people will...  can y'know can can applaud er and enjoy, so it's like, 
an audience satisfaction kind of approach to it. 
KRP: Finish with a flourish! 
04: Indeed. 
KRP: Er, let's have a listen t... just to where you did start out... [AP] in terms of register, erm. 
04: I think the start of it as well, is a little bit... er with the nature of the the tune... always influenced by 
er Miles Davis. [I] Forgot what the track is... 
KRP: [/AP] I... in what way by Miles Davis? Is there a particular track you're thinking of? 
04: [sings 'So What'] 
KRP: 'So what'. 
04: 'So What', yeah it's that the way Miles Davis starts off 'So What'... yeah, it's kind of...that.. a similar 
approach to doing it there... 
KRP: In terms of phrasing?  
04: Erm... um mmm 
KRP: Or note choice, or...feel? 
04: Note choice, and ujst that kind of like playing a very strong kind of first quite long first note... of a 
phrase or a i...[I]. kinda of like approach it...That first note is quite a strong... as well as... [ASK] don't 
know how to put it. 
KRP: Yeah [AP] That theme seemed to come back a couple of times, that precession. 
04: The.. becession? 
KRP: [/AP] [sings phrase] Where you've got a phrase which reduplicates but because it's concatenated 
if you like, joined on directly, it doesn't fall in the same place in the bar or the format. 
04: Yeah. 
KRP: Er, and it does seem to me to...  to follow that erm strong opening phrase, in terms of could almost 
be vocal, and it makes a statement.  
04: Hmm. 
KRP: And then the dynamics of it mean that towards the end, you're getting, as you said...[AP] [FW] 
That's the veryvery  end... let me just go back and... [RW] ...high register. 
04: Yeah, I mean yeah as I get to like quite an intense bit I will use [/AP]...yeah the, like I'll push the 
kind of the boundaries ofthe time a bit more, er play play around with it. er and as I said before I'd 
normally expect that to be kinda like reflected back at me and probably pushed even more. 
KRP: Mmm the c..conversation? 
04: Yes. 
KRP: Yeah. So that was a reduplicative phrase again wasn't it? Let's just check [RW] [AP][/AP] Yeah. 
Erm, so in terms of where did  the ideas came from, you said before you you have no idea, really? 
04: Er... in that I know that they've kind of picked up in over years and years of listening and playing. 
They're all there, they're nothing kinda like, new. 
KRP: So in that in... in terms of that, how much of it do you think you were drawing on your idea bank, 
and how much of it would you say you've perhaps never played before? 
04: How do you mean? Sorry. Oh of that?  
KRP: Well in terms of an idea bank or a vocabulary or a lexicon? 
04: I don't think... I don't think for one second that there was any of that that I've never played before... 
KRP: Hmm. 
04: ... and I think... I mean I... er... I don't f.. yeah, I can't talk for anyone else and I'm not going to talk 
for anyone else... er that's... in er.... in this kind of style of music, that would be what I do, that w... there 
are... there is a cupboard full of i... not that full necessarily, but there's a couple of ideas er that I draw 
from, and that I play around with, er and that's my comfort zone in this, if I y'know er and I'd have to... 
there might be circumstances where I dig deep and kinda like push further er and that would probably 
be with someone else helping me to do that, or encouraging me to do that. 
KRP: Mmm. 
04: But, er yeah in thi... an example like this where I just want to kind of play the... the right notes er, 
over a few choruses [I] not digging that deep, and it is all stuff that I'd played before. 
KRP: To what extent do you think you modified the ideas in your repertoire during this? Do you think 
you modified any of the ideas for this improvisation?  
04: er... 
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KRP: Or do you think...just slotting in? 
04: Erm, well the other thing to look back on is, erm that, er we've had this discussion before, that the 
trombone is bound by its own mechanics, playing the trombone is bound by its own mechanics... 
KRP: Mmm. 
04: ... and so to play... you're playing in two different scales, er can totally change what you're likely to 
do, if it had been a semitone higher, I probably would have played very differently, because it's a very 
different set of scale... er slide positions, and, just the whole mindset is different. 
KRP:  Would it have been more difficult to play... 
04: No. 
KRP: in say E minor?  
04: No. 
KRP: Than Eb minor? 
04: No. It would have been different. 
KRP: Just different? 
04: Yeah 
KRP: That's interesting.  
04: It would've been... 
KRP: You were saying before when you were looking... one of your first reactions when you looked at 
it before was that you could tell you were playing off a scale and dealing with the mechanics of the 
instrument. 
04: Yes. 
KRP: So, could you say a bit more about that dealing with the mechanics of the instrument? 
04: Erm... 
KRP: How does that affect the kind of ideas that you can draw on? 
04: Erm [long pause] er I don't know if the trombone... to what degree the trombone is unique in er... in 
that every note has a d... that has a different quality to it, and thus every scale has has a has a different 
quality to it, er and from that point of view, different problems that come with it in the way that you 
play it... erm... and er I supposeit it...  it comes...I'm thinking also of visualising er that set of notes er in 
order then to kinda like play across those... that set of notes and then to try and broaden that visualisation 
to... to include other notes, y'know what... what might they be? Er... how how can I kinda expand on 
the repertoire of notes that are going to fit into that... into that improvisation, erm... and I think that's 
the difficulty with the trombone, is... is that ability to... to hear the notes and visualise them before you 
play them, which... which is what you have to do with the trombone. I'm not sure...  
KRP: Interesting... 
04: ... not sure. 
KRP: I mean, to what extent do you think conscious processes were involved? I mean it's interesting 
you say 'visualise', erm because I would guess one of the things that is different about the trombone, as 
opposed to say, the piano or the guitar, is that there isn't the kind of visual and spacial pattern available 
that you've learned by association, there's a pattern of movement or there's a pattern of positions... 
04: Mmm. 
KRP: ... but I don't think that's necessarily the same. So maybe that's one way that trombone is different 
from, say the piano, where if you're playing in E minor, there's a regular pattern that you could, er 
visualise in a certain way, but would you... would you say that's different on the trombone or would you 
say you do visualise the pattern of... ? 
04: That's what I'm saying is that you do... you have to visualise, but obviously it's internally visual 
because you can't look at what it's gonna be 'cos I mean the slide is a... is... isn't hasn't got enough 
dimensions to it, it's er... playing a note involves that physical, y'know you're pla... you're creating the 
sound with your mouth... 
KRP: Yeah. 
04: ... and so for every note is y'know er it's a it's a, well I s'pose it's kinda like very much sensory, the 
whole thing is... multisensory. er... and so to er prepare to play each note... er is a combination of... er 
preparations, er y'know p putting the slide in the right place and making sure you.. your embrouchure 
is in the right place and how you're going to tongue that and how you're going to breathe before it, etc. 
KRP: Would you say though that most of those things are automatic? 
04: Yes, most of them are automatic, yes. 
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KRP: So, then again, when you're saying 'visualise', what... what is it that... what's it like in your head... 
as you're about to play something, would you say? Co... would 'visualise' be the way you would put it? 
[pause] Or are you using 'visualise' as a kind of catch-all generic term for 'imagine'? 
04: Erm.. 
KRP: Again, the the etymology of 'imagine' is in with 'image', so we're bound by a lot of language. 
04: I think the trouble is, as you talk more is that I get to a point where er erm er, as happens if I'm 
trying to teach, i've kind of been trying to imagine what it is that I do, and I possibly over-imagine so 
I'm not sure... 
KRP: Mmm. 
04: ... and it gets to the point where I'm not sure if I'm talking rubbish, but yeah there is... there's in 
terms of the scale itself there's an there is a er... there is a to a degree a visualisation of what... what the 
notes are that I can easily use, that you know I have... have ready to do... to play. 
KRP: What does that look like? 
04: What does it look like? 
KRP: Yeah, 'cos you said 'visualisation', well what does it look like? Could you draw it? 
04: No I couldn't draw it, no 'cos... er, well yes using 'visualisation' is a catch-all, it's a serie... yes...er, 
it's my... in my my own notion of what visualisation is, and it includes er essentially sensory things. The 
fact that playing a B would be... like that [mimes slide position]... I'm thinking of playing that tune in E 
now, so... 
KRP: Oh! 
04: ... thinking of that kinda playing B and D and E and then G, and A and where they'd be, and then 
sticking in a... an F#. 
KRP: Right. So you're... to me that sounds like you're erm talking about multimodal imagery that is to 
do with sensorimotor integration, that's that's what it sounds like to me. 
04: That! I'm sure that descibes it nicely. 
KRP: What strategies, if any, did you use to generate ideas? 
04: Experience, I think. Erm... I think the more the more I think about it, the more... there have been 
times when I have practiced improvising, and I and I do still practice improvising... but er... a lot of the 
practice that I do is playing with other other musicians and hearing them and and  listening to other 
music, so er to try and get that to influence what I'm doing, to kinda give more repertoire. 
KRP: Erm, in terms of the timing, just to return to that question of the timing of when you thought what 
you thought, you said that, erm you decided to do the harmony in the second chorus at the end, at the 
beginning of that chorus, orat  the beginning of the first chorus at the end? 
04: It was during the second chorus at the beginning, I was thinking 'oh the harmony would be nice 
here' and so I stuck the harmony in on the last phrase of the second second chorus at the beginning... 
and then but had it in my mind that I'd do it in the second chorus at the end. 
KRP: Right. So, is... would you say there are any other instances where you've thought that far ahead, 
or is that a very specific instance? 
04: Erm... well you mention you mentioned planning before, and the notion er and I think I was aware 
playing it the second time, that I did have that planning o-o-overall plan of building up er range and 
building up intensity to a point that I thought would be kinda like towards the end of the... of the solo 
before the chorus came back in again,  
KRP: Um. 
04: Er so there's an awareness of that, so it is a kind of planning but er not one that... y'know I wouldn't 
have said it. 
KRP: So, it's like a different level of description? 
04: Yeah.  
KRP: The content? Rather than thinking of individual motifs, ideas, phrases you're talking about the 
overall plan of how it's gonna go? 
04: Mmm, yeah, and I think what kind of mu... shows how it's kinda planning but it's not that  kinda 
like deep is wh... when I described what I thought at the beginning of the solo was like, and then you 
played it, it was nothing like I'd descibed it to be, er and somewhat y'know, there's a thought in my head 
but it's actually er, and I suppo...th-th-there's a similarity there to composition, if I go to write something, 
I might have a plan, and I want to write something that's like this er but no no no, it never ends up like 
that it goes it goes in a different direction, and I think improvisation is often the same thing, you might 
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say I want to do a solo that's like this, er but no you get sucked along and it's like this instead, er and 
even though I'm whingeing about kind of y'know I'm sticking to one scale pattern and I'm doing the 
same thing, there is that... it does... y'know there is that variation, y'know if I did the solo again, part of 
it would be very similar, but the shape of it and the y'know the overall sound would be different... I 
hope! 
KRP: Mmm! How much of what you played d'you think you heard in your head? 
04: I don't know...  th-that's er I've been thinking about that as we've been talking... and erm I've been 
made aware whilst teaching a pianist trombone how essential it is to have the sound of y'notes in your 
head 'cos otherwise you you just can't play them and and so I I think I'd probably be modest and say not 
a great deal, but then I think I'd probably find that yeah there probably was more er more of the sounds 
in my head, erm and then some of the surprises of where I go to play a note that I think I'm hearing but 
then another note comes out and that's either good or bad... but er... yeah I think... I think if I...  in fact 
I think if I could sing the solo that I thought I was going to play, it probably would be less interesting 
than the solo that I'd end up playing, 'cos I think there's that thing of the fight with the mechanics is... 
provides some of the interest of the instrument. 
KRP: Interesting, so... is that one way that... or another way that the trombone might be different from, 
for example the piano in that you're saying if you don't have the note in your head, you can't actually 
physically play the note, well of course that's not true of a piano because you just press a key? 
04: Mmm. 
KRP: So, what is it about the trombone that makes that different, because in principle if you'd learned 
all the motor actions necessary and the millimetre precision of the slide et cetera, you wouldn't need to 
hear it to actualy play it, but are you saying that like the violin, you tend to microtune as you converge 
to the note? 
04: No, no it's not... this is to do with 'cos the slide is a minimal part of how you play the trombone, th-
the most most of the work is going on with your mouth and the accuracy er is is a lot to do with your 
mouth, and you might kinda go to play er especially if you get higher through the register, you might 
go to play a note and nah that's not gonna,,, it's gonna come out and er you're gonna end up in trouble, 
so er and as an experienced performer you you knock out a completely wrong note and you just and 
you pull that into something you turn that into something so that it sounds like oh obviously that's what 
I meant! 
KRP: So is that what you meant when you said that what you might play playing the trombone would 
be more interesting than if you just sang it, is that one of the reasons, because... 
04: One of the reasons yeah, 'cos 'cos yeah you go... 
KRP: ... you have to roll with it... 
04: Yes. 
KRP: Sometimes? And that makes you and that prompts you to play things that you wouldn't have 
otherwise thought of doing if you'd just sung it? 
04: Yes. 
KRP: Are there any other ways in which, say if you just sang a chorus, d'you think that would be 
different? Would it be different if you, in some ways, sang it but mimed playing? I suppose that's almost 
impossible because, if playing is in the mouth you wouldn't be able to get the note out and mime the 
embrouchure bit? 
04: Yeah it's it's the embrouchure, there's some mechanics there that is the difficult bit, y'know like I 
say, the slide is the... the minimal part of it. 
KRP: That's interesting because it... it speaks against the idea of these, erm musical ideas forming in 
the imagination irrespective of the method of delivery... and then you just, playing them. 
04: Yeah. 
KRP: You're you're describing something that's not like that at all, something that to me at any rate 
sounds more embodied. 
04: That's in... so what do you mean by embodied? 
KRP: That the sensory side and the imagination side are bound up with what we actually do with our 
bodies. So the movement... 
04: Mmm. 
KRP: ... and the way our bodies interact with the world. 
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04: I think I [U].. yeah and mo... possibly an interesting way of describing what it is to improvise on 
the trombone is a very physical instrument er and it it is... has got... kind of a lot more... er greater 
parameters than other instruments, in that you can't play as fast, you can't play across the range quite so 
quickly, erm er er... and you get knackered and you have to breathe, erm so... so yea the character of 
the instrument characterises what you're going to play. Which is why it's sometimes easier to go into 
comedy. 
KRP: [Laughs] Ok... erm, so one one more of the set questions that I guess is what draws you t-to 
improvising? Y'know, could you say more about why you do it? 
04: Erm, I got kinda stock answers to that and erm I remember being I never played in the orchestra at 
college er being in the wind orchestra at college and er somebody pointing a stick at me and I was 
supposed to play this particular note and that note wasn't going to come out and it was just awful and I 
didn't like it, being just being sat there and having to play when I was told and play these notes on the 
page, erm which was what I was training to do, er and I found it easier to have minimal direction er and 
just to to kind of go off that made that made a lot more sense to me than having a lot of music written 
down, erm er and wha and whether that's what draws it to me... it's I I I think I like er the process of er 
it's 'cos y-you're kinda creating music, you're making different... you're making the music different every 
time, er er you're giving movement and life to a piece of music er er and making it different every time 
and I think that's what that's what excites me, erm er I think I think that's it. 
KRP: Ok so, is there anything else you'd like to add about your solo or your experience of the process 
today? 
04: No, not really no. 
KRP: have you ever participated in research before? 
04: Er, no no I haven't. 
KRP: Um, how did it feel to sort of improvise in this sort of setting being recorded as you knew it was, 
for research? 
04: Erm, it was a little like doing a recording in a studio but er slightly less intense. 
KRP: Mm, fair enough thank you ver much... 
04: Thank you. 
KRP: ...for participating today and please feel free to contact me, er via email if you have any questions, 
goodbye! 
04: Oh, I will! 
 
Participant 5 
 
KRP: So... erm right so the idea is, you you can control the playback... 
05: Yeah ok. 
KRP: Or we both can 'n y'know if I see something that I think 'Ooh that's interesting and I go back, fair 
enough, similarly for you... 
05: Uh hmm. 
KRP: ...if you want to describe something that's happening and you want to pause it at that stage fine, 
or go back or whatever...  
05: Yeah! 
KRP:erm the idea is that you give a kind of... [AP] [/AP] whoopsie! That you give a DVD commentary... 
05: Ok. 
KRP: ... kind of director's cut, kind of... 
05: This is what. 
KRP: ... this is... and the focus of that is kind of idea generation, really. 
05: Mmm 
KRP: So it's like, where did that come from...? 
05: Sure. 
KRP: ...what were you thinking then? What was the timing of the decision relative to when you played 
it? 
05: Ah ok, yeah. 
KRP: Y'know, those kind of themes. When did that pop into your head, what kind of thing was in your 
head that led... 
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05: At that moment. 
KRP: ...y'know that sort of thing. 
05: Sure. 
KRP: So if we set off... you can stop at any time, pause, rewind... whatever. 
05: [AP] Yeah. Well basically all that was going through my head when I was playing the tune is that, 
I dont think I've ever played it... so I was just actually trying to remember the tune so... [laughs] I 
might've played it y'know, off a lead sheet when I was sixteen or something, but it's not a blues I ever 
call on jams or anything... I should do! So... so that was what all the fluff at the start was about! [laughs] 
KRP: Do you mean the tasteful embellishments? 
05: Well [laughs] that was intentional, the rest of it was not! [laughs] Anyway... I should be saying 
some things rather than just listening... so....[/AP] so I mean that... I think that's pretty much the same 
rhythm that Coltrane starts with, isn't it? 
KRP: Ok. 
05: I think that's all that was in my head at this... [AP] to to launch off... or he does er something similar 
at the top of some chorus. [/AP] Yeah, I also wasn't listening [AP] particularly carefully. 
KRP: What gives you that impression? 
05: Well...[/AP] well I went to the... major third to resolve and that was just not going on in the piano 
very much, my concert G just sounded quite... quite bright and out of place. 
KRP: Mmm. 
05: And that gave me a bit [AP] of a pause [I]... and then it's fine afterwards. I mean this is all[I] the 
first bit's just fairly sort of standard blues stuff, I don't think I'm.... not reinventing any wheels... and 
then, I was just delaying the resolutions... through the II-V-I... but a lot of this is well, y'know if you 
were playing with a live rhythm section obviously...[laughs] it would be a different thing.[long listen to 
AP] The pianist was listening there, that was nice! Yeah...  
KRP: So that... 
05: Yeah, so that... that bit, if you wanna specifically [/AP] look at that... erm, that, erm that is er... a 
thing I took from Coltrane... 
KRP: 'Cos that sounds quartal to me... 
05: Yeahyeahyeah, so it's staring on concert Bb, going up Bb. Eb, Ab and then moving that up in minor 
thirds... 
KRP: Yeah... yeah that's... 
05: ... and then just sort of altering mmm but but erm... yeah mmm it's certainly those...tha... those 
harmonic groupings is something I took from Coltrane. 
KRP: Mmm. 
05: Er, when I was doing that dissertation I was saying about, that was, one of the big things was 
divisions of the octave, erm and different groupings within that as a way to get outside harmony, but 
keep it with a logical flow. Y...y'know, obviously once you start sequencing, then you can just go outside 
and it, your... the audience's ear follows it, y'know if... 
KRP: So what you're saying is that the audience, erm follows the internal logic of the phrase... 
05: Exactly yeah... 
KRP: ... and the fact that... 
05: ... despite th... the notes in the middle are pretty unrelated harmonically to the the chord, so say I... 
by the time I get to erm the second sequence, I'm playing concert, er E... E, A er D, but over Eb... 
y'know... 
KRP: Yep. 
05: ... Eb7 so that er y'know it doesn't really bear much relation to what's going on... y'know, you could 
rationalise it... 
KRP: You could say it's starting on the flat 9... 
05: Yeah but then, going to the #11 and the major 7 doesn't seem like a particularly logical... 
KRP: No! 
05: But, y'know it won't sound good if you do that on its own [laughs] y'know so yeah but then...erm 
so so that's a particular thing I took from Coltrane, I... and tho...those sorts of harmonic splits I do tend 
to play about with quite a lot as a way of going outside, and especially if you've got a pianist who's on 
board with that then you can have a lot of fun with those things. [AP] And then y'know just taking the 
rhythm from the piano... shifting them.. that was... that was a less logical... [/AP] ... y'know, I wasn't 
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particularly intending er there to be much of a logic to the jumps there, it was slightly more randomised 
er move about, just sort of going where I felt rather than with a harmonic logic behind it... 
KRP: Right. 
05: ... it was just sequencing the little tone. 
KRP: Right... so... 
05: Just it was more of a rhythmic thing. 
KRP: In terms of the feeling... 
05: Uh hmm? 
KRP: ... what was that like in your head? What kind of feeling was it? 
05: What kind of feeling? 
KRP: Mmm. 
05: Erm...  
KRP: So, to give a kind of example... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ... of a kind of answer, it's... it's like, in your head what was it like for you to experience the feel 
of what you wanted to play? So cou.. 
05: Ok so just erm... so in that moment, that that was y'know just like speech erm I heard the 'badoo 
badoo' in the piano and so I just immediately went to that sort of that ...[taps on table] y'know sort of, 
what do you call it erm what's the name of that er 'acciaccatura'? .. type rhythm or whatever the proper 
term would be y'know what I mean er, and then I sort of let it go where just as y'know if I was to say 
words aloud, there wasn't a forethought with the harmonic movement there, it was [sings pitches in the 
rhythm] y'know, just sort of moving the thing around wherever it felt... 
KRP: So... 
05: ... comfortable. 
KRP: Yeah so it's... so it's the nature of that feeling of it being... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ... of it being comfortable that I'm trying to get at in a way because... have another play of it. 
05: Yeah  
KRP: Have a listen. 
05: [AP][/AP] Y... 
KRP: I detect a pattern! 
05: Yeah, it wasn't an intentional pattern, w..or it wasn't a consciously intentional pattern, there was a... 
[sings pitches in rhythm 'badoo badoo...'] yeah. 
KRP: Mmm [mimes finger movements as if playing keyboard] 
05: But I wasn't I certainly wasn't consciously aware when I was playing that bit of the pattern, that's 
just... that that's [I] it was probably what... what was in my subconscious... 
KRP: Yeah. 
05: ... from from working on... 
KRP: So... 
05: ... sequencing patterns and things but but in that moment it was just a phrase I played, I wasn't 
rationalising it in my head as a sequence. 
KRP: No, but an... I guess there are lots of ways of experiencing in your head that don't involve having 
music-theoretic considerations or clarity of knowledge... 
05: Yeah... yeah. 
KRP: ...in that way, and you expressed it as, in a couple of ways, one was to say 'randomised' which 
was an interesting way to put it, and the other... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ... is to say 'feel'. So I suppose what I'm trying to get at is if you think back, or you think what it's 
like for you when those things happen, what is the con... is is there a conscious component to it is one 
thing... 
05: So... 
KRP: ... or, if you could describe the contents of your conscious experience at the time, would it be 
related, and how would it be related to what you played? 
05: Ok, so it's interesting though, 'cos like my.. my memory of playing that phrase was that I... I wanted 
to take that that little rhythm and take it outside... 
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KRP: Yeah. 
05: ... and in my head I wanted to do that rather randomly... 
KRP: Yes. 
05: ...and obviously in actuality that's not what happened 'cos there is a really clear sequence there when 
you listen, back... 
KRP: [laughs] 
05: ... erm which I'd say is more indicative of human capacity for actual randomness off... off the cuff, 
randomness or perceived randomness, if you actually want to sound random it's not very random is it? 
It's actually a really specific thing to play things that sound like they're random... 
KRP: It's... 
05: ... y'know what I mean? 
KRP: ... it's cognitively I think a very different process... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ... from improvising, to generate pseudorandom... strings of notes. 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: It's actually quite hard... 
05: Yes. 
KRP: It's cognitively quite demanding. 
05: Exactly, yeahyeahyeahyeah, so I mean... 
KRP: ...and I think you're right 
05: ...so I slipped into something that was a clear pattern, but that wasn't the intent of the line, and in 
my head when I was playing it I wasn't hearing it as a... an obvious sequence... but obviously, listening 
back... 
KRP: In retrospect, yeah. 
05: ...it's extremely apparent y'know! [laughs] Em.. but that that wasn't my my thought at the time. 'Cos 
I mean, y'know... the act of it being a sequence makes it erm, sound clearer but a lot of the notes aren't 
particularly [AP] harmonically y'know, er they're not 'in', y'know... [/AP] Yeah, so... 
KRP: [mimes piano fingering] Well it evinces that principle that you were just talking about before, 
which is er.. an internal logic in a patterned phrase counterbalances the tension of the outsideness. 
05: Yes, absolutely, yeahyeah. Yeah. 
KRP: And it gives the audience a sense of tension and release but not total randomness in fact. 
05: Yeah yeah. 
KRP: Er...[AP][/AP] lots lots of erm, to me, lots of playing with expressive timbre and rhythm there? 
05: Yeah, so that that, yeah obviously there wasn't much of a a melodic component to to that little four 
bar stretch or whatever it was, but then y'know, carries on into a a phrase but erm I think that that's 
comin' off the back of  erm yeah, well yeah it's just playing around with rhythm, the same way I was 
thinking when with the 'badoo badoo badoo badoo' it's just y'know... 
KRP: A continuation? 
05: Yea yeah that. 
KRP: There's... there's also, I mean a sense of if you look where we are in the arc of the solo... 
05: Uh hm. 
KRP: ...erm, there is still a sense in which we craft the dynamics of it, so there is a kind of climactic 
aspect... 
05: I mean or or by... 
KRP: Y'know... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ... what Mike Walker says about y'know, getting yer knob out at some stage [laughs]. 
05: [laughs] But I think that the big... the big thing with this which is obviously the more artificial setup, 
is that I would always be the person in control of when that climax is, whereas I... I was y'know cut 
short and told this is the end because the rhythm section started playing the tune again. Whereas I'm 
y'know, as people who play with me regularly will tell you, I'm a swine for playing far too long and the 
solos tend to be about, y'know three, four minutes whereas... so the actual improvising aspect of this is 
maybe about two... two and a half minutes something like that? The actual...  y'know outside of the two 
heads, either end... 
KRP: Yeah. 
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05: ...erm so I I never quite got to the point where I was fully going for it, I woud've still been building, 
y'know. 
KRP: Plus, I would imagine that you rely on a certain push back... 
05: Yes! 
KRP: ...from the things that you offer... 
05: Oh yeah, absolutely. 
KRP: ... and there's a dialogue then that happens. 
05:  Yeah, I mean it was nice there was one or two moments where something on the backing track fell 
in the right place and then you'reyou're able to sort of y'know imagine it was a [laughs] an interaction 
but, yeah very much  reliant on that normally. 
KRP: [AP] 
05: Yeah that was me realising that the rhythm section was going round the head. [/AP] There was er 
an accidental little bit of that erm Coltrane lick I showed you. 
KRP: Yeah. 
05: [AP] Yeah [rewinds] [/AP] [sings]  
KRP: Ah. 
05: But it crept in somewhere. 
KRP: Yeah, well you could say its... 
05: [I] but it's y'know... 
KRP: ... a recombination... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ...to fit the context of material. 
05: Yeah. But also, it's y'know, that little bit of it alone is just jazz phrase 162 or whatever, [KRP laughs] 
really standard bit of bebop language there, which obviously y'know a lot of bits of the solo are just 
y'know, standard bebop or blues language y'know. There wasn't too much out and out beboppy stuff 
but... 
KRP: Hmm. 
05: ... erm, yeah, so I'm when I'm playing those sort of phrases erm and there's a bit of a different mental 
process going on to the sort of sequencing stuff like that it is just y'know, rattling off words almost more 
in a way. Y'know, if I'm speaking a sentence there's very little conscious thought going on it's just these 
things are coming out of my mouth because I understand sentence structure and grammar and all that. 
KRP: So, what you're saying there is that the conscious awareness is not at the level of automatic 
processes that handle the grammatical construction of the ideas you're trying to express? 
05: So, so within the... playing phrases like that, so say a lot of the phrases that I played there, th the 
bluesy bebop lines er some of them in their entirety I've never... i'm not aware of ever having played 
before, so it it's still being improvised, it's not like 'I've learnt this phrase and I'm dropping it in, here'...  
KRP: Yeah. 
05: ... but y'know all the little corners of it are standard resolutions, enclosures, y'know little harmonic 
devices that make you sound like y'know, you're playing jazz, y'know? Y'know er which is y'know the 
syntax of the language of playing jazz y'know? 
05: Yeah. 
05: And so they don't really require conscious thought above y'know minimum operating level, 'cos I've 
done practice when I was younger and I know what those things are so I don't need to worry about them 
they just flow out without me having to worry. Erm, but there's, y'know it it's not just regurgitation in 
that way, in that yknow when obviously you learn words when you're a child, but every sentence you 
speak it's unlikely that many of your sentences have been said in their entirety in the same way before. 
Like so much of this conversation I'd say that my sentences I've probably never said before in my life 
'cos I've never sat in this sort of context, so but it's not like I'm having to really consciously think of 
how each of my words and how they relate to the one before or after, it's it's very background processing, 
all that, so a lot of the solo is just that, it's not stuff that I'm ... I was thinking particularly hard about at 
the time, it was just coming out. 
KRP: So, I mean you've spoken a little bit about erm, some of it being beboppy, or not, do you think 
that is akin to a kind of dialect? 
05: I suppose so... 
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KRP: To use that language analogy, is it like speaking a bit in the bebop dialect as opposed to a more 
mainstream jazz dialect, or... a blues dialect? 
05: Yeah, I mean I suppose I suppose to me I I would probably use bebop and mainstream jazz dialect 
as the same dialect in my head I'd say just... though that's possibly because of how I came into jazz I 
mean when I started out listening it was Parker... 
KRP: Yeah. 
05: ...that I first got into and then branched out from there so in my head that is... and I'd say  that other 
people that are considered mainstream, so Alan Barnes, people like that, they're very boppy players 
y'know so I would consider those so... but certainly like, if I go into a bluesy thing rather than that boppy 
sort of thing, it is a different dialect and I'm thinking differently, and not not only in terms of the the 
note choices, but the way I articulate and place the rhythms will be different as well. I mean, t-to me 
anyway, most of just y'know if I if I want to dip into that bluesy sort of feel, y'know there's there's only 
really one or two things that makes [I] playing a blues scale is... is just bluesy! y'know 'cos B. B. King 
made an entire career out of just playing, y'know five notes! 
KRP: Yep. 
05: Erm y'know and obviously that just takes you straight into that, and y'know when you listen to loads 
of great, I mean, even like Parker for instance, doing loads of bob, then he'll just stick in a a really dirty 
blues scale... even over y'know like er y'know the dominant chord where the notes of the tonic erm 
blues scale don't actually really fit particularly well but it just sounds really raunchy and bluesy and 
y'know, erm so th there is a lot of that erm going on in my head, so I try and dip into bits of bits of 
bluesy playing, not not exclusively just blues scale but erm, y'know... 
KRP: Mmm. 
05: Emphasising the the the flat seven or the interplay between the major and minor third, y'know gives 
quite a bluesy sound I think I did a little bit of that here and there erm. That's one of the things I quite 
like erm, which the the rhythm section weren't doing so explicitly through the first four bars of the one 
four, one one having that interplay of dipping the the concert G down to a Gb and back again, I I like 
to to  mess about with that and then if you you think that the fourth bar is a more altered harmony then 
you get the the Gb back again as well. Erm, it being a fairly standard... 
KRP: I mean, I hear the the four chord on that as being quite #11ey. 
05: Mmm. 
KRP: Er, I hear the the tonic as being kind of, skeletal. 
05: Yeah, it's faily open. 
KRP: And then the the like the five chord is quite #9ey. 
05: Yeah. Yeah, yeah. 
KRP: Erm, so to to summarize, I mean, there's... I've got some standard questions... 
05: Yeah... 
KRP: ... I ask everyone, erm one of them is where do the ideas come from do you think? And you've 
spoken quite a lot about that, already. 
05: So, so I'd say just as an addendum maybe to that, erm, obviously most of my ideas come from 
listening to loads of jazz... y'know, so erm... 
KRP: And are you saying that they then emerge, or is there a balance between explicit working out 
what... the ideas are? 
05: Yeah, there's definitely a balance, ah yeayeah but in... so... it depends what you mean by by the 
'idea' as well, 'cos there's y'know there's the the pitches but there's also all of the delivery and things like 
that, and obviously if I didn't listen to loads of jazz I wouldn't swing, I wouldn't articulate correctly, I 
wouldn't understand the tone, all that sort of thing, so so much of what is integral to whatever I imagine 
and then comes out of my horn is is just purely through listening to loads of stuff. And th-there are also 
a lot of moments on gigs where, I'll start to play something... and then it'll trigger in my head, y'know 
y'know, either a phrase that I've heard, y'know Dexter Gordon play, or a tune y'know, and I might not 
even be able to remember the name of the tune but a standard that I know, or something and then you 
just carry with it and play the rest of that phrase or that tune, and might never have done it before, but 
because all the other building blocks are in place of y'know, enclosures and jazz harmony and 
contrapuntal elaboration of static harmony and all, y'know the y'know standard sort of bop devices, I 
just y'know, I'll hear the phrase in my head say that oh, yeah 'Dexter carried that on, like that' so I'll just 
carry on like that. And y'know, sometimes it might not come out as I intended, 'cos I'm not, y'know, the 
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musician I want to be yet! [laughs] But, erm most of the time y'know, it comes out as as I'm trying to 
replicate from my, from my head.  
KRP: Hmm, I mean, to what extent er, well how much of what you played in this improvisation do you 
think you heard in your head? 
05: Erm, I'd say the majority of it, but it's hard to know because they're they're instantaneous aren't they? 
So it is a difficult one to judge. When when I'm playing the standard bop harmony, that's y'know it's it's 
really easy because y'know, it's mostly just outlining chord tones and stuff, it's very obvious harmonic 
leaps, y'know. 
KRP: Yeah. 
05: Erm but er, yeah, some of the stuff where I'm going more outside and sequencing and stuff, erm 
some of the sort of quartal stuff I was doing, not for a while but at a point I did practice quite a lot, so 
the sound of that is quite strong in my head, so I can always hear that, that's not a problem. And a few 
of the bits where I wasn't doing standard thing... or y'know, more y'know run-of-the-mill stuff... 
KRP: So like that pattern that we subsequently... 
05: Yes. 
KRP: ...saw had emerged... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ...but that you said you weren't consciously aware of the pattern aspect of it... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ...when you were playing it... 
05: It's hard to know whether... 'cos my ...yeah... I'd imagine I didn't hear that exactly as it came out... 
but it could be that I was hearing it like that but wasn't aware of the pattern behind it as I was thinking 
it but... 
KRP: Could've been, which do you think? 
05: Ffff... you could toss a coin for that to be honest, I I couldn't tell you, I... 
KRP: Which relates to another question I wanted to raise as well which is.... 
05: Mmmmm difficult, it's really hard to know, yeah. 
KRP: ...the timing of that, so the timing of decisions that inform ideas, I mean I guess, it will depend 
on whether your idea has come from your idea bank, like we were talking about before... 
05: Mmm. 
KRP: ...or whether it's a response to something you heard on the backing? 
05: Yeah 
KRP: That you're modifying on the fly? Whether it's music-theoretic in it's origin, whether you're 
thinking 'oh, I want to generate something that sounds a little outside, I know a device, I can do that, 
which is erm, consecutive fourths shifting in minor thirds, say? 
05: Uh hmm. Yeah. 
KRP: So those will all perhaps have a different process behind them but what... what do you think, in 
terms of the timing of when you made decisions... 
05: So I... 
KRP: ...relative to when you played them? 
05: ...so I I try to never decide in advance anything when I'm improvising, so I... I don't think at any 
point in that, I did anything other than, just play something absolutely in the instant, now obviously that 
doesn't mean that it's not stuff that I haven't thought about before at some point, y'know it's what you 
were saying but, erm even stuff that maybe is a bit more not sort of, he he, not sort of shoehorned in but 
maybe a bit more sort of drag-and-drop, here is my quartal thing [laughs] y'know. erm I didn't know 
before I started playing that I was gonna do that and there's there's lots of other sort of Coltrane-type 
harmonic patterns, y'know done lots of stuff with pentatonics around major minor thirds and stuff like 
that that could easily have been... y'know when I was in that mood for something that was a bit more 
out, there's lots of potential things that I could've dipped into, that just happened to be the one that at 
that point felt 'that's that's what I'm gonna do'...  
KRP: So... 
05: ... and even... yeah go on. 
KRP: ...you were saying, again a... you're saying 'felt' so does that, is that like saying you weren't 
deliberately or consciously thinking? 
05: No, I wasn't deliberately thinking. 
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KRP: Were you thinking at all on the level of overall sketch planning, so something like 'oh, well I...I I 
feel like I want to be more outside now'? 
05: Yes. Yeah, I'd say... i-d yeah and that... that again maybe isn't so much of a conscious thing but 
again, like you were saying about structuring and and developing through a solo, y'know, at the start 
playing longer notes, phrases that are are more in, y'know you have to you have to go on some sort of 
journey, y'know it's a very cliched thing but obviously because it's trick... y'know, you couldn't start 
out, well you could start out with that, but there's there's less room to to go from there, especially with 
the backing track thing, if you had a live rhythm section maybe you could do something really out and 
just go completely free or whatever you know, but you're already setting the bar very high if you start 
with some y'know quartal shifting harmony y'know... 
KRP: Doesn't give you many places to go? 
05: Yeah... 
KRP: So... 
05: ...unless you're Coltrane or Chris Potter or something, but... 
KRP: There's there's something emerging from this which I hadn't thought about that much before, well 
I have, but in different contexts that's that's another thing, but the distinction between how people 
construe conscious thought and say, feeling because of course I would say that... 
05: Mmm... 
KRP: ...to be a feeling, it's constitutive of having a feeling that you're conscious of that. You can't... 
05: Well the the feeling arises and then you're conscious of it, is that not, I mean that's a that's a question 
y'know... 
KRP: Yeah! 
05: So are you... I would have thought the conscious thought arises from the feeling... the feeling the... 
is prior? 
KRP: Well, I I think many of the contents of conscious thought are prior to becoming aware of them... 
05: Oh oh for sure yeah yeah... 
KRP: ... but the but the... 
05: ..ab absolutely absolutely. 
KRP: ...idea that you felt a certain way, are you are you saying that when when you're looking back at 
it and you're talking about feeling a certain thing, that that's a... that might be... that you weren't 
consciously aware of that feeling at the time, but you know in retrospect looking at it that that must be 
what... 
05: Er n..., I don't think it's... I don't think it's labelling post event, no erm...only it could be to do... I'm 
I I just know how it feels for me when I'm soloing and it gets to that point where I want to stop just 
playing inside the harmony [laughs] and there is a definite point, possibly where I just get fed up with 
myself where I go... I'll want to break things open a bit more and see where they start to go, erm and in 
this case that was what came out when I had that thought or feeling however you're going to label that, 
of that bit's done for now and I'm going to start trying to explore something different y'know. 
KRP: So, I think just so I've asked everyone the same amount... 
05: Mmm mm...  
KRP: and the same things, and I think you've probably answered a lot of these... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: [I] but so, what strategies if any did you use to generate ideas? 
05: Erm... I mean aside from, y'know hours spent practicing at home and in practice rooms, erm, is that 
what you're talking about or do you just mean absolutely now? Ok, so I mean transcribing, er er just... 
KRP: I suppose I'm interested in when you actually did them, did you use strategies there? 
05: There? Erm... except, ok so I mean my... I suppose the approach when I'm improvising, erm again 
it's very different with a backing track to a live group, because with a live group I would be almost 
exclusively relying on, not relying but being part of, y'know the conversation with three other musicians 
say, on the stage and that's a constantly evolving dynamic and that would be constantly altering where 
you decide to go. 
KRP: Mmm. 
05: ...and that that probably requires a lot more conscious thought because you're actively hearing things 
and adjusting and thinking 'ok what was that, I want to do this with that, I want to shape this in this way 
or whatever y'know, there's there's a lot more happening... when it's a a backing track like that there's 
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more limited potential for that, but my my general approach to improvising is to see what happens and 
then react to it. Erm, it was that it felt a bit different here, and it was a bit more bit more like, y'know 
just chatting away monologuing, rather than that that dialogue, yes. 
KRP: Did you modify any ideas in your repertoire for this improvisation? 
05: Erm, yeah so, er so like like we talked about, say just first of all with the standard bebop language 
y'know, I'd say any individual aspect of it, y'know if you were to cut three notes out, y'know I've played 
them all somewhere before in pretty much exactly the same context but as a whole, those ideas, a lot of 
them that would have been the first time they came through as a whole. Erm, and the rhythmic 
placement, maybe different all that sort of thing, erm the one th the most obvious bit of that was just 
the bit where the the space was left and then the piano did the acciaccatura 'badum badum', er I'd never 
done that before and that came out as we've discussed y'know. 
KRP: Yeah.. 
05: 'Badoo, badoo, badoo, badoo' 
KRP: Erm... I think we've covered most of the others like how planned was your improvisation overall? 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: And to what extent were conscious processes involved, we've covered. Erm I think maybe just to 
sort of wrap up the shape of it erm, could you say something about what draws you to improvising?  
05:Mmm! 
KRP: Could you say more about why you do it? 
05: Yeah, erm er I can absolutely honestly say that improvising with a live band is the most exciting 
thing I do in my life and that's why I do it as a living. Y'know it's the best feeling anyone can have I 
think. Erm er yeah, there's...y'know without wanting to sound too potentially poncey about the whole 
thing, it's almost that feeling of y'know, the numinous and greater connection y'know, when you really 
lose yourself and you're... in the moment, with other people around you and you're creating something 
y'know you feel like you're plugged into a a bigger thing, it's amazing, yeah it's the best feeling. 
KRP: No, the ponceyer the better, I mean... 
05: [laughs] Without wanting to sound too poncey, here's something really poncey! 
KRP: [I] I'm interested by the term 'numinous', what what do you mean by that? 
05: Erm, well, pfffr... er you know when people have say, you know, religious revelatory moments? Or 
er y'know or erm, just deep meditation and you feel connected to the world as one small part of a... a 
whole? 
KRP: Yeah. 
05: That that feeling. 
KRP: Yeah. 
05: I...I get that in a small way if I'm in a a true... y'know i...it's one thing playing standards in a 
restaurant, that's not what I'm talking about, y'know but if I'm on a gig doing, say like a post-Coltrane 
thing, er or if I'm playing with one of my groups so I've written the music and it's a listening crowd that 
are really into it and the atmosphere's right, and you can allow yourself to just completely get lost, you 
stop feeling like you're... one pa... y'know the it's... 
KRP: The fundamental interconnectedness of all things? 
05: Well [laughs] well yeah, w-withinn the context of of the music y'know you're the the music is a 
whole, yo... and you feel part of the whole rather than 'I'm playing a saxophone' you feel like you're the 
band making the music... i-it just it becomes more than yourself, I think that's probably the way to put 
it. 
KRP: Right, yeah... d'you draw any kind of wider implication from that, I mean because there are 
different ways to conceptualise that I s'pose. Have you heard of the idea of flow states? 
05: No, run flow states by me please? 
KRP: They, well that would be a cognitive way of looking at that mental phenomenon of feeling really 
engaged in something such that the subjective experience of time is altered... 
05: Oh, yeah yeah... 
KRP: ...the feeling of almost being like the music is playing you rather... 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: ...than vice versa. 
05: Yeah. 
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KRP: That's been described in terms of flow states and the neural correlates of that have been looked 
into etc etc. 
05: Yeah. 
KRP: Well that whole way of looking at it is one way of conceptualising that idea, er the... there are 
others, there are more kind of, like I don't know for the want of a better word, metaphysical or spiritual 
or different ways of construing that, and the value of music, I don't know whether y'know you have any 
wider thoughts on that, or whether you are content with just the description of being one with th music? 
05: Erm, I mean wouldn't when you're talking about things like y'know erm... perceptions of time 
altering, that that's definitely... that happens, y'know the perception obviously er changes and 'cos I 
mean the the speed of thought and execution that happens when I'm improvising y'know in in a really 
intense setting say, is is is like far greater than I could probably achieve sitting doing any other sort of 
y'know, intellectual task erm but it's still very much in the moment y'know, erm so the yeah, I mean I'd 
I'd be fascinated to know more what is going on and that's happening, but I'm pretty sure in terms of 
what my my brain is achieving it's achieving far more [laughs] in those moments than it does i in that 
space of time doing anything else. 
KRP: And that feels very good? 
05: Oh yeah, yeah... high as a kite when I'm doing those sorts of gigs. Can't can't sleep for about four 
or five hours when I get back from a gig like that. Yeah. [laughs] 
KRP: Ok, well to wrap up, I would say erm is there anything else you would like to add about your solo 
or your experience of the process today? 
05: Erm, so when when you were talking about erm, y'know how how much your, y'know to what 
degree I heard things in my head as I was playing, I'd say pretty much all the time I've got a constant 
stream in my head of of what the music is and most of the time it's the same as what's coming out of 
the instrument. 
KRP: Uh hmm. 
05: But there are times when something else will come out, y'know erm and er as far as I would view it 
it's just because I haven't practiced those things enough yet for the link to be properly established that 
when, I'm hearing that over that sequence then actually this is what I'm supposed to be playing not that 
other thing that I had in my head. 
KRP: Erm... that's an interesting way round to put it erm because I think a lot of people would say the 
thing in their head is what is prior I suppose, or what needs to be expressed, so... 
05: Oh yeah yeah no, I'm trying to match what comes out obviously to what's in my head. 
KRP: Yes. 
05: Or or what's in my head is the thing I'm trying to achieve. 
KRP: Yes, but almost there, you hinted at the idea that that maybe it would go in the other direction I 
don't know. 
05: No, no no sorry, I I  if... 
KRP: Or are you thinking... 
05: ...that's what I said then I... 
KRP: No, it's an inference I'm drawing it's not what you said I think, it's it's... 
05: Hmm, ok. 
KRP: ...if you had to modify one of the things, what you're saying is you would modify what you 
actually articulate so that it matched... 
05: Yeah, yeah yeah. 
KRP: ...what's in your head? 
05: Well, th-there have also been times where something comes out that I didn't intend, that actually by 
happenstance I s'pose more than anything else, erm actually is quite interesting and can take you down 
another way, and then you... but then there's the whole thing because I didn't intend it, you need to think 
back and try and work out what what it was in the first place and then do the backwards work and then 
get it into your imagination, so I s'pose there is a [I] and and that's what practice is about isn't it? You're 
informing your imagination so that when you actually come to improvise, things that you're thinking in 
your head are more interesting. So obviously listening to lots of different styles of music, erm, things 
that are more harmonically... y'know if you go and listen to Stravinsky you'll play some really 
interesting jazz, y'know? Erm, 'cos you're just informing your imagination? Y'know, your aural auditory 
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imagination, y'know erm so it is definitely a two-way proess, as I see it, erm but when I'm actually 
improvising what I'm trying to do always is get out what's in in my head. Yeah a-and then because 
y'know, I'm not a perfect musician yet erm, [laughs] y'know that link is not always a hundred percent, 
and obviously I strive to get it better all the time. And but I think it probably it'll never match up entirely 
because y'know, the more you develop, the the greater your imagination for things will be and the harder 
it is to keep the link a hundred percent and I don't know, perhaps unless you have, perfect pitch or 
something like that I don't know. And then maybe those links are just solid, I'm not sure. 
KRP: But the interesting, it's... the the links to an extent are associations between motor patterns... 
05: Yes. 
KRP: ...and how they're gonna sound... 
05: Yes, yeahyeah. You're associating a sound with that... yeah. 
KRP: ...mmm...but supposing they're at the the level of description of mid-level units, that line up with 
say, the subjective present, which is 2-3 seconds, erm the issue then is, to what extent do you hear these 
things in advance... 'cos if you hear them too much in advance, surely you'd get lag? 
05: Yeah no, I I don't I don't erm... 
KRP: [I] 
05: ...so I think of them as instantaneous things. 
KRP: So it might be that you hear what you're doing? 
05: Yes but then, when they diverge, that's when it becomes obvious... 
KRP: Mmm. 
05: ...y'know so so when you were asking me about, y'know when am I thinking when I'm doing it, it's 
hard to say because the... it's just happening it's it's like speech, I'm not thinking beforehand, the words're 
just coming out of my mouth, the notes are just coming out of the instrument, where...when it does 
become obvious, like say when your tongue trips up, while you're trying to speak then that's when you 
become ara... aware of what you're saying, more so I think. So... 
KRP: [I] 
05: So when my thoughts diverge from what's coming out, then I go 'ah', y'know, I know that that's not 
what was here [indicates head] y'know. 
KRP: Yeah. Makes sense. 
05: If that makes sense? 
KRP: It does... does it's a good analogy, language I think. 
05: Yeah 'cos 'cos it's pretty much about the only [laughs] useful way to talk about it I think. 
KRP: Alright well thank you very much for doing this today... 
05: No, it's a pleasure, thank you very much, very enjoyable. 
KRP: and feel free to contact me via email... 
05: [laughs] 
KRP: ...if you have any questions. Goodbye! 
05: Pleasure... 
 
Participant 6 
 
KRP: Ok, so... have er re/ have you ever done any research before? 
06: No. 
KRP: Ok so first time... How was it then? How did it feel to improvise in this setting? 
06: Er I think it was a bit weird because like, obviously especially like... erm doing it to a backing track 
and not with like actual players was kind of like, that was a bit weird but erm... yeah it's not quite being 
like a performance it yeah kind of #was a bit# kind of off-putting in some respects 'cos it was like it 
wasn't just like a normal playing session kind of thing. 
KRP: #Yeah.# Mmm, and how how do you think that affected what you did, i-#in terms of#... 
06: #I think I# I tended to over-think things a little bit too much, #'cos it wasn't as easy to kind of get 
into it, I think I was kind of like started to panic about certain things just because... yeah 'cos it felt 
different, and er yeah. 
KRP: #Mmm#  And d'you think that was mainly the fact that it was a backing track and you could and 
there wasn't that #usual#... 
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06: #Yeah there wasn't# like the interaction and things and yeah 'cos I think if it had been like the same 
the same setting but with a band or something it would've been more comfortable and I could've just 
kind of got into it more like a performance... 
KRP: Yeah. 
06: ...but yeah. 
KRP: Oh, makes sense. Ok, well erm like I said, you can control the feed/ er the playback so you just 
usual controls, I'll set it going, and then if you or if either of us feel there's something interesting erm 
and we want to chat about that we can stop it and...it's probably easier or/ in terms of recording not to 
talk over the playback # 'cos# then when I've got to try and transcribe it, it's like... 
06: #Yeah.# Yeah. 
KRP: ...but y'know, so hopefully. [AP] 
06: [/AP] Think in that bit erm obviously with the still being the head going on already, I think I was 
just kind of trying to make sure I wasn't plaring over the head too much? And I was just being conscious 
of not like, just kind of making it too everything overlapping. 
KRP: So a bit more sparse than #you would#? 
06: #Yeah#, I wasn't just like going for it I was just kind of backing off a bit while that was still... 
KRP: Ok. [AP] 
06: [/AP] Think there's a couple of notes there [mimes playing saxaphone] and I could tell I was kinda 
I've played  it and was kinda like not sure of that that was like doesn't feel quite right and rather than 
kind of sticking to my guns and trying to come out I've kind of petered off a bit. It's a bit kind of kind 
#of# gave up on it a little bit. 
KRP: #So# So that that idea of conviction of sticking to your guns, what what would that have been 
like if if you'd played something and and felt you weren'r sure about how it felt, what would you do if 
you had stuck to your guns, would you say usually #,y'know in a playing...# 
06: I probably would have like either just stuck on that note and just kind of played it with conviction 
and just been like yeah that sounds a bit dodgy but I meant it... 
KRP: Yeah. 
06: ...erm, or like, tried to resolve it somehow so it sounded a bit but I think there like, I kind of attempted 
to resolve it but kind of went for another kind of naff note and just kind of was like ah ok never mind. 
Erm, I think if I if like, again with this kind of like backing track thing, if I'd been playing with other 
players I think, like I know like cer/ certain people I play with tend to like they notice somethink like 
that, they'll kind of play something to kind of be like to push me on and kind of make me not just kind 
of peter off and give up. 
KRP: Mmm.[AP] 
06: [/AP] [Laughs] I think that bit was definitely like I played some really dodgy notes and I was just 
like I was going to do some more chromatic things and kind of make it look like I did it on purpose! 
[laughs] 
KRP: Yeah, I noticed there's there's a pattern there, there was a like er, a figure? [#sings imitation of 
pattern#] 
06: Yeah. 
KRP: D/ is that something that you where where do you think that came from that [sings imitation of 
pattern] 
06: I think I've definitely like played it in a transcription or heard it somewhere, and then, erm whether 
it was in the context of the actual like descending chromatic thing or just a part of a phrasing, but yeah 
it was definitey kind of er, I've played some dodgy notes so I'm gonna make it look like that's what I 
intended kind of thing as a way to kind of get out of the dodgy phrase [I]. 
KRP: Yes [AP] 
06: [/AP] I think you can definitely tell, in terms of like the... like my relation with the instr/ [miming 
playing] like how I I can definitely tell that when I get down to the lower sections where it like where 
it's a bit less comfort comfortable and in terms of actually playing, I tend to end up kind of starting 
phrases and going low and then, because I'm not comfortable in that part of the instrument as much as 
I am in the middle, it's kind of like sometimes it just kind of dies off and not necessarily I think... #yeah# 
KRP: #So#, is that you're talking about the lower register? 
06: Yeah. 
KRP: And and what what are the technical factors that make that more difficult for you would you say? 
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06: You I think you need you there's a lot more support and like it's a lot it's a lot more difficult to make 
the notes sound or like sound nice at least. 
KRP: In terms of tone? 
06: Yeah, and like in terms of I dunno like a lot of the time if you try and do something that's quite kind 
of chilled like obviously like 'cos it's with jazz stuff it's easier in some respects because a lot of the time 
you can kind of do the whole subtone thing it's quite airy and can sound quite nice but somet/ like if 
you don't support that then it can sound a bit naff and there was a few moments there where I think I 
kind of was like I started doing going a bit lower and it sounded a bit bleugh, so it just kind of died out 
a little bit. [laughs] 
KRP: [AP] 
06: [/AP] I think there was a there was a little phrase that I kept I like I repeated a few times I think I 
think, I noticed this as well before that I was... like I felt like I was struggling like again with the backing 
track thing because obviously there's nothing really to go against so it was kind of like I was kind of 
having to kind of use myself as something to go against a little bit #some of the time# so I think that's 
like that th/ the repeat of the phrase thing I kind of tried  to do that, but I think it perhaps would've been 
would've felt stronger if someone else was there with me doin' it if you know what I mean, that's kind 
of like I think there's a little a little bit dodgily done! [laughs] Yeah, I think erm if there was someone 
else [mimes drumming] to kind of like be like 'yeah just repeat this, and we'll kind of go along with it' 
then it would have been... would've worked a bit better. 
KRP: #Yeah# So... in terms of the individual phrases there, you're sort of bouncing off what you've 
done before #in some ways, to an extent# so interacting with yourself because you're not getting 
anything that's responding to what you're doing from the #backing, is that right#? 
06: #Yeah# #Yeah# I think so yeah, I think like I might have done a similar kind of thing if I was 
playing with other people anyway, but I think kind of one of the things I was thinking in my head at 
that point was probably that like 'cos there wasn't much else going on that I kind of needed to have 
interaction with myself if that makes sense? 
KRP: Yeah, yeah. Erm, in terms of the timing of when you decided to play certain phrases if we just 
listen to that 'cos there are some patterns in there that seem to erm in terms of interval patterns they they 
seem to traverse harmonized, if you see what I mean, #it's like a#  a contour to them [mimes saw tooth 
with finger] and you might play them on a different start note #but with# a similar contour fitting to the 
key and where you are in the backing #is that#, or at least that's my impression, erm so when, just if we 
look back at that little section there when you come out of the low register, let's see if we can... [AP]. 
06: #Uh huh#. #Uh hmm.# #Yeah# 
KRP: Might be a bit earlier than that actually [rewinds playback]. [/AP] So there, you you had like that 
cascade #down# phrase, that motif [mimes downward motion] that you developed, do you think, look 
I mean, you might not be able to tell now, of course, 'cos it's in retrospect. But... [AP] at that point 
[points at playback], or the point before,  where where [/AP] do you think you knew that cascade 
might've #been coming#? 
06 #Yeah#. #I think it was just a kind of like in the moment kind of thing I think I #just# played the 
first one and kind of realised  that's something else I can do on different... #places#(?) 
KRP: #Mmm# #So it's like#... so in part it's like an associative chain, 'I've done that', #and that# makes 
the next thing occur to you which #makes the next thing#... 
06: #Yeah#. #Yeah, yeah#. 
KRP: An that, so i/ would you say that's a way of erm reacting to yourself as well? 
06: Yeah, I think so. 
KRP: [AP]  
06: [/AP] [laughs] I think at that point I was probably kind of like stuck for ideas, I went 'that's a thing 
I did before, I can do that again' kind of thing. 
KRP: Is is is it identical? I don't think #it's identical#. 
06: #I don't think#, but I think it's quite quite similar I think... 
KRP: Yeah. 
06: ... to something I'd already done, but I think it's obviously a case of like, I wasn't necessarily a 
hundred percent confident on the chords for the whole time, so I think it it was like kind of a 'oh I can 
do that and that works' kind of thing, like something to fall back on. 
KRP: How did you find the key, 'cos it's concert Eb isn't it? #For a blues sequence#? 
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06: It's, yeah, it's not too bad, I think... ah blueses aren't one of my... 
KRP: Things? 
06: ...favourite things to play over, yeah and [I] just quite often just not as confident on that as I would 
feel on other things I think. 
KRP: What what is it you find about the blues, is it the the sort of that you don't have something to work 
against that strongly er suggests things or is it a different...? 
06: I think it might be partly to do with like the fact that a lot of sort of practicing jazz like harmony 
and improvisation is based on like two five ones and stuff, and when there's not loads of them 
everywhere, it's kind of like not as obvious as what I can kind of lock into kind of thing? 
KRP: Mmm. 
06: I think I think it's just a term of... erm it's just a case of getting more used to playing somthing that's 
slightly different harmonically to what I'm constantly doing [I]  
KRP: [AP]  
06 [/AP] I think, at that point, 'cos I've started to like use a bit more space and stuff, I think I'd started 
to get a little bit more comfortable with what I was playin' so it wasn/ like I think, for a lot of it I was 
kind of still trying to work my way round like what my fingers were doing kind of stuff, and then when 
I... something kind of clicked and I was kinda like 'ok, I kind of know what I'm doing now', I kind of 
calmed down and then I was like 'ok I can actually think about more about in terms of phrasing and 
things and not just constantly playing and trying to work out where I was. [lots of miming playing 
during this section] 
KRP: Which ironically I think is where the head came back! 
06: Yeah! [laughs] 
KRP: [AP] [/AP] Thoughts on that last #time through# with the head again? 
06: #Erm#, I think there's a... [dysfluency] it was kind of li/ like you said like I'd just got comfortable 
with what I was playing then the head came back and it's something different and like I I still kind of 
hadn't got my head round it at the beginning so, I was again kind of a little bit uncomfortable and kind 
of playing perhaps a bit too much like more than I needed to just because I was kind of making up for 
if I'd done a dodgy note I wanted to make.... do one that was nice! 
KRP: And that's about kind of riso/ resolution #and# and making it er work? 
06: #Yeah#. 
KRP: Mmm. So, in terms of... I've got I've got some, like questions I ask everyone just to, er make it a 
bit standard, so where did the ideas come from, d'you think? 
06: Erm... 
KRP: Not necessarily just in this but #focusing on what we've looked at #. 
06: ... #I think# a lot of it is based, well [dysfluency] especially jazz improvisations a lot of it is based 
on things you've listened to and, even if it's not directly like learning like licks and just playing licks 
like, a lot of what you're playin' is things you've heard and has subconsciously gone in I think. 
KRP: Mm. You said you've done a lot of practice over things that are very two five one based... 
06: #Yeah#. 
KRP: .. #so# y/ y'know, a lot of the jazz standards have two five ones that modulate in different keys, 
so like All the Things You Are or something like that, six two five one four will modulate and then 
another erm two five one and then another like six two five one four, something like that, would you, 
er you say you you practice over those so what do you think would be the difference between something 
like that playing over something like that and playing over something like this, in terms of where the 
ideas would come from..# because# you you probably listen #to# various things, but is there a difference 
in in how you practice as well as what you listen to that makes a difference to where the ideas come 
from do you think? 
06: #Ah#. #Yeah#. I think, I...like, things like two five one kinda based stuff I think because a lot of it 
is things that I've transcribed and things like that erm, it's a a lot of it is I think things that I've picked 
up on while transcribing and learnt the things, whereas I think things like this that I've not necessarily 
erm done as much of that kind of thing on, er it's m/ I think the two like more two five one kinda stuff 
is like things that I've literally learnt by writing down and practicing like learning how to play it, whereas 
stuff like that is like, I've listened to that quite a lot so it's gone in in a different way, #if that makes 
sense#? 
KRP: #So when when# yeah, so when  you say you've transcribed erm is it particular people?  
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06: There was quite quite a few different people really, erm... 
KRP: And do you think... is it your intuition that, when you've transcibed these things and you've 
actually played them and learned them in that sense, would you say that well how would you say that 
that gives you ideas when you improvise? 
06: I think it's kind of gives you a basis of how to like link things together like say if say if you start 
playing a phrase and then you get to like a two five one at the end and like you've always kind of got s/ 
a sort of safety net to fall back on so it doesn't necessarily have to be like just a sh/ like a long  string of 
licks that you've learnt kinda thing, but it's just kind of like even if that's just a basis for what you end 
up playing, even if it's just a couple of notes that start it off, it's always just kind of like it's k/ it's like, I 
think of it like learning a language, like you you're learning like the like words or phrases erm but 
putting them together in your own way kinda thing? 
KRP: Yeah. Yeah that makes a lot of sense. Erm, what strategies if any did you use to generate ideas? 
06: Erm... I'm not sure, I think it part of it's just kind of hearing what I imagine other players would 
sound like in my head and kind of tying to, not replicate but kind of use that as inspiration kind of thing 
and... 
KRP: What elements of the of what you're playing do you think that relates to, does it relate to er, tone, 
timing, rhythm, phrases,  #note content#? 
06: #Probably# a little bit of everything #really#, just I think like there's different different players erm 
influence different things more than others. 
KRP: #Yeah#. Erm you... we've talked a little bit about the relative timing of when you made decisions 
erm compared to what you played, and you were saying in terms of er that cascade phrase it was very 
much in the moment sort of reacting to what you'd just done. Were there any times in which that was 
different, or or was it y'know o/ on a different level did you have a view of what you might do in the 
next chorus compared to what you'd done in this chorus, or was it very much... 
06: I think it was for this it was very much erm just kind of playing in the moment and sort of seeing 
what happened kind of thing but I think there were other ocasions where I'm playing and I'm specifically 
thinking like I might have played something on the first time round and than it gets to the second time 
round and I'd kind of started playing something on the first time which I kind of in my head, might have 
carried on, but then the second time actually like picked up on it again and went back and kind of 
elaborated on that a little bit. 
KRP: Yeah. Erm how planned was your improvisation overrall? 
06: Not at all really, just...[shakes head]  
KRP: To what extent were conscious processes involved? 
06: Erm, I think in terms of like harmony and what notes I was playing, that was l/ like the part I was 
actively thinking about logically, and then when it came to actually like, playing phrases and things, 
that was just kind of a th/ there wasn't kind of a a logical process to it, it was just a... 
KRP: So how would that interact then, because obviously y/ you're there you're listening to the backing, 
you know it's a blues, so there's a sense in which you probably have some expectations #about# the 
format, and after you've heard it once through, that's #reinforced# presumably? Do you think th/ that 
the conscious awareness of of say, well, tha/ I mean as... that's the question I guess, did you...d'you think 
you had a conscious awareness at the time you were playing, of what the chords were or what notes 
would fit over what? Or was it #less like that?# 
06: #Mm# #uh huh#. #Erm# Yeah I think I was I was aware aware of it and like I said, 'cos it's not 
necessarily the thing that I'm most erm most confident on I think as it went along and I got more 
comfortable with it I kind of thought about it less and did it more intuitively. Erm I think at the start I 
was very much trying to like think about it and work it out kind of thing erm but yeah I just kind of let 
it get more comfortable and then it bcame more natural. 
KRP: So that's what you were saying at the beginning wasn't it, that you thought you might have over-
thought it a bit #and# that that was due to the setting and the fact that it was a backing? 
06: #Yeah#, yeah. 
KRP: Erm so were the kinds of thoughts you were having to over-think it at the level of explicit note 
values, music theory, phrases or or was it...? 
06: I think a little bit yeah i/ it was like it was 'cos I was very much trying to kind of make sure I was 
comfortable in the key so I was kind of playing more notes than I needed to because it was kind of it's 
almost like note checking to a certain extent and making sure I kind of knew what notes worked and 
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then the more I kind of was aware of that the less I was playing because I could think more musically 
in terms of like logistically. 
KRP: And so your initial thoughts on note selection in terms of note checking, would that come from a 
scale or arpeggio pattern or w/ would it be kind of more, I don't #know#? 
06: #Erm# I think it's just kind of trying to play phrases that I thought would work 'cos [dysfluency] I 
was like trying to do that but trying to do it in a musical way so... erm but I  think it kind of m/ by the 
process of kind of having to do that kind of makes what you're playing slightly less musical because it's 
i/ it is just double checking things work kind of thing but then yeah the more you become comfortable 
in the key the more y/ you're comfortable playing musically rather than trying to work out what you're 
doing. 
KRP: Mmm. Erm, how much of what you played do you think you heard in your head?  
06: I think, I'd say... about fifty sixty percent probably? Or at least like I'd say like most phrases at least 
started with the notes I intended them to start with and then it might have been like I heard a beginning 
and then kind of then just kind of went and did something that finished the phrase but wasn't necessarily 
exactly what I'd planned or or heard in my head. 
KRP: And in ter/ getting back to the timing of hearing it in your head and playing, do you have any 
thoughts on that? 
06: Erm... 
KRP: ...to relative to the playing bit and then hearing what you've played where does the hearing in 
your head come in? 
06: Erm I I feel like it's very much dependent on how comfortable you are with that particular tune, so 
I think if it was something that I was I'd played loads and knew really well and kind of had knew it 
under my fingers really well then I'd erm I'd be a lot more th/ what I was hearing in my head would 
come out a lot more than things like this that I was less comfortable with. 
KRP: Did you erm find, or how much of what you played came from your idea bank? Er and how much 
represents material that you think you haven't played before? 
06: Erm... 
KRP: Do you know what I mean by an idea bank? 
06: I think so, yeah erm... I'm not sure, it's difficult to say 'cos I think there's a lot of things which I... I 
I think I play quite often that I don't necessarily realise I play a lot of the time and it's kind of like an 
automatic thing that, because it's something I've worked out which is comfortable but I've not 
necessarily actively sat and learned it and worked it out, it's just something that I've happened to play 
in a few solos and then something's just kind of like remembered it and I go back to it but so it's probably 
I don't know I reckon around thirty forty percent is probably stuff that I've actively kind of I'm aware 
of having as ideas and then the rest of it is kind of just built around that I think. 
KRP: It's probably why they... or why it's recommended to record yourself? [I] 
06: Yeah yeah I quite often find if I like if I've recorded myself and like I listen to a couple of different 
things it's like 'oh, I keep doing that' but I'm not aware of the fact that I keep repeating something.  
KRP: It's good good to kind of weed out those musical tics! 
06: Yeah. 
KRP: Erm, did you modify any of the ideas in your repertoire for this improvisation? 
06: Erm I think there was probably an there's there's a fair bit of things that I kind of unintentionally 
because it it was things that I hadn't necessarily thought about having learnt, sorry that makes no sense, 
the stuff I hadn't consciously learnt erm but was like these kind of ideas that I'd subconsciously taken 
on into my playing I think it a lot of it was/ wasn't necessarily like an exact phrase that I'd learnt it was 
kind of a sort of idea of a shape of a phrase or a a few notes that worked together, so it was never 
necessarily like this exact thing, it was kind of like a this is like ki/ a kind of idea and there's different 
ways of approaching it or playing it kinda thing. 
KRP: What d'you think would change if you did modify an idea? What would you modify about it 
generally do you think? 
06: I think it'd be things like erm rhythmically, like where it started and ended in the bar and things and 
how it resolved I think it would depend on I think it could change a l/ a lot more if I was like playing 
with other people in terms of how they were playing with me and reacting kinda thing I think that would 
kind of give me more ideas to bounce off. 
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KRP: D'you reckon that the ideas in your idea bank that are accessible are the same for every key or 
not? 
06: Definitely not I think I tend to learn like especially if like say I I've learnt a transciption of something 
and then there's one particular phrase I pick out and think ok I'm gonna try and learn that in every key, 
no matter how hard I try I always find that the key I found it in originally is always the one it's strongest 
in no matter what like how much I practice I'll sort of just because like it was taken from the specific 
like transcription it's always much more comfortable in that key. 
KRP: That's interesting isn't it? Mmm yeah 'cos yeah when when that happens, is there always 
something about the way that the phrase functions inthe key that it came from that you can identify in 
terms of manipulation of the instrument ot whatever that would explain it or is it just just a feeling thing 
'ah that's just where that's the key it belongs in'? 
06: I think sometimes it's to do with it's more comfortable there on the instrument kind of thing 'cos a 
lot of the time like say you might be learning a phrase and it goes up into altissimo and it's like that 
wouldn't be a comfortable thing for just like it's kind of like that's the kind of thing I'd have to more 
actively think about if I was playing it in the middle of the solo, erm i/ erm rather than it just be in the 
middle of the register erm but erm yeah I think I think part of it's just to do with if I've like learnt a 
transcription and there's a particular part in it it's because it's like it's kind of like that's where it originally 
l/ like that's kind of home for that little phrase and so I always kind of associate it with that so it's never 
quite as... 
KRP: And I guess it's possible if you'd done an analysis of your practice pattern that that's where the 
key you practiced it in the most #in total# because that's where it came #from# and you originally 
practiced it to get it #right# from the original #context#, then the transposition to other keys, you're 
gonna time slice that to every other key and you're not, it's unlikely you'd spend as much time on any 
other key than the #first# key, that's possible but... it's just a y'know 
06: #Yeah#, #yeah#, #yeah#,#yeah#. 
KRP: Erm, so just to say a bit more, what what do you think draws you to improvising, could you say 
more about why you do it? 
06: Erm I think it's just a very different way of sort of I I feel in a lot of ways it's a lot more expressive 
than written er well I think it very much depends on what it is for me personally like as a saxaphone 
player I the kind of sort of classical music I listen to is not the like standard class/ classical saxaphone 
repertoire because it's it's that's all very like modern things that are just not really the kind of thing I'm 
into so I think I kind of naturally gravitated to like things like jazz and pop, because in terms of my 
what I could play, it was they were kind of things that musically interested me the most, but I think I 
also just there's something quite erm I dunno it's quite liberating to be able to improvise and kind of just 
do what you want in your head rather than having something written down and you have to 'cos I think 
it like I do enjoy that in some er some contexts but I think I generally it just it feels more interesting to 
play something that's just in the moment, kind of make it up as you go along! 
KRP: Erm ok that's that's erm very interesting, very good er is there anything else you would like to 
add about your solo or or about your experience of the process today, is there anything? 
06: Er, I don't think so really I think yeah it's just [I] it's difficult to I don't think that's necessarily a 
hundred percent erm what would I would usually play like because of the fact that it was to the backing 
track rather people but yeah. 
KRP: Yeah, er a lot of participants have said that erm so it is y'know one of the limitations of this and 
with a budget... 
06: Mmm yeah [laughs]. 
KRP: ...we could have perhaps hired a band, and that so for future studies that might that's something 
that we might well take on board [I] so thank you very much for doing this today, really appreciate it 
and please feel free to contact me via any y'know mobile or or email or if you have any questions and 
any feedback about when it comes out, I'll send your way as well if you'd like. 
06: Yeah, #that'd be great#  
KRP: #Alright#. #Thank you#. 
06: #Thank you#. 
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